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Abstract 
 
At independence the emerging African elite was dominated by employees of the state. Many 
academics have since speculated that this over-reliance on public employment contributed to 
the continent’s poor economic performance, as resources extracted from society were captured 
by a rent-seeking public sector class. Because this elite was directly beholden to the state, it 
also lacked the independence needed to hold the political class to task. Was this diagnosis 
accurate and has the state’s role as a creator of the elite persisted? This dissertation explores 
how three East African governments –those of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda - have used their 
powers as the single largest employer in their respective countries to influence the structure of 
society. Using quantitative evidence, it traces how public employment and pay evolved 
between the 1960s and the present. It examines the effects of these changes on the economic 
standing of public sector employees and the educational, regional and ethnic backgrounds of 
the people who came to work for the state. This long-run perspective shows that the public 
services in all three countries have changed a great deal over the past half-century and suggests 
that public sector salaries have declined in importance for the region’s educational and income 
elites. It also reveals that public sector jobs have been more evenly distributed - on a regional, 
ethnic and gender basis - than is sometimes presumed. The thesis relates these findings to a 
rich political economy literature on public employment, social stratification and the 
development of the African postcolonial state. 
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given the abbreviation KE SA 1967. The IMF Recent Economic Developments publication for 
Uganda in 1987 has the abbreviation UG IMF RED 1987. The full citation is then given in a 
dedicated data source bibliography at the end of the thesis, organised by country, author, source 
and year. Where these same sources are cited directly in the chapters, these abbreviated codes 
are also used rather than giving full notes. 
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Chapter 1. 
The political economy of public employment 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
How did the role of the state change with the coming of independence in Africa in the 1960s? 
Three schools of thought, all coloured by the continent’s disappointing economic performance 
since independence, have left a strong mark on the study of Africa’s political economy.  In the 
1960s and 1970s dependency theorists challenged the optimistic narratives of Africa’s 
nationalist leaders, arguing that African independent states were doomed to become neo-
colonies, tethered to their colonial masters through continued dependence on foreign capital. 
In the 1980s the public choice school concluded that Africa’s woes stemmed from its 
disproportionately powerful urban lobby that steered state spending towards the urban sector 
and a misconceived industrial policy at the expense of an over-taxed peasantry. In the 1990s a 
literature on clientelism and patrimonialism traced the continuities across pre-colonial, colonial 
and postcolonial African governance structures. It highlighted how colonial governments 
empowered and manipulated ethnic leadership structures to govern the colonies, resulting in a 
toxic postcolonial ethnic politics exercised through patron-client relationships. 
In all three narratives public sector employees make frequent appearances. Dependency 
theorists saw public servants as the main winners at independence, forming a ‘bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie’ that prevented the emergence of a capitalist elite. Some also viewed the broader 
public sector wage earning class as a labour aristocracy and ‘guarantors of the neo-colonial 
solution.’1 The public choice school similarly viewed public sector employees as a 
disproportionately powerful interest group that earned high wages financed by excessive 
taxation of the rural sector. The patrimonial school (the label is used loosely here to refer to a 
broad literature on patronage and ethnicity), saw public sector jobs as one of the crucial 
patronage resources that leaders used to shore up the support of key individuals or 
constituencies. 
Similar arguments have been made about other parts of the world. Literature on class in Latin 
America and South Asia for instance, has also emphasised the disproportionate role of the state 
                                                   
1 John S. Saul, “The ‘labour Aristocracy’ thesis Reconsidered,” in The Development of an African 
Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action, ed. Richard Sandbrook and R. Cohen (London: 
Longman, 1975), 305. 
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in stratifying society, in comparison with the rise of a private sector-dominated bourgeoisie in 
Western Europe and North America during the 18th and 19th centuries.2 But these arguments 
have taken on a particular salience in the African context because of the extremely narrow 
indigenous capitalist elite at independence, the continent’s greater ethnic fragmentation, and 
its failure to grow at the same pace as other developing regions over the second half of the 20th 
century. 
This political economy literature, however, makes limited use of quantitative evidence about 
public employment in Africa to support such arguments. Perhaps because public sector 
employment is often treated as a puzzle piece in a larger political economy argument, it is rarely 
the object of study itself. Quantitative studies of public employment have primarily been 
produced by policy researchers, who use data on employment and wages to inform debates 
about the efficacies of particular policy reforms or governance capacity.3 Less has been said 
about the long-term dynamics of state employment and its historical significance.  
This thesis aims to bridge the policy and theoretical literatures, by bringing economic data and 
policy discourse to bear on questions about the evolution of the postcolonial state. It does this 
by examining how public employment levels, composition and remuneration changed over the 
course of the postcolonial era (c.1960 to the present) in Kenya, mainland Tanzania4 and 
Uganda, how these policy choices were justified, and how these developments accord with 
those in other regions of the world. It examines the consequences of these policies on the 
stratification of society and composition of elites. It relates this evidence about public sector 
employment to the theoretical arguments about the state-society relationship in postcolonial 
Africa.  
The main contribution of this thesis is its evidence base. It brings new quantitative evidence, 
analysed in novel ways and over a 50 year time horizon, to bear on theoretical debates. It 
focuses on the changes experienced over the course of the postcolonial period rather than 
assuming that colonial or precolonial legacies persisted and mechanically determine current 
                                                   
2 Rachel Heiman, Carla Freeman, and Mark Liechty, “Introduction: Charting an Anthropology of the 
Middle Classes,” in The Global Middle Classes: Theorising through Ethnography (Santa Fe: School for 
Advanced Research Press, 2012). 
3 See for instance: Derek Robinson, “Civil Service Remuneration in Africa,” International Labour 
Review 129, no. 371–286 (1990); David L Lindauer, Oey Astra Meesook, and Parita Suebseng, 
“Government Wage Policy in Africa: Some Findings and Policy Issues” (Washington D.C., 1988); Ian 
Leinert and Jithendra Modi, “A Decade of Civil Service Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa,” IMF Working 
Paper (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997). 
4 This dissertation focuses on mainland Tanzania. Unless otherwise specified, none of the analyses 
include Zanzibar. 
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economic outcomes. It thereby seeks to ‘decompress’ postcolonial African economic history.5 
In so doing it also demonstrates the breadth and availability of data sources from the 
postcolonial era, showing the extent to which economic historians can make greater headway 
in the comparatively understudied history of postcolonial Africa. 
This a large research topic and some qualifiers are in order. By focusing on public sector 
employment in depth, this thesis explores one specific channel through which governments 
influence society. It is not offering a full account of state development an state-society relations 
in Africa. It does not consider the many ways in which governments control, regulate and shape 
economic incentives in the private sector. Neither is it a study of state efficiency and provides 
no measures of how well public services are delivered. Rather it considers the wages paid by 
the state as a form of transfer and examines some of its economic and social effects. 
To briefly summarize the arguments in this thesis, it finds that East Africa’s public services 
share much in common with public services elsewhere in the world, challenging the idea of a 
uniquely African public employment-mediated political settlement. As in other parts of the 
world, the Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan public services grew in the post-war era and then 
contracted in the 1980s with the slowdown in economic growth. Public sector wages were 
restrained in the 1970s and 1980s in the interest of industrial development, which reduced the 
high earning differentials that had characterised the colonial service. With time the public 
sector share of the elite therefore declined.  
As in other regions, East Africa’s public services employs a disproportionate share of the highly 
educated workers in each respective country, resulting in a considerably higher average 
educational attainment than in the labour force at large. Among higher educated Kenyans, 
Tanzanians and Ugandans there is little sign of a public sector wealth premium today, although 
lower skilled public sector workers appear to be better off than private sector comparators (a 
common feature of public sector labour markets). As in Europe and North America, tertiary 
educated women are overrepresented in public employment. Moreover, because state services 
are designed to reach the entire population, public sector jobs tend to be spread more equitably 
on a geographic basis than private employment. Consequently, people in more remote and 
underdeveloped regions of their respective countries are overrepresented in the public sector, 
conditional on their educational attainment. 
                                                   
5 In reference to Gareth Austin’s suggestion that the use of regression analysis to examine the persistence 
of institutional legacies in Africa has resulted in a ‘compression of history’, see: Gareth Austin, “The 
`Reversal of Fortune’ Thesis and the Compression of History: Perspectives from African and 
Comparative Economic History,” Journal of International Development 1027, no. July (2008): 996–
1027. 
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These findings have implications for political economy theories of state development in Africa. 
Rather than a patronage-ridden or elitist institution, I argue that public sector employment 
served the nation building efforts of East Africa’s independence leaders. Unable to satisfy high 
popular expectations for improved living standards after independence, all three governments 
rationed opportunities to join the coveted formal labour force on the basis of educational 
performance, while simultaneously seeking to improve the regional equity in educational 
access. As educational attainment increased, governments chose to hold down wages and 
spread jobs more widely to the growing group of secondary and tertiary graduates who had 
come to expect a safe public sector career, rather than protecting a narrow group of insiders. In 
this way the Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan governments used public sector jobs to satisfy 
the aspirations of a broad cross section of the educational high achievers in society, while 
feeding the thirst for more educational opportunities by expanding educational supply.  
This strategy eventually collapsed under the strain of a declining budget. With the fiscal crises 
of the 1980s and early 1990s the state was forced into retreat, leaving a growing share of 
graduates to make their own way in the private sector and in the process weakening the state’s 
hold over, and responsibilities towards, the educational elite. Consequently, today’s public 
sector employees constitute a smaller share of the top income or wealth strata than they did in 
the 1960s and 1970s. With regard to public employment, the Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan 
examples show that state-society relations have indeed changed a great deal over the course of 
the past half-century. 
These arguments will be developed over the coming three chapters. Chapter 2 examines the 
growth and decline in public sector employment and how public sector wages performed and 
why. Chapter 3 investigates where public sector employees fell in the national income 
distribution and how their relative economic standing changed over time. Chapter 4 studies the 
resulting vertical and horizontal inequalities in public sector job access. Chapter 5 concludes. 
To set the scene this introductory chapter provides a justification for the case study choices and 
short history of the three countries highlighting their similarities and differences. It then 
provides a discussion of the colonial antecedent to the postcolonial public service, showing 
how late colonial policies influenced academic thinking about the future of Africa’s elites and 
the political and economic consequences of independence. This is followed by a review of how 
the academic literature has analysed and made sense of public sector employment over the 
course of the postcolonial era. The last section discusses the research contribution and 
methodology, including a description of the sources that will be used throughout the rest of the 
thesis to test the various theoretical predictions in the secondary literature. 
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1.2. COLONIAL LEGACIES AND POSTCOLONIAL PATHS 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are three neighbouring countries clustered around Lake Victoria 
in eastern Africa. While each has its own complex history, they are nonetheless illustrative of 
the African postcolonial experience, to the extent that such a generalisation can be made. Their 
political trajectories are typical of the continent, with rising authoritarianism and political 
discord following independence in the early 1960s. Their economies performed relatively well 
in the 1960s and 1970s, but all three suffered a severe downturn in the 1980s (or in the Ugandan 
case starting already in the early 1970s), characterised by falling terms of trade, high inflation 
and debt service difficulties. Their economies began to recover in the 1990s-2000s, and all 
three reintroduced multiparty elections in the same period. With populations of between 40-50 
million and a GDP per capita ranging between US$700-1,400 (2015),6 they are relatively large, 
low- or lower-middle income countries without considerable resource wealth and 
predominantly agrarian populations. They score slightly above the continental average on the 
quality of governance while their GDP per capita is somewhat below average.7 
While they share some economic and political characteristics, there are also important 
differences between the countries. This variation provides an opportunity to explore the relative 
effect of different conditions on public service outcomes. Of particular relevance is the varying 
degree of ethnic polarization across the three countries, the different ideological leanings of 
their founding fathers and the educational policies they pursued, and differences in the severity 
of the economic and political crises in the 1970s-1990s. Before discussing their histories of 
public sector employment therefore, the following section provides a brief political history of 
the sub-region, highlighting some of the legacies that are thought to have influenced 
postcolonial public employment policy. 
Colonial legacies 
The modern-day political configurations of the sub-region date back to the 1885 Berlin 
conference, which established a British sphere of influence in today’s Kenya and Uganda, and 
German influence over what was to become the Tanzanian mainland. After the German defeat 
in the First World War, part of German East Africa came under British Administration as a 
Mandate of the League of Nations (becoming a UN trust territory after WWII), and was 
renamed Tanganyika. The islands of Zanzibar, off the Tanganyikan coast, became a British 
protectorate in 1890 and merged with Tanganyika in 1964 to form the United Republic of 
                                                   
6 WB WDI 2017 (comparing GDP in current US$) 
7 WB WDI 2017 (using the country policy and institutional assessment scores to measure governance) 
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Tanzania. From the 1920 until the late 1970s, various iterations of an East African regional 
organisation provided some joint administrative functions for the region as a whole. 
Colonial conquest expanded cash crop production in the region, which came to account for the 
bulk of exports. Coffee, sisal, tea, cotton and pyrethrum dominated production across the 
colonies, in addition to food crops, livestock and on a smaller scale mining of copper in Uganda 
and diamonds and gold in Tanganyika.8 In Kenya a nascent industrial sector began to develop 
in the colonial era while manufacturing was limited in Uganda and Tanganyika.9  
The nature of this economic production, and its effects on the people of the region, differed in 
important respects across the colonies. Following the construction of the Uganda railway 
(started in 1896), which traverses today’s Kenya, the British opened up the Kenyan highlands 
to European settlement. The colonists laid claim to the most productive lands, pushing Africans 
onto the reserves at its fringes where they served as a labour pool for European-owned farms.10 
A further consequence of the building of the railway was the arrival of over 30,000 Indian 
construction workers in East Africa. Many settled permanently in the region and others joined 
them over time, forming a numerically small but economically important strata across East 
Africa that came to dominate the region’s trade and commerce.  
European settlement also resulted in an uneven process of integration of Africans into the 
Kenyan colonial economy and rising intra-ethnic inequality, predominantly affecting those 
groups living in what became the white highlands. Tension over land blossomed into the Mau 
Mau uprising in the 1950s, a grassroots movement that drew its support from poorer members 
of the Kikuyu ethnic group and targeted settlers and wealthier Kikuyus seen to be collaborating 
with the colonial state.11 In response the government introduced a state of emergency from 
1952 to 1956. Over a million people were placed in detention camps or guarded villages, and 
a costly military operation was launched against the Mau Mau.12 The Emergency coloured the 
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decolonisation process and nature of economic reforms in this period, which were designed in 
part to contain further violence by empowering a group of conservative middle class Kikuyus.13 
Uganda in contrast was never opened up to European settlement and Uganda’s cash crop 
production remained in African hands. However, the nature of British alliances with the 
colonies different kingdoms had long-lasting consequences, in particular the unusual status of 
colony’s most populous Kingdom, Buganda.14 Buganda was one of the strongest and most 
centralized kingdoms in eastern Africa in the 18th and 19th centuries, with a well-organised 
tax collecting state. The British established a protectorate in Buganda in 1894 and in 1900 
signed a further agreement with a representative of Buganda’s king, granting the Kingdom 
considerable rights, including freehold land tenure for the Ganda elite. Neighbouring kingdoms 
were gradually incorporated into the Uganda protectorate, but with less autonomy than 
Buganda. The Protectorate initially grew to the east and west, incorporating other centralised 
kingdoms, while the northern, semi-arid region, home to communities without centralised state 
structures, was incorporated after. This led to an unequal economic geography, with greater 
wealth in the Baganda-dominated south. As in Kenya, an Asian community occupied a 
politically awkward (and widely resented) position as traders and industrialists, and colonial 
policy reserved Asians the sole right to engage in the cotton ginning industry.15 
German East Africa also became a settler colony in the early 20th century, with European 
settlement concentrated in the northeast. With regards to agricultural policy the Germans 
treaded a path somewhere between that of Kenya and Uganda, allowing white settlement but 
encouraging African cash crop production alongside it.16 While the level of economic 
development varied across Tanganyika’s regions, it did not accord neatly with pre-existing 
ethnic divisions, owing in part to the country’s extreme ethnic fragmentation.17 This also meant 
that there were no larger ethnic groups able to build independent ethnically-based political 
movements. Ethnic tensions are thus thought to have had less salience in the run up to 
independence, as political movements had to rely on broad, cross-ethnic support.  
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Independence 
The three countries gained independence in rapid succession: Tanganyika in 1961, Uganda in 
1962 and Kenya in 1963. The independence leaders of all three countries were quick to reform 
the governance structures adopted at independence. All three adopted new constitutions, 
turning their countries into republics, centralising power in the office of the President and 
reducing the power of local governments or disbanding them entirely. By the 1970s they were 
de-facto or official one-party states. A regional organisation, the East African Common 
Services Organisation and its successor organisation, the East African Community (EAC), 
provided a common market, common customs tariff and some joint public services across the 
sub-region in the first decade of independence, but this organisation was dissolved in 1977 as 
Uganda slid into autocracy and relations between the three countries deteriorated. 
In Kenya and Uganda these political developments were coloured by ethnic tensions. Kenya’s 
two main parties at independence, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya 
National Democratic Union (KADU), drew their support from different ethnic communities. 
KANU developed out of distinctly Kikuyu political organisations, and gained its main support 
from the most economically and educationally advantaged groups in central Kenya, the 
Kikuyu, Meru and Embu. KADU’s support base lay with the Kalenjin and other smaller groups, 
including those of the coastal regions. KANU, led by Jomo Kenyatta, won the independence 
election. In 1964 Kenyatta brokered a merger with the opposition, bringing KADU’s most 
prominent members into senior roles within KANU, and making Kenya an effective one-party 
state.  KADU’s leader, Daniel Arap Moi, (of Kalenjin ethnicity) assumed the Vice Presidency 
of a new and united (if uneasy) KANU. Upon Kenyatta’s death in 1978 Moi assumed the 
presidency in spite of various efforts to ensure the continued rule by Kenyatta’s inner Kikuyu 
clique.18 Moi’s ascendance has been interpreted by many as a shift in power from a Kikuyu 
centre of gravity to a Kalenjin one.19 
Uganda’s party landscape was shaped by the Buganda question. Tension arose almost 
immediately within the uneasy ruling coalition, which included the Uganda People’s Congress 
(UPC), led by the northerner Milton Obote, and the conservative Baganda Kabaka Yekka party, 
led by the Baganda kabaka (king), Mutesa II. At independence Milton Obote became Prime 
Minister while the Kabaka held the ceremonial role of President. Following the 1966 Buganda 
crisis, however, when Buganda’s parliament tried to expel the Ugandan government from 
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Bugandan territory, Obote forced the Kabaka into exile. He issued a new constitution in 1967 
that made Uganda a republic and abolished the kingdoms in favour of a centralised structure 
of governance. 
In Tanganyika in contrast, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) led by Julius 
Nyerere, commanded a broader following and faced no serious political contenders in the 
independence elections. While the country had a less fractured party landscape, Nyerere faced 
opposition from within the party, primarily to his economic policies.20 As in the neighbouring 
countries he therefore sought to centralise power, instituting a new republican constitution in 
1962 and making Tanganyika an official one-party state in 1963, with continued Parliamentary 
elections between pre-approved Party candidates.  
Although all three countries registered disappointing rates of growth over the postcolonial era, 
economic policy and performance across the region differed in important respects. Kenya and 
Tanzania are often contrasted to highlight the differences between Kenya’s pro-capitalist route 
after independence and Tanzania’s African socialism,21 although this binary should not be 
overstated. Both countries nationalized large sections of industry after independence, created 
development banks and repressed wages in the interest of industrial development, although the 
Tanzanian reforms were further reaching. In addition to nationalizing most of the Tanzania’s 
nascent industry and restricting private capital ownership, in the 1970s the government’s 
villagization reforms shifted a large proportion of the population into collectivized ujamaa 
villages. These policies are broadly regarded as failures, and the forced collectivization resulted 
in a decline in agricultural production.22 In Kenya in contrast, the government encouraged the 
development of a domestic capitalist class and through its indigenisation policies it increased 
African participation on company boards and as private business owners in the commercial 
sector.23 A large land reform programme, started in the late colonial era, transferred land from 
the former white highlands back into African hands and empowered a group of comparatively 
well-off large and medium-sized landowners.24 
Tanzania’s economic performance lagged that of Kenya throughout most of the 1970s and 
1980s. The economy contracted severely in the 1980s, compounded by droughts and a 
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protracted fiscal crisis.25 Kenya’s economy held up better than most of its neighbours through 
the 1970s and 1980s, although it too faced serious fiscal imbalances and debt crises by the 
1980s. In the 1990s Tanzania abandoned its socialist policies and liberalized many aspects of 
the economy and experienced strong economic growth over the 1990s and early 2000s. Kenya’s 
economy in contrast stagnated in the 1990s with a recovery first in the 2000s. 
Uganda in contrast, saw its economy plummet and state institutions virtually disintegrate 
following the 1971 coup which brought Idi Amin, Obote’s former army commander, to power. 
Amin’s rule from 1971-79 was characterised by extreme brutality and loss of life. In 1972 he 
expelled Uganda’s Asian population and confiscated their businesses, which weakened the 
Ugandan economy severely. With Tanzanian intervention, Amin was overthrown in 1979 and 
Milton Obote returned to rule the country. This ushered in a second period of political 
instability and civil conflict, which continued to exact its toll on the fractured Ugandan 
economy. In 1986 the National Resistance Army seized power, bringing Yoweri Museveni to 
the presidency (of southern origin, from the Banyankole ethnic group). Since then Uganda has 
experienced a strong economic recovery. Museveni’s rise brought peace to the southern part of 
the country, while lingering conflicts, primarily in the east and the north, only drew to a close 
in the 2000s. 
Starting in the 1990s, many of the political reforms of the 1960s and 1970s were reversed and 
all three countries began to democratize. In 1992 Kenya held its first multiparty presidential 
election since independence, although the country only saw a regime shift in the 2002 election. 
Kenya’s successive elections since 1992 have had a strong ethnic character, with party 
affiliations broadly following ethnic lines. The 2007 election results were contested by the 
opposition and resulted in the outbreak of ethnic violence. Tanzania held a multiparty general 
election in 1995, although the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has so far remained 
in power. Uganda held its first multiparty election in 2006, although Museveni’s National 
Resistance Movement (NRM) has remained in power to date. All three countries have also 
reversed the centralisation policies of the 1960s and decentralised some administrative powers 
to local governments. In 1999 the East African Community was re-established and regional 
integration has deepened since. 
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Country differences and similarities 
These three countries offer some important variation in both institutional legacies and 
postcolonial political trajectories. In relation to public employment policies, four factors are 
particularly salient. 
Ethnicity. Although all three countries are multi-ethnic, the greater ethnic fragmentation in 
Tanzania may in fact have served it well, as its political parties did not arise out of ethnic 
movements and Julius Nyerere proved an able nation-builder.26 In Kenya and Uganda in 
contrast, the colonial penetration had an asymmetrical impact on different ethnic groups, which 
heightened postcolonial ethnic cleavages. Ethnic polarization is expected to influence public 
employment policies by intensifying competition for state jobs and incentivizing politicians to 
rule through the distribution of ethnic patronage rather than programmatic policymaking (as 
will be discussed in further detail in Section 1.4). 
Conflict. Kenya and Tanzania experienced relatively limited armed civil conflict in contrast to 
Uganda, which experienced a protracted civil war. Some have suggested that wars in Africa 
are a consequence of inequalities in access to state resources, including public sector jobs, while 
leaders who successfully avert conflict do so either through military deterrence or by 
redistributing state resources so that groups excluded from power are co-opted.27 
Economic policy and conditions. Although all three countries experienced financial 
difficulties in the 1970s and 1980s, economic conditions varied considerably across the sub-
region, with a stronger economic performance and a more developed industrial sector in Kenya. 
Uganda experienced by far the most serious economic decline with a virtual state collapse 
towards the end of Idi Amin’s rule, while Tanzania trod a path somewhere between the two. 
The relationship between fiscal crisis and public employment growth is ambiguous. While 
some link fiscal imbalances to excessive employment,28 poor public finances may also limit 
employment and wage growth. 
Education. Kenya’s education sector developed faster than in the neighbouring countries and 
consumed an unusually large share of budgetary resources. In contrast to Kenya, Tanzania 
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initially restricted its secondary education system to the projected manpower needs of the 
country, leading to an unusually low secondary attainment rate today. Uganda’s educational 
development fell somewhere between the two. To the extent that education mediated access to 
public employment, a faster pace of educational expansion may affect the intensity of 
competition for state jobs. 
In emphasising difference however, it is important not to lose track of the similarities. All three 
countries are examples of poor, economically undiversified, young and ethnically fragmented 
nations. All three are former British colonies, none are oil producers and only Tanzania is 
currently classified as resource rich.29 These commonalities may well prove the more crucial 
determinants of postcolonial state development and public employment policies. Part of the 
rationale for a case study approach is to gather evidence on trends and changes in a small 
sample of cases and to develop hypotheses that can be tested more systematically in the future, 
using a larger and more diverse set of countries. 
1.3. THE COLONIAL STATE AND THE ORIGINS OF AFRICA’S PUBLIC 
EMPLOYMENT PREDICAMENTS 
The colonial state 
African colonial states have been described as a ‘gatekeeper states’30 and ‘administration on 
the cheap,’31 on account of their skeletal structures and limited developmental ambitions. 
Certainly in comparison to other parts of the British Empire, the British East African colonial 
states were slim, with low revenue per capita and limited public expenditure beyond basic state 
administration and security.32 The vast differentials between the incomes of colonial civil 
servants remunerated according to wage conditions in Britain, and the taxable income of the 
African peasantry, led to very high personnel costs, which in the 1920s consumed almost 60% 
of the budget in a sample of British colonies.33 Within British East Africa revenue and 
expenditure was highest in Kenya, the most economically developed of the three colonies, 
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followed by Uganda and lastly Tanganyika.34 African states were also small in personnel terms, 
even if pay absorbed a relatively large share of public spending. The public sector labour force 
was largest in Kenya (at roughly 2% of the population c.1950), followed by Uganda (1.5%) 
and Tanganyika (1%).35 
Their public services mirrored the racial inequalities in colonial societies at large, with senior 
and mid-level positions held by Europeans and Asians, while African employees 
predominantly staffed the low-skilled occupations. By the 1950s the public sector labour force 
consisted of a civil service proper (the established services) constituting roughly 40% of total 
public employment.36 It was subdivided into the senior unified service (staffed almost 
exclusively by Europeans), other semi-professional positions, and the clerical and artisanal 
grades, staffed by Asians (predominantly in the higher clerical posts) and Africans. Below the 
civil service was the larger subordinate service comprised of unskilled African workers on 
monthly contracts and casual wage labourers on daily rates.  
Starting in the 1920s separate service structures and salary scales were established for the 
different racial groups. Kenya introduced non-European terms of service in 1920, dedicated 
salary scales for Asian staff in 1923, and a separate African clerical service in 1927.37 Up until 
the 1930s the colonial government recruited some of its staff directly from India, thus 
necessitating a salary scale set to Indian labour market conditions. The Tanganyikan and 
Ugandan governments similarly had racially-segmented public service structures.  
For much of the colonial era the working conditions for the thousands of low-skilled African 
engaged in the colonial wage labour market were far from favourable. Labour scarcity was a 
recurring colonial concern. Policies in the early colonial era focused on the inducements 
necessarily to push ‘lazy’ and ‘reluctant’ Africans into the colonial labour market, through 
forced labour obligations, taxation policies, or dispossession from arable land.38 African 
workers were presumed to be target workers, seeking wage employment only to meet specific 
cash needs (such as tax payments or marriage). This was used to justify coercion, as it was 
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argued that raising wages would simply enable workers to meet their targets more quickly and 
reduce their labour market participation further. A recent study on household incomes in 
colonial Uganda found that average peasant households earned more than an unskilled wage 
labourer up until the 1950s,39 while studies from Kenya have argued that coerced labour was 
critical to the profitability of European-owned farms.40 Governments also encouraged the use 
of migrant labour and prevented Africans from settling permanently in the urban areas. This 
limited the ability of workers to organise politically and kept them and their dependents linked 
to their rural farms and communities.41 
In contrast to unskilled labourers, however, some strata of colonial African society clearly 
benefitted from their association with the colonial state. The colonials governed through 
alliances with chiefs and headmen (sometimes appointed by colonial officials), who received 
income and other benefits from the government.42 Over time the share of Africans in semi-
skilled and skilled public service ranks also grew, as a growing number of mission-educated 
Africans gained employment as clerks, translators and teachers and in skilled manual 
positions.43 Yet the colonial state had an ambivalent relationship to these skilled and semi-
skilled cadres, who already by the 1920s earned well above average farm incomes and occupied 
an awkward position within the racial hierarchy.44 The British were reluctant to grant this 
nascent elite too much authority. They limited educational opportunities for Africans beyond 
primary schooling for fear that the rise of an educated elite would resist colonial rule, pointing 
to the need to avoid the Indian predicament of an educated and vocal indigenous elite.45  
That said, educational policies differed somewhat across the region, with more educational 
opportunities for Africans in the non-settler colony, Uganda. In Kenya, as late as 1946, there 
were only 35 African students passing the annual Form IV Cambridge School Certificate 
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exams.46 At the time of independence Tanganyika had only 120 university graduates in total.47 
The first university in the region, Makerere University in Uganda, first began offering 
certificate courses in 1937 and because a university college in 1949, while the first universities 
on Kenyan and Tanzanian soil were established in 1961.48 
The decolonisation era and changing nature of public sector employment 
Colonial rule changed considerably in form and function in its twilight years as the colonial 
powers grew more responsive to economic and social conditions in the colonies over the course 
of the 1940s and 1950s. These changes were driven by fortuitous economic conditions, 
changing global ideas about the role of the state, and growing opposition to colonial rule. 
Higher domestic revenues owing to the commodity price boom during the Korean War coupled 
with increased transfers from the metropoles, allowed a considerable expansion in the size and 
reach of the late colonial state. Some academics have defined this phase as a ‘second colonial 
invasion’ on account of the growth in the size of the colonial service in areas such as education, 
health and agriculture.49  
Furthermore, in the aftermath of WWII, governments across the world embraced an ideology 
of state-led development.50 The failure of capitalism during the 1930s had generated scepticism 
towards the benefits of unfettered markets.51 Across both East and West, electorates were more 
favourable to state activism than previously, including in the colonies. Governments involved 
themselves directly in the productive sectors and provision of social services, with the aim of 
mitigating the economic and political crises of the first half of the century. 
But perhaps most critically, after the end of the Second World War the racial order on which 
colonialism was predicated came under fire, both within the colonies and on the international 
stage. In response to labour strikes and uprisings across their empires (including strikes in 
Uganda in 1945, Mombasa in 1947, Dar es Salaam in 1948 and Nairobi in 1950), coupled with 
international condemnations of imperialism, both the British and French governments 
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embraced the language of development to justify their empires.52 Colonial policy papers came 
to espouse a modernization framework, labelling the colonies as backward or traditional, and 
framing the role of the colonial state as shepherding its subjects towards modernity by bringing 
about the social and economic progress necessary to make Africans ‘fit for self-government’.53 
These changes were underpinned by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, and 
its French equivalent FIDES (Investment fund for the economic and social development of 
overseas territories), which sanctioned transfers from the metropolitan budgets to the colonies 
for developmental purposes. 
Integral to this policy shift was a changed perspective on African labour. Despite efforts to 
keep African wage workers tethered to their rural communities, by the 1940s colonial 
governments were forced to recognize the growing presence of an increasingly assertive and 
militant African urban-based working class, much of which worked for the government or its 
parastatals. To temper worker militancy, colonial governments began to promote labour 
stabilization policies designed to enable a permanent African worker presence in the cities. 
Governments introduced minimum wages in urban areas set to levels that would allow African 
workers to support an urban-based family. They also began to encourage ‘responsible’ trade 
unionism, and supported the establishment of formal worker unions.54  
A famous testament to this shift in policy is the Kenyan report of the committee on African 
wages from 1954. 55 Produced at the height of the Emergency in Kenya, this report 
recommended the introduction of a family wage which would effectively triple the minimum 
wage in urban areas.56 The committee argued that low labour productivity was a result of low 
wages and a reliance on a migrancy system. It called for a dual labour market, with a relatively 
small, highly paid and permanent urban labour force divorced from the ‘traditional’ sector. The 
commission argued that ‘[w]e cannot hope to produce an effective African labour force until 
we have first removed the African from the enervating and retarding influences of his economic 
and cultural background.’57 This dual labour market was intrinsic to the vision of how Africa 
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was to develop: individuals would gradually enter the wage labour market, adopt a modern 
way of life and shed their traditional identities and practices, thereby driving social progress.58  
At the forefront of this transformation was the growing group of the mission school educated 
Africans holding salaried positions in the bureaucracy or private firms as teachers, clerks and 
other mid-level roles. They too, saw employment conditions improving in the 1950s, and 
colonial governments hoped to find in them the role models and leaders who would promote 
modernity.59 As calls for decolonisation escalated, governments sought to promote more 
members of this narrow, skilled African labour force into senior positions in the colonial 
service. A British Colonial Office noted already in 1946 that ‘the road to self-government’ 
required that the colonial service ‘to the greatest possible extent be staffed by local people’.60 
Educational investments in post-primary education were cautiously increased, with the explicit 
aim of producing the skilled manpower required to staff public institutions.61 In the early 1960s 
the British East African governments introduced affirmative action policies, which gave 
preference to Africans over Europeans in the public sector.62 From a negligible share in the 
immediate postwar era, by the time of independence, Africans filled between a quarter and a 
third of middle and high level public service positions in Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda.63  
The employment terms and conditions for this growing group of educated African mid-level 
public sector employees were a politically sensitive issue, as colonial governments faced the 
challenge of reforming a public service structure with an inbuilt racial hierarchy. This raised 
the thorny question of how to remunerate African and Asian appointed to positions previously 
held by Europeans. In 1947 an East African commission on the restructuring of the civil service 
argued for a cautious, gradual approach to Africanization. The commission concluded that East 
Africa was not ready for the unification of the racially-based pay scales and recommended that 
Africans and Asians in higher grades should be paid three-fifths of the European salary. It 
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argued that ’it would be wrong for any Government, in pursuit of this or that ideology, to 
disrupt the economy of its territory by paying salaries to Africans, or, for that matter, to Asians 
or Europeans, four or five times as high as those paid for similar work in outside 
employment.’64 It concluded that ’[t]he disadvantages of so remunerating any class of Africans 
as to create a Mandarin caste, divorced in income and interests from their fellows, would not 
be confined to the economic field.’65 
Such blatant racial discrimination was less acceptable by the 1950s. Only six years later a new 
civil services commission recommended the immediate removal of racially demarcated pay 
scales and the controversial three-fifths rule and encouraged greater local recruitment of staff 
and a reduced reliance on expatriates.66 But the report also sounded the warning that ‘[p]ublic 
servants should not become a privileged class’, and soberly noted the dangers of using the 
British colonial pay scale as the reference scale.67  
This rapid reversal of position is testament the rapidly accelerating pace of decolonization in 
the 1950s and the tensions inherent in this process. The racially based dualism of the colonial 
wage structure was politically untenable, yet due to underinvestment in the education system, 
senior salaries had to be set at a level that would attract local skilled manpower as well as 
expatriate personnel. At the local level moreover, commissioners reflected on the difficulty of 
setting wage rates, expressing exasperation over the dearth of private sector employment 
alternatives with which to determine what a fair, market-determined wage should be.68  
While the number of Africans in the higher levels of the public service expanded and their 
salaries increased, opportunities for Africans to enter and compete with foreign entrepreneurs 
or employees in the business and firm sector remained constrained for longer. Colonial rule 
had in many respects prevented the emergence of an African business elite able to compete 
directly with foreign business interests or with the local Asian business communities. Albeit 
more so in Kenya than in Uganda or Tanganyika, restrictions had limited the rights of Africans 
to engage in certain industries or crop production, settle permanently in cities, and determine a 
taxation structure favourable to their business activities.69 Genuine African capitalists, with 
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capital, business networks and know-how, were in short supply. Transferring wealth, networks 
and entrepreneurial skills proved harder and slower than training and deploying young 
graduates into senior public sector posts. 
Consequently, the first beneficiaries of decolonization were those with the educational or skills 
qualifications required by the state apparatus. These public sector employees came to constitute 
a large proportion of the well-to-do ranks of postcolonial society. An estimated three-quarters 
of all tertiary educated Kenyans, Ugandans and Tanzanians were employed directly or 
indirectly by the state in the 1960s.70 In 1963, 75-80% of African wage earners in the highest 
income bracket (above Shs.1,000/month) were public sector employees.71 Moreover, by the 
late 1950s unskilled wage employees, a large share of whom worked for the government or 
parastatal sector, earned well above rural peasant farmers.72 Governmental pay and 
employment policies therefore shaped the postcolonial distribution of income and the 
composition of the nascent middle and upper classes. This point did not go unnoticed by 
contemporary observers. Peter Lloyd argued in 1966 that one of the distinguishing features of 
newly independent African countries was that ‘[t]he overwhelming majority of the elite (…) 
are in bureaucratic employment,’73 while Rene Dumont’s 1966 study characterised Africa’s 
elite as a ‘bourgeoisie of the civil service.’74 
The predominance of public sector employees within the new, postcolonial national elite has 
led to a range of theories about its consequences for the continent’s growth and development. 
What did this mean for the development of the postcolonial state and its relationship with 
society? Is it to blame for the region’s disappointing economic performance after 
independence? The next section explores the secondary literature on postcolonial Africa’s 
public sector employees and the development of the African state. 
1.4. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN POSTCOLONIAL AFRICA 
The African state and global development paradigms 
The literature on the African state and its employees is itself a product of its time and place, 
shaped by changing global attitudes to the role of the state, shaped in turn by economic 
conjunctures. The African postwar growth trajectory is commonly divided into three main 
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phases: the developmental era of strong growth from the end of the Second World War until 
the mid/late-1970s; the growth reversal of the 1980s and early 1990s; and the period of 
economic recovery since the mid/late-1990s until the present (Figure 1.1). While these 
inflection points correspond to shifts in global conditions (with the 1970s marking the end of 
the three decades of strong postwar growth in the global north), the African continent saw a 
more pronounced decline in the 1980s and protracted recovery. The Kenyan, Tanzania and 
Ugandan growth trajectories broadly follow the African trend, although Uganda saw an earlier 
and more dramatic income decline, while Kenya’s growth decline was less severe than that of 
the continent in aggregate. 
Figure 1.1. Sub-Saharan Africa: GDP per capita, 1960-2015 
 
Sources: Sub-Saharan Africa and Kenya: WDI 2017; Tanzania and Uganda: PENN WT 9.0. 
African development discourse roughly accords with these three phases. The period from 
WWII until the 1970s has been characterised as the developmental or modernization era.75 In 
this phase the state was expected to lead its country’s economic development by appropriating 
or directing the economic surplus towards industrial development and social welfare, thereby 
overcoming the market failures that had ravaged the world in the interwar period. This ideology 
was shared by the postwar colonial governments and the nationalists alike and rested on the 
theories of scholars such as Alexander Gerschenkron who envisaged a particularly large role 
for the state in late developing countries.76 In the absence of sufficient private accumulation, 
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governments would mobilize the necessary capital for industrial development and enable their 
lagging countries to catch up. Development was viewed as broadly synonymous with 
industrialisation and structural transformation, a process involving the transfer of surpluses 
from the traditional, rural sector into a higher productivity modern, industrial sector.77 Through 
import substitution, exchange rate management and capital controls, states sought to use 
pricing to tilt the incentives in favour of domestic industrial production. These developmental 
policies were pursued against the backdrop of the cold war, which spurred a funding race 
between East and West and raised the flow of aid and concessional financing to developing 
countries. 
Towards the end of the 1960s dependency theory also entered the African development 
discourse. The Prebisch-Singer thesis, which argued that the terms of trade for primary 
producers were continuously declining, provided a further rationale for industrial policy and 
nationalisation of industries.78 The dependency school faulted the earlier modernisation 
theorists for failing to recognize an unequal global division of labour which locked countries 
at the periphery into the production of low-value primary products and dependence on foreign 
capital. Such economic prerogatives were also used to justify the introduction of one-party 
states across the continent.79 Only through strong, centrally-directed control could a country 
mobilize the surpluses necessary for development and break the hold of metropolitan 
commercial control over African economies. 
Cooper dates the end of this developmental era to the oil price shock of 1973, which ushered 
in a period of greater price volatility, growing fiscal imbalances and political unrest (c.1973-
1990).80 Ndulu in contrast, focusing on governance regimes rather than economic performance, 
argues that the dirigiste policies of the postwar era dominated into the early 1980s.81 As 
economic conditions tightened in the 1970s and fiscal conditions deteriorated, the faith in state-
led development gradually weakened and the state began to be seen as the problem rather than 
solution to underdevelopment.  
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These ideas gained global traction with the election of Ronald Reagan in the USA and Margaret 
Thatcher in the United Kingdom, who’s supply side economic policies sought to reduce 
distortionary taxation and cut back the reach of the state. In the 1980s international 
development organisations began to advise African governments to scale back their 
overbearing states, reduce the size of the public service, privatize industries, and ‘get prices 
right’ by devaluing the exchange rate and liberalising financial sector.82 Such reforms formed 
the conditions for further borrowing from the IMF and World Bank. Furthermore, with the 
waning power of the Soviet Union, the IMF and World Bank’s policy leverage increased as the 
alternative financing sources dried up. 
By the 1990s however, the difficulty of gaining traction for these reforms and their failure to 
bring about a swift recovery shifted attention from policies to politics. In the wake of the fall 
of the Soviet Union, multiparty democracy was reintroduced in countries across the continent 
and development donors began to place more emphasis on political and institutional reforms. 
This discourse was inspired by advances in institutional economics, which highlighted the 
property rights regimes and other institutional incentives that underpinned investment and 
growth.83 The World Bank and other international agencies came to re-evaluate the role of 
government in recognition that an efficient state was indispensable to a thriving private sector.84 
A good governance agenda emerged, emphasising democratic contestation, a free press and 
other accountability measures that could hold the state in check and allow the market to 
flourish.  
With these shifting development paradigms as the backdrop, the remainder of this chapter 
explores narrower debates about public sector employment in Africa. This literature contains 
two main strands. During the developmental era (1960s-1970s), the public employment debate 
was framed in class terms, pitting the more optimistic modernization theory against 
dependency theory. The debate hinged on two matters: whether public servants were 
incentivised to serve the best interests of their fellow citizens or would come to calcify into an 
exploitative class, and whether this group would consume or invest the surplus they extracted 
from the economy. 
With the crisis of the 1980s, however, attention to class waned and a new political economy 
literature focused on the origins of extractive and growth-inhibiting institutions (which to a 
large extent still dominates the discourse on the African state). The contrast with Asia’s 
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extraordinary rise gave impetus to Africa-specific explanations for the continent’s poor 
economic performance. Ethnicity, persistent state weaknesses and other social fissures were 
seen as drivers of Africa’s poor policy choices. In many of these models, public sector jobs, a 
patronage resource par excellence, played in important role in mediating ethnic settlements. 
In the past five years the literature has begun to come full circle with a return of an African 
class debate. After almost two decades of strong growth in many African countries, academics 
have announced that a new middle class is on the rise. Its politics, allegiances and consumption 
patterns are increasingly a topic of scrutiny, as are its sources of income and sectors of 
employment. The more optimistic of these observers have argued that today’s middle class is 
more oriented towards the private sector than in previous periods. They suggest that Africa’s 
middle class may finally be freeing itself of its statist shackles and gaining the independence 
needed to hold governments to account. 
Public servants: vanguard or bourgeoisie? (1960s – 1970s) 
 ‘If the government gives it enough time and opportunity, this bourgeoisie [of the 
civil service] will manage to put away enough money to stiffen its domination. But 
it will always reveal itself incapable of giving birth to an authentic bourgeois society 
with all the economic and industrial consequences which this entails.’ (Fanon 1961: 
179) 
‘The damned salaries! These are the salaries which build this kind of attitude in the 
educated people, all of them. Me and you. We belong to a class of exploiters.’ (Julius 
Nyerere criticising a student protest for higher post-study earnings at the University 
of Dar es Salaam in 1966, cited in Coulson 1982: 182) 
A natural consequence of the developmental ambitions of the postwar era was a bigger role for 
the state and a growing share of the labour force in public sector employment. Both colonial 
and postcolonial governments recognized that a Western educated cadre of high-level 
manpower was critical to this modernization process, even if it fostered social inequality in the 
short run.85 Opinions differed however, about the consequences of this growing income 
inequality among Africans. The more optimistic narratives argued that African societies were 
classless in the Marxist sense and held together by traditional social solidarities, which 
prevented class exploitation.86 In the absence of entrenched classes, politicians, the 
intelligentsia and professionals served as leaders or a vanguard to which the masses would 
                                                   
85 For example: Fabius Odubi Passi, “Planning for the Supply and Demand of Qualified Teachers in 
Uganda,” International Review of Education 36, no. 4 (1990): 441–52; James Katorobo, Education for 
Public Service in Uganda (Vantage Press Inc., 1982).  
86 For a discussion, see: Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, “Socialism and Economic Development in 
Tropical Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies 6, no. 2 (1968): 141–69. 
35 
 
aspire. Thus Sékou Touré, Mali’s first President, argued against those that criticised the wealth 
of the new elite: 
In our denunciation of bourgeois tendencies we must not (…) accuse of being 
bourgeois the peasant, the worker or the civil servant (…) who by his personal efforts 
has been able to build a modern house, purchase a car or acquire honestly anything 
which contributes to the material well-being of his family. Since the main objective 
of our revolution is to make it possible for all to attain through work the highest 
possible degree of prosperity, we cannot blame these people. On the contrary, a man 
must utilize his energies and faculties for the constant improvement of his living 
standard.87 
This vision of a pioneering cadre of African public sector officials, teachers and professionals 
was also captured in some of the academic literature of the era, including in a volume from 
1964 edited by Peter Lloyd on ‘the new elites of tropical Africa.’88 The study defined the elite 
as western-educated men earning at least £250 per annum, of which public sector employees 
constituted the majority. It chose to use the term elite rather than social class in order to stress 
that this group was not (yet) a hereditary group where privilege was perpetuated through 
inheritance of wealth or educational opportunities. Qualitative and quantitative evidence 
showed that most of the members of this elite came from humble beginnings. Many had been 
raised in rural households by illiterate parents and retained ties to their rural communities. The 
study understood these elite members as creators of new African identities that mediated 
‘between western and traditional influences’.89 They promoted a value system and life style 
that others could aspire to, imitate and adopt.  
This literature also argued that in the absence of an entrepreneurial, capital-owning African 
class, social status were largely a function of educational performance, as this, quite 
mechanically, determined entry into a high-paying job, usually in the public sector.90 A number 
of articles in the 1970s reasoned that because of the large role of the state as an employer of 
skilled manpower, meritocratic criteria were in fact a stronger determinant of social status in 
developing countries than in wealthier parts of the world.91 Surveys of students at the top 
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ranked secondary schools and universities in various African countries confirmed that in the 
1960s and 1970s at least, the education system was relatively open, with the majority of 
students hailing from poor, rural communities.92 These candidates owed their academic and 
career progression to their academic acumen and strong exam performance. 
Academic and political attitudes towards this public sector-dominated elite was also coloured 
by another major concern of the era: economic sovereignty. Many of Africa’s nationalist 
leaders argued that without freeing their countries from dependence on foreign-owned firms 
they were not truly independent of their former colonial masters. A further question therefore, 
was how the nascent elite or bourgeoisie would use the rents that it commanded, and whether 
they would help to shift the ownership of productive assets into African hands.93 
Some argued that public sector salaries offered a spring-board into private enterprise, as wage 
earners invested their savings in agriculture or smaller enterprises. Collier and Lal and Kitching 
found that in the absence of functioning financial markets in Kenya, wage earnings in the 
formal sector formed an important source of investment capital, allowing households to expand 
or intensify their land holdings or start small businesses.94 This, they predicted, was creating 
greater social differentiation and the emergence of a relatively broad-based middle class or 
petty bourgeoisie. If this process continued, Kenya’s disproportionately large bureaucratic elite 
could prove a transitional phenomenon as a relatively benign process of primitive accumulation 
spawned a new entrepreneurial bourgeoisie.  
Yet many of these writers also noted clouds on the horizon. Several questioned whether the 
state could afford to continue acting as the main creator of middle class employment. Would 
this dynamic be curtailed by the financial constraints to an over-ambitious developmental 
agenda? Already by the 1960s politicians were raising alarm over what they perceived to be a 
growing unemployment problem among the educated African youth.95 These graduates and 
their families had frequently made big sacrifices to finance their education and expected a 
salaried job in the formal sector upon completion of their studies. They looked to the state to 
aid this process of social mobility by ensuring that aspirants with secondary or tertiary 
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education could enter formal, middle class professions. Pressure on the state to expand 
employment was exacerbated by the relatively dismal rate of private sector employment 
growth, which failed to keep pace with the growth in the economy.96 Both government 
publications and academic literature from the 1960s and 70s therefore expressed the fear that 
growing unemployment, particularly among secondary educated men, would prove politically 
destabilising.97 Kitching’s reflections are an apt example of this line of thinking: 
‘From the point of view of political stability it is particularly important that the number 
of ‘better paid’ jobs, from which savings and investments can be made, should be 
expanded and the ‘educated unemployed’ (often produced by immense consumption 
sacrifices within the household) bought off. To keep the political system stable this 
must continue to happen, and given the rate of population growth and the ever-
increasing number of households entering runners in the ‘education race’ it must 
happen at an accelerating rate, at least in the immediate future.’98 
What then would be the consequence of a downturn in revenue? Lloyd argued that if economic 
growth stalled, ‘[t]he expansion of the bureaucracies experienced in the past decade will slow 
down considerably, and the present elite will be able to fill a high proportion of vacant posts 
with their own children (…) Competition within the elite for higher posts will become more 
intense; the aspirations of the sub-elite will be less frequently rewarded.’99 This would intensify 
the tension and conflict between the ‘frustrated literates and an entrenched elite.’100 Thus the 
classless Africa described with optimism in the 1960s may already have been on its way to 
becoming a class society.  
These pessimistic predictions of class calcification in Africa already had their proponents 
among the neo-Marxist scholars. Theorists associated with the dependency school began 
raising doubts in the early 1960s about the incentives and motivations of Africa’s ‘modernizing 
vanguard’ to act in the national, collective best interest. According to Frantz Fanon (quoted 
above) the over-reliance of Africa’s post-independence elite on income from the state rather 
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than returns to capital created an incentive problem.101 This weak and wage-reliant middle class 
or petty bourgeoisie was easily co-opted by the foreign capitalists who had been extracting 
resources and agricultural commodities from Africa throughout the colonial period. The 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie would be offered an immediate independence dividend – a share of 
the extracted rents - in exchange for maintaining the economic status quo. This would 
perpetuate the extraction and exploitation previously practiced by the colonial powers and limit 
the ability of a genuine domestic capitalist class to emerge in its place. Samir Amin identified 
a similar phenomenon, using the term ‘comprador class’ to denote a dependent elite at the 
periphery of the global economic system that derived its social position from its connection to 
international firms or investors.102 
In the footsteps of Fanon, several dependency theorists set about describing the African middle 
class or petty bourgeoisie through country case studies, several of which focused on Kenya, 
Tanzania or Uganda. Best known is perhaps Issa Shivji’s work on Tanzania, which coined the 
term ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ and concluded that public officials used Tanzania’s 
nationalisation policies to reduce the power of the capitalist class and gain control of the 
nation’s productive resources, in the process elevating themselves to the position of a 
bourgeoisie.103 Mahmood Mamdani’s study of class formation in Uganda made a similar 
argument, by showing that Milton Obote, Uganda’s first president, sought to create a 
‘bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie’, a beholden middle tier, while leaving the commercial 
(foreign) elite intact.104 Collin Leys similarly drew a parallel between Louis Bonaparte’s and 
Jomo Kenyatta’s effort to build an independent power base in support of the presidency through 
the expansion of the bureaucracy.105  
While writers such as Fanon, Mamdani and Shivji primarily focused on senior officers at the 
top of the public service, other theorists expanded this dependency framework to incorporate 
the urban working class. Saul and Arrighi argued that workers and low-skilled employees in 
public enterprises and other state employment formed a labour aristocracy vis-à-vis the 
peasantry.106 Because of the labour stabilisation policies introduced in the late colonial era, 
those fortunate enough to hold a formal sector job earned many times the rural wage. These 
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comparatively high earnings meant that lower skilled formal sector workers would side with 
the middle and upper classes against rural producers, to the detriment of economic growth. In 
the absence of radical policy change they predicted that ‘[t]he labour aristocracy will therefore 
continue to use its power in a state-controlled modern sector in order to appropriate a 
considerable share of the surplus in the form of increasing discretionary consumption.’107 Not 
only would this reduce investment in the agricultural sector, they also speculated that high 
urban wages encouraged firms to adopt labour-saving, capital-intensive technologies which 
slowed the pace of structural transformation. 
Although the labour aristocracy thesis was quickly challenged and its authors moderated some 
of their original claims, 108 this idea was re-formulated in non-Marxist terms in the 1980s when 
Robert Bates raised concerns about the urban bias in African policymaking.109 Bates used an 
interest group perspective rather than a class lens to show how urban workers and white-collar 
employees, most of whom were directly or indirectly working for the state, extracted from the 
peasantry. He argued that because of the success of labour movements in the decolonisation 
struggle, the urbanites had greater political voice and influence. They belonged to better 
organised labour movements, had direct ties to the nationalist political leaders who came to 
power in the 1960s, and lived in closer proximity to the seat of government. The large 
peasantry, in contrast, was politically fragmented and weak. Through their control of marketing 
boards, governments therefore taxed the peasantry heavily to fund a growing state apparatus 
staffed by highly paid bureaucrats and industrial workers. They also used national pricing 
policies to hold down food prices for urban consumers to the detriment of the peasant 
producers.  
Some have argued that high urban wages also led to distortions in educational investments. 
Because the public sector placed strong emphasis on educational qualifications, households 
over-invested in education at the expense of other more productive forms of investment.110 
Children spent many years preparing for secondary school exams which most of them would 
fail, giving them educational skills of little value in the informal economy where most were 
destined to remain.  
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These arguments proved influential in international policy circles as they chimed well with the 
advice proffered by the neoliberal international finance institutions. By removing market 
distortions, such as the urban wage premium, food subsidies or subsidised higher education, 
African governments could restore incentives for rural producers. Ironically, what started as a 
neo-Marxist critique of African power relations came to justify neoliberal economic reforms. 
Yet both dependency theory and the urban-bias framework were overtaken by events. Whether 
by design or default, public sector salaries began to decline shortly after independence. In the 
1960s and 1970s, governments across Africa proved quick to reign back the power of labour 
unions and institute incomes policies that promoted wage restraint.111 Urban-bias and 
dependency theory was often used to justify these very policy decisions.112 Studies of wage 
dynamics in Africa in the 1970s and 1980s concluded that the urban wage premium had been 
a short-lived phenomenon as salaries fell sharply in the 1970s.113  
Patrimonialism, clientelism and ethnic favouritism (1980s – present) 
‘Ministers, district commissioners and even some permanent secretaries saw 
themselves, and were regarded, as the chief patrons and protectors for their localities, 
and in accordance with the system their relatives and clients came to Kampala or 
gathered at district headquarters to claim their appointments, promotions and 
financial rewards. All this increased the importance of alliances and accounts for the 
constant jockeying for positions within and between tribal groups in the period after 
independence. Competition for office and jobs became the nation’s growth industry.’ 
(Glentworth & Handcock, 1973: 240) 
‘The politics of political tribalism and moral ethnicity become linked to the ability 
of the 'big men' of ethnic communities holding positions in the state to obtain for the 
districts and regions a significant share of the large-scale collective benefits of 
development in infrastructure projects of roads, schools, dispensaries, etc, as well as 
the more individual rewards apportioned through the discrete personal contacts of 
the back verandah.’ (Berman, 1998: 335) 
The declining formal sector fortunes in the 1970s called into question the presumed political 
leverage of the nascent, urban middle class or petty bourgeoisie. As members of this new urban 
elite proved unable to perpetuate their privilege, critics began to argue that they did not in fact 
represent a consolidated interest group. Some writers faulted Fanon and other dependency 
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theorists for having been too optimistic when predicting that a local bourgeoisie would replace 
the colonial order and perpetuate the extractive role of the state. A prior condition was the 
consolidation of a petty bourgeoisie with sufficient cohesion and solidarity to protect its class 
interests. In 1976 Saul speculated that the African petty bourgeoisie was too fractionalised, 
along ethnic, regional, or narrow institutional groupings, to properly play its allotted role as 
intermediary to foreign capitalist interests.114 He examined the striking case of Uganda where 
Idi Amin expropriated the Asian capitalist class in 1972 and allowed the country’s economy to 
collapse, in the process eliminating the rents that fed the African bureaucratic bourgeoisie. 
This line of reasoning was expanded and formalized in what has been loosely described as the 
neopatrimonialism school,115 which emphasised the importance of social solidarities such as 
ethnicity and religion, which cleave and neuter economic interest groups.116 Patrick Chabal and 
Jean-Pascal Daloz, for instance, argued that African societies are organised through vertical 
rather than horizontal ties. Kinship and ethnicity connects rural villages, towns and the political 
centres, while horizontal organisations such as business associations and trade unions are 
comparatively weak.117 Jean-Francois Bayart explicitly set this literature apart from the 
dependency school and modernization theory, which in his view imposed a Western lens on 
African development that was blind to the ways in which African actors developed political 
structures based on local conditions, traditions and power relations.118  
This literature should be seen in light of Africa’s disappointing growth performance in the 
1980s and the frustrating failure of structural reform efforts. Academics searched for answers 
that could explain Africa’s exceptionally poor growth performance. Many rooted their 
arguments in the persistence of growth-inhibiting precolonial and colonial institutions, such as 
the salience of ethnicity. They pointed to factors such as low population density,119 disease 
burden,120 and the slave trade,121 which had prevented the emergence of larger political polities 
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in Africa and resulted in high ethnic fragmentation. Colonialism aggravated this problem by 
imposing arbitrary boarders on these small polities, empowering despotic ethnic leaders to 
administer their localities and exploiting inter-group rivalries to divide and rule.122 As a result, 
postcolonial leaders inherited ethnically and socially fragmented states with weak national 
cohesion.123 This made postcolonial states exceptionally vulnerable to internal conflict. In order 
to prevent war, leaders would rule through pork-barrel politics rather than building coalitions 
for developmental policies.124 That Botswana, one of the undisputed postcolonial African 
success stories, is relatively ethnically homogenous, added intuitive appeal to such explanation. 
While their finer details may have differed, most of these studies saw patronage as a critical 
ingredient in these uneasy postcolonial political settlements. Leaders governed by purchasing 
the political loyalty of particular ethnic, regional or religious leaders and their supporters 
through the distribution of jobs and other patronage, rather than seeking mass support for a 
particular political platform. Political appointments, directorships of state-owned enterprises 
and senior civil service posts were awarded to local leaders in order to strike an uneasy coalition 
of support for the ruler. These patrons in turn used public employment to reward their 
supporters for their political loyalty, or conversely, withheld jobs as punishment.125 In 
similarity with the dependency theorists then, this literature also viewed the state as ‘the 
essential focus for the accumulation of wealth.’126  
Beyond a general emphasis on patronage and social cleavages however, this literature offers a 
wide variety of models and predictions. The concept of patronage is used differently by 
different writers. Clientelism, or patronage, is by no means a uniquely African phenomenon. 
Its draws its conceptual roots from Max Weber, who defined patrimonialism as a traditional 
form of authority where power is concentrated in the person (rather than the office) of the ruler, 
who gains his or her legitimacy through systems of reciprocity.127  
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Kitschelt and Wilkinson and Hicken formally define clientelism or patronage as a ‘contingent 
exchange’, where a political patron rewards a client with a public sector job or other benefit in 
exchange for delivering votes or other forms of political support.128 They distinguish between 
targeted benefits (programmatic or club goods), which politicians may use to sway particular 
voter constituencies but without any guarantee of a particular behaviour or action on the part 
of the beneficiaries, from clientelism, where the client’s quid pro quo is explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed and non-performing clients can be sanctioned. Building on Hicken's framework, 
Robinson and Verdier argue further that public sector jobs are a particularly attractive form of 
patronage because they allow patrons to overcome a time-inconsistency problem: the job is 
contingent on continued cooperation and can be withdrawn if the client reneges.129  
A critical feature of clientelism then, is its discretionary nature. Individual patrons choose how 
to allocate or withdraw jobs. Because politicians reward clients based on their political 
influence or acumen rather than the skills needed in the delivery of public services, it is 
expected to lead to a bloated public service staffed by people ill-suited for their official job 
responsibilities. Robinson and Verdier assert that this problem is particularly acute in Africa. 
A related literature, which has gained considerable traction in the African context, considers 
ethnic favouritism. While often conflated with patronage, much of this literature uses the 
concept in a softer sense to describe the distribution of state resources towards a favoured 
ethnic, religious or regional group, without making a clear distinction between targeted 
spending and clientelism ‘proper’. Here then, different groups complete for control of the state, 
and once victorious will use the resources of the state to reward their followers and cement 
their own power, as vividly described in the much quoted catch-phrase, ‘it’s our turn to eat’. 
Several papers have found evidence of such targeting of state resources towards favoured 
ethnic groups in Africa. Franck and Rainer use a sample of 18 countries to look at the effect of 
ethnic favouritism on primary educational attainment and infant mortality and find a positive 
and significant effect of being a coethnic of the country’s leader during childhood.130 With a 
focus on Kenya, Burgess et al. show that the ethnicity of the president influenced the level of 
road investment at district level.131 Kramon and Posner, also focusing on Kenya, found that 
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being a coethnic of the President during primary school age increased educational attainment, 
attendance and completion rates.132 Using experimental methods, Carlson examined voter 
behaviour in Uganda and found that voting patterns are consistent with the expectation that a 
coethnic leader will provide more resources to his or her ethnic constituency.133 In many of 
these studies state resources are skewed towards a politically favoured group by virtue of their 
geographic location or conditions of use, such as the building of roads of schools in areas where 
the president’s coethnics predominantly live. But individuals who do not support the president 
are not necessarily prevented from using the road or school, and the resource may be 
competitively allocated among those who qualify. Thus ethnic favouritism need not be 
antithetical to merit. One of the economic drawback of ethnic favouritism is thought to be that 
it heightens inter-ethnic competition for political office and resources. This in turn increases 
the risk of conflict, skews public spending towards items that can be targeted to particular 
constituencies, and incentivizes an over-investment of resources in the political game itself.134 
In contrast to this understanding of ethnic favouritism where the incumbent group has a large 
resource advantage, others have argued that multi-ethnic societies in Africa redistribute in an 
inclusive manner. A recent paper by Francois, Rainer and Trebbi studied the ethnic 
composition of cabinets in Africa and found that ministerial positions were allocated in 
relatively close proportion to the ethnic composition of the population. 135 They argue that this 
strategy reduces the risk of conflict or coups. A similar argument has been made by Bangura, 
based on a global study of ethnic inequalities in the public sector.136 This study highlighted 
several examples of politically inclusive multi-ethnic societies both in Africa and other regions 
of the world. Francois, Rainer and Trebbi suggest that the members of these ethnically-
inclusive cabinets use the ministries over which they preside to extend the flows of patronage 
to their respective ethnic groups, ensuring a relatively equitable ethnic distribution of spending 
in aggregate.137 
Focusing on resources rather than ruling coalitions, Azam has similarly argued that to stave off 
a civil war in a multi-ethnic society, a ruling group can either invest in deterrence or 
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redistribute.138 He shows that some governments in Africa have been able to credibly commit 
to redistributing to the ethnic groups excluded from power, thereby placating potential rebels. 
Green has argued further that the choice of patronage strategy is shaped by the types of political 
threats that rulers face. When leaders face a risk of rebellion or secession from provincial 
regions, they will distribute patronage at the centre to counteract it. When faced with 
competition from within, they will instead seek to broaden their power base by extending 
patronage to the rural periphery.139 Both Azam and Green also argue that this redistribution can 
take many different forms. Some leaders have placated potential dissenters by improving 
educational access and infrastructural development in under-served regions, while in other 
cases the redistribution takes more insidious and growth-inhibiting forms. Azam thus 
concludes that the economic consequences of such patronage or redistribution depends on the 
nature of the goods and services supplied. Where leaders redistribute by improving basic 
education and healthcare in underserved regions, it need not inflict an economic cost on society. 
This strand of literature therefore suggests that it is not ethnic polarization in and of itself, but 
how it is managed, that shapes economic outcomes. 
Scholars also differ in their understandings of the depth and density of these patron-client 
relationships in Africa. Many of the models assume that political patrons will redistribute a 
share of the resources he or she commands to buy the loyalty of his kinsmen or other allies, 
while skimming off some for his or her own personal benefit.140 Others have queried the 
importance of redistribution in the first place. Nicolas van de Walle concluded that African 
clientelism is not broad-based, but instead limited to an exchange of favours and benefits 
among a narrow, elite clique.141 Ordinary people acquiesced because they had little option but 
to support the leader from their locality or tribe, regardless of his or her ability to deliver 
benefits to the constituency. One of the perverse consequences of ethnic polarization, according 
to this line of through, is that by capitalising on group fears of the ‘other’ it enables 
exceptionally high elite capture.142  
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As a body of work then, this literature on ethnicity and clientelism is highly varied in its 
economic and political predictions.143 Some writers have argued that a reliance on patronage 
crowds out public goods and social service provision in the interest of creating unproductive, 
well-remunerated government jobs.144 Others have claimed that clientelist states easily revert 
to a tragedy of commons, where competing political patrons will seek to extract as many jobs 
from the government as possible for their clients, even when this threatens fiscal 
sustainability.145 Some writers acknowledge multiple equilibria, where leaders will sometimes 
succeed in averting civil conflict by compensating the loosing groups, and other times slide 
into civil conflict.146 The nature of this compensating redistribution can take many forms, from 
conspicuous consumption by elites to broad-based investments in schooling and healthcare. As 
a result, these theories predict everything from civil war and ethnically-divisive, kleptocratic 
rule, to developmental social policy.147 By acknowledging the interaction between ethnic 
fragmentation and political institutions, leadership quality and external economic conditions, 
it suggests that these conditioning factors may be equally relevant explanators after all. 
Africa’s growth recovery and the revival of the class debate 
Over the 2000s many African countries have seen a recovery in economic growth, a fall in the 
poverty incidence148 and cautious improvements in governance.149 These improved economic 
conditions have revived interest in class analysis once more. Evidence of falling levels of 
poverty and rising household wealth in particular, has inspired a literature proclaiming the 
‘emergence of the African middle class.’150 In the more optimistic of this writing, this growing 
group of middle class Africans are once again expected to serve as modernizers and role models 
and promoters of democracy, human rights and progressive policies.151 In contrast to the 
modernization theorists of the 1960s however, these writers have highlighted the 
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entrepreneurial activities of the new middle class, its private sector focus and global 
connectedness, rather than its statist orientation. 
Pushing back against these optimistic predictions however, other academics have challenged 
the assumption that the growth of the middle class will have positive political consequences.152 
The fault-lines in this debate are similar to those of the 1970s and 1980s, with academics asking 
whether the middle class, defined on a consumption or income basis, share a middle class 
identity or common political aspirations. A recent collection of papers edited by Henning 
Melber for instance, leans against using class distinctions to explain contemporary Africa, 
highlighting that ethnic political allegiances still tend to trump economic interest groups.153 
So far, however, there are relatively few studies that take a historical perspective on social 
stratification in Africa, and investigate whether the occupational, educational and sectoral basis 
of the middle class have changed since the 1960s and whether the government’s role in 
stratifying society has reduced. Given this gap in the literature, the coming chapters will 
examine how public employment structures have changed over the past half-century, how this 
has shaped the relative standing of public sector employees, and how these dynamics speak to 
the various predictions in the theoretical literature just discussed. 
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS, CONTRIBUTION, METHODS, SOURCES AND 
DEFINITIONS 
Research questions and contribution 
The preceding section has discussed the rich secondary literature on state development in 
postcolonial Africa and the varied interpretations of the social and political salience of public 
employment. Table 1.1 summarizes these theories of public employment and their predicted 
effect on public employment and the broader economy. The coming chapters of this dissertation 
brings quantitative evidence to bear on these various predictions. 
In Chapter 2 I examine the growth of public employment and the public sector wage bill, using 
a budgetary lens to understand how the wage bill evolved relative to other spending priorities. 
This speaks to the predictions of the dependency and public choice theorists, by showing when 
public sector earnings began to fall and why the high-earning public sector class did not persist. 
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It also tests the claims made in some of the patronage literature that patronage politics leads to 
excessive employment growth and wage spending at the expense of more socially productive 
spending. Lastly it examines the consequences of structural adjustment and the extent to which 
it marked a break in spending patterns. 
The third chapter establishes where public sector employees fell within the national income 
distribution and what share of the income or wealth elite they comprised. This speaks to the 
dependency theory assumptions that bureaucrats dominated the nascent elite and middle class 
in Africa. It also addresses current debates about whether Africa’s current, growing middle 
class is less beholden to the state and more oriented towards private enterprise. 
The last chapter examines inequalities in access to public sector jobs and what this tells us 
about the types of people that came to work for the government. This addresses various 
hypotheses in the patronage/ethnicity literature: are certain ethnic groups or regions favoured 
in the distribution of jobs? What discretion do politicians have over the distribution of public 
sector jobs?  How has educational attainment growth shaped the composition of the public 
service? It also tentatively addresses the question of social reproduction by examining the 
parental educational characteristics and asset wealth of current public servants. 
To investigate these questions I use a case study approach focusing on three countries in East 
Africa. Case studies have the advantage that they allow careful, country-level analysis of the 
context and history, but the disadvantage that their findings are not necessarily generalizable. 
But although these cases cannot be presumed to be representative of the continent as a whole, 
they can nonetheless inform theoretical debates. To the extent that these three cases refute a 
proposition about Africa, they challenge the generalizability of such theories, and demonstrate, 
at the very least, the need to modify the theory to account for such deviations. By digging 
deeply, a case study approach may also offer new ideas or insights, thereby generating 
hypotheses that can be tested across a greater range of cases in the future. 
These case studies in turn rest on data about government finances, public employment, and the 
structure of labour markets, data that hasn’t previously been collated or analysed in such ways. 
By demonstrating the usability of economic data for the postcolonial period, moreover, this 
dissertation seeks to correct the current skew in African economic history towards the study of 
the colonial period. Given the importance of this data to the contribution of this thesis, it is 
useful to review what these sources are, how they will be used, and what quality and coverage 
challenges they pose. 
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Table 1.1. Theories of public employment 
Theory of public 
employment 
Description Effect on public 
employment 
Channel through which 
it retards (or aids) 
growth 
Modernization 
theory  
 
Public servants (and 
other elite members) 
formed a vanguard of 
educated modernizers 
and proto-capitalists to 
which the masses could 
aspire 
- Growth in public 
employment; strong 
emphasis on 
merit/education 
- Aids (selective) upward 
mobility 
- Creates a middle class  
- Reinvestment of earnings 
in enterprises 
Dependency 
theory 
 
Public employees form 
a cohesive rentier class 
who facilitate 
continued exploitation 
by foreign capital 
 
- Highly paid public 
service 
- Hereditary, in the 
sense that children of 
the elite have 
disproportionate access 
to public jobs. 
- Limits investment 
- Prevents emergence of 
local capitalist class (and 
thus economic 
diversification) 
- Reduces incentive to 
deliver services 
- Limits social mobility 
Urban bias 
 
Urban workers as well 
as public servants 
constituted 
disproportionately 
influential interest 
groups that encouraged 
high spending on urban 
wages at the expense of 
heavily taxed rural 
producers 
- Public sector and 
urban pay premium, 
financed through 
taxation of agriculture 
- Reduces 
investment/development in 
rural sector 
- Excessive investment in 
educational paper 
qualifications 
- High urban 
unemployment (queuing 
for jobs) 
Clientelism / 
patrimonialism 
 
Public employment is 
used instrumentally by 
political patrons to 
reward specific clients 
for their political 
loyalty/support 
 
Clientelism 
- Public sector jobs 
discretionarily awarded 
to political clients 
- Excessive job 
creation & wage bill 
growth crowds out 
public goods 
- Jobs not awarded on 
merit (misallocation of 
skill) 
- Under-provision of goods 
and services 
- Budget imbalances 
Ethnic favouritism  
- Favoured ethnic 
groups hold 
disproportionate share 
of jobs 
- Suboptimal allocation of 
resources 
- Excessive investment in 
the competition for 
resources 
- Ethnic conflict 
Redistribution & ethnic 
equity 
- Strong /“excessive” 
emphasis on equity 
(‘fair shares’) 
- Contingent on type of 
redistribution; can impose 
economic inefficiencies if 
it encourages spending on 
non-productive items 
 
‘Africa rising’ Renewed growth in 
Africa has created a 
new, private sector-
oriented middle and 
upper class that will 
drive growth and 
development; falling 
relevance of state 
employment 
- Falling share of the 
middle class in public 
employment 
- Falling public sector 
pay premium 
- Private sector friendly 
economic policy 
- Greater accountability 
between new private sector 
elite & state 
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Data sources and data quality 
African economic history suffers from a missing middle. While the colonial period is well 
documented by economic historians, the postcolonial period often features as an outcome of 
past conditions rather than a period of study in its own right, with various methods used to 
show how colonial or postcolonial legacies shape contemporary economic performance. Gareth 
Austin characterised this research approach as ‘the compression of history.’154 It risks 
overlooking the significant economic policy changes that took place in the decades after 
independence or explain adequately if and how political independence changed African states. 
One of the reasons for the limited study of the postcolonial period is presumably the 
deterioration and change in data availability after independence. Many of the economic data 
sources used by historians of colonialism changed in form and function after independence, 
making harder, in many instances, to study the postcolonial than the colonial period. This thesis 
is therefore also an attempt to show that these data challenges are not insurmountable and that 
more can be done with the available postcolonial sources. 
The traditional sources used by economic historians collected and collated by the colonial 
powers changed after independence and are no longer as systematically collected by libraries 
or archives. While colonial governments were accountable to a metropole who demanded 
regular reporting for monitoring purposes, the relationship between independent African states 
and the analogous postcolonial organisations – international financial institutions and UN 
bodies – did not have the same strength. Moreover, with the rise of autocratic one-party states 
in Africa in the 1970s in combination with the onset of a severe and protracted economic crisis, 
many statistical bureaus found themselves short of resources and lacking in political incentive 
to actively monitor development performance. As a result of these limitations, some academics 
have questioned the usefulness of what data is available. Morten Jerven’s ‘Poor Numbers’ has 
revealed the serious quality gaps in Africa’s national accounts reporting and questioned the 
validity of African GDP estimates.155 A recent special issue on African statistics concluded that 
‘while the sheer amount of data on these issues has multiplied in recent years, reliable and inter-
                                                   
154 Austin, “The `reversal of Fortune’ Thesis and the Compression of History: Perspectives from African 
and Comparative Economic History.” 
155 Morten Jerven, Poor Numbers: How We Are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to 
Do About It (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
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temporally and internationally consistent information on many basic economic and social 
variables remains scarce in Sub-Saharan Africa.’156  
But although the quality of data may not always live up to the academic ideal, the advantage 
of the postcolonial period is precisely the growth in the ‘sheer amount of data,’ which gives us 
greater ability to triangulate and cross-check between sources and thereby account for potential 
biases or quality gaps. Furthermore, while coverage is patchier, some postcolonial governments 
continued to collect some of the same routine information as their precolonial predecessors, 
and in other cases new forms of statistical surveys, particularly the proliferation of household 
surveys, compensate for some of the decline in administrative data generation.  
Moreover, accessibility of this data is continuously improving. Since the early 2000s, national 
statistical bureaus have begun to publish a range of statistical sources and reports on their 
websites. Furthermore, because many African countries relied heavily on borrowing from the 
IMF and World Bank, these organisations have produced a relatively consistent set of reports 
for each country dating back to the early 1960s, many of which have been digitized and made 
publicly available in their online archives. IMF reports such as ‘Recent Economic 
Developments’ and the Article IV consultation reports contain a range of tables with 
macroeconomic and fiscal data. The World Bank economic memoranda, and its later series of 
public expenditure reviews, frequently included large data annexes with macroeconomic, fiscal 
and social data. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has also digitized a large 
proportion of its archives which include a rich set of studies on labour markets. These sources 
generally republish statistics from the national statistical bureaus rather than producing 
alternative series, but they provide a long-term repository that compensates for gaps in library 
collections and national statistical websites. These sources also have the advantage of providing 
a running commentary on events and trends and contemporaneous assessments of the reliability 
of the available statistics. 
Drawing from these online repositories in addition to published volumes in libraries, five types 
of data sources provide the main underlying material for this thesis. The richest source of data 
on public employment is the Employment and Earnings Surveys (EES) or Annual Enumeration 
of Employees Survey (the survey has been titled slightly differently in the three countries and 
in different time periods). This survey was started in the late colonial era in response to colonial 
concerns about labour unrest and urban unemployment. It provides data on formal sector 
                                                   
156 Stephan Klasen and Derek Blades, “Issues and Challenges in Measuring National Income, Wealth, 
Poverty, and Inequality in Sub-Saharan African Countries: An Introduction,” Review of Income and 
Wealth 59, no. SUPPL1 (2013): S7. 
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employment and earnings, disaggregated by sector, industry and geographic location and 
collected using a questionnaire sent annually to all formal sector establishments.157 In Kenya 
this survey has been administered annually up until the present, while the Tanzanian and 
Ugandan survey is only available for parts of the postcolonial period. 
Because the EES only surveyed the formal sector however, which constituted roughly 10-15% 
of the total labour force, I use censuses and household surveys to understand how this narrow 
formal sector fits into the broader labour force and income distribution. Censuses have the 
advantage of providing comprehensive information on the contours of the labour market, such 
as the working aged population, size of the labour force and its educational attainment. Certain 
censuses contain some labour market information such as status in employment, employment 
industry and occupation, and in the case of the 2009 Kenyan census only, an invaluable 
breakdown by the sector of employment. Most of the censuses are available as microdata sets 
curated by the Minnesota Population Center IPUMS project (usually as a 10% sample of all 
census records). 
The East African censuses do not, however, contain data on incomes or consumption. I 
therefore turn to household budget surveys and labour force surveys to place public servants 
within the national income (or consumption) distribution. Many of these surveys are available 
to researchers in microdata form. Most of these household surveys provide questions on sector 
of employment which makes it possible to identify public sector employees among the sampled 
respondents. For these surveys it is therefore also possible to derive alternative estimates of 
total public employment. These surveys are based on the national sampling frames and 
designed to be nationally representative. Their disadvantage however, is their relatively small 
sample sizes (usually in the order of 10,000 households), which raises the confidence intervals 
and introduces a risk of sampling biases. 
In addition to these surveys, some national budgets (or public finance summary tables) contain 
summary data on the number of government employees along with an important second source 
of data on total government earnings. A challenge is to establish the exact scope of the reported 
employment or wage bill data, as some personnel expenditure takes the form of transfers to 
autonomous agencies or subnational governments and is therefore not classified under the 
personnel budget.  
For the first few years of independence all three governments also published income tax 
reports, containing schedules of taxpayers by income bracket, which can be used to reconstruct 
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sampling of private establishment. 
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the very top tail of the income distribution.158 Unfortunately these reports are of less value after 
the introduction of Pay As You Earn (PAYE) schemes in the 1960s, as the reports stopped 
listing taxpayers individually when the burden of tax collection was shifted to employers. 
In addition to these main sources, various ad hoc surveys such as manpower surveys, 
educational surveys and tracer surveys are used to complement the sources above.  
Admittedly, the availability and quality of these sources varies significantly across countries 
and periods. This study has purposely selected countries with relatively strong statistical 
systems by continental standards. The high degree of administrative centralisation in all three 
countries also simplifies the exercise considerably. Kenya has particularly strong data records 
on labour markets, with consistent data on labour markets running back to the late colonial 
period. Tanzania’s economic data is less consistent, but its commitment to economic planning 
in the first three decades of independence generated a considerable volume of statistical reports. 
Uganda’s postcolonial statistical records are the patchiest of the three owing to the erosion of 
the state after the coup of 1971, but the records improve in the 1990s with the country’s 
economic recovery and large inflow of aid and technical assistance. Thus, while not necessarily 
representative for the continent as a whole, these three cases suggest that we can make more 
progress in the writing of economic histories of particular parts of the continent at least. 
The decision to include three case study countries with relatively similar endowments and 
colonial institutions can also help to dispel data concerns. An unexpected data finding in one 
country may throw doubt on the quality of the data, but finding similar patterns, trends or levels 
across three different countries can increase confidence in the results.   
Furthermore, the bar for improving the evidence base is currently low. To provide meaningful 
contributions to the discourse it is not always necessary to estimate economic variables with 
perfect precision. Understanding the rough direction of travel and estimating orders of 
magnitude, or including plausible low and high case scenarios, is sometimes enough to enrich 
the debate. While level differences across countries may be hard to accurately determine, 
differences or similarities in time trends provide an alternative method of comparing countries. 
 
 
                                                   
158 This approach was used by Atkinson to measure income inequality across a range of Anglophone 
African countries, see: A B Atkinson, “Top Incomes in East Africa before and after Independence,” 
WID.world Working Paper No. 2015/2, 2015. 
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Definitions 
Any discussion of public sector employment is sensitive to the definition used. While the 
appropriate definition will depend on the narrower research question, unless otherwise stated 
this study uses a broad definition of public employees, covering all workers whose salary and 
employment conditions are controlled or strongly guided by the state. The ILO defines public 
employment in relation to three levels of control: the central government which includes the 
civil service and employees of non-profit institutions directly controlled by the central 
government; the general government, which includes central, state and local governments, 
social security funds and non-profit institutions controlled or financed by the government; and 
the public sector, which combines the general government and the parastatal sector. 159 
Although officially a part of the public sector labour force, the military is often excluded from 
the official data on public employment (for security reasons). In this study I use estimates of 
the armed forces from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance 
to give a rough idea of the magnitude of this omission. 
Another definitional issue is the treatment of casual workers. Many of the data tables in this 
study include casual workers in the aggregate data on public employment as excluding them 
could skew the results. After independence governments regularised many jobs that had 
previously been conducted on a casual basis. That said, it is hard to ascertain exactly what type 
of casual workers are included in administrative data. Short-term workers, outsourced service 
providers and consultants (who are paid out of the non-wage budget) are for instance not 
captured, and their numbers have probably increased in recent decades. 
A further point of note regards the classification of the staff of regional organs. Up until 1977 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda retained some region-wide public sector functions, carried out 
by the East African Common Services Organisation (renamed the East African Community in 
1967). In this study the EACSO/EAC personnel (most of whom were employed by the rail and 
harbour parastatals) are considered to belong to the public sector of the country in which they 
reside.  
With these clarifications and qualifiers, the next three chapters uses the sources and approaches 
just discussed to examine changes in public employment levels, composition and earnings, 
relating these changes to public expenditure outcomes, income dynamics in society at large and 
the growth in educational attainment. 
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Chapter 2. 
Paying for the public service: a budgetary 
perspective on public employment and pay 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
As African countries gained independence in the 1960s, academics cautioned that the colonial 
legacy of a privileged and highly paid public service was contributing to growing social 
inequalities and distorting the labour market by crowding out talent from the private sector and 
taxing the peasantry disproportionately. Later analyses from the 1980s and onwards also raised 
concerns about public employment imbalances, but focused less on wage levels than on the 
excessive reach of the bloated African state. Policy literature of the World Bank and IMF 
blamed this on an overambitious industrial policy and statist orientation,160 while political 
economists downplayed policy ambition and instead linked Africa’s bloated wage bills to 
ethnic patronage.161 How well do these various assertions fit the statistical record on public 
employment and wage growth in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda? This chapter addresses this 
question by examining trends in employment and earnings from a budgetary perspective. 
The number of staff employed by the government and their level of pay is at its heart a 
budgetary matter. Governmental decisions about how to tax or borrow determine the overall 
availability of resources, and staffing costs compete with other budget priorities for space 
within this resource envelope. Within the share of the budget allotted to wages, governments 
annually determine how to balance the creation of new posts against adjustments to the wage 
level. Using data on public spending and employment collected and digitized from a range of 
statistical sources, this chapter therefore examines how the public sector wage bill and 
employment evolved in relation to the overall resource envelope and other spending priorities, 
illuminating both domestic budget priorities and the nature of overall resource constraints on 
public employment and wages. It also compares these three East African trajectories to 
developments in other parts of the world to shed light on African exceptionalism, or lack 
thereof. 
                                                   
160 World Bank, “Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action.” 
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The chapter concludes that employment growth and wage determination in the Kenyan, 
Tanzanian and Ugandan public sectors were strongly circumscribed by the general health of 
the economy and global ideas about the role of the state. As in many other regions of the world, 
overall public spending and employment grew strongly in the 1960s and 1970s then plateaued 
or contracted in the 1980s as fiscal imbalances worsened. During the expansionary period the 
wage bill grew at roughly the same pace as GDP, and in this sense it did not crowd out other 
spending categories. With the onset of the structural adjustment era in the late 1980s, the level 
of public employment fell sharply. The public employment to labour force ratios are today 
lower or on par with the levels at independence. 
Where these East African cases diverge from trends in the west however, is in the severity of 
the earnings decline. Average earnings fell by 70-95% over the course of the 1970s through 
1990s, and were the most severe for the higher skilled public employees. This was partly by 
design, as governments chose to continue employing new staff even after real wages began to 
fall on the grounds that job creation was more important than the protection of earnings. But 
the fall in earnings was exacerbated by a shrinking wage budget and a severe terms of trade 
decline and exchange rate shock, which dramatically weakened the purchasing power of wage 
earners. Contrary to some of the predictions in the political economy literature which described 
the public service as a privileged and protected class, public servants proved to be some of the 
biggest relative losers during the economic downturn.  
As a result, some of the imbalances inherited at independence were overcome. Urban wages 
fell and the duality of the racially segmented colonial service withered. Furthermore, the 
growth in schooling and other frontline services shifted a greater share of public employment 
out of the capital cities and closer to the population, countering the colonial era urban bias in 
public spending. While domestic policy choices clearly influenced these outcomes, this chapter 
places domestic policy choices in the context of broader economic swings and external 
conditions. It concludes that public sector employment outcomes were less of a cause than a 
consequence of such swings. 
The bloated African state? 
The notion of the bloated African state is strongly tied to the World Bank and IMF analyses 
that underpinned structural adjustment. The stylized story in this literature, first fully elaborated 
in the World Bank’s 1981 report on growth in Africa, laid considerable blame for the 
continent’s growth slow-down on domestic policies, in particular an overextended state and 
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protected industry.162 Comparisons with other developing regions suggested that African 
governments consumed too much, and that employment and wages had grown excessively.  
More careful comparative studies of African public employment and spending, however, have 
already challenged some of these charges.  By the 1990s the severity of the urban wage declines 
in Anglophone Africa came into relief and the policy literature began to raise concerns about 
excessive wage falls and its effect on productivity.163 Using cross-country comparisons, Arthur 
Goldsmith and Dani Rodrik have both found that African countries on average had smaller 
civil services and wage bills than other developing regions of the world in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The biggest civil services were found in two of the most economically successful and least 
patrimonial African states, Botswana and Mauritius.164 
While these cross-sectional studies provide valuable insights into whether and how African 
states differ from those in other regions, they shed less light on how these conditions came to 
be or what their consequences were. This chapter in contrast takes a long-run perspective on 
expenditure and employment growth and uses the changing composition of spending to deduce 
budget priorities and public sector wage dynamics. This approach builds on Aaron Wildavsky’s 
insight from the 1960s that budgeting is incremental.165 Governments rarely reduce funding for 
their existing base programmes, but by using the budget increment to address new priorities, 
they gradually shift the composition of spending over time. In keeping with this logic, this 
chapter assumes that policy priorities are best understood by examining the direction of change 
rather than differences in absolute levels between countries. 
This chapter has five main sections that successively unpeel the budget. As a starting point, it 
looks at the rate of revenue and expenditure growth in aggregate terms, to understand the 
broader resource envelope and its influence on the wage bill.  It then turns to the composition 
of public expenditure to establish what categories of spending grew most in the postcolonial 
era and their relationship to the widening or contraction of the deficit. The third and fourth 
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sections examine internal wage bill dynamics: how did the level of public employment change 
over this period? How did the size of the wage bill and level of public employment influence 
average public sector wages? Lastly it also considers the geographic distribution of public 
employment and wage spending. First however, as a point of departure, it provides a stylized 
account of state growth around the world over the same time period. 
2.2. STATE GROWTH IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Over the past century the size of government has grown the world over, both in terms of public 
expenditures and employment. While the pace and scope of state expansion may have differed 
across countries and regions, the trend has cut across ideological divides and been underpinned 
by a considerable change in public perceptions about the role of government.166 Over the 
second half of the 20th century states came to take on a far greater range of services and 
functions than ever before, from the provision of social safety nets to universal provision of 
education and healthcare.167 Growing state intervention in the productive sectors, through the 
creation of public corporations and nationalisation of industry, also brought an unprecedented 
share of industrial employment and investment under state control. This growth of the state 
was underpinned by the Keynesian idea that discretionary fiscal policy could be used to manage 
aggregate demand and maintain full employment.168 
A new IMF database provides historical data on the public expenditure and revenue for a range 
of countries across the world, illustrating the remarkable growth in the state over the 20 th 
century (Figure 2.1). With the exception of South Africa however, the database contains no 
African country observations prior to 1980. The available data shows that the growth of the 
state was most marked in today’s advanced economies. For a sample of eight Western 
European countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, United 
Kingdom),169 public expenditure grew from an average of 10% of GDP in 1890 to 46% in 2000, 
an almost five-fold increase. In the USA and Canada public expenditure grew from 4% to 38% 
of GDP between the same period, in India from 7% to 27%, and for a sample of Latin American 
countries from 7% in 1905 to 24% in 2000. In the western world the Second World War was 
an important watershed, shifting spending to a permanently higher level and followed by 
continued strong state growth from the 1950s through 1970s. In Asia and Latin America state 
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growth took off after the war. Unlike in the 19th and early 20th century, when governments 
sought to maintain balanced budgets, many countries ran persistent deficits in the post-WWII 
era (Table 2.1). In Europe, Latin America and Asia the primary balance was on average 
negative during the postwar golden era. 
Public expenditures grew rapidly until around 1980, after which state growth slowed or 
plateaued in most parts of the world. Latin America experienced a decline in spending the 
1980s followed by a recovery in the late 1990s. Budget balances improved during this period 
of state consolidation. 
Figure 2.1. Growth in public expenditure, c.1890 – 2010 
 
Table 2.1. Government primary balance, % of GDP* 
 Europe North America Latin America Asia 
1890-1913 1.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 
1920-1937 -0.2 0.8 0.5 0.8 
1946-1979 -0.5 1.6 -0.1 -0.6 
1980-2007 1.4 1.8 1.7 -0.4 
Notes: * Simple averages, same samples as above. 
Sources: Public Finances in Modern History database: Ariel J. Binder et al., “A Modern History of 
Fiscal Prudence and Profligacy,” IMF Working Paper (Washington D.C., 2013), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40222.0. 
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Although there are fewer comparative studies on public employment growth, the available data 
shows a similar trajectory. A study using a sample of six Western countries found that 
government employment roughly doubled as a share of the labour force between 1951 and 
1981.170 In tandem came the growth of the state-owned enterprise sector, which by the late 
1970s employed around 8-15% of the labour force and accounted for over 10-15% of GDP in 
sample of seven OECD countries.171  
Since the 1980s however, the level of public employment has stagnated or fallen in many parts 
of the world, in part due to privatization policies that resulted in divestures from public 
corporations.172  Table 2.2 reproduces data from a World Bank study of public employment and 
pay; it found a marked decline in the level of central government employment across all regions 
of the world over the 1980s.173 In neither period, moreover, did African countries stand out as 
having exceptionally high levels of central government employment compared to other 
developing regions. 
Table 2.2. Government employment, early 1980s and early 1990s compared 
 Central government employment as percentage of population 
 # obs Early 1980s Early 1990s 
Africa 13 1.8 1.1 
Asia 5 2.6 1.1 
Latin America 5 2.4 1.5 
OECD countries 15 2.9 1.9 
Total sample 38 2.5 1.5 
Source: Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, Giulio de Tommaso, and Amitabha Mukherjee, “Government 
Employment and Pay : A Global and Regional Perspective,” Policy Research Working Papers 
(Washington D.C., 1997)., Table 3. 
2.3. REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE IN KENYA, TANZANIA AND UGANDA 
Aggregate growth in revenue and expenditure 
In light of this global trend towards bigger states in the 20th century, with states peaking in size 
around 1980, how do Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda compare? In Figure 2.2 general government 
                                                   
170 Richard Rose, Public Employment in Western Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), 11. 
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Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Vol. III, Structural Change and Growth, 1939-2000, 
ed. Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 85.  
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government. 
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revenue (before grants) and expenditure (including net lending) are plotted as a percentage of 
GDP, with the deficit presented adjacent. The sources and assumptions made in building these 
time series are discussed in Appendix II. 
Because of the well-known problems of estimating historical GDP series in Africa,174 Figure 
2.3 present the expenditure trend in constant per capita terms (deflated by the consumer price 
index) as an alternative, which has the added advantage of incorporating the effect of price 
changes for the goods traded in East Africa, rather than those produced domestically only. 
Given the big terms to trade swings over the 1970s and 1980s, this provides an important 
alternative perspective on the government’s ability to sustain its spending on goods and 
services. Unlike GDP estimates moreover, consumer price indices are available as early as the 
1940s, which makes it possible to examine these expenditure and revenue trends further back 
in time. Public finance data for the 1940s and 1950s, however, has only been compiled for the 
central government (see dotted line), but nonetheless indicates the direction of change. 
Figure 2.2 shows that the Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan revenue and expenditure 
trajectories roughly match the global inflection points, with strong state expansion from the 
late 1940s through the 1970s and a stagnation or decline thereafter. Independence did not mark 
a break with the past; the expansion of the African state started well before decolonization and 
lasted until after the global shocks of the 1970s.175 The region saw a marked rise in revenue 
and expenditure in the immediate postwar era, buoyed by strong demand for commodities 
during the postwar reconstruction and Korean War. Revenue slumped briefly in the late 1950s 
after the end of the Korean War, then resumed in the early 1960s and grew strongly until the 
early 1980s in Kenya and Tanzania, while in Uganda growth tapered off earlier in the 1970s. 
This was followed by Africa’s growth stagnation, when GDP per capita remained flat or 
regressed and the level of state expenditure fell.176 Here the contrast with other regions of the 
world is more marked. While many OECD and Asian countries saw public expenditure levels 
plateau in the 1980s, these East African cases, like some Latin American countries, experienced 
declines in revenue and expenditure relative to GDP and only a partial recovery in expenditure 
in the 2000s. 
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Figure 2.2. General government revenue, expenditure and deficit as % of GDP, 1950s – 2010 (3-year 
moving ave)  
Kenya 
 
Tanzania 
 
Uganda  
  
Sources: Statistical appendix 1. 
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Figure 2.3. Government expenditure in real per capita terms 1940s – 2010 
Kenya 
 
Tanzania 
 
Uganda  
 
Sources: Statistical appendix 1.  
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Yet spending expressed as a share of GDP doesn’t fully account for the severity of the 
expenditure decline. In all three cases, deflating public expenditure by consumer prices rather 
than expressing it as a share of GDP shows a more marked rise and decline (Figure 2.3). Real 
per capita government spending halved in Kenya and Tanzania over the 1980s and 1990s and 
fell by a factor of six in Uganda (1970s), partly as a result of the rising cost of imports brought 
about by worsening terms of trade and currency depreciations. Per capita spending fell back to 
the levels of the early 1950s, or in the Ugandan case the 1940s. Government spending was 
therefore hit by several shocks in the 1980s-1990s: expenditure to GDP was reined back at the 
same time as input costs increased. Furthermore, as will soon be discussed, debt payments rose 
during the same period placing even further downward pressure on domestic spending. 
Although state growth was not exceptionally fast, East African post-independence deficits were 
high by international standards, as spending outpaced revenue growth. Budget deficits 
expanded significantly in the 1970s and 1980s, peaking at almost 7% of GDP in Kenya (1980), 
11% in Tanzania (1980) and 11% in Uganda (1973). But these deficits were in large part a 
consequence of the dual budgeting practices of the 1960s and 1970s rather than uncontrolled 
consumption spending. The dotted lines in Figure 2.2 trace the growth in recurrent spending. 
During the period of strong expenditure growth (c.1960 – late-1970s, or early 1970s in 
Uganda), all three countries maintained their recurrent spending below revenue and allowed it 
to grow roughly in line with revenue growth. This practice was in keeping with the budgeting 
orthodoxy of the times: recurrent costs were to be kept below recurrent revenue, while capital 
projects with a projected rate of return above the interest rate could be debt-financed.177 This 
approach had theoretical backing in the economic literature of the era, which stressed the 
economic catch-up potential of developing countries by importing capital and technology.178 
These trends in revenue and expenditure also reveal important country variation. Kenya had an 
unusually high budget deficit in the 1950s on account of the Emergency, which raised state 
outlays in the effort to supress the Mau Mau uprising. In the early 1960s the deficit fell as 
security spending decreased. It then began to grow in the 1970 and peaked in the late 1980s. 
Kenya’s economy also held up better than its neighbours through the shocks of the 1970s and 
80s. The revenue to GDP ratio increased considerably between the late 1950s and early 1980s, 
then plateaued and fell first in the 1990s with the introduction of structural reforms. 
                                                   
177 Discussed in: UG BtB 1958/59 & 1967/68; Government of Tanganyika, “Development Plan for 
Tanganyika, 1961/62 - 1963/64” (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1961); Kitching, Class and 
Economic Change in Kenya: The Making of an African Petite-Bourgeoisie. 
178 Moses Abramovitz, “Catching Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind,” The Journal of Economic 
History 46, no. 2 (1986): 385. 
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Tanzania ran the highest deficits of the three, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, but also 
received considerable aid throughout the period, thus the deficit after grants was markedly 
lower. Figure 2.2 also shows the considerable expense of the war with Uganda in 1978-79, 
which caused a sharp increase in expenditure followed by a consolidation in the 1980s. Also 
note that high inflation and rapid exchange rate deprecation led to a severe decline in 
government purchasing power in the 1980s. 
Uganda stands out as the most extreme case. Revenue as a share of GDP peaked earlier in 1966, 
with the start of Uganda’s postcolonial political upheavals. It then experienced a dramatic fiscal 
collapse in the mid-1970s, following Idi Amin’s 1971 coup and the 1972 expulsion of the 
Indian community. Revenue fell from 17% to 2%, and expenditure from 23% to 6%, and in 
many years receipts covered less than half of all spending. The official figures probably 
overstate the true decline in public spending, as record keeping also deteriorated and off-
budgetary transactions likely increased. Nonetheless, even as an account of official outlays 
only, this figure is indicative of Uganda’s state implosion. After Yoweri Museveni came to 
power in 1986 the country experienced a rapid recovery and revenue and expenditure returned 
to their pre-crisis levels.  
The changing composition of public expenditure 
These dynamics can also be examined by category of expenditure. Figure 2.4 presents a 
modified economic classification of general government expenditure to examine how the 
composition of spending changed over time. In contrast to a normal economic classification, 
defence (a functional category) is included as an independent spending category in these charts. 
The sources and adjustments to it are discussed in Appendix II. The Ugandan estimates from 
the late 1970s and early 1980s should be taken with a grain of salt, but the wage bill was, if 
anything, the most reliable of the public expenditure estimates according to the IMF.179 
This analysis shows that it was indeed the development budget which consumed most of the 
incremental rise in government expenditure in the first decade of independence. In Kenya and 
Tanzania the development budget rose from roughly 15% of expenditure at independence to 
30% by 1971, while it peaked at 26% in Uganda in 1969. As discussed in Chapter 1, an 
important objective of Africa’s first postcolonial leaders was to develop an industrial base.180 
Concerned that an undiversified primary commodity-based economy would perpetuate 
economic dependence, many African governments vigorously pursued industrial policies, 
                                                   
179 UG IMF RED 1983. 
180 Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present. 
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taxing imports heavily and using state resources to build and subsidise a nascent domestic 
manufacturing industry.181 Nationalisation policies, whereby the government formed or bought 
stakes in foreign-owned corporations, also provided a means of indigenizing the economy, 
thereby reducing foreign ownership of productive resources.182 Big infrastructure projects, in 
trunk roads, power generation and port infrastructure, also featured strongly in development 
plans.  
Funds reserved for ‘development’ because the prime budget objective - in budget speeches, 
economic analyses and development plans, officials show a preoccupation with shrinking the 
recurrent outlays in order to make fiscal space for investment.183 Tanzania’s third development 
plan for instance, stressed that ‘it will be imperative (…) to control the government recurrent 
budget in order to realize a sizeable investible surplus.’184 A World Bank report from 1977 
noted that ‘There is likely to be considerable resistance in Tanzania to any suggestion that the 
investment rate be reduced for the sake of macrofinancial balance. (…) it is clear from 
Tanzanian policy documents that maintenance of the investment rate is regarded as a principal 
indicator of commitment to development.’185 
The largely debt- and grant-financed development budget therefore drove up the debt stock, 
which in time translated into higher interest payments. As loans were denominated in foreign 
currency, currency depreciations also pushed the debt burden higher. By the 1980s debt 
payments began to crowd out capital spending. This was particularly marked in Kenya, where 
subsidies and interest peaked at 30% of spending in the early 1990s, displacing both capital 
and recurrent spending. Tanzania also experienced a high debt burden with interest payments 
peaking at 18% of expenditure, while this was less the case in Uganda which had less access 
to capital markets during Idi Amin’s rule and started receiving debt relief earlier than its 
neighbours.186 Furthermore, the composition of capital spending grew less socially productive. 
In Tanzania in particular, transfers to the floundering parastatal sector grew to consume an 
increasing share of the development budget.187  
                                                   
181 Ibid.; Gareth Austin, “The Developmental State and Labour-Intensive Industrialization: ‘Late 
Development’ Reconsidered,” Economic History of Developing Regions 25, no. 1 (June 2010): 51–74. 
182 Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda, 315. 
183 Government of Tanganyika, “Development Plan for Tanganyika, 1961/62 - 1963/64”; Uganda, 
“Sessional Paper no.2 of 1962: Proposals for the Implementation of the Main Recommendations of the 
Report of the World Bank Economic Survey Mission – ‘the Economic Development of Uganda.,’” 1962. 
184 Tanzania, “Third Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July 1976 - 30th June 
1981. Part One.,” 1976 (Dar es Salaam, 1976), 3. 
185 World Bank, “Tanzania: Basic Economic Report, Annex 1 - Domestic Finance and Resource Use” 
(Washington D.C., 1977), 93. 
186 Nancy Birdsall, John Williamson, and Brian Deese, Delivering on Debt: From IMF Gold to a New 
Aid Architecture (Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2002)., Appendix C. 
187 Gun Eriksson Skoog, The Soft Budget Constraint : The Emergence, Persistence and Logic of an 
Institution (Stockholm: Stockholm School of Economics, Economic Research Institute, 1998). 
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Figure 2.4. Government expenditure by economic classification 
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Figure 2.5. Real public sector wage spending per capita 
Kenya Tanzania Uganda 
   
Notes: Expenditure deflated by the consumer price index. 
Sources: Statistical appendix 1 
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Another important postcolonial expenditure shift was the growth in military spending. Under 
colonial rule the metropolis had effectively subsidized much of the defence of the colonies, as 
foreign policy and defence was an imperial matter rather than a responsibility of individual 
colonies.188 Domestic military spending began to grow in the independence period and 
escalated towards the end of the 1960s and 1970s in response to regional and domestic political 
instability. In Uganda the defence budget consumed almost a quarter of the government 
expenditure by the close of the civil conflict in 1986. Tanzania too, which fought a war against 
Uganda in 1978-79, saw its military spending spike and recurrent expenditure exceeded 
revenue for the first time in 1979.189 Kenya also faced growing instability on its northern 
border, as conflict broke out in Ethiopia and between Ethiopia and Somalia, although a stronger 
military may well have served domestic political purposes too. Defence spending crowded out 
both recurrent and development spending.  
Against a growing capital budget, growing military spending, and later a ballooning debt 
burden, the civilian wage budget fell as a share of total expenditure. Far from being a protected 
segment of the budget that drove up the deficit and crowded out more productive spending on 
public goods, in all three countries the wage bill contracted as a share of the budget. As a share 
of GDP the wage bill remained relatively constant in Kenya and Tanzania while it declined in 
Uganda during the crisis decades. This relative decline in wage spending started in the 1960s, 
well before the economic crisis. Deflated by consumer prices this wage bill decline was even 
more severe, owing to the rising cost of imported goods in the 1980s and 1990s. Figure 2.5 
presents the wage bill in per capita terms deflated by the CPI. The real per capita value of the 
wage bill fell by over 50% over the course of the 1980s and early 1990s in Kenya and Tanzania, 
and by almost 90% in Uganda.  
A point to note is that the wage bills of parastatals or public corporations are not included in 
Figure 2.4 (as it captures only the general government). Figure 2.6 therefore plots the wage bill 
to GDP for the entire public sector in Kenya and Tanzania, broken down by general government 
and parastatal sector. The Tanzanian data series ends around 1980 and the estimates from the 
2000s are only indicative, constructed by multiplying the number of public sector employees 
by average earnings.190 In both countries the parastatal wage bill increased in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, when industries were nationalised, and decreased starting in the 1980s with the 
plateauing and subsequent decline of the parastatal sector. Kenya also saw a decline in the size 
                                                   
188 Leigh A. Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa: The Political Economy of British Imperialism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), chap. 9. 
189  World Bank, “Tanzania: Public Expenditure Review” (Washington D.C., 1989).  
190 Employment estimates from payroll sources and ave earnings taken from the EES, see Appendix II. 
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of the general government wage bill while Tanzania’s has remained a relatively stable share of 
GDP. Wage bill estimates for Uganda’s parastatal sector are not available, but given the 
privatization reforms of the 1990s and 2000s, it seems likely that it followed a similar trend. 
Figure 2.6. Public sector wage bill as % of GDP 
Kenya Tanzania 
 
Sources: Statistical appendix 1. 
Another important shift in expenditure policy, not captured in the economic classification, was 
the rise in education spending. Table 2.3 estimates education expenditure as a share of total 
central government primary expenditure in Kenya and Uganda. The education share rose from 
12% in 1950 (recurrent spending only), to a peak of 33% of primary expenditure in 1999/2000 
in Kenya, and from 9% in 1950 to 27% in 1999/2000 in Uganda. Literature on the colonial 
state has stressed the low priority given to African education in the first decades of colonial 
rule, which colonial governments (at least in British Africa) largely outsourced to religious 
missions.191 British colonial policy in Africa also discouraged the expansion of post-primary 
education, for fear that this would fuel nationalist sentiments and resistance to colonial rule.192 
These policies began to change cautiously in the interwar period and more rapidly in the 1940s, 
and towards the end of the colonial era the East African governments began a rapid expansion 
of the education system which continued into the postcolonial era.  
Table 2.3. Education expenditure as share of primary* central government expenditure, % of total 
 
1950 
Recurrent only 1960/61 1969/70 1979/80 1989/90 1999/00 
Kenya 10% 17% 25% 20% 26% 33% 
Uganda 9% 22%+ 20% 27% - 27% 
*Total expenditure excluding interest payments; +1961/62 for Uganda 
Sources: Statistical Appendix 1. 
                                                   
191 Ewout Frankema, “The Origins of Formal Education in Sub-Saharan Africa : Was British Rule More 
Benign ?,” European Review of Economic History 16 (2012): 335–55; Gardner, Taxing Colonial Africa: 
The Political Economy of British Imperialism. 
192 Mamdani, Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity. 
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In summary, the rise and fall in government revenue and expenditure across all three countries 
roughly coincided with global peaks and troughs, reflecting changing economic pressures on 
the state and global ideas about the role and reach of governments. As in many parts of the 
world, postcolonial leaders initially placed strong emphasis on development outlays, both in 
infrastructure and efforts to spur industrialisation. The economic legacies of this short-lasting 
attempt to change the economic foundations of the former colonies proved disappointing, but 
not because it was crowded out by ballooning wage spending. The decline in the development 
budget in the late 1970s was due to rising military expenditures and a growing debt burden 
rather than a growing wage bill. Country context clearly mattered as well, but the most extreme 
case of state mismanaged and dysfunction - Uganda – was also the state with the greatest 
neglect of its public servants. On the basis of these three cases alone the correlation appears to 
run in the opposite direction of that proposed in the structural adjustment and patronage 
literature. It was in fact the country with the largest government wage bill - Kenya - that 
experienced the milder economic contraction.193 
2.4. THE GROWTH AND DECLINE IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT  
As public expenditure grew in the 1960s and 1970s, so too did the level of public employment. 
But with growing pressure on the budget in the 1980s public employment subsequently 
declined. Figure 2.7 provides time series data on the public sector share of the labour force, 
disaggregated into four broad categories: general government, parastatals and state-owned 
enterprises, defence and the teaching force. A full discussion of the sources of data and 
assumptions made in constructing these tables is provided in Appendix II. While there is some 
uncertainty around the Tanzanian and Ugandan totals in 1980s and 1990s, I have used a variety 
of different sources to validate the results. As the military was excluded from most surveys on 
public employment, estimates for total military personnel are taken from the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies annual bulletin instead. This data is only available from 1971 but 
suggest that the armed forces were a negligible share of public employment before the mid/late 
1970s.  
                                                   
193 See also Goldsmith, “Africa’s Overgrown State Reconsidered: Bureaucracy and Economic Growth”; 
Rodrik, “What Drives Public Employment in Developing Countries ?” 
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Figure 2.7. Public sector employment as % of labour force, late 1940s – 2010  
Kenya 
 
Tanzania 
 
Uganda 
 
Sources: Statistical appendix 1 
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In all three countries employment grew rapidly after independence. In absolute terms the 
number of public sector employees tripled in Uganda, quadrupled in Kenya and increased by a 
factor of five in Tanzania between 1960 and 1990. However, all three countries experienced 
fast population growth over the same period and in relation to the size of the labour force the 
public employment growth was more modest, growing from roughly 4.5% to 7% in Kenya 
between 1960 and 1990, 2.5% to 6.5% in Tanzania, and 3.4% to 4.5% in Uganda. The Ugandan 
series exclude parastatal employment (due to the lack of long-run data), but ad hoc measures 
suggest that parastatal employment was lower than in the neighbouring countries, at 0.8% of 
the labour force in 1988.194 Even at their peaks however, these levels of public employment 
were low by international standards (Table 2.2). The public employment share then fell 
significantly in the 1990s. By 2010 public sector employment in Kenya was 40% lower than at 
independence, in Uganda 30% lower, and in Tanzania on par with the level at independence. 
Military personnel remained a small share of the total, at least in Kenya and Tanzania, rising 
to a high of 4% of all public employment in Kenya by the early 2000s, and peaking at 9% in 
Tanzania following the Uganda-Tanzania war in 1979. In Uganda the armed forces grew 
bigger, and reached a quarter of total public employment by the early 1990s.  
The broad sectoral public service divisions also show that most of the public employment 
growth was due to two factors: nationalisation policies, which brought a large share of 
industrial employment under state direction, and the growth in the teaching force. Parastatal 
employment shot up in the 1960s in Kenya and Tanzania when firms were nationalised or 
created (many were thus existing employees who were reclassified from private to public 
sector). Parastatal growth then plateaued in the 1970s and dropped back down in the 1980s and 
1990s as firms were privatized, shifting employees back from the public to the private sector.195 
The teacher share of employment in contrast continued to grow throughout the austerity period. 
Table 2.4 calculates teachers (or staff of the teacher’s service commission) as a share of total 
general government employment, drawing on records from the ministry of education and 
employment survey data. The teacher share grew from between 12-16% of general government 
employment in 1960 to 50% of more by 2010. This is a considerably higher share than in the 
UK, where the 2005 labour force survey puts the teacher share of government employment at 
21%. The growth in the 1960s and 1970s may be overstated by the incorporation of teachers in 
aided schools into the public sector (where previously they had been recorded as private), but 
even if the early estimates were raised, the growth since the 1980s alone has been significant. 
                                                   
194 Estimated at 54,000 in 1988, see: UG WB PER 1993a, p.104. 
195 For a discussion of parastatal reform, see: Nord et al., “The Story of an African Transition.” 
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Table 2.4. Share of teachers/teacher’s service commission employees in general government 
employment  
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Kenya  16% 23% 28% 38% 44% 49% 
Tanzania  12% 14% 37% 26% 36% 51% 
Uganda  14% 19% 27% 36% 60% 57% 
United Kingdom      21%* 
* UK 2005. Calculated on the basis of occupational classification. General government includes central 
government, armed forces, local government, NHS trusts and universities. 
Sources: Statistical Appendix 1 (East Africa); UK LFS 2005 (UK). 
The rising share of teachers in government employment also contributed to a shift in public 
employment composition, away from low-skilled, contractual workers towards permanent 
employees in social service provision with a comparatively high level of education. This partly 
reflected growing demand for skilled personnel, but may have been hastened by the 
employment guarantees instituted for graduates around the time of independence. Because they 
feared losing qualified staff to the private sector, all three countries had introduced employment 
guarantees for graduates from government training institutions and some university courses, 
which obliged graduates to work for the government for a set number of years and compelled 
the state to hire them.196 Kenya eventually abolished this guarantee in 1986 on the grounds that 
it was fiscally unsustainable,197 while Tanzania retained the guarantee on paper, if less so in 
practice. 
New hiring thus favoured comparatively highly educated East Africans, and the skills gap 
between the public service and rest of the labour force therefore expanded. In Kenya the share 
of public sector employees with at least four years of secondary education increased from 14% 
in 1972 to 79% in 2009; in Tanzania the share rose from 8% in 1962 to 58% in 2006; and in 
Uganda from 16% to 58% (2005/06). 198 In the labour force as a whole comparable shares were 
26% in Kenya (2009), 8% in Tanzania (2006) and 10% in Uganda (2005/06).199 
The public services also grew more female. The share of women in public employment rose 
from 8% in 1965 to 37% in 2009 in Kenya, from 6% in 1965 to 40% in 2011/12 in Tanzania, 
and from 13% in 1965 to 30% in 2005/06 in Uganda.200 
                                                   
196 K. Husbands, T. Konyango, and T Pinckney, “Education and Agricultural Productivity in Africa,” in 
The Evaluation of Public Expenditure in Africa (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1996). 
197  Kenya. National Assembly., “Sessional Paper no.1 of 1986, Economic Management for Renewed 
Growth” (Nairobi, 1986). 
198 See Appendix IV for sources and calculation method. 
199 KE CENSUS 2009; TZ LFS 2006; UG NHS 2005/06. 
200 KE EES 1963-67, Table A.10; KE CENSUS 2009; TZ EES 1965, Appendix I; TZ HBS 2011/12; UG 
EES 1965, Table 14; UG NHS 2005/06. 
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2.5. BUDGET PRIORITIES AND PUBLIC SECTOR PAY DETERMINATION  
The fall and recovery in average public sector earnings 
With government employment increasing and the wage bill remaining a constant or falling 
share of GDP, we would expect wages in the public sector to have fallen, and indeed they did. 
Figure 2.8 shows the rise and decline of average real earnings in the public sector between 1960 
and the present. It shows that formal sector workers received a wage dividend in the early 
independence era as average earnings rose in the 1960s while prices remained stable. After 
this, however, public sector wages declined steadily between the early 1970s until the 
early1990s, with a fall of almost 70% between peak and trough in Kenya, and almost 80% in 
Tanzania. The Ugandan wage trend is calculated as a multiple of GDP per capita rather than in 
constant terms due to the lack of a reliable consumer price index for the mid-1980s to 1990s. 
It suggests an even steeper decline in Uganda, with public sector earnings falling by 90% in 
relation to GDP per capita and 95% in real terms by the mid-1980s. Since the mid-1990s 
earnings have been recovering in all three countries. 
Public sector employees were not the only ones to see falls in income during this period. But 
even relative to average household consumption the wage fall was significant (see orange 
dotted line in Figure 2.8). Average public sector earnings can be expressed as a multiple of 
average household consumption (total household consumption is extracted from the national 
accounts and normalised assuming a family size of five). In Kenya this ratio fell from a high 
of 1.8 to just below 1 in the mid-1990s, and in Tanzania from 1.8 in 1975 to under a half by 
the late 1980s. In Uganda it fell from 1.3 in 1967 to 0.1 in the late 1980s. At their lowest point, 
the average government pay check did not meet the expenses of an average household in any 
of the three countries. 
For Kenya, which also produced data on agricultural output and private (formal) sector 
incomes, it is possible to compare the average public sector earnings to agricultural output per 
worker and the private wage (Figure 2.10). This shows a pronounced downward trend in 
relation to both agricultural output per worker and private sector earnings up until the mid-
1990s. After that, government earnings recovered relative to agricultural output per worker, 
but continued to decline against private sector earnings. 
  
 76 
 
Figure 2.8. Average real monthly earnings in the public sector compared to average household 
consumption expenditure, 2010 prices  
Kenya 
 
Tanzania 
 
Uganda (Note: Average earnings as a multiple of GDP per capita) 
 
Sources: Statistical appendix 1. 
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Figure 2.9. Relationship between relative government wages, level of public employment and total wage 
bill 
Kenya 
 
Tanzania 
 
Uganda 
 
Sources: Statistical appendix 1. 
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Figure 2.10. Kenya: average government earnings as a multiple of agricultural output per worker and 
average formal sector salaries, 1960-2009 
 
Sources: Statistical appendix 1. 
As just discussed, the educational level within the public service increased sharply over the 
postcolonial period, as new employment favoured teachers, nurses and other comparatively 
high skilled professionals. The average earning declines in Figure 2.8 therefore understates the 
true extent of the formal real wage falls. Table 2.5 gives real salaries for particular positions in 
the Kenyan government as an alternative to averages across the public sector. Because of 
changes in the grading and nomenclature it is hard to match roles precisely over time, but post 
titles have been selected where there is relatively little variation over time and from within the 
same or a related ministry. These trends mirror the declines already observed in real wages, but 
shows an even steeper decline in more senior roles. It is hard to fully account for allowances 
and benefits which may in part have dampened the severity of the decline (particularly benefits 
provided in-kind such as government housing). Allowances included here are averages for the 
department (except for 2011/12 when detailed by post). On the whole however, the decline was 
dramatic and it is hard to see how a more regressive allowance distribution would have been 
able to off-set these base salary falls. Combining the base salary and estimated allowances, a 
director’s salary in 1993/94 was a sixth of what it had been in 1971; it then roughly doubled 
between 1993/94 and 2011/12. Minimum wages declined by less than senior salaries, leading 
to a compression in the salary structure, with the ratio between a director’s salary and the 
minimum wage falling from 30:1 in 1961 to 10:1 by the 1990s. These findings are consistent 
with the literature on returns to education in Kenya, which found sharply falling private returns 
to secondary education between 1978 and 1995.201  
                                                   
201 Simon Appleton, Arne Bigsten, and Damiano Kulundu Manda, “Educational Expansion and 
Economic Decline : Returns to Education in Kenya,” WPS (Oxford, 1999). 
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Table 2.5. Kenya: Real budgeted salary and allowances for selection of positions, Annual 2010 KSh. 
(‘000) 
 1961/62 1971/72 1981/82 1993/94 2011/12 
Director – base salary 6129 5099 2419 713 1138 
Director – allowances* 447 372 556 185 860 
Officer – Level I – base salary 2043 2086 786 294 272 
Officer – Level I – allowances* 143 146 181 76 110 
Minimum wage 204 214 147 68 116 
Director:minimum wage 30:1 24:1 16:1 10:1 10:1 
* Estimated as a share of total allowances for the department, except for 2011/12 where allowances are 
tabulated by post. 
Sources: Kenya: Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure, 1961/62, 1971/72, 1981/82, 1993/94 and 2011/12. 
Taken from the budgets of Ministry of Commerce and Industry / Ministry of Commerce (1981) / Ministry 
of Trade (2011/12). Minimum wages: statistical appendix 1. 
To examine earnings differences across the three countries, Figure 2.11 convert the average 
government earnings into US dollars, at official exchange rates, deflated by the US consumer 
price index. The results are skewed by the overvalued exchange rates in the 1970s and 1980s 
and growing spread between the official and black market rate, particularly in Uganda and 
Tanzania. Moreover, the exact wage bill coverage differs slightly between the counties, and as 
a result we should take these results as rough estimates only. This exercise suggests that 
earnings have been highest in Kenya for most of the period, although the particularly large 
wage differential the 1960s is largely due to the larger share of expatriate officers in Kenya. 
Since the 1990s average earnings have converged across the region. In fact, in USD terms the 
Kenyan and Tanzanian average earnings are similar today, while earnings in Uganda lag behind 
those in the neighbouring countries.  The sharp income spike in Tanzania in 1974 is related to 
the reorganisation of government, which saw the layoff of disproportionately lower skilled 
local government staff and thus a rise in average earnings.  
Figure 2.11. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: Average government earnings in 2010 US$, 1960-2010 
 
Sources: statistical appendix 1. 
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The trade-off between employment and wages 
By combining the data on total government employment and average earnings we can examine 
how the wage level responded to the growth in employment after independence. Expressed in 
relation to GDP per capita, average government wages are a direct function of the size of the 
wage bill (in relation to GDP) and the level of employment (in relation to the population). This 
relationship can be expressed as follows: 
Average govt wage/GDP per capita = govt wage bill/GDP / govt employment/population 
It follows that a relative rise in the average government wage will be due either to a rise in the 
size of the wage bill relative to GDP or a fall in government employment relative to the 
population. Examining how these three variables changed over time therefore gives insight into 
the relative priority afforded to wages or employment. Figure 2.9 plots these three variables, 
using indices to ease the comparison of change over time. These plots show an inverse 
relationship between relative government earnings and the level of employment and suggest 
that the period was characterised by three different policy phases. In the late 1950s and 1960s 
average government earnings rose while the level of public employment fell (albeit less so in 
Tanzania where employment stayed relatively flat). In the 1970s this relationship reversed and 
average earnings began to fall shortly after public sector employment shot up as a share of the 
labour force. In the 1990s the relationship reversed once more as governments restricted public 
employment growth in order to allow earnings to recover.  
In Tanzania and Uganda the average wage path was also strongly influenced by the declining 
size of the overall wage bill in the 1970s and 1980s, but at the same total wage spend, earnings 
would have been considerably higher if the level of public employment to population had not 
also been growing. The next section discusses how the policy literature described the 
government’s employment policies and the priority placed on job creation versus wage 
increases over these three different phases.  
The labour stabilization era, 1950s- 1960s 
As discussed in Chapter 1, public sector employees saw their earnings rise substantially in the 
late colonial period. The average earnings in the colonial period mask extreme differences in 
pay across pay grades and racial groups; in 1947 for instance, the average European public 
sector employee in Kenya earned 30 times the average African wage.202 These large earning 
differentials began to narrow in the 1950s as earnings rose across the board, but particularly 
                                                   
202 Statistical Appendix 1. 
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sharply for the lowest earners. Real wages had fallen considerably during the Second World 
War and a series of strikes among dock workers, railway workers and other manual labourers 
in the second half of the 1940s and 1950s across cities in Africa threatened the colonial order. 
In response to this labour unrest and rising nationalist agitation, colonial governments sought 
to ‘stabilize’ the African formal labour force through the introduction of minimum wage 
legislation and responsible trade unionism.203  
Government publications from the period speak to an explicit trade-off between employment 
and earnings. After the sharp rise in employment immediately after WWII, colonial 
governments curbed employment to make fiscal space for wage increases, to placate the 
increasingly militant urban working class.204 For Africans alone, real earnings rose almost four-
fold in Kenya and Tanzania and three-fold in Uganda between the late 1940s and c.1970 as 
minimum wages were progressively raised (Figure 2.12). By independence the expatriate wage 
share in Kenya had fallen considerably and the European: African wage ratio fell to 12:1. By 
the early postcolonial era, a government job was an attractive prospect both for unskilled 
workers and the growing pool of Africans with formal education.205  
Figure 2.12. Real average public sector earnings, African employees only, late 1940s – early 1970s 
 
Note: Series switches from ‘African’ to ‘citizens’ after 1970 in Tanzania and 1974 in Kenya. 
Sources: Statistical Appendix 1.  
                                                   
203 Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa; 
Weeks, “Wage Policy and the Colonial Legacy - a Comparative Study”; Grillo, Race, Class, and 
Militancy; an African Trade Union, 1939-1965; Freund, The African Worker; John Iliffe, The African 
Poor: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
204 Uganda. Ministry of Finance., “Background to the Budget 1963-64” (Entebbe: Government Printer, 
1963). 
205 Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa; 
Freund, The African Worker. 
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These developments were the basis for Saul and Arrighi’s ‘labour aristocracy’ thesis and 
Bates’s urban bias theory, discussed in Chapter 1. These scholars argued that a 
disproportionately powerful urban African wage working class commanded wages well above 
the reservation price, financed through high taxation of the agricultural sector.206 They 
predicted that these formal wage earners would use their disproportionate political leverage to 
perpetuate their privileged status. 
Employment growth and wage decline, 1970s – early 1990s 
Yet counter to these predictions, average public sector earnings began to fall in the 1970s. In 
practical terms the wage adjustments took place almost entirely through inflation. Several of 
the big wage shocks coincided with the oil price shocks of the 1970s, early 1980s and 2000s. 
Because government wage setting is done sporadically, and usually in big, across the board 
wage awards, there was sometimes a partial compensation for inflation a few years after an 
inflationary spike as the government ratcheted average earnings back up again. But unlike in 
Europe in the 1970s when wage indexing ensured that salaries rose in line with inflation, in 
East Africa average wages grew considerably slower than the price index over the course of 
the 1970s and 1980s. 
Although macroeconomic instability and weak budgetary control may have hastened the wage 
decline, government publications from the era also speak to an active attempt to limit wage 
growth in the interest of employment growth. After independence all three governments were 
quick to temper the demands of wage earners. All three had an institutional architecture in place 
for managing wage growth and made frequent policy pronouncements about the government’s 
preferred wage path.207 Starting in the 1960s, union powers were successively curbed across 
the region. Tanzania abolished unions in 1964,208 Uganda restricted union activities in 1964 
and outlawed strike action in 1970,209 while the Kenyan government made it virtually 
impossible for workers to strike in 1972.210 The number of man-days lost annually to strikes 
fell considerably shortly before real earnings began to decline, see examples from Kenya and 
Tanzania below (Figure 2.13). Moreover, government salary scales were determined centrally 
                                                   
206Arrighi and Saul, “Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa”; Bates, Markets and 
States in Tropical Africa : The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies.  
207 The Kenyan Industrial Court and the Tanzanian Permanent Labour Tribunal received guidelines on 
wage policy from the government and had the power to vet collective bargaining agreements, see: 
Richard H. Sabot and John B. Knight, Education, Productivity, and Inequality : The East African Natural 
Experiment (Oxford ; New York: Published for the World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1990).  
208 Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania. 
209 Mamdani, Politics and Class Formation in Uganda. 
210 Arne Bigsten, Education and Income Determination in Kenya (Hampshire and Brookfield: Gower 
Publishing Company, 1984). 
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which weakened the bargaining power of any individual public sector cadre. In Tanzania wage 
setting in the country’s bulging parastatal sector was also (at least formally) brought in line 
with regular governmental wage setting to avoid competition between the two sectors through 
the 1967 Standing Committee on Parastatal Organisations.211   
Figure 2.13. Real earnings in the public sector compared to intensity of strike action  
Kenya Tanzania 
 
Sources: Data Appendix 1. Note: Kenya 1997 spike due to teachers strike. 
Policy documents from this era speak to an active attempt to contain public sector salaries. 
Concerned that senior government wages were set too high on account of the colonial wage 
scale and that the public sector employment was contributing to urban-rural income 
differentials, governments sought to prevent further wage creep. ‘[C]reating more jobs for the 
unemployed must take precedence over increasing the incomes of those already employed’ was 
the official position of the Kenyan government in 1967.212 Julius Nyerere made a similar plea 
in his inaugural speech as President in 1962, emphasising the risk of tension between highly 
paid civil servants and the uneducated majority.213 When it came to salary adjustments 
moreover, policies stated that wages of lower-paid employees were to be raised more than those 
at the top, in an effort to compress the large wage spread within the public service. 
                                                   
211 Although empirical studies suggest that the parastatals paid a wage premium, see: David L Lindauer 
and Richard H Sabot, “The Public/private Wage Differential in a Poor Urban Economy,” Journal of 
Development Economics 12 (1983): 137. 
212 Government of Kenya, “Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1967, Proposals by the Government of Kenya for 
the Implementation of the Recommendations Contained in the Report of the Public Service Salaries 
Review Commission,” 1967. 
213 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity : A Selection from Writings and Speeches 1952-65 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1967). 
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The Kenyan policy discourse from the early 1970s was strongly influenced by concerns about 
urban unemployment, particularly among secondary school leavers.214 A series of tripartite 
agreements in Kenya (1964, 1970 and 1979) bound the government and private sector to 
increase the number of jobs by a set percentage in exchange for wage restraint on the part of 
trade unions, with the explicit aim of producing jobs for the unemployed.215 While the actual 
impact of these agreements has been debated (some argue that it had little real effect on 
employment),216 it is a testament to how politically important the government perceived the 
unemployment problem to be. 
The wage adjustment processes differed in the three countries. Kenya’s government adjusted 
civil services wages intermittently based on the recommendation of a series of Parliamentary-
appointed commissions on public service remuneration. In 1963, at the recommendation of the 
Pratt Commission, the Kenyan government raised public sector wages at the top of the 
distribution with the explicit aim of attracting Kenyans from the private to the public sector in 
order to speed up the process of Kenyanization.217 The following 1967 Millar-Craig 
Commission, however, argued for wage restraint at the higher levels of the civil service and 
modest wage increases only at the lower levels.218 In 1971 the Ndegwa Commission introduced 
a new wage scale that raised salaries at all levels.219 But with inflation rising following the oil 
shocks of the 1970s, real earnings eroded quickly in the mid-late 1970s. In line with 
government guidance, the subsequent 1979/80 Waruhiu Commission and 1985 Ramtu 
Commission both recommended that lower paid workers should receive wage awards that fully 
compensated them for the rising cost of living, while those at the middle and higher level would 
only be partially compensated.220 This compressed the wage scale and caused average earnings 
to fall.221 Inflation spiked again in the early 1990s and rapidly drove down earnings as the 
                                                   
214 Abernethy, “Bureaucratic Growth and Economic Stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa”; Cohen, 
“Importance of Public Service Reform : The Case of Kenya.” 
215 J. T. Mukui, “The Politics and Economics of the 1979 Tripartite Agreement in Kenya: A Note,” 
African Affairs 82, no. 329 (1983): 559–63. 
216 Ibid. 
217 L. J. Pratt, “Report of the Commission on the Kenya Civil Service, the Kenya Teaching Services, the 
East African Posts and Telecommunications Administrations and the General Fund Services of the East 
African Common Services Organisation” (Nairobi, 1963). 
218 Government of Kenya, “Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1967, Proposals by the Government of Kenya for 
the Implementation of the Recommendations Contained in the Report of the Public Service Salaries 
Review Commission”; Kenya, “Kenya Civil Service Salaries Review Committee 1985 (Chairman: T.C. 
Ramtu)” (Nairobi, 1985). 
219 Ndegwa, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry: Public Service Structure and Remuneration 
Commission 1970-71.” 
220 Kenya. National Assembly., “Sessional Paper no.10 of 1980 on the Acceptance and Implementation 
of the Recommendations of the Civil Service Review Committee, 1979/80” (Nairobi, 1980). 
221 Thomas Piketty argues that this is a general phenomena; wage inequality rises in boom years but falls 
in downturns as those at the lower end of the spectrum are compensated more fully for inflation, see: 
Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2014), 287.  
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structural adjustment negotiations with Kenya’s donors broke down. Only in 1994, as the 
structural adjustment programme got back on track and the government began implementing a 
civil service reform programme did Kenyan formal sector salaries begin to recover.222  
In Tanzania the wage awards continued for a few years after independence, with new minimum 
wage awards in 1963 and 1965 that drove up average earnings in both the public and private 
sectors. 223 But average earnings then plateaued with the introduction of the Arusha Declaration 
in 1967, which heralded Tanzania’s move to the left. The government explicitly sought a 
solidaristic incomes policy that would reduce social inequality, and even reduced nominal 
salaries of high paid civil servants by 10-15% in 1967. The 1967 Permanent Labour Tribunal 
Act and new incomes policy limited wage and benefits increases to a maximum of 5% in any 
year, in an effort to reduce a perceived urban bias.224 The government issued a further large 
wage award that came into effect in 1974, again targeting workers at the lower end of the 
distribution (see spike in earnings and the wage bill in Figures 2.5 and 2.9).225 But high inflation 
in the following years quickly eroded this boon. Between 1975 and 1980 the government froze 
wages in the public sector (to counter the perceived urban-bias) which resulted in a rapid 
decline in earnings. High inflation continued to eat into real earnings into the 1980s and it was 
only after the structural adjustment reforms began in earnest in the late 1980s, including a long-
running pay reform programme with donor support, that average wages began to recover while 
the level of employment ceased to grow. 
In Uganda in contrast there were fewer adjustments to the public sector salary structure after 
independence. Uganda experienced a terms of trade decline in the 1960s which raised the 
deficit, and already in this period the budget efforts focused on restraining recurrent spending. 
In 1963 the government appointed the Ani Commission, with the aim of reducing the wage bill 
and reducing extreme disparities in pay.226 However, the commission concluded that salaries 
could not be reduced without losing scarce, skilled manpower, and recommended modest 
increases instead. After that no new commission was appointed until 1973 (the Bikangaga 
Commission), by which time real earnings had fallen considerably, as they had only been 
                                                   
222 Damiano Kulundu Manda, “Incentive Structure and Efficiency in the Kenyan Civil Service,” 
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adjusted through allowable annual increments and increases in the minimum wage over the 
preceding decade.227 The 1973 commission recommended a reduction in the size of the public 
service and an increase in taxes in order to generate the fiscal space for wage increases, but its 
recommendations were never implemented and real earnings continued to decline. Under 
Obote’s second Presidency in the 1980s salaries and allowances were raised across the board, 
but as inflation spiked again in the 1980s, this did little to reverse the decline. A government 
study reported that by 1990 the base pay for an entry-level degree-holder was $7 per month, 
and a Permanent Secretary officially earned $23, although a complicated structure of 
allowances and benefits raised effective pay somewhat.228  
Structural adjustment and public service reform, 1990s – 2000s 
Already by the 1980s, the policy discourse in East Africa started to emphasise the unsustainable 
rate of employment expansion and negative effects of the public sector wage decline. The 
Kenyan Minister of Finance stressed in his 1985 budget speech that ‘[t]here is evidence that 
Government employment has expanded excessively. (...) if we want to avoid landing in the 
predicament where much of the Civil Service sits around drawing its salaries, unable to perform 
economically meaningful services for the population, we must take forceful action.’229 Reforms 
started cautiously in the 1980s with employment freezes and other means of curbing new hires. 
From the late 1980s and on IMF and World Bank programmes across the region commonly 
included structural benchmarks related to restraining the wage bill and size of the civil service.  
Uganda initiated a donor-supported civil service reform programmes in 1990 and Kenya and 
Tanzania followed in 1993.230 These programmes were explicitly designed to reduce staffing 
numbers to finance increases in salaries, which both governments and donors agreed had fallen 
too low. In Uganda the government established a minimum living wage based on a 1989-90 
living cost survey, and sought to raise the government minimum wage to this level. Staff 
numbers were reduced by almost half through a combination of employment freezes, payroll 
cleaning and removal of inactive workers, voluntary early retirement schemes and 
                                                   
227 John Bikangaga, “Uganda: Report of the Public Service Salaries Commission 1973-74” (Kampala: 
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Development 15, no. 1 (1995): 365–90; Graham Teskey and Richard Hooper, “Tanzania Civil Service 
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redundancies. In tandem all three governments initiated programmes to reform the parastatal 
sector, with long-running privatization programmes that reduced the number of parastatal staff.  
Although these reform programmes have been criticised for failing to bring about a meaningful 
change in staff capacity and civil service effectiveness,231 in pure numerical terms they largely 
achieved their objectives. The number of staff fell across the civil services in all three countries, 
which set against continued rapid population growth resulted in a sharp reduction in the public 
service share of the labour force. Salaries were successively increased over the course of the 
1990s and 2000s, resulting in improvements in real earnings, although some of the increase in 
average earnings was also due to the disproportionate number of retrenchments in the lower 
cadres. Adjusting for skill, base wages for senior staff remain well below the levels of the 1960s 
(see Kenya example in Table 2.5), although various evaluation studies have found them to be 
roughly commensurate with pay levels in the private sector.232 
The rationalisation of the public service also coincided with the HIV/AIDS crisis, which hit 
East Africa hard with adult prevalence rates between 7-13% in the late 1990s.233 AIDS-related 
deaths peaked in 2002 in Kenya, 2004 in Tanzania and 1998 in Uganda.234  Literature from the 
early 2000s predicted a considerable impact on the public sector work force,235 but more recent 
estimates suggest that the effect may have been more muted than originally feared. A 1998 
study from Uganda found teacher mortality of just below 1%, declining to 0.72% by 2003, 
which represented around 20% of the overall teacher attrition (and of which only a share can 
be attributed to AIDS).236 Tanzania reported an increase in teacher mortality from 0.37% to 
0.75% between 1991 and 2003,237 and in Kenya the teacher death toll reportedly rose from 450 
in 1995 to 1500 in 1999, a rise in rate from 0.2% to 0.6%.238 These scattered estimates suggest 
an increase in the public sector mortality rate during the late 1990s, which, all else being equal, 
would have increased the pace of public service decline. Yet other reasons for leaving 
(retirement, voluntary departure, other morbidities), remained the bigger drivers of attrition. 
                                                   
231 Ibid. 
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This review of the process of salary revisions reinforces the earlier findings: for much of the 
postcolonial era, protecting high public sector salaries was not a key budget priority. The wage 
budget remained a constant or falling share of spending across the period, and during the first 
decades of independence all three governments explicitly prioritized employment growth over 
the protection of the wages of those already in employment. Policy documents from the era 
show that governments were aware of this trade-off, and acknowledged that they were unable 
to raise salaries in line with inflation. This trend was only reversed with the advent of structural 
adjustment, when, with donor encouragement, all three governments rationalised or froze 
public employment appointments in order to raise pay.  
2.6. THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT  
One further important postcolonial public expenditure shift was the changing geographic 
distribution of public sector spending. The colonial era had saddled postcolonial states with a 
geographically skewed pattern of public spending, particularly so is in settler colonies such as 
Kenya. European and Asian state and private sector employees were disproportionately based 
in Nairobi, Mombasa, Dar es Salaam and Kampala and Entebbe.239 In Kenya moreover, a 
system of pass laws had limited the free internal movement of Africans within the country and 
prevented Africans from settling in Nairobi. Uganda also contended with the special status of 
Buganda, governed from Mengo on the outskirts of today’s Kampala, which was richer and 
had greater political autonomy than the other kingdoms within the colonial state. 
In Kenya in 1956, 56% of all formal sector salaries and wages were earned in Nairobi or 
Mombasa.240 In 1972, the first year for which sectorally disaggregated data is available, 23% 
of all public sector employees were found in Nairobi, although the city was home to 5% of the 
nation’s population.241 In Tanzania in 1965, 19% of public sector employees were based in Dar 
es Salaam which was home to only 3% of the population, and in Uganda 20% of public sector 
employees were based in Kampala, which contained 4% of the country’s population.242 Even 
outside the main cities, colonial government spending had been influenced by the uneven 
                                                   
239 Although this dualism was less pronounced than in Francophone Africa, see: Thomas Bossuroy and 
Denis Cogneau, “Social Mobility in Five African Countries,” The Review of Income and Wealth 59 
(2013): 84–110. 
240 42% of total formal earnings accrued to employees in Nairobi and 14% in Mombasa. Statistical 
abstract 1956. 
241 Earliest year for which data is available. KE EES 1972. 
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penetration of missionaries and an uneven distribution of colonial investments, which skewed 
the distribution of the public sector jobs.243  
Since the colonial period, as rural-urban migration increased and social services were expanded 
across each respective country, public employment has grown more geographically equitable. 
Geographic inequality in public sector employment can be measured by calculating the number 
of public sector employees per capita by district or region and examining the coefficient of 
variation across them. For Kenya a geographic breakdown of formal sector employment and 
pay by Kenya’s 32 districts is available from 1972, although a disaggregation by sector 
(public/private) and district is only available for a smaller subset of years. The Kenyan data 
from the employment and earnings surveys is complemented with data from the 1994 
household survey and 2009 census. For Tanzania, data for the private and government sector244 
broken down by mainland Tanzania’s 20 regions, is available from the employment and 
earnings surveys between 1965-1980, and from the 1993, 2000/01 and 2011/12 household 
surveys. For Uganda there are fewer data points, and we are limited to comparing the EES data 
for 1965 – 1970, to the results from the 1987 census of civil servants and 1992 integrated 
household survey, using the 1960 district divisions. Note that district and regional divisions 
have undergone changes in all three countries. The method for harmonizing geographic areas 
and detailed source information is provided in Appendix III. 
As shown in Figure 2.14, in all three countries public employment became more equitably 
distributed on a geographic basis over time. In Kenya the coefficient of variation of the public 
employment share across districts fell from close to 1 to 0.4 between 1972 and 1994 and in 
Tanzania from 1.1 to 0.4 (albeit with some fluctuations that may reflect data quality problems). 
It fell in Uganda too, although with only four data points these results should be treated as 
tentative. In Kenya, where we distinguish between public sector jobs and all formal sector jobs 
(public and private), shows that public sector jobs are much more evenly distributed than those 
in the private sector, with a public sector coefficient of variation roughly half has large as that 
for the formal sector overall. 
For Kenya and Tanzania it is also possible to measure the inequality in the distribution of 
formal sector pay (Figure 2.15). In Kenya the regional distribution of the public sector wage 
                                                   
243 There is a large literature on the economic geography of colonialism, for instance that by Nathan 
Nunn on the links between missionary penetration and schooling: Nathan Nunn, “Religious Conversion 
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sector. The government sector denotes the central and local government and former EAC functions. 
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bill is available for a subset of years, while for Tanzania we can only measure the distribution 
of the formal sector wage bill in aggregate (of which the public sector constituted 55-75%). 
For each district/region I calculate the formal sector earnings per capita and then measure the 
coefficient of variation across districts or regions. Although the distribution of earnings 
remained more unequal than the distribution of jobs (given the continued concentration of high 
skilled jobs in the urban centres), the fall in the coefficient of variation was also substantial on 
a wage bill basis. In Kenya the coefficient of variation fell even more steeply on a wage bill 
than employment basis, reflecting the added effect of the compression in earnings over the 
same era and creation of higher skilled jobs in more peripheral regions. 
This dynamic was heavily influenced by the declining exceptionalism of the capital cities. As 
Table 2.6 shows, public employment growth was more rapid outside the capital city than inside 
it, reflected in the falling share of public sector employees resident in the capital. At the same 
time rapid migration into the capital cities (evidenced by the rising capital city population 
share), raised the share of the population served by the capital cities’ public sector employees.  
As a result of these two dynamics, today’s public sector employees in Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda are more evenly distributed across their respective countries than in the 1960s and 
1970s. The implications of this will be explored further in Chapter 4. 
Figure 2.14. Coefficient of variation for district/regional public/govt employment to population ratio 
Kenya  
(32 districts) 
Tanzania  
(20 regions) 
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Uganda 
(16 districts) 
 
 
Sources: Appendix III. 
Figure 2.15. Coefficient of variation for district/regional formal sector earnings per capita 
Kenya  
(32 districts) 
Tanzania  
(20 regions) 
 
Sources: Appendix III. 
Table 2.6. Share of government/public sector employees resident in the capital cities (closest year 
available to benchmark year) 
  c.1970 c.1980 c.1990 c.2000 
Nairobi (Kenya) Population share 5% 6% 7% 8% 
Public 
employment  
share 23% 24% 15% 17% 
Dar es Salaam 
(Tanzania) 
Population share 4% 5% 7% 7% 
Government 
employment share 18% 16% 10% 13% 
Kampala 
(Uganda) 
Population share 4%  5%  
Government 
employment share 20%  14%  
Sources: Kenya: KE EES 1972 and 1982, KE WMS 1994, KE CENSUS 2009; Tanzania: TZ EES 1970 
and 1980, TZ HRDS 1992, TZ HBS 2000/01; Uganda: UG SA 1970, UG IHS 1992.  
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2.7. CONCLUSION 
Various emotive claims have been made about the development of the African state after 
independence. While some regarded the public service as a narrow, highly paid exclusive club, 
others criticised governments for excessive employment growth at the expense of more socially 
productive spending. These arguments have implications for how we understand the politics of 
employment in postcolonial Africa.  
To test these claims, this chapter has sought to unpack the broader budget priorities in 
postcolonial Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda by starting from the aggregate resource envelope 
and examining how the distribution of resources within this envelope changed over time. 
Drawing from a range of statistical publications, it collates data on government revenue and 
expenditure, employment and average earnings over a 50-year time horizon. 
This perspective reveals how strongly the availability of budget resources dictated employment 
and wage dynamics. Economic historians of African colonialism have long stressed that 
colonial policy was intimately tied to resource constraints;245 unsurprisingly these constraints 
continued to shape the policy space after independence. As in other regions of the world, the 
Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan state expenditure and deficits expanded in the 1960s and 
1970s during a period of high economic growth, then plateaued or fell in the 1980s as growth 
slowed (albeit with an earlier decline in Uganda owing to Idi Amin’s 1971 coup). The level of 
public employment responded with a lag to these changing economic conditions, with 
continued employment growth into the early 1980s followed by a sharp decline in the 1990s. 
The changing composition of government expenditure shows that it was not the expansion of 
the wage bill that generated these budget imbalances; the wage bill remained a constant or 
falling share of GDP and total expenditure for all but a few years. Compositional changes to 
the budget were at first driven by the development budget, which consumed the lion’s share of 
the budgetary increment in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the late 1970s military spending began 
to eclipse the development budget, as political instability in the region escalated. This was 
followed by a growing share of spending on debt service in the 1980s. 
A long-run perspective also tempers the assessment of public employment growth. Set against 
rapid population growth, public sector employment grew rapidly for roughly a decade and a 
half, from the mid-1960s until the early 1980s. After that public employment levels plateaued 
or fell as governments instituted employment freezes and redundancy programmes. In 
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proportion to the labour force, the public services of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are on par 
or smaller today than in the mid-1960s. 
As a result of prioritizing the development budget, military expenditure and debt service over 
growth of the wage bill, and prioritizing the expansion of the public service over wage growth 
for existing employees, real earnings in the public sector fell significantly between the 1970s 
and 1990s. As deficits widened, the wage bill was effectively held in check through high 
inflation which eroded real earnings. This decline in earnings was partly a result of growing 
employment, which spread the shrinking wage bill ever more thinly among an increasing 
number of staff. Another reason for the earning declines was the falling value of the wage bill 
in aggregate; as the terms of trade and exchange rates declined, the import-dependent urban 
wage class faced sharply rising commodity prices.  
Inflationary pressures in the 1970s and 1980s were not unique to East Africa, although the 
levels of inflation in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were high by global standards. An important 
difference between these East African cases and Western European and North American 
economies during this same period, however, was the extent to which workers were able to 
incorporate compensation for inflation into their wage demands. In the 1970s many 
governments in industrialized countries allowed wage indexation, which pegged wages to the 
rate of inflation. 246 As a result, high inflation had an immediate effect on budgets, forcing up 
the deficit further. This vicious inflationary spiral has been blamed for runaway inflation, but 
an alternative interpretation is that the strong bargaining power of workers forced governments 
to abandon this inflationary adjustment method relatively quickly. In Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda in contrast, workers were less successful in protecting real earnings, which allowed 
wage declines and deficit financing to continue for longer and presumably had serious 
consequences for worker motivation. Whether active or passive, the decision on the part of 
East Africa’s governments to allow wages to decline over a 20 year period while employment 
expanded lowered the average official earnings of public sector employees by between 70-
95%. Other researchers have calculated that the base wages of senior Tanzanian officials had 
by 1986 declined to one-twentieth of their value in 1969.247 In Uganda in 1990, an entry-level 
university graduate earned a base wage of US$7 per month. Earnings recovered considerably 
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following the reforms of the 1990s, but comparing wage levels by grade or qualification shows 
that by 2010 they still remained well below their levels at independence. 
As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, these wage developments explain why class analyses of 
African societies waned in the 1980s and dependency theory lost some of its credibility. The 
supposed protectors of the neo-colonial order, Africa’s privileged public servants, proved to be 
among the first to be sacrificed in the economic downturn.248 While there may have been 
pockets or individuals within the public service who continued to profit from their positions, 
the living standard of the average public sector employee must have declined. Informal rents 
and other means of compensating staff for falling wages may have off-set some of the decline 
in wages, but such compensation could only have been partial. Back-of-the-envelope 
calculations for Kenya and Tanzania suggests that in order to maintain constant average 
earnings over this period, the informal component of the public sector wage bill would have 
had to be three or four times as large as the official wage bill by the early 1990s, and the ‘true’ 
public sector wage bill would have consumed 30-40% of GDP. This is clearly an unrealistic 
scenario. In the coming chapter the consequences of these earning declines will be explored 
further by examining how they influenced the relative economic standing of public sector-
headed households.  
This begs the question why employees remained in public employment, despite what appears 
to be a (partially) policy-induced relative income decline. Although real incomes fell in the 
private sector too in the 1980s and 1990s (as indicated in Figure 2.8), the declines were 
particularly severe in the public sector. That said, the assumption that governments remained a 
competitive employer needs to be nuanced. Policy literature shows that East African 
governments did in fact lose manpower and faced vacancies in the more senior grades and in 
specific technical cadres.249 Across the larger public service however, there was no dramatic 
manpower loss. 
Some have suggested that the relative decline in formal sector earnings reflected changes in 
the labour supply. Civil servant salaries were high in the early colonial era because skills were 
in short supply, consequently salaries fell as educational attainment rose. Several papers on 
Kenya have explored this argument, showing that the returns to education fell among secondary 
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school leavers as their share of the labour market grew.250 With respect to Tanzania and 
Uganda, Terkildsen and Tidemand have similarly argued that the growing number of university 
graduates since the 1990s have made labour markets more competitive and held public sector 
salaries in check.251 But while this may be a factor in the equation, it fails to explain why 
salaries fell so low that both governments and their international partners felt it necessary to 
raise earnings sharply again. At least by the early 1990s, the market for skills seemed to be 
failing both the workers and the employers. Furthermore, salaries declined more in Tanzania 
and Uganda than in Kenya, despite their slower expansion of secondary and tertiary education 
in those two countries, which suggests that other factors were also at play.  
Many have also argued that workers responded by shirking. As earnings declined so did effort. 
The opportunity cost of holding a public sector job was low as it could be combined with other 
forms of income generating activities.252 Furthermore a monopsony argument may hold some 
explanatory power in this context. As will be shown in Chapter 4, the government was the main 
employer of tertiary graduates, particularly for specific cadres such as teachers and nurses. In 
the short-run it may have been able to retain staff, despite falling earnings, because few other 
employment opportunities existed locally for employees with those specific skill sets.253  
The clientelist frameworks, at least in some of their iterations, also at first glance provide a 
plausible explanation for some of the public finance outcomes of the 1970s and 1980s. Some 
scholars have argued that power in Africa is brokered between political patrons, usually ethnic 
leaders, who vie for control over public sector resources. Because each individual patron 
benefits from having as many jobs as possible to distribute to his or her supporters, a tragedy 
of the commons may emerge. Each patron benefits fully from every additional job he or she 
can distribute, but bears only a portion of its cost. It may thus be individually rational to 
advocate for continued employment expansion, even when this drives down wages.  
Yet the nature of employment growth during this period is not what the clientelist theory would 
predict. Despite rising levels of employment, the wage bill in aggregate did not rise, suggesting 
central control over budget aggregates. Given the falling share of spending on wages between 
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the 1960s and 1990s, the claim that patronage pressures raised wage spending to unsustainable 
heights is not supported by the evidence. Furthermore, rather than low skilled generalist 
positions that could be distributed discretionarily to politically important constituencies, the 
Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan states primarily hired skilled employees, particularly teachers 
graduating from teacher training colleges. By the end of the 20th century roughly half the central 
government wage bill went to pay teachers, presumably in response to strong popular demand 
for schooling and possibly on account of a strong teacher’s lobby. But given that they would 
have been filtered into teaching careers at reasonably young ages and based at least in part on 
their exam results, it seems unlikely that these teachers were individually-rewarded clients of 
particular political power brokers. This argument will be explored further in Chapter 4. 
As a consequence of these employment and earning dynamics, some of the colonial budget 
legacies proved short-lived. The duality of the racially segmented public sector salary structure 
disappeared as the salary scale was compressed, urban low-skilled wage premiums declined,254 
educational supply quickly outstripped public sector demand, and public employment was 
shifted out of the capital cities and closer to the citizens. African economic historians have 
focused considerable attention on colonial legacies, seeking to explain differences in 
contemporary economic performance by studying the colonial institutional inheritance. Yet the 
policy literature reveals that postcolonial leaders and politicians were often well aware of these 
colonial legacies and sought, in various ways, to correct them. Many academics have been 
quick to dismiss these deliberate attempts to break with the past as smokescreens for the opaque 
political bargaining that informally dictated resource distribution. Yet a closer look at public 
expenditure patterns shows them to be quite consistent with official policy. They testify to the 
importance given to industrial development and educational expansion in the early 
independence period; they show the emphasis placed on expanding public employment and 
expanding service delivery rather than protecting those already in employment; and they 
suggest a considerable ambivalence towards the high-wage legacy of the late colonial era. In 
this case then, it may well be the actions aimed to correct the inequities of the past that caused 
the predicaments of the present. Over the coming two chapters the consequences of some of 
these changes will be explored further. 
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Chapter 3.  
The rise and fall of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Whereas the previous chapter examined the evolution of public employment and wages in 
relation to public expenditure and national income, this chapter considers how public servants 
fared relative to other households. It studies how the government’s role as an employer 
influenced the national income distribution by creating a large share of the high income 
employment opportunities, and how these shares changed following the shocks to income and 
public employment over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. This engages directly with an 
important question in the African political economy literature: have public servants remained 
a disproportionately large share of the postcolonial elite?  
Concerns about Africa’s beholden bourgeoisie date back to the decolonisation era. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, many of Africa’s early independence scholars feared that a large and 
highly paid public service would crowd out the continent’s under-developed private sector and 
make the upper and middle classes too indebted to the state to act as an independent economic 
interest group and counterweight to the political class. While dependency theory lost influence 
in the 1980s, the idea that the African state had undue influence over household social standing 
did not. The clientelist literature emphasised ethnicity rather than class, but it similarly 
understood African elites as a creation of the state: high income earners owed their status to 
their relations to politicians.  
This debate has recently been revived in the context of renewed economic growth in Africa but 
today offer a more optimistic outlook. A flurry of recent papers have speculated that Africa’s 
middle class may finally be coming into its own, embodied by a young, assertive, urban and 
private sector-oriented elite.255 Other scholars, however, have treaded more cautiously, 
questioning the relevance of class analysis in the African context and cautioning that the same 
political power dynamics as in earlier periods may have determined who has gained during this 
latest growth episode.256 
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Several recent papers have examined whether the role of the state has declined since 
independence and discussed its political consequences, but their findings are inconclusive. 
Lofchie has argued that Africa has indeed seen a shift from an old middle class of the 1960s – 
1980s dominated by public servants, to a new middle class solidly rooted in the private sector, 
but provides only descriptive accounts from Ghana to support this assertion.257 Antoinette 
Handley has discussed the extent to which an independent private sector is emerging in Africa, 
cautiously concluding that the private sector is playing a larger role in African economies today 
than in the past.258 Leonardo Arriola’s recent work on financial liberalisation in Africa argues 
that some of the structural adjustment reforms of the 1980s and 1990s have reduced the state’s 
control over the credit market and helped to empower a new business elite that is better placed 
to challenge the political status quo through support to opposition parties.259 This chapter 
furthers the debate by examining where East Africa’s ‘privileged’ public sector employees fell 
within their respective national income distributions. Did state employment create the 
postcolonial elite and middle class? Has its importance withered with time? 
The chapter finds that public sector employees formed a considerable share of the top 1% - 
0.1% at independence, while their share of the broader middle class was lower to begin with 
and fell considerably over the course of the postcolonial era. In 1975 Kenyan public sector 
employees comprised roughly 36% of the top income or consumption decile; by 1994 this ratio 
had dropped to 30% and by 2005/06 to 17%. In Tanzania the public sector share of the top 
decile fell from an estimated 25% in 1969 to 14% in 2011/12. While the estimates are less 
reliable, these same sources also suggest a decline in the public sector share of the top 1%. No 
Ugandan estimates are available prior to the 1990s, but by the 2000s the levels are comparable 
to those of Kenya and Tanzania, at 16% in 2005/06. These levels are lower than comparable 
estimates for the United Kingdom today. In all three countries moreover, public sector-headed 
households have relied on multiple income sources to meet household consumption needs, 
particularly during the economic crises of the 1980s and early 1990s. Without recourse to 
secondary incomes from farming, businesses or other employment, public sector-headed 
households would have seen considerably larger relative income declines. The corollary to this 
declining share of public sector employees among high income earners is an increase in the 
                                                   
609–27; Scott D. Taylor, Globalization and the Cultures of Business in Africa: From Patrimonialism to 
Profit (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012); Melber, The Rise of Africa’s Middle Class: Myths, 
Realities and Critical Engagements. 
257 Michael Lofchie, “The Political Economy of the African Middle Class,” in The Emerging Middle 
Class in Africa, ed. Mthuli Ncube and Charles Leyeka Lufumpa (New York: Routledge, 2015), 42. 
258 Handley, “Varieties of Capitalists? The Middle-Class, Private Sector and Economic Outcomes in 
Africa.” 
259 Leonardo R. Arriola, “Capital and Opposition in Africa: Coalition Building in Multiethnic Societies,” 
World Politics 65, no. 2 (2013): 233–72. 
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share of private sector employees and business owners at the top of the income distribution, 
providing some cautious support for notion of a rising private sector elite. 
Before describing these trends and the data underlying them, this chapter first reviews some 
definitional issues and provides a short discussion of the relative standing of public sector 
employees in Europe, as a point of reference for the East African case studies. This is followed 
by an empirical analysis of the socioeconomic standing of public sector employees, using a 
variety of measures to stratify the population, including educational status, income data from 
tax records, household consumption and asset wealth. The fourth section discusses geographic 
differences and compares public sector elite shares in urban and rural areas. The last section 
concludes. 
3.2. DEFINING AND MEASURING THE UPPER AND MIDDLE ‘CLASSES’ 
This chapter builds on the assumption that relatively wealthier social strata wield 
disproportionate political influence, and that the sources of income of the wealthier classes are 
a clue to their economic and political interests. Examining how the professions and income 
sources of the elite changed over time may therefore shed light on the changing expectations 
and political pressures placed on the government. This assumption, however, raises practical 
questions. How should this wealthy strata be defined? At what levels of income, wealth or 
occupational status do interest groups form and gain significant political leverage? Such 
questions are implicit in the class studies of African societies carried out in the 1970s and in 
today’s middle class debate, yet many of these studies are imprecise about the contours of the 
privileged public sector elite or middle class that they describe. While some conceptualize 
power in Africa as dominated by a small clique of politicians with little co-optation of the 
middle class,260 others assume that political power rests with a relatively broad group of middle 
class denizens. 
Among those studies of social stratification in Africa that do give precise definitions, there are 
a wide range of alternative approaches. A landmark study on Africa’s new elites from 1966 
defined this elite as those earning at least £250 per year and with a western education, which 
put the Kenyan African elite at a bit below 1% of the labour force.261 Issa Shivji’s study of 
Tanzania, which coined the term ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ similarly gave it a narrow 
definition.262 Shivji’s bureaucratic bourgeoisie comprised political heads of government 
                                                   
260 van de Walle, “Patrons, Clients, and Policies”; Melber, The Rise of Africa’s Middle Class: Myths, 
Realities and Critical Engagements. 
261 Based on the EES wage group data and assuming that wage employees were the only Kenyans fitting 
this description. 
262 Shivji, Class Struggles in Tanzania. 
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ministries and departments, top civil servants, top positions in the judiciary, military and party, 
in combination with economic functionaries in senior roles in the parastatals and public 
corporations. This description of the bourgeoisie probably puts it a few thousand people, or in 
the order of 0.1% of the labour force at the time of the book’s writing. Shivji contrasts the 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie with a wider petty bourgeoisie comprising an upper strata of 
intellectuals, professionals, businessmen, private sector officials and wealthy farmers, and a 
middle and lower strata comprising the salariat, teachers, petty traders, shopkeepers, craftsmen 
and urbanised farmers. He anticipated growing conflict between these groups. 
At the other extreme the African Development Bank chose to characterise Africa’s middle class 
as individuals with a daily consumption of between US$2-20 (in PPP terms), subdivided into 
a floating class (US$2-4), lower middle class ($4-10), and upper middle class ($10-20).263 
While this broader definition put the continent’s middle class at 34%, restricting it to the lower 
and upper middle class reduced the share to 13%. This approach follows Banerjee and Duflo’s 
work on the global middle class which used similarly low thresholds.264  Implicit in these 
middle class definitions is the assumption that a larger pool of people with incomes just a little 
above subsistence give more people an incentive and ability to engage in political matters 
beyond those of immediate survival concern. 
Whether such strata have any analytical content, however, remains an open question. The 
language of class invokes Marx and Weber, who conceptualised classes as distinct interest 
groups in conflict with each other.265  Marx defined class in relation to its ownership of the 
means of production, with a working class that sells its labour while the bourgeoisie owns 
capital and employs labour; in between them is a petty bourgeois middle tier of small shop and 
business owners who sometimes ally with the bourgeoisie and other times with the working 
class. The Marxist literature recognizes these groups as classes only once its members become 
aware of their common economic interests (‘class in itself’) and organise collectively to defend 
said interests (‘class for itself’).  
Many academics have contended that class in the Marxist or Weberian sense does not describe 
the African reality, where social stratification remained fluid and ethnic allegiances often trump 
economic interests. With reference to Kenya specifically, two recent articles have addressed 
this question empirically, by testing whether social strata based on income, consumption or 
                                                   
263 Mubila and Ben Aissa, “The Middle of the Pyramid: Dynamics of the Middle Class in Africa.” 
264 Abhijit V Banerjee and Esther Duflo, “What Is Middle Class about the Middle Classes around the 
World?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22, no. 2 (2008): 3–28. 
265 For a discussion, see: Roger Southall, The New Black Middle Class in South Africa (Johannesburg: 
Jacana Media, 2016). 
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analogous measures predict political and economic behaviour. Nic Cheeseman finds some 
signs that middle class Kenyans exhibit stronger support for traditional middle class values, 
while Deiter Neubert finds little evidence of a distinctly middle class politics.266 
This study, however, does not directly address the question of class formation or identity. 
Instead it starts from an empirical angle: are there signs of change to the composition of the 
elite that would signal the rise of new, or emboldened economic interest groups? Whether these 
groups represent classes in a Marxist or Weberian sense is a second-order question, but it 
cannot be answered without an understanding of the economic structure of society, and thus 
the ability to make predictions about interests and behaviour.  
Because of the focus on the relative power of different interest groups, this chapter uses relative 
wealth or income rather than absolute measures. It seeks to rank households in Kenya and 
Tanzania from poor to wealthy and locate where those headed by public sector employees fell 
in this rank order at different points in time. It will primarily use the top 1% and top 10% of 
the income or consumption distribution as proxies for the upper and middle class respectively, 
allowing us to study the elite composition at two different levels relative privilege. These are 
arbitrary cut-offs, but have the advantage of simplicity and a precedence in other academic 
research.267  While the top 1% is roughly in keeping with Lloyd’s 1966 elite measure, the top 
10% is a large enough group to be representative of something broader than the ruling clique, 
yet capturing a stratum of households living above subsistence. It is roughly in line with the 
AfDB’s definition of the stable middle class (per capita consumption of $4-20), but a far cry 
from the middle of the income distribution proper. 
Despite focusing on a comparatively high strata of society, the top 10% of East African 
households is not a wealthy group by international standards. Using the most recent estimates 
available based on household budget surveys, the average household in the top 10% of 
consumers lived on roughly US$13,000 per year in Kenya (2005/06), US$7,500 in Tanzania 
(2011/12) and US$7,000 Uganda (2006) (2010 dollars), equal to roughly US$7 per person per 
day in Kenya, and roughly US$4 per person and day in Tanzania and Uganda.268 The share of 
households in this top decile living in homes with piped, indoor water and electricity was 70% 
                                                   
266 Nic Cheeseman, “‘No Bourgeoisie, No democracy?’ The Political Attitudes of the Kenyan Middle 
Class,” Journal of International Development 27 (2015): 647–64; Dieter Neubert, “Kenya - an 
Unconscious Middle Class?: Between Regional-Ethnic Political Mobilisation and Middle Class 
Lifestyles,” in The Rise of Africa’s Middle Class: Myths, Realities and Critical Engagements, ed. 
Henning Melber (London: Zed Books, 2016). 
267 Thomas Piketty uses the top 10% and top 1% cut-off in his study of top incomes, see: Piketty, Capital 
in the Twenty-First Century, chap. 8. 
268 Calculated using the consumption shares from POVCALNET and WDI total household consumption 
estimates in US$ 2010; assuming an average family size of five. 
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in Kenya in 2005/06 and 56% in Uganda in 2006, while the share who reported owning a 
refrigerator was 25% in Kenya in 2005/06 and 28% in Tanzania in 2011.269 With the caveat 
that household budget surveys are imperfect instruments for measuring the very top of the 
income distributions and most likely underestimate top income levels, the same surveys suggest 
that the average annual household consumption in the top 1% was US$40,000 in Kenya 
(2005/06), US$19,000 in Tanzania (2011/12), and US$17,000 in Uganda (2006). Taking these 
estimates at face value suggests that only the top 1-0.5% of East African households would 
scrape into a British middle class definition.270 
A remaining question and weakness therefore, is whether the top 10%, or even the top 1%, are 
in fact too broad to capture elite dynamics. Perhaps an even narrower 0.1% strata would nuance 
the story further. Unfortunately there are few sources that allow income disaggregation at such 
a high level of granularity and it is only possible to make speculative statements about income 
or consumption shares above the 1% mark. 
3.3. AFRICA’S PUBLIC SECTOR ELITE AND THE EUROPEAN POINT OF 
REFERENCE 
Class or social group dynamics in Africa are typically defined in reference to class dynamics 
in the West, not least because Marxist and Weberian analyses and predictions were premised 
on the 19th century European experience. As discussed in Chapter 1, academics have speculated 
about how conditions particular to Sub-Saharan Africa, or former colonies in general, would 
generate a postcolonial bourgeoisie with a different set of interests and characteristics to that 
which emerged in Europe a century or more earlier.271 This dichotomy between middle class 
development in the Global North versus Global South, however, has probably been overstated. 
Studies on the origins of the British middle class have stressed the importance of the state both 
as an employer and regulator of professional labour as early as the 18th century.272 While it is 
beyond the scope of this study to quantify the composition of Europe’s 18th and 19th century 
bourgeoisies for comparative purposes, it is possible to say what the contemporary literature 
and economic data has to say about the social position of public sector employees in advanced 
economies, and therefore, at least for the most recent period, provide some benchmarks for the 
three African country cases. 
                                                   
269 Calculated from: KE IHBS 2005/06; TZ HBS 2011/12; UG NHS 2006. 
270 Comparing it, roughly, to the Great British Class Survey stratifications, see: Mike Savage et al., “A 
New Model of Social Class? Findings from the BBC’s Great British Class Survey Experiment,” 
Sociology 47, no. 2 (2013): 219–50., Table 6. 
271 See: van de Walle, “Barrington Moore in the Tropics: Democracy and the African Middle Class.” 
272 Mike Savage et al., Property, Bureaucracy and Culture: Middle-Class Formation in Contemporary 
Britain (London: Routledge, 1992), chap. 3. 
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As shown in Chapter 2, public services in wealthier economies tend to be considerably larger 
than in developing countries, with the United Kingdom public sector employing roughly 18% 
of the working population today compared to roughly 3% in the three East African cases.273 
The European public sector workforce has higher educational attainment than that of the private 
sector, with a disproportionately large share of college and university graduates in public sector 
employment (given the comparatively high educational attainment of teachers, nurses and 
doctors). This skew is more accentuated among women than men. In the United Kingdom in 
1995 for instance, public sector employees constituted 27% of economically active workers, 
but 41% of all economically active degree holders, and 50% of all workers with other forms of 
higher education, according to the 1995 labour force survey (Table 3.1). Women formed a 
much larger share public sector employees overall, but particularly so amongst the highly 
educated, with over 60% of university or higher educated women in state employment. The 
same pattern is evident in France, where the 1999 census provides data on employment by 
sector. It showed that 38% of university degree holders worked for the state, compared to 28% 
of workers overall, with higher shares among women (Table 3.2). 
Table 3.1. United Kingdom 1995: Share of economically active people in public employment by 
educational attainment (ages 30-60) (n=46,040) 
Highest level of 
education 
% in public 
employment 
ALL 
% in public 
employment 
MEN 
% in public 
employment 
WOMEN 
Total number 
(million) 
degree or equivalent 41% 34% 56% 2.5 
higher education 50% 28% 67% 1.8 
gce a level or equiv. 19% 15% 30% 4.1 
gcse grade a-c or equiv. 26% 20% 30% 2.8 
other qualification 22% 15% 29% 2.6 
no qualification 20% 13% 25% 3.2 
Total 27% 20% 36% 17.1 
Source: UK LSF 1995 [Q2 April – June]  
Table 3.2. France 1999: Share of economically active people in public employment by educational 
attainment (ages 30-60) (n=882,530) 
Highest level of 
education 
% in public 
employment 
ALL 
% in public 
employment 
MEN 
% in public 
employment 
WOMEN 
Total number 
(million) 
University 38% 30% 46% 4.1 
Secondary  27% 21% 34% 8.0 
Primary 28% 25% 31% 3.3 
Less than primary 17% 14% 23% 2.2 
Total 28% 23% 35% 17.7 
Source: FRA CENSUS 1999 
                                                   
273 Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: statistical appendix 1; UK: UK BoE 2015. 
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Wage setting in the public sector also differs from that in the private sector, as discussed briefly 
in the introductory chapter. While many studies of pay find a premium for public sector workers 
compared to those in the private sector,274 this premium tends to be largest among low-skilled 
workers, while salaries are often quite compressed among senior civil servants. Studies have 
found that institutionalised salary scales rather than individual bargaining tend to reduce wage 
spread and thus wage inequality within the public, relative to the private, sector.275 
Thus while the public sector’s high educational attainment and the possible pay premium for 
the lower skilled suggests that public sector employees will be skewed towards the top of the 
distribution, greater wage compression may limit their shares among the very top earners. This 
is illustrated in Figure 3.1 which calculates the public sector-headed household share of each 
income decile using data from the 2014/15 United Kingdom family resources survey (the head 
is defined as the household member with the highest income). Public sector-headed households 
are concentrated at the top of the wage distribution, peaking in the 9th decile at 26%, compared 
to 3% in the bottom decile. At the top of the distribution, however, the public sector share 
declines, falling to 23% in the top decile and 22% in the top percentile, reflecting greater wage 
compression in the public sector. Note, moreover, that because of the large share of women in 
public employment, who are less likely to be the highest household earner, public sector shares 
at the top would be larger on a worker basis.  
While the United Kingdom and East African contexts differ in many ways, these data points 
provide a useful reminder that public sector employees tend to be a comparatively high-skilled 
and high earning segment of the labour force the world over. 
Figure 3.1. United Kingdom 2014/15: Public sector-headed households as a share of each household 
income decile 
 
Source: UK FRS 2014/15 
                                                   
274 Gregory and Borland, “Recent Developments in Public Sector Labor Markets.” 
275 See for instance: Anthony B. Atkinson, Inequality: What Can Be Done? (Cambridge and London: 
Harvard University Press, 2015); Richard Disney and Jelena Lausev, “Pay Compression : The Role of 
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3.4. THE RELATIVE SOCIAL STANDING OF EAST AFRICA’S PUBLIC 
SECTOR EMPLOYEES  
Predicting the wage and employment effects on the relative standing of public sector 
employees 
As in the example from the United Kingdom above, the coming sections will measure the 
relative economic standing of Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan public sector employees by 
establishing the share of public sector-headed households in the top 10% or 1% of the income 
or consumption distribution and how these shares changed over time. While Chapter 2 showed 
that there have been big shifts in public employment and the distribution of public sector 
earnings in these countries, the effect of these economic changes on the relative social position 
of public sector employees are is not obvious a priori. The share of public sector employees 
by income decile or percentile are a function of several factors, including the size of the wage 
bill relative to total household income; the share households that this wage bill is shared 
amongst; the income distribution within the public sector; and the overall household income 
distribution in the country. It follows that a fall/rise in the share of public sector households in 
the top decile or percentile could be driven by changes to any of these variables.  
Other intra-household changes may also affect change. Given that our measure classifies 
households based on the employment of the household head, the public sector shares may also 
fall as the public service grows more female, and if these women are less likely to be classified 
as household heads. Changes in the relative size of households in the public/private sectors 
may also influence these ratios. 
Chapter 2 provided data about how some of these variables have changed since the 1960s. As 
shows in Figures 2.4 and 2.6, the public sector wage bill, including the parastatal sector, 
increased as a share of GDP until the mid-1970s and then decreased, primarily on account of 
the decline in parastatal employment. The general government wage bill fell in Kenya and 
Uganda between the 1970s and 1990s and then partially recovered, while it stayed relatively 
steady in Tanzania. In all three countries household consumption increased as a share of GDP 
between the 1960s and 1990s. All else being equal, these dynamics should result in a decline 
in the relative standing of public sector headed households in the 1970s through 1990s. 
Furthermore, between the 1970s and late 1980s total employment increased and the wage bill 
was therefore spread between an increasing number of households while the earnings 
differentials within the public service declined. This ought to reduce the public sector shares at 
the very top further, although its exact effect will also depend on the original income 
distribution.  
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Between the mid-1990s and 2000s earnings recovered while the level of public employment 
fell, which should have the reverse effect, concentrating earnings towards the top once more, 
albeit amongst a smaller number of households. Working against this dynamic however, 
income inequality in society at large appears to have increased since the mid-1990s in Kenya 
and Tanzania,276 while the public service has grown more female and a smaller share of its 
employees are therefore classified as household heads. Because of the shift in public 
employment and pay policies in the 1990s, I therefore seek to understand relative income 
standing across two periods: the 1960s-1970s through early 1990s, and 1990s to the present. 
A further complexity is that official salaries may be a poor guide to the actual earnings of public 
sector employees. Many have observed that African public sector households augmented low 
salaries with less transparent forms of rents, such as non-monetary benefits, opportunities for 
shirking, preferential access to goods and services, or outright corruption.277 While it is hard to 
see how such non-wage compensation could have fully compensated for the severe wage 
declines of the 1970s and 1980s (see discussion in Section 2.7), they may have influenced the 
public service income distribution. Some of the subsequent sections will therefore move 
beyond reported income, by looking at the consumption and asset wealth of public sector-
headed households as an alternative lens on their relative privilege or deprivation, which should 
be less sensitive to the possible underreporting of income. 
Public employment and educational attainment 
First, however, I examine educational attainment, which is often used as a proxy for social 
status and can therefore be used as a rough means of stratifying the population. As in Europe, 
East Africa’s public sector employees are a comparatively highly educated segment of the 
labour force (as discussed in Chapter 2) and its educational attainment has been growing over 
time. In the 1960s-early 1970s, roughly 15% of Kenya’s public sector employees had four years 
of secondary schooling, a similar share to that in formal private sector. By the 2000s secondary 
educated public sector employees constituted 79%, compared to 26% within the labour force 
overall (see Table 3.3). In Tanzania the share rose from roughly 6% in the 1960s to 77% in 
2011/12, and in Uganda from 16% to 58% in 2006. As in Europe therefore, we should expect 
the public service income distribution to be skewed to the right, with higher shares in the top 
income brackets.   
                                                   
276 The trend in Uganda is more ambiguous see: POVCALNET 2017.  
277 E. A. Brett, “Rebuilding Organisation Capacity in Uganda Under the National Resistance 
Movement,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 32, no. 1 (1994): 62–63; Therkildsen and Tidemand, 
“Staff Management and Organisational Performance in Tanzania and Uganda: Public Servant 
Perspectives.” 
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Table 3.3. Secondary school completers as a share of public and total employment, 1960-70s and 2000s 
 All formal 
employment* 
Public 
employment 
All employment Public 
employment 
 1972 1972 2009 2009 
Kenya 15% 15% 26% 79% 
 1964 1964 2011/12 2011/12 
Tanzania 4% 6%** 12% 77% 
 1967 1967 2005/06 2005/06 
Uganda 11% 16%** 9% 58% 
* Levels would be considerably lower for the labour force as a whole.       
** General government only, excludes parastatal sector. 
Sources: method and source given in Appendix IV. 
This data can also be used to examine the share of all second and tertiary educated labour force 
participants that worked in the public sector (Table 3.4 – 3.6). In the early postcolonial period 
the public sector dominated the skilled labour market. Among employees with a secondary 
school degree, roughly 41% worked for the public sector in Kenya in 1972 and 69% in Uganda 
in 1967 and 90% in Tanzania in 1980.  Over time these shares have declined. Estimates using 
recent household surveys suggests that the share fell to 17% in Kenya by 2009, 22% in 
Tanzania (2011/12) and 9% in Uganda (2005/06). From the 1990s and on we can use the same 
household surveys to measure the shares for tertiary graduates (Kenya and Uganda only), which 
also suggests a fall in the share of tertiary graduates employed by the government.   
However, the level of educational attainment has increased considerably over the same period 
and the returns to education have declined; holding a university degree today is not as rare an 
event as in the 1960s and possibly less strongly correlated with income.278 This measure alone 
does not tell us about the changing relative social position of public servants. For this we turn 
to income-based stratifications of society. 
Table 3.4. Kenya: % of all working secondary and tertiary completers employed in the public sector 
  
Share of all working graduates in public 
employment 
  1972 1994 2009 
Secondary completer (Form IV) or above ~41% 26% 17% 
Tertiary education (uni or college)   44% 32% 
Sources: method and source given in Appendix IV. 
Table 3.5. Tanzania: % of working secondary and tertiary completers employed in the public sector 
  
Share of all working graduates in public 
employment 
  1980 1993 2011/12 
Secondary completer (Form IV) or above ~90% 46% 22% 
Sources: method and source given in Appendix IV. 
                                                   
278 See for instance: Appleton, Bigsten, and Manda, “Educational Expansion and Economic Decline : 
Returns to Education in Kenya.” 
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Table 3.6. Uganda: % of all working secondary and tertiary completers employed in the public sector  
  
Share of all working graduates in public 
employment 
  1967 1992 2005/06 
Secondary completer (Form IV) or above ~69% 24% 9% 
Tertiary education (uni or college) ~75% 55% 39% 
Sources: method and source given in Appendix IV. 
Who constituted the taxpaying income elite at independence? 
For the early independence period income tax statistics provide valuable insight into the 
incomes at the very top of the East African income distribution. Detailed tax schedules are only 
available up until the mid-1960s, prior to the introduction of pay-as-you-earn tax (PAYE), and 
can therefore give insight into conditions around the time of independence but are of little help 
in tracking change over time. This income tax data from the 1950s and 1960s was recently used 
by Tony Atkinson in a study on inequality in East Africa.279 Although only around 1% of 
households were liable to pay income tax, by assuming that these taxpayers constituted the top 
1% of all earners, he could estimate their shares of total income.  
These same tax records also provide information on the sources of income within this taxpaying 
elite. The tax schedules disaggregate between employees and individual tax payers (primarily 
the self-employed), and further between government and ‘other’ employees (Table 3.7). Taxes 
were levied on earners above £200 per year,280 although the tax schedules include few earners 
reporting earnings of less than £500 per year. These schedules show that government 
employees constituted roughly a quarter to a third of all taxpayers, and by extension of the top 
1% income earners in Tanganyika and Uganda, and top 3% in Kenya. These shares are 
significant, but probably not exceptionally high compared to other regions of the world and in 
no case did public servants constitute a majority of taxpayers.281 In Kenya and Tanganyika the 
government share fell over time as highly paid European colonial officers left the countries and 
positions were Africanized. 
  
                                                   
279 Atkinson, “Top Incomes in East Africa before and after Independence.” 
280 Ibid., 10. 
281 See discussion about the UK in Section 3.3. 
 109 
 
Table 3.7. Income tax payers by source of income in Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, 1959-1964 
  1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
KENYA             
Total tax payers 52,922  57,442  52,119  51,739  51,679  52,703  
Government employees, % of total 31% 30% 27% 28% 27% 24% 
Other employees, % of total 44% 42% 45% 45% 46% 46% 
Individual tax payers, % of total 24% 27% 28% 27% 27% 30% 
TANGANYIKA             
Total tax payers 18,099  18,797  18,069  18,803  18,873  21,036  
Government employees, % of total 32% 25% 24% 27% 24% 24% 
Other employees, % of total 40% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 
Individual tax payers, % of total 27% 35% 34% 33% 35% 35% 
UGANDA             
Total tax payers 18,099  12,841  12,397  12,427  12,896  14,508  
Government employees, % of total 23% 26% 30% 31% 27% 28% 
Other employees, % of total 29% 40% 40% 42% 43% 39% 
Individual tax payers, % of total 48% 34% 31% 27% 30% 33% 
Sources: EA TAX 1960/61 - 1965/66, Schedule No.3 
This income elite was heavily dominated by Europeans and Asians, however, and therefore 
gives limited insight into the African income distribution. An alternative source from the same 
period, the employment and earnings survey, does provide income distributions by racial 
group, albeit for formal sector employees only. In combination with the income tax data these 
can be used to establish a rough estimate of the public sector share among high-earning 
Africans alone. For practical purposes, this analysis is limited to one year, 1964, at the dawn 
of the independence era.  
In 1964, Africans constituted 15% of salaried employees earning above £600 per year in Kenya, 
21% in Tanganyika, and 26% in Uganda.282 This African taxpaying elite was therefore a much 
smaller share of all African households, constituting roughly the top 0.3% of households in 
Kenya, 0.2% in Uganda and 0.1% in Tanganyika. Importantly, however, among Africans alone, 
public sector employees significantly out-number private sector employees, in contrast to 
Europeans and Asians among whom private employees and business owners dominated.  
I have no way of estimating the African share of self-employed tax payers, however, and can 
only set very rough upper and lower bounds. The literature on Africanisation suggests that the 
public sector led the way in Africanizing senior positions, while firms Africanized in the late 
1960s with the introduction of rules on firm ownership, board memberships and such.283 It thus 
                                                   
282 The income tax tables are given in £/annum and the EES ones in Shs./month. To simplify the 
calculations I compare those earning above £600 with taxpayers with income above £500 (this 
simplification has only a minor impact on the results). 
283 Rothchild, “Kenya’s Africanization Program: Priorities of Development and Equity.” 
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seems reasonable to assume that the African share of high-earning self-employed taxpayers 
would be lower than their share of high earning employees.284 I therefore estimate a lower 
bound scenario, assuming that there were no African self-employed (i.e. individual) taxpayers 
earning above £500, and an upper bound where the African individual taxpayer share was the 
same as their share of taxpayers in employment.  
On the basis of these assumptions, public sector employees constituted between 50-75% of all 
high-income taxpayers, who constituted roughly the top 0.1-0.3% of all households. This gives 
some quantitative support for the notion of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie – within the very top of 
the African income distribution public servants were indeed dominant. Interestingly, despite 
Uganda’s larger indigenous landowning elite, it’s public sector share is only marginally lower 
than in Kenya and Tanzania, although landowners are most likely underrepresented in these 
tax records. 
Table 3.8. African share of taxpayers and by source of income, Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, 1964 
   Kenya   Tanganyika   Uganda  
Total employees with 'actual' income above £500 30,487  10,824  8,297  
African* employees with salary above £600 4,600  2,246  2,166  
o/w public sector 3,500  1,717  1,579  
o/w private sector 1,100  529  586  
Total individual taxpayers with 'actual' income above £500 11,721  4,945  3,294  
African individual taxpayers - lower bound 0 0 0 
African individual taxpayers - upper bound 1,769  1,026  860  
Public sector % of earners >£600 - UPPER BOUND 76% 76% 73% 
Public sector % of earners >£600 - LOWER BOUND 55% 52% 52% 
African high income earners as % of total households 0.3% 0.1% 0.2% 
African high income earners as % of all high income earners 15% 21% 26% 
* for Tanganyika and Uganda this covers men only. 
Sources: Calculated from: EA TAX 1965/66, Schedule No.3 & No.5; KE EES 1963-67, Table A.25; 
TZ EES 1964 Appendix III; UG EES 1964 Table. 
Since independence these shares appear to have fallen. Using available data from the earning 
and employment survey on the wage distribution, Figure 3.2 calculates the public sector share 
of the top 10% of formal employees (which corresponds roughly to the top 1-2% of income 
earners overall). Uganda is excluded from this chart due to lack of consistent data. In Kenya 
and Tanzania the public sector share rose briefly in the late 1960s, peaking at 57% in Kenya 
and 74% in Tanzania in the early to mid-1970s, as many Europeans and Asians, who dominated 
the high income private sector ranks, left East Africa and as industries were nationalised. 
                                                   
284 In agriculture the situation may be different, but individual taxpayers were concentrated in the trade 
and services sectors rather than agriculture (the tax tables also include separate industrial distributions 
of earnings), which suggests that wealthy farmers were a relatively small share of the income elite. 
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Starting in the early-mid 1970s however, the public sector share of high income earning 
employees began to fall and declined to roughly 46% in Kenya by 1985 and 22% by 2014, 
while in Tanzania it had fallen to 54% by 1990. While these estimates only cover formal sector 
employees, it seems likely that the number of wealthy African business and farm-owners also 
rose in proportion to public sector employees over the same period, at least in Kenya where 
indigenization of the private sector was actively pursued. 
Figure 3.2. Kenya and Tanzania: public sector share of top 10% of formal sector employees 
 
Sources: Kenya: KE EES 1963-67, Table A.25; KE SA 1976, Table 255; KE EES 1985; KE SA 2015, 
Table 186. Tanzania: TZ EES 1963-76; TZ LFS 1990/91 Table Y5.  
Note: Tanzanian measures for 1963 and 1965 based on adult African male employees only, 1970 
estimate based on all adult male citizens. 1990 data for male and female employees. 
Yet these top slivers of the income distribution reflect only the formal sector and capture a 
small share of public sector employees overall. Perhaps of even greater political significance 
is the degree to which the broader, nascent middle class was dominated by public servants. In 
the following analysis I therefore estimate the public sector-headed household share within the 
top income or consumption decile and percentile, using data from household budget surveys.  
Establishing public sector position within the national income distribution: method 
and data 
Household budget surveys provide a valuable source of information about social stratification 
across the labour force. This analysis draws on Kenyan surveys from 1975, 1994 and 2005/06, 
Tanzanian surveys from 1969, 1993, 2000/01 and 2011/12 (for the mainland only), and 
Ugandan surveys from 1992 and 2006. With the exception of the Kenyan 1975 estimates, all 
are nationally representative surveys of private households. 
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Table 3.9. Description of surveys used in analysis 
 Source Abbreviation Data access Sample size  
(# hhs) 
Likely 
direction of 
bias 
Kenya      
1974/75 Integrated Rural Survey 
(in addition to other 
sources) 
IRS 1974/75 Published 
tables 
IRS: 2,300 Under-
estimate 
1994 Welfare monitoring 
survey, second round 
WMS 1994 Microdata  11,000 Over-
estimate 
2005/06 Integrated household 
budget survey 
IHBS 2005/06 Microdata  13,000 Small under-
estimate 
Tanzania      
1969 Household budget 
survey 
HBS 1969 Published 
tables 
2,800 Under-
estimate 
1993 Human Resource 
Development Survey 
HRDS 1993 Microdata  5,000 Over-
estimate 
2000/01 Household budget 
survey 
HBS 2000/01 Microdata  22,000 - 
2011/12 Household budget 
survey 
HBS 2011/12 Microdata  10,000  - 
Uganda      
1992 Integrated Household 
Survey 
HIS 1992 Microdata 10,000 - 
2006 National Household 
Survey 
NHS 2006 Microdata  7,500 - 
 
The surveys from the 1990s and 2000s are available in microdata form and include variables 
capturing the respondent’s sector of employment. In these surveys households are ranked on 
the basis of consumption per adult household member rather than income, as consumption is 
regarded as a superior measure of living standards in low-income contexts.285 This has the 
further advantage that it captures the ‘output’ of all household income, and is thus less sensitive 
to potential underreporting of informal earnings and benefits. I choose to normalize household 
consumption by adult household members (15 and above) rather than per capita or using an 
adult equivalency scale as the focus of this paper is on the ability of different types of 
households to generate income rather than living standards per se. Household size may well be 
endogenous to earnings if wealthier households have more dependents.286 Further discussion 
on the construction of variables and various sensitivity tests to gauge possible biases in the data 
are discussed in Appendix V. Note that across the surveys the percentile measures are quite 
volatile due to the restricted sample sizes. As discussed in the appendix, these 1% samples may 
also be biased by the under-sampling of high income households.  
                                                   
285 See discussion by: James Galbraith, Inequality and Instability: A Study of the World Economy Just 
before the Great Crisis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
286 Normalizing consumption by adult equivalents places a high share of single person households in the 
top decile. 
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The weakest part of this analysis are the Kenyan and Tanzanian results from the 1960s and 
1970s, which are derived from printed tables that tabulate the number of households by 
household income groups. The Kenyan 1975 analysis moreover, builds on several sources, 
including the integrated rural survey (which covered roughly 75% of the population), the large 
farm survey, the enumeration of employees, the informal sector survey, income tax statistics 
reports and estimates of the pastoral population by Collier and Lal, to arrive at a national 
income distribution (see Appendix V.1).  
As these printed income distribution tables do not disaggregate the distribution by sector of 
employment, I estimate the public sector share by comparing the national income distribution 
with data on the wage distribution in the public sector from the employment and earnings 
surveys. The data on public sector wage distribution, however, is presented on an individual 
worker basis rather than a household basis. I therefore remove women from the distribution 
and make the assumption that each male public sector employee is the head of a household and 
his public sector earnings is the household’s only source of income. 
This last assumption is particularly problematic as other surveys from the same period show 
that many public sector households had more than one source of income. In Kenya the 
government relaxed the colonial-era rules on ownership of firms and property by civil servants 
in 1971.287 It was argued that public servants were well placed to raise capital and possessed 
the necessary skills to replace foreign business owners, thereby aiding the pace of 
Africanisation of the private sector. By the mid-1970 critics were already complaining that this 
reform created a conflict of interest, as civil servants now served ‘two masters.’288 By 1980 
another public service commission concluded that many civil servants had multiple income 
sources.289 In Tanzania in contrast the 1967 Arusha Declaration included a leadership code that 
prevented senior and mid-level civil servants from owning companies, real estate or holding 
more than one salary, but these rules were limited to relatively senior posts, and did not prevent 
land ownership or other household members from working. It is therefore likely that the 
Tanzanian 1969 and Kenyan 1975 results are lower-bound estimates. 
Adding a further downward bias, moreover, is the inclusion of Europeans and Asians in the top 
income brackets. This has only a marginal impact on the public sector shares of the top decile, 
as non-Africans were a small share of the overall population. The public sector share of the top 
                                                   
287 On the basis of the recommendations of the Ndegwa Commission on the Public Service Structure and 
Remuneration, see: Ndegwa, “Report of the Commission of Inquiry: Public Service Structure and 
Remuneration Commission 1970-71.” 
288 H. J. Nyamu, “The State of the Civil Service Today: A Critical Appraisal” (Nairobi, 1974).  
289 S. N. Waruhiu, “Report of the Civil Service Review Committee 1979/80” (Nairobi, 1980). 
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1% however, would be higher if limited to Africans alone as the European and Asian minorities 
held a disproportionate share of senior private sector roles. This effect will be strongest in the 
earlier periods when the European and Asian population shares were higher, compounding the 
likely underestimation of the 1975 and 1969 public sector share estimates. 
Kenyan results 
With these caveats Figure 3.3 presents the Kenyan results, showing the share of all households 
in each income or consumption decile headed by a public sector employee in each year.290 
While public sector-headed households comprised 7-14% of all households,291 they are 
strongly skewed towards the top of the distribution and peak in the top income or consumption 
decile in all years. Even with a likely underestimation of the 1975 measures however, the 
Kenyan results show a significant decline in the share of high earning households headed by 
public sector employees. As a share of the top decile, public sector-headed households fell from 
roughly 36% in 1975 to 30% in 1994 and 17% in 2005/06. By the 2000s the Kenyan public 
sector-headed household share of the top decile was lower than in the United Kingdom. 
The public sector-headed household distribution also grew more progressive over time. While 
32% of public sector-headed households were found in the top decile in 1975, in 1994 the share 
was only 22%; it then rose again to 26% in 2005/06 as the public sector pay scale was 
decompressed. In both 1994 and 2005/06 roughly half of all public sector-headed households 
were in the bottom three-quarters of the consumption distribution, which can hardly be 
considered an especially privileged social strata.  
Figure 3.3. Kenya: public sector-headed households as percentage of consumption decile, 1994 and 
2005/06 
1975 1994 2005/06 
  
Notes: Distributions normalized by adults in household except for 1975. Sources: Appendix V.I. 
                                                   
290 Note that the data for 1975 is a rough recalculation as it builds on underlying wage group data divided 
into six rather than ten bins. I simply assume a linear distribution of incomes within each wage group, 
resulting in a flat distribution across deciles 1-3 and 4-6. 
291 As public sector employees tend to be the heads of their households they comprise a larger share of 
household heads than of the labour force. 
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Table 3.10 examines the composition of the top 10% and top 1%, disaggregated by the 
economic sector of the household head. These decompositions based on economic sector 
should be treated as rough estimates as some of the categories are difficult to distinguish in 
certain of the surveys (the distinction between private sector employees and informal/self-
employment is particularly tricky). Furthermore, the growing share of retirees, homemakers 
and students in the top income shares may be distorting the picture as some retirees are 
presumably former public sector employees, while some students may be supported by their 
public sector-employed parents. However, assuming that these inactive households are in fact 
supported by sectoral earnings that match the broader composition of earnings in the income 
bracket as a whole would only raise the public sector shares by 1-2%. 
With these qualifiers, the data confirms that while the public sector share of the top decile fell, 
the share of high earning households in the private sector increased, in particular those headed 
by self-employed business owners, many of whom operated businesses in the informal sector. 
Agricultural-based households in contrast, fell significantly in share of the top decile (although 
the mid-1970s was also a period of relatively high agricultural prices).292 
At the very top of the distribution, among the top 1% instead of the top 10%, the pattern of 
change was similar, although the estimates at the 1% level are less reliable. While there is no 
obvious change in the public sector share of the top 1% between 1975 and 1994, the share then 
fell from 31% to 13% between 1994 and 2005/06. The formal private sector share, meanwhile, 
dropped between 1975 and 1994 and then almost doubled again between 1994 and 2005/06. 
These formal private sector employees were primarily managers or professionals in the service 
sector, including many in the financial sector. A large share of households in the top 1% were 
also found in the ‘other’ category, which comprised retirees and other unclassifiable 
households. Agricultural households also fell as a share of the 1%. 
Table 3.10. Kenya: composition of the top income/consumption decile and percentile, by economic 
sector of the household head 
 Top 10% Top 1% 
Household head sector of 
employment 1975 1994 2005/06 1975 1994 2005/06 
Public 36% 30% 17% 30% 31% 13% 
Private employment* 23% 27% 33% 47% 18% 32% 
Own business / enterprise 9% 23% 26% 
}23% 
42% 31% 
Agriculture 32% 19% 12% 9% 5% 
Other (retirees, students etc.)  1% 12%   19% 
*Not necessarily in ‘formal’ sector; all who report themselves as employees. 
Sources: see Appendix V.I.  
                                                   
292 See Statistical Appendix 1, series on agricultural output per worker.  
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As an alternative to consumption-based measures of socioeconomic standing, it is also possible 
to use asset ownership and housing characteristics to stratify the population. A potential 
weakness of consumption-based means of stratifying the population is that they are sensitive 
to price differences across the country, as well as survey quality and sampling issues (discussed 
further in Appendix V). Although less granular than consumption, asset-based measures of 
living standards therefore have several advantages. Firstly, they are easier to measure 
accurately. Asking a household member if they own a car or refrigerator gives a result less 
prone to error than computations of their full consumption patterns over a month or year. 
Secondly, they are less sensitive to differences in price level across a country (rural-urban), and 
may say more about actual social status than consumption, particularly where consumption 
measures are strongly shaped by own-production of food. Lastly, in the Kenyan case, it allows 
us to make use of the 2009 census, which contains measures of employment sector and asset 
ownership, but not of income or consumption. The census provides a much larger sample of 
households and a detailed breakdown of the labour force by sector of work. This is particularly 
useful for understanding differentiation at the very top of the distribution for which the 
relatively small 1994 and 2005/06 samples are less well suited. One drawback of asset and 
housing quality measures, however, is that they are likely to react with a lag to changes in 
income. Households who have already made said investments may be able to retain a house 
with piped water or tiled floors, even if their income falls. 
I construct an asset index comprising items or housing characteristics that signify a high 
standard of living, such as ownership of a car, computer, refrigerator, modern stove, TV, and 
living in a home with electricity, flush toilet, piped water and modern flooring (cement or tiles) 
(see Appendix V.I for further details). For Kenya in 1994 this index relies only on household 
characteristics – electricity, piped water, flush toilet, flooring and wall materials and cooking 
fuel/method - as the survey questionnaire did not include questions on asset ownership. Note 
that roughly half or more of all Kenyan households have none of these characteristics (in any 
of the years). While this index is a useful way of measuring differences at the top of the 
distribution, it is unhelpful for distinguishing the poor from the slightly better off. I therefore 
use this measure solely to examine the composition of the top 10% and 1%. 
I construct both a ‘naïve’ index, which simply sums the number of wealth characteristics that 
each household has, as well as using factor analysis to estimate variable weights following the 
approach used by Sahn and Stifel and Ncube and Shimles.293 This technique allows the data 
                                                   
293 David Sahn and David Stifel, “Poverty Comparisons over Time and across Countries in Africa,” 
World Development 28, no. 12 (2000): 2123–55; Mthuli Ncube and Abebe Shimeles, “The Making of 
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itself to determine the relative importance of each asset in contributing to some unspecified 
underlying factor (presumed to be wealth in this case). The two alternative index construction 
methods give very similar results (correlations of between 0.97 and 0.99), and following the 
more recent literature I choose to report findings using the factor analysis technique. The index 
is then divided into deciles and percentiles to give a relative wealth measures. Only the 2009 
percentile measures are reported, as the results for 1994 and 2005/06 showed considerable 
volatility in the top percentiles suggesting that the indicators were insufficiently granular to 
capture differences at the very top of the distribution.  
In Table 3.11 I replicate the disaggregation from Table 3.10 using asset wealth rather than 
consumption per adult to identify the top 10% and top 1% of households. This shows that public 
sector-headed household and private employee-headed households are a higher share of the top 
decile when measured on an asset wealth rather than consumption basis, while the share of self-
employed stays roughly the same. The share of agricultural households in contrast, is 
considerably smaller. This may reflect the fact that consumption measures are sensitive to the 
pricing of consumption of own-produced food, and may be inflating the observed consumption 
levels in agricultural households through the pricing of own-production (this technique 
assumes that this food could be sold and converted into other forms of household spending, 
which may not be the case). Some of the asset or housing characteristic measures may also be 
partial to urban households. A rural, agrarian household is presumably less likely to have piped 
water, flush toilets or be connected to an electricity grid than an urban dweller with the same 
level of income. 
While this alternative method of stratifying the population suggests a slower rate of change 
than the consumption method, it does not alter the overall trajectory. While the public sector 
share of the elite remained relatively steady between 1975 and 1994 (assuming that the 1975 
income-based measure is an accurate reflection of asset wealth), it then dropped considerably 
to 21% in 2005/06 and 18% in 2009. The 2009 census results, which are based on a far larger 
sample (10% of the population) add further confidence to these findings, showing a continued 
fall in the public sector share of the top decile. 
 
 
                                                   
Middle Class in Africa : Evidence from DHS Data,” The Journal of Development Studies 51, no. 2 
(2015): 178–93. 
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Table 3.11. Kenya: composition of the top asset wealth decile and percentile, by economic sector of the 
household head 
 Top 10% Top 1% 
Household head sector of 
employment 1975* 1994 2005/06 2009 1975* 1994 2005/06 2009 
Public 36% 36% 21% 18% 30%   19% 
Private employment** 23% 38% 36% 36% 47%   44% 
Own business / enterprise 9% 22% 26% 33% 
}23% 
  30% 
Agriculture 32% 3% 4% 2%   0.5% 
Other (retirees, students etc.)  1% 13% 10%    7% 
* 1975 measure based on income, see Table 3.10 
**Not necessarily in ‘formal’ sector; all who report themselves as employees. 
Sources: see Appendix V.I.  
The 2009 results do, however, modify the assumption that public sector shares fall further 
within the 10%. On an asset wealth basis the public sector share of the top 1% is higher than 
the 10% average. Given the richness of the 2009 census sample, it is worth examining this 
intra-elite asset wealth distribution in greater detail. Figure 3.4 provides a sectoral distribution 
of the top ten percentiles using the 2009 detailed sectoral breakdown. Public sector employees 
peak in the 98th percentile, and within the public sector the parastatal employees gain the most 
as we move up the distribution. As autonomous government agencies set salary scales 
independently of the general government, this result is unsurprising. Across the top percentiles 
in general, employees in the private sector, NGOs and in self-employment (in the formal sector) 
gain in share at the very top of the distribution. Although the public sector is clearly over-
represented in the top percentiles, the private sector dominates this wealth elite in absolute 
terms. 
Figure 3.4. Kenya 2009: Sector of employment distribution by asset wealth percentile 
 
Source: KE CENSUS 2009. 
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Given the significant decline in public sector salaries in the 1990s, it is perhaps surprising that 
most of the decline in the public sector elite shares has taken place since the 1990s rather than 
during the crisis of the 1980s. In 1994 the Kenyan economy had been performing poorly for 
several years with inflation in double digits; formal sector wages were at their nadir while the 
level of public employment was close to its peak.294 Part of the answer to the relative resilience 
of public sector-headed households appears to lie in income diversification. As already 
mentioned, public sector headed households often had more than one source of income. 295 
While the earlier surveys provided only indirect evidence of this, the surveys from the 1990s 
and 2000s allow us to quantify the effects of secondary income sources. In 1994 the median 
public sector-headed household earned 57% of household income from its public sector salary 
and the other 43% from farming, business profits or the salaries of other household members.296 
Although the 2005/06 income data is less reliable, it appears that these levels rose again as 
salaries recovered (and agricultural prices slumped) in the mid-2000s. In 2005/06 the median 
public sector-headed household earned 80% from the household head’s primary salary and 
20% from other sources.297 
Table 3.12 examines these secondary income sources. It measures the share of public sector-
headed households that report additional incomes by income stream. As a control group, these 
shares are also reported for households headed by a private (formal) sector employee. Close to 
60% of public sector headed households in 1994 had either a business or farm that generated 
income beyond their salaries or wages, and 49% had at least one additional wage income 
earner. These shares were higher among public sector-headed households than among private 
sector-headed households, although this may be an artefact of more urban-based households in 
the private sector, which limited agricultural opportunities. Either way, it appears that formal 
sector households were able to augment their salaries by straddling different economic sectors, 
including employment, farming and business.  
In 2005/06 the share of households with a farm or enterprise income had fallen to just below 
50% among public sector-headed households and 24% among private sector-headed 
households (although the formal private sector measure may not be entirely consistent across 
                                                   
294 International Monetary Fund, “Kenya: Recent Economic Developments” (Washington D.C., 1995). 
295 Also discussed by: Waruhiu, “Report of the Civil Service Review Committee 1979/80”; Mwangi wa 
Githinji, Ten Millionaries and Ten Million Beggars: A Study of Income Distribution and Development 
in Kenya (Hampshire and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2000); Neubert, “Kenya - an 
Unconscious Middle Class?: Between Regional-Ethnic Political Mobilisation and Middle Class 
Lifestyles.” 
296 Author’s calculations based on WMS 1994. 
297 Author’s calculations based on KIHBS 2005/06. However, the agricultural and business income data 
appears to be underreported. 
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surveys). The share of households with a second salary or wage earner had also fallen quite 
considerably. While not conclusive evidence as we have no data points for the pre-crisis era, 
the higher reliance on secondary income sources in the 1990s compared to the 2000s is 
consistent with the idea that households diversified incomes in response to the economic crisis 
of the 1980s and 1990s, and concentrated their efforts again once salaries began to recover. 
Table 3.12. Kenya: Percentage of public and private sector-headed households who have secondary 
incomes, by source 
 1994 2005/06 
Sources of secondary income Public Private  Public Private  
Operate business 31% 27% 19% 13% 
Agriculture or livestock income 40% 28% 39% 17% 
Spouse/other family member in employment 49% 45% 32% 25% 
Have either business, farm or livestock that is earning 
income 58% 46% 49% 24% 
Sources: Calculated from KE WMS 1994 and KE IHBS 2005/06. 
Tanzanian results 
The Tanzanian results tell a similar story of change to that of Kenya. Figure 3.5 shows where 
public sector employees fell within the entire Tanzanian income or consumption distribution 
in each year.298 Because of Tanzania’s large parastatal sector, public employment shares are 
shown separately for the general government and parastatal sectors in these charts. The results 
show that public sector-headed households fell from roughly a quarter of the top decile in 1969 
to 16% in 2011/12. As in the Kenyan case, most of the reduction took place after structural 
adjustment, when the number of public sector jobs fell. In the 2000s the government’s 
divestures from the comparatively high-paying parastatal sector explain most of the reduction.  
The broader distribution of public sector-headed households also shows considerable change. 
In 1969 nearly all public sector-headed households had incomes that put them in the top two 
deciles of income earners. By 1993 a larger share of all public sector-headed households were 
found towards the middle of the consumption distribution, particularly within the general 
government, while parastatal sector employees continued to be clustered towards the top.299  
Public sector employees in the top decile as a share of all public sector employees fell from 
44% in 1969 to 21% in 1993.  
                                                   
298 Note that the 1969 distribution is estimated on the basis of five uneven income brackets and I therefore 
simply assume an even distribution across the bottom 7 deciles. 
299 For support for idea that parastatal employees were better protected, see: Lindauer and Sabot, “The 
Public/private Wage Differential in a Poor Urban Economy.” 
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By the 2000s Tanzanian public sector salaries had increased significantly and by the end of the 
decade were close to their 1960s level, while the level of employment had fallen as the 
government instituted hiring freezes and divested from the parastatal sector (see Chapter 2). 
Public sector-headed households became more concentrated at the top of the distribution once 
more, with the public sector share in the top 10% relative to total public sector-headed 
households rising to 39% by 2000/01. 
Figure 3.5. Tanzania: Share of public sector headed households by income/consumption decile 
1969* 1993 
 
2000/01 2011/12 
  
* All distributions normalized by adults in household with the exception of the1969 measures. 
Sources: see Appendix V.II. 
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Table 3.13 examines the composition of the top 10% and 1% on the basis of the household 
head’s stated sector of work.300 As the public sector share of the top decile fell over the 1990s 
and 2000s the private sector appears to have gained in size, both among employees and 
business-owners. As in Kenya, agricultural households fell in share, at least over the course of 
the 2000s. 
In the top 1%, as opposed to the top 10%, public sector-headed households were a larger share 
throughout the period, but fell from roughly 42% in 1969 to 21% in 2001, before recovering to 
25% in 2011/12, presumably on account of rising public sector salaries. Business owners 
constitute the largest and most rapidly growing share of the top 1%, while agriculturalists fell 
in share. Private formal sector employee households remained a relatively steady 20% of the 
top 1% throughout the postcolonial era. 
Table 3.13. Tanzania: composition of the top income/consumption decile and percentile, by economic 
sector of the household head  
 Top 10% Top 1% 
Main activity of household 
head 1969 1993 2001 2011/12 1969 1993 2001 2011/12 
Public 25% 24% 17% 14% 42% 36% 21% 25% 
    Government 18% 17% 13% 12% 28% 21% 8% 16% 
    Parastatal 7% 7% 5% 2% 14% 15% 13% 9% 
Private employment* 14% 13% 19% 27% 24% 21% 20% 22% 
Informal sector / business 
}61% 
30% 24% 36% 
}34% 
30% 35% 42% 
Agriculture (or fishing) 30% 33% 21% 13% 19% 9% 
Other (retirees, students etc.) 3% 5% 3%  4% 3% 
Sources: see Appendix V.II. 
Using the same methods as in the Kenyan analysis, asset ownership and housing characteristics 
are used as an alternative means of ranking households (Table 3.14). Using an asset index rather 
than household consumption to stratify households raises the share of public sector-headed 
households in both the top 10% and top 1%, but does not alter the broader story of change. 
Between 1993 and 2011/12 the public sector share of the top decile fell considerably, while the 
share of the top 1% shows a more modest reduction. As in Kenya, stratifying households by 
asset wealth significantly reduces the number of agricultural households in the top strata. 
 
 
                                                   
300 As in the Kenyan case, these categories are quite roughly defined and various judgement calls had to 
be made in order to harmonize categories across surveys. 
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Table 3.14. Tanzania: composition of the top asset wealth decile and percentile, by economic sector of 
the household head  
 Top 10% Top 1% 
Main activity of household 
head 1969 1993 2001 2011/12 1969 1993 2001 2011/12 
Public 25% 31% 19% 19% 42% 43% 37% 37% 
    Government 18% 20% 12% 16% 28% 22% 16% 26% 
    Parastatal 7% 11% 7% 3% 14% 21% 21% 11% 
Private employment* 14% 18% 28% 25% 24% 19% 32% 22% 
Informal sector / business 
}61% 
32% 33% 43% 
}34% 
29% 24% 34% 
Agriculture (or fishing) 13% 13% 6% 1% 3% 2% 
Other (retirees, students etc.) 6% 7% 7% 9% 4% 6% 
Sources: see Appendix V.II. 
As in Kenya, the formal sector income declines in Tanzania during the 1970s through early 
1990s were partially off-set by household diversification of incomes. In 1993 the vast majority 
(67%) of Tanzanian public sector-headed households also had some income or own-production 
of food from farming, livestock or fishing (although this high share may also reflect a large 
share of casual workers in the public sector sample). Very few, however, reported income from 
a business. Secondary income sources remained important in the 2000s, although the share 
with agricultural incomes dropped significantly. In 2000/01 roughly 53% of public sector-
headed households had additional income from farming or business activities and 27% had a 
spouse or child in paid employment. Somewhat unexpectedly the share of public sector-headed 
households with secondary incomes rose modestly between 2000/01 and 2011/12 despite the 
continued recovery in public sector earnings. This may be a result of the falling share of 
parastatal employees in public employment, who were less likely to own farms than their 
general government counterparts. Unlike in Kenya therefore, there is no suggestion that public 
sector household concentrated their efforts once earnings in the public sector began to recover. 
Table 3.15. Tanzania: Public and private sector-headed household shares with secondary incomes, by 
income source, 1993, 2000/01 and 2011/12  
 Additional income source beyond 
primary employment earnings 
1993 2000/01 2011/12 
Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Business/self-employment income 4% 4% 26% 33% 26% 22% 
Agricultural or fishing income 67% 52% 39% 24% 44% 20% 
Spouse/other family member has 
employment income N/A N/A 27% 23% 27% 22% 
Have either business or farm that 
is generating income 69% 55% 53% 46% 58% 38% 
Sources: TZ HRDS 1993; TZ HBS 2000/01; TZ HBS 2011/12.  
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Ugandan results 
The earliest Ugandan survey that includes variables on sector of employment is the 1992/93 
integrated household survey, which reflects conditions shortly after the end of the civil war and 
Yoweri Museveni’s rise to power in 1986. Since then Uganda has undertaken regular household 
surveys, which underlay the country’s poverty monitoring systems. I chose to use the 2006 
survey as a second point of observation as it is the most recent survey with a sizable sample. 
Because it has not been possible to locate any household budget surveys for Uganda for the 
1960s through 1980s, this analysis is limited to the post-conflict phase. 
Uganda’s public sector–headed households were a smaller share of all households than in 
Kenya and Tanzania and the public wage bill was a lower share of GDP (see Chapter 2). 
Correspondingly, their share of the top consumption decile was lower in the 1990s, at 15%. 
Between 1992 and 2006 the share of public sector-headed households fell, but improved 
earnings in the public sector changed the earnings distribution, concentrating a bigger share of 
all public sector-headed households in the top decile. In contrast to Kenya and Tanzania 
therefore, the public sector share of the top decile stayed constant between 1992 and 2006. 
Public sector-headed households in the bottom 90% of the distribution, on the other hand, fell 
sharply as many casual and unskilled jobs were shed and earnings improved. 
Figure 3.6. Uganda: Public sector headed household share of consumption decile 
1992/93 2005/06 
 
Note: Normalized by adults in household. 
Sources: see Appendix V.III. 
Table 3.16 details the composition of the top consumption decile and percentile by economic 
activity of the household head. The trends are similar to those in Kenya and Tanzania, with a 
fall in the share of households in the top decile relying on agriculture, the share in business 
rising in the top decile but falling in the top percentile, while the private formal sector 
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employees increased in both the top decile and percentile. The percentile measures are far from 
precise, but suggest a higher public employment share at the very top of the distribution in 
1992, which fell over the 1990s and early 2000s as the economy recovered.  
Table 3.16. Uganda: top consumption decile and percentile by main activity of the household head, 
1992 and 2006 
  Top 10% Top 1% 
Main activity of household head 1992 2006 1992 2006 
Public employment 14% 15% 24% 14% 
Private (formal) employment 18% 25% 20% 26% 
Farming / agriculture 29% 15% 3% 6% 
Self-employed / business 29% 38% 47% 40% 
Other (retired, housemaker, student etc.) 10% 6% 6% 15% 
Sources: see Appendix V.III. 
In Table 3.17 households are stratified based on asset wealth rather than consumption. As in 
the Kenyan and Tanzanian cases, the asset index is constructed using factor analysis to derive 
weights for each asset/characteristic. The assets used for the 1992/93 analysis include 
ownership of a car, telephone, TV and camera, while the housing characteristics include piped 
indoor water, electric lighting, flush toilet, modern flooring materials, and ‘modern’ cooking 
fuels (in this case electricity, gas or paraffin).  For the 2006 analysis the asset variables were 
more restricted, and did not include the TV or camera variables (see Appendix V.III). 
As in the other two country cases, using asset wealth indices raises the share of wage employees 
in the top decile, including public sector employees, relative to farming households. Overall 
however, the trend remains similar, with a relatively steady share of public sector employees 
in the top decile, and falling share in the top percentile (although the percentile shares are based 
on a very small sample). Private sector employees and business owners increased in share over 
the same period. 
Table 3.17. Uganda: top asset wealth decile and percentile by main activity of the household head, 1992 
and 2006  
  Top 10% Top 1% 
Main activity of household head 1992 2006 1992 2006 
Public employment 20% 16% 45% 18% 
Private employment 22% 30% 20% 35% 
Farming / agriculture 18% 11% 1% 2% 
Self-employed / business 29% 37% 29% 30% 
Other (retired, housemaker, student etc.) 11% 7% 5% 15% 
Sources: see Appendix V.III. 
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As in Kenya and Tanzania, a large share of public sector-headed households relied on more 
than one income. Over 70% of Ugandan public sector-headed households engaged in 
agriculture, a family business, or had a second family member in paid employment. These 
shares did not fall between 1992 and 2006 and a growing share of households in fact started 
businesses or saw a second household member entering paid employment. As in Kenya and 
Uganda, a public sector-headed households in 2006 were more likely to have a diversified 
household income portfolio than households headed by permanent private sector employees. 
Other studies confirm this importance of alternative income sources. A 2003 tracer survey of 
Ugandan university graduates, of whom 66% were found to be working in the public sector, 
found that 55% reported a secondary job or business activity (not counting the activities of 
other household members).301 
Table 3.18. Share of public sector-headed households that have at least one household member engaged 
in a secondary activity, by sector, 1992 and 2006 
 1992 2006 
 Public Public Private 
Farming / agriculture 56% 53% 27% 
Business or informal sector 10% 27% 16% 
Second family member in paid employment 20% 25% 20% 
Household has any secondary activity 72% 74% 49% 
Sources: UG HIS 1992; UG NHS 2005/06. 
In sum, Uganda’s tumultuous postcolonial history has left its imprint on the income 
distribution. In comparison to Kenya and Tanzania the public sector share of top income 
earners was already very low in 1992 (at 15%), likely reflecting the fact that Uganda’s public 
service never grew as large as its neighbours and average salaries fell further during Uganda’s 
fiscal collapse of the 1970s and 1980s. Public sector salaries recovered substantially in the 
2000s as the economy rebounded, but so did opportunities in the private sector and Uganda’s 
public service thus remained a constant share of the top 10% of households. 
The regional distribution of public sector employment  
Across all three countries these wealthy strata of society are concentrated in the urban areas, 
and particularly in the capital cities. The data suggests that 66% of the Kenyan top 1% of asset 
wealthy households live in Nairobi (and another 7% in Mombasa) in 2009, 59% of the 
Tanzanian top 1% in Dar es Salaam (2011/12), and 61% of the Ugandan top 1% in Kampala 
                                                   
301 Edward Kirumira and Fred Bateganya, “Where Has All the Education Gone in Uganda? Employment 
Outcomes Among Secondary School and University Leavers” (Brighton, 2003), 24. 
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(2006). The declining public sector share in the top percentile is thus largely a function of more 
comparatively wealthy private sector-headed households in the capital cities. This begs a 
further question: does the declining share of public sector employment have a distinct 
geographic pattern? Does the public sector’s relative importance differ in rural versus urban 
areas?  
As described in Chapter 2, since the 1960s the geographic distribution of public sector in East 
Africa has grown more equitable. A larger share of public sector jobs are today found outside 
the capital cities, in smaller towns and rural areas, compared to the early independence era. As 
a result, the public employment share of the labour force fell in all three capital cities. A rough 
estimate of the share of Nairobi households headed by a public sector employee suggests a fall 
from roughly 35-40% in the 1970s,302 to 23% by 1994, and 8% by 2009.303 In Dar es Salaam 
the public sector share fell from roughly 20% in 1970 to 13% in 2000/01,  304 and in Kampala 
from roughly 30% in 1970 to 19% in 1992.305 The fall in public sector-headed households in 
the urban areas was also accentuated by the growing share of women in public employment, 
who are more likely to be classified as the spouse rather than head of the household. In Nairobi 
for instance, the share of public sector employees who were the heads of their household fell 
from 77% in 1992 to 62% in 2009.306 
Given the declining importance of public sector employment in the capital cities relative to the 
more peripheral parts of the country, has the declining public sector elite share varied by 
locality? Using the asset wealth index rather than consumption measures (as it allows us to 
make use of the Kenyan 2009 census), the tables below calculate the public sector share of the 
top wealth decile for rural and urban areas separately, and the capital city alone. Note that these 
results will not tally with the earlier decile shares, as the decile thresholds vary across these 
localities (the cut-off into the top decile among Nairobi residents is far higher than in the rural 
areas).  
The Kenyan results show the steepest decline in the public sector share of the top wealth decile 
in the capital city, where it fell from roughly 40% in 1994 to 17% in 2009, compared to a fall 
from 26% to 15% in the rural areas, and 41% to 20% in the urban areas overall. The Tanzanian 
trends are more ambiguous, and the 1993 results should be treated with caution given the small 
samples, but suggest extremely high public sector employment levels in Dar es Salaam’s 
                                                   
302 Calculated by comparing public sector employment in Nairobi (from KE EES) with total population 
(KE SA), assuming a household size of four. 
303 KE WMS 1994; KE CENSUS 2009. 
304 TZ EES 1971; TZ HBS 2000/01. 
305 UG EES 1970; UG IHS 1992. 
306 Calculated from KE WMS 1992; KE CENSUS 2009. 
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highest wealth bracket in 1993, and a sizeable fall since. The decline in the urban areas 
excluding Dar es Salaam however, was lower than in the rural areas. The Ugandan urban-rural 
disaggregation mirrors the Kenyan trajectory, with a much steeper decline in the public sector 
elite shares in the urban than rural areas (the Kampala sample was too small to analyse 
separately from the urban areas in aggregate). Uganda’s rural areas have seen no decline in the 
public sector share of the elite, while in urban areas the share has halved over a 14 year period. 
This disaggregation sheds further light on the reconfiguration of East Africa’s elites. Within 
the capital cities public servants were a larger share of the middle and upper strata in the first 
decades of independence than in the countries at large. In these localities the public sector share 
of the top decile has declined more rapidly than in the smaller towns and rural areas. Thus in 
the capital cities and larger metropolises, if less so in the more peripheral parts of each country, 
the elite reliance on public employment has fallen markedly. 
Table 3.19. Kenya: public sector share of the top decile by asset wealth, by urban/rural locality 
 Rural Urban Nairobi 
 1994 2009 1994 2009 1994 2009 
Public sector share of 
top decile (asset wealth) 26% 15% 41% 20% 40% 17% 
Percentage decline 42% 51% 58% 
Sources: Calculated from the Kenya 1994 WMS and 2009 Housing and population census 
Table 3.20. Tanzania: public sector share of the top decile by asset wealth, by urban/rural locality 
 Rural Urban Dar es Salaam 
 1993 2000 2011 1993 2000 2011 1993 2000 2011 
Public sector share of 
top decile (asset 
wealth) 19% 16% 12% 37% 39% 30% 57% 40% 33% 
Percentage decline 
(1993-2011) 36% 19% 42% 
Sources: Calculated from Tanzania 1993 HRDS and 2000 and 2011/12 Household Budget Surveys 
Table 3.21. Uganda: public sector share of the top decile by asset wealth, by urban/rural locality 
 Rural Urban 
 1992 2006 1992 2006 
Public sector share of top 
decile (asset wealth) 16% 15% 41% 20% 
Percentage decline 6% 51% 
Sources: Calculated from the Uganda 1992 IHS and 2006 NBS 
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The large 2009 Kenyan census sample also makes it possible to examine public sector 
employment shares on a county by county basis. Figure 3.7 calculates the public sector share 
of the top 5%307 of asset wealthy households by county using the 2009 census, and relates this 
to the level of development in each county.308 This shows a negative correlation between the 
public sector share of the wealth elite and the level of economic development in the county. On 
average, less developed counties have a larger share of the local asset wealth elite work for the 
public sector. 
Figure 3.7. Kenya 2009: percentage of employees in top 5% of asset wealthy households by county  
 
Source: KE CENSUS 2009 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
The big shifts in public employment and pay over the course of the postcolonial period 
described in Chapter 2 affected the relative economic standing as well as the absolute level of 
earnings of public sector-headed households. This chapter has argued that Kenya, Tanzania 
and Uganda’s educational and income elites are less dominated by public servants today than 
in the first decades of independence. 
Establishing the public sector share of top income, consumption or wealth brackets over time 
is no simple exercise, and all the available data sources suffer from drawbacks and limitations. 
The approach in this chapter has been to compile as many of the available sources and measures 
as possible, providing social stratifications based on education, income tax reports, wage 
earnings in the formal employment sector, consumption-based measures using household 
surveys, and asset-based measures using censuses and other surveys. While point estimates 
                                                   
307 Top 5% was the smallest bracket that could be used without losing observations.  
308 See Chapter 4 for details on the construction of this development index. 
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will differ depending on the method used to stratify the population, these sources are broadly 
in agreement on the direction of change. Whether measured on an educational, income and 
consumption, or asset wealth basis, the public sector share of the more privileged strata of 
society has fallen over time. 
An analysis of the income tax records from the early 1960s and available household survey 
data from the 1960s and 1970s show that Africans public servants were indeed a large share of 
top income earners. Within roughly the top 0.1% they comprised between a half and three-
quarters of all income earners. Within the broader distribution ‘middle class’ their shares were 
considerably lower yet still reasonably large, comprising roughly a quarter of households in 
the top decile in Tanzania in 1969 and just over a third in Kenya in 1975 (no Ugandan estimates 
are available for this period). 
Between the 1970s and 2000s, the share of public sector employees in the top income or 
consumption decile roughly halved in Kenya and Tanzania. While public sector-headed 
households constituted in the order of 36% of households in the top income decile in Kenya in 
1975, this share had dropped to 30% by 1994 and 17% by 2005/06. The Tanzanian public 
sector share of the top 10% of income earners started lower, falling from an estimated 25% in 
1969 to 14% in 2011/12. For Uganda there are no early estimates with which to compare the 
shares in the 1990s and 2000s, and no fall in top decile share in the 1990s, but the levels were 
probably lower to begin with and by the 2000s they were comparable to those in Kenya and 
Tanzania. In the top percentile, as opposed to the top decile, there also appears to have been 
some decline, although the Tanzanian public sector share of the top percentile rebounded 
slightly between 2000/01 and 2011/12 while the Kenyan 2009 census data suggests a more 
modest percentile fall than that given budget household budget surveys. These declines were 
sharper in the capital cities than in rural and smaller urban centres, suggesting that the growing 
urban metropolises have undergone the most extensive structural change. Interestingly, despite 
the differences in economic legacies between Kenya’s pro-capitalist orientation and Tanzania’s 
statist one, the results are not too dissimilar, although Tanzania’s public servants probably 
remain a larger share of the top 1% than in the neighbouring countries.  
Despite the large fall in public sector salaries in the 1970s and 1980s these results suggest that 
in Kenya and Tanzania, albeit not in Uganda, the structural adjustment reforms of the 1990s 
had the bigger impact on the public sector share of top incomes, with most of the decline in 
both the top decile and percentile happening between the early 1990s and late 2000s. This is 
somewhat surprising as average public sector earnings were rising in relation to GDP per capita 
over this period, which ought to have shifted public sector employees higher up in the 
distribution. There are several possible reasons for this. In Tanzania in particular, the public 
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sector decline in the top decile was primarily driven by divestures from the high paying 
parastatal sector. In both Kenya and Tanzania it also appears that income inequality increased 
over this period, possibly shifting a greater share of household earnings into private sector-
headed households at the top of the distribution. Kenyan public sector-headed households also 
reduced the extent to which they complemented their public sector earnings with earnings from 
family farms, businesses or other employment. Furthermore the growing share of women in 
the public sector has reduced the share of public sector-headed households relative to total 
public sector labour force participants. Public sector earnings are more often complementing 
the earnings of a private sector-employed spouse or that of another public sector worker. In 
Kenya for instance, 40% of spouses working for the public sector are married to another public 
sector employee.309 
Relative to other regions of the world, the share of public sector headed-households in the top 
10% or top 1% are not exceptionally high today. In all three countries the share of public sector-
headed households in the top 10% is lower than in the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom 
the public sector shares taper off more strongly in the top percentiles, a pattern that is less 
obvious in the three East African cases. However, the educational attainment gap between the 
public and private sector employees in East Africa is also higher than in the United Kingdom, 
which may explain this difference. 
This story of change provides a cautiously optimistic tale. Both at the very top and among the 
broader middle class, those households at the fore of the income distribution during East 
Africa’s economic recovery in the 2000s are primarily households in the private sector. 
Compared to the first two decades of independence, a larger share of the relatively prosperous 
Kenyan and Tanzanians, and presumably also Ugandans, are today business owners and 
employees at banks and in other service jobs, suggesting that Frantz Fanon’s derided 
‘bourgeoisie of the civil service’ may no longer be as important a social force. This analysis is 
of course limited to employment to the government’s employment role, and does not rule out 
the possibility that the state’s influence and control over the private sector may have increased 
over the same period, through for instance outsourcing and contracting with private contractors. 
However, other recent work by Arriola and Handley suggests that this is probably not the case, 
given that government involvement in the financial and productive sectors have been declined 
over the same period.310 
                                                   
309 Calculated from KE CENSUS 2009. 
310 Arriola, “Capital and Opposition in Africa: Coalition Building in Multiethnic Societies”; Handley, 
“Varieties of Capitalists? The Middle-Class, Private Sector and Economic Outcomes in Africa.” 
 132 
 
How these trends will play out in the future, however, are far from certain. Kenya’s 2010 
decision to devolve power to county governments for instance, has raised concerns that local 
governments are beginning to expand the level of public employment again, as well as creating 
a new tier of high-paying political posts at local level.311 This may boost the importance of 
public sector jobs in county capitals, but could also trigger future wage deciles. It may also lead 
to a continued divergence between the employment distribution in Nairobi and Mombasa and 
those in the peripheral towns. Economic setbacks could also slow the ongoing transition, if 
falling demand reduced the growth of high-paying private sector jobs. 
Nonetheless, just as the last chapter did, this chapter underscores that African economies have 
been far from static over the past half-century and are unlikely to become so in the future. 
Political economy interpretations of the continents postcolonial performance need to take 
greater cognizance of the changes to the structure of household earnings in the decades since 
independence, and identify the winners and losers of these shifts in different eras. Public sector 
employment was an important source of income for comparatively well-off Kenyans, 
Tanzanians and Ugandans at independence, but the political and social status of public sector 
employees ebbed and flowed over the subsequent decades and their relative importance in the 
social hierarchy is by all accounts at its lowest today.  
                                                   
311 Michelle D’Arcy and Agnes Cornell, “Devolution and Corruption in Kenya: Everyone’s Turn to 
Eat?,” African Affairs 115, no. 459 (2016): 246–73. 
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Chapter 4. 
Public servant, who art thou? 
Inequalities in public sector employment 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite their declining share of the labour force, public sector wages still constitute an 
important source of income for 5-10% of all Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan households and 
touch an even larger share indirectly. And although their earnings may have declined since the 
1960s, the previous chapter shows that public servants remain concentrated towards the top of 
the income distribution. Given this, what types of people benefit from these comparative 
privileged public sector salaries? What horizontal inequalities (regional and ethnic) has the 
public sector’s hiring strategies given rise to? Have some social groups benefitted 
disproportionately from government jobs? 
The previous two chapters have considered the evolution of public employment and pay and 
its effect on the social stratification. This chapter instead examines the composition of the 
public sector labour force in relation to theories about unequal access to state resources in 
Africa. It uses recent census data to construct a logistic model that examines the influence of 
education, age, gender, ethnicity, social background and place of birth on a person’s likelihood 
of holding a public sector job, and how these characteristics have changed over successive 
cohorts. This sheds light on vertical and horizontal inequalities in access to state jobs and 
thereby, indirectly, on the politics of public employment.  
This chapter argues that inequalities in access to public employment are less pronounced than 
much of the secondary literature would have us believe. In all three countries high educational 
attainment sharply increases the probability of working for the state. Graduates from colleges 
and universities have historically faced relatively little competition for jobs, which by extension 
constrained political influence over hiring decisions. Moreover, among the educated in Kenya 
and Uganda, if less so in Tanzania, women and candidates from less developed parts of their 
respective country are more likely to work for the government. This has the effect of making 
the public service more socially, regionally and ethnically equitable than educational 
attainment alone would predict. As a result, ethnic inequalities in public sector job access are 
not enormous, and with one exception, the Presidency of Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya, there is 
little sign of an employment advantage for coethnics of past or current presidents. 
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I argue that formal policies provide plausible explanations for this pattern. A comparatively 
equitable geographic spread of public sector employment opportunities in combination with 
quotas and other forms of affirmative action in educational institutions and employment, as 
well as the falling attractiveness of public employment in an era of growing private sector 
demand for skilled labour, have the effect of privileging candidates from less developed regions 
and contributes to a comparatively inclusive public service. 
These conclusions apply to Kenya and Uganda but less so to Tanzania. Interestingly, despite 
Tanzania’s government’s greater commitment to social justice under Julius Nyerere, its public 
service is less of an aid to social mobility than in its neighbouring countries. This throws doubt 
on any simple causal relationship between ethnic polarization and inequality. 
This chapter starts with a short summary of the theoretical predictions about inequalities in 
public sector job access. This is followed by a discussion of the relationship between 
educational policies and public employment. After that I proceed with the data description and 
analysis, examining, in turn, the effect of education, place of birth, ethnicity and parental 
characteristics on the probability of working for the state. The conclusion discusses the 
implications of these results for theories about public employment access. 
4.2. PREDICTIONS ABOUT INEQUALITIES IN AFRICAN PUBLIC SERVICES  
Since independence many different theories have been put forward to explain who and how 
people came to work for the public sector in postcolonial Africa and the types of inequalities 
this gave rise to. Literature from the early independence period framed this debate in class 
terms, asking whether high-earning public sector employees formed a nascent, exploitative 
class. The more optimistic observers, eschewing class frameworks, highlighted the meritocratic 
nature of Africa's public services and speculated that in the absence of strong social 
stratification under colonialism, mid- and senior-level positions in the public service were open 
to aspirants from a relatively broad cross-section of society.312  
Others, however, painted the emerging African educational elite as a class in the making. They 
assumed that the institutional structures in postcolonial states would be shaped to suit the 
interests of its incumbents. Several articles from the 1970s and 1980s, from Kenya in particular, 
showed that parental income strongly influenced the likelihood of educational progression.313 
                                                   
312 P.C. Lloyd, The New Elite of Tropical Africa  (Oxford: International Africa Institute, 1966). 
313 For instance: Kabiru Kinyanjui, “Education and Inequality in Kenya: Some Research Experience and 
Issues” (Nairobi, 1981); Kilemi Mwiria, “Kenya’s Harambee Secondary School Movement: The 
Contradictions of Public Policy,” Comparative Education Review 34, no. 3 (1990): 350–68; Kirumira 
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This effect was expected to get worse as economic growth slowed and the state’s ability to 
employ a large share of graduates declined.314 This literature therefore predicted that today’s 
public services will predominantly be staffed by children of a pre-existing elite.  
In more recent decades, however, researchers have moved away from this class-based lens and 
instead characterised African bureaucracies as clientelist or patronage-based, focusing on 
horizontal inequalities between ethnic groups or regions rather than vertical inequalities 
between individuals. Kitschelt and Wilkinson and Hicken’s definition of clientelism as a 
‘contingent exchange’ would imply that public sector jobs are given to specific individuals or 
narrowly defined groups in exchange for votes or other political favours.315 If either party 
reneges this deal can be reversed.316 This understanding of clientelism or patronage implies 
that the political patron has direct control over public sector jobs and the power to allocate and 
withdraw them. This is expected to lead to a public service staffed by people ill-suited to their 
official responsibilities and in excess of actual staffing needs. 
A related literature considers ethnic favouritism. To the extent that they invoke patronage, these 
writers use the concept in a looser sense to refer to the targeting of state resources towards 
favoured ethnic, religious or regional groups, without necessarily requiring a formal quid pro 
quo. Several recent papers have examined whether coethnics of past or present Presidents in 
Africa have received a disproportionate share of public sector resources, and many find that 
indeed they do.317 In Kenya there has even been a special investigation into ethnic equity in 
state employment. Since 2011 the National Cohesion and Integration Commission has 
undertaken a series of ethnic audits of different public sector institutions, in order to determine 
whether jobs are distributed fairly.318 It has found that the ethnic groups of past or present 
presidents (the Kikuyu and Kalenjin), are overrepresented compared to their population share, 
although this analysis compared employment shares to aggregate population shares without 
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regard for ethnic group differences in demographic structure, labour force participation or 
educational attainment.  
While the ethnic favouritism literature focuses on the redistributive actions of politicians and 
the inequalities this gives rise to, others literature has highlighted the persistence of structural 
inequalities between regions, religious or ethnic groups and its potential to inflame ethnic 
conflict. It predicts that long-run geographic inequalities in educational attainment will leave 
their mark on the composition of public employment. In Kenya, for instance, the Africanisation 
process of the 1960s was derogatorily referred to as ‘Kikuyisation’ on account of the high share 
of Kikuyus in the civil service.319 In 1968 there was even a debate in the Kenyan Parliament 
about the merits of establishing a Select Committee to investigate evidence of ethnic 
favouritism in the civil service. The debate pitted those Parliamentarians who accused the 
government of ‘tribalism’ against those that viewed such inequalities as a consequence of 
uneven educational attainment during the colonial era.320 President Nyerere of Tanzania raised 
similar concerns in his 1962 inaugural speech stressing that ethnic tensions surrounding 
employment and education had resulted from uneven missionary penetration: 
‘You will discover that the missionaries did not build their schools all over 
Tanganyika, but only in certain areas. And as a result of this not only are the majority 
of educated Africans today likely to be Christians, but a very large proportion of 
them are draw from the Wahaya, Wanyakyusa, and Wachagga peoples. So those who 
would strike at our unity could equally well exploit this situation to stir up animosity 
between the tribes. (…)’ 321 
Yet some scholars have argued that precisely because of the explosive nature of horizontal 
inequalities in multi-ethnic settings, such societies often go to greater lengths than others to 
promote horizontal equity in access to state resources. Azam argued that to reduce the risk of 
active conflict, leaders in Africa can either deter potential rebels by investing in their security 
services, or co-opt dissenters by redistributing to them.322 He suggests that when leaders 
redistribute, the redistribution is often mediated through formal sector labour markets and the 
education system. Communities will invest in- and send their most educationally promising 
youth into the urban labour market, and they in turn will remit some of their earnings and use 
their positions of power to ensure that public resources reach their communities of origin.  
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Along the same lines, a recent paper by Francois, Rainer and Trebbi (FTR) studied the ethnic 
composition of cabinets in Africa and found them to be surprisingly inclusive, with ministerial 
appointments allocated proportionately to the ethnic composition of the population.  323 FTR 
suggest that the members of these ethnically-inclusive cabinets will use the ministries over 
which they preside to extend the flows of patronage to their respective ethnic groups, ensuring 
a relatively equitable ethnic distribution of spending and employment in aggregate.324  
While Azam and FTR invoke patronage to explain this relatively even pattern of spending, the 
same distributional results could have been achieved through affirmative action and regional 
policies. While their efficacy may be subject to debate, many African states have used formal 
affirmative action policies, often aimed to improve the regional distribution of educational 
opportunities and jobs, and in some cases explicitly motivated by a desire to reduce ethnic 
conflict.325 Tanzania accepted the need for regional quotas for entry into secondary school in 
the 1960s and adopted a formal quota system in 1972.326 Kenya introduced a district quota 
system in its national secondary schools in the 1980s, as well as requiring that provincial 
secondary schools to admit most of its candidates from the local area, which had the effect of 
reducing competition from higher performing ethnic groups outside the catchment area.327 
Kenyan teacher training colleges also used district quotas, which lowered the bar for students 
from historically underserved regions. Since 2003 Uganda distributes roughly a quarter of 
university scholarships based on district quotas to candidates from underprivileged 
backgrounds,328 while in Kenya the grade-point cut-offs for government-sponsored university 
and college courses are lower for women, minority and marginalised groups and disabled 
applicants.329  
In recent years these governments have also sought to address equity in job access directly. 
Following the post-election violence in 2007, Kenya adopted the National Cohesion and 
Integration Act (2008), which requires that ‘all public establishments […] seek to represent the 
diversity of the people of Kenya,’ and prohibits public establishments from hiring more than 
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30% of their employees from a single ethnic community.330 Following the civil conflict in 
Uganda, the government introduced district quotas in the army.331 Efforts to decentralise 
recruitment to local governments in Uganda since the 1990s have also been interpreted as a 
means of ensuring greater equity in public employment as local level recruitment is expected 
to privilege local candidates. 332 
In parallel with these explicit attempts to level the playing field, some have suggested that the 
highly bureaucratised, transparent hiring criteria in place in the East African public sectors 
(which emphasise educational qualifications and years of experience) are a direct reaction to 
ethnic polarization, as simple transparent rules help to reduce accusations of capture.333 
Perceptions of public servants themselves support the idea of a strong formal emphasis on 
merit. A 2006 study by Therkildsen and Tidemand, which surveyed graduate-level public 
servants in Tanzania and Uganda, found that over 80% believed merit was an important factor 
in recruitment decisions,  although a minority also believed that political and social connections 
mattered.334   
Successful affirmative action policies should have a similar distributional effect to that 
predicted by Azam and FTR; a relatively equitable distribution of public sector jobs on a 
regional or ethnic basis. While FTR predicts that this levelling is the effect of patronage 
resources trickling down from an inclusive cabinet, affirmative action or regional policy fosters 
meritocratic competition, albeit with a lowering of the bar for predefined underprivileged or 
marginalised groups. It also shifts competition and bargaining to the formal political arena. In 
essence then, it may well be that formal rules and institutions – shaped in turn by ethnic 
considerations – have the bigger effect on employment distribution. 
In sum, the existing literature makes a range of predictions about public sector hiring 
imperatives in Africa and the resulting inequalities in job access. Large-scale microdata 
samples from the Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan censuses makes it possible to examine some 
of these hypotheses quantitatively. By identifying public servants within these census samples, 
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we can see how their characteristics, be it educational, ethnic or gender, differ from those of 
the labour force at large, and how these inequalities conform to the various predictions. 
As already noted, this chapter is not the first study to examine ethnic and regional inequalities 
in public employment in East Africa, but earlier studies have tended to examine a fairly small 
number of high level offices, be it ministerial appointments or cabinets,335 senior civil 
servants,336 or ministers, deputy ministers and the army officer corps. 337 Cabinet positions and 
other appointed roles, however, are by design a form of patronage: these post-holders are 
appointed by the president or party in order to deliver a political agenda.338 These strategic 
posts serve a different purpose from those of the rank and file public servants. This study in 
contrast considers the public sector labour force at large. 
4.3. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND 
EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITIES 
Before examining the characteristics of the public sector labour force, this section discusses 
the relationship between education and public sector employment. As discussed in Chapter 2 
and 3, over the course of the postcolonial era newly created public sector jobs in Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda have disproportionately benefitted educated East Africans. An estimated 
two-thirds or more of all public sector employees had at least four years of secondary education 
by the 2000s, compared to an educational status of the working population as a whole which 
ranged from a quarter in Kenya to around 10% in Tanzania and Uganda (See Table 3.3.). Public 
employment outcomes therefore need to be viewed in relation to education policy. 
The relationship between public employment and education in East Africa in part reflects a 
colonial legacy of underinvestment in human capital formation. In the late colonial and 
immediate postcolonial era policymakers were preoccupied not with the consequences of an 
overstaffed bureaucracy, but with the shortage of skilled African manpower to replace 
expatriates in the colonial service.339 Post-primary educational policies, and particularly those 
relating to tertiary education, were designed with the skills-needs of the public service in mind. 
Angus Maddison characterised the skills gap in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1965 as a ‘crisis 
situation’, as ‘[a]lmost all leading posts in the administration and the economy were held by 
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expatriates and settlers until very recently.’340 There was strong pressure on independence 
leaders to replace this foreign public sector elite with Africans, yet persistent under-investment 
in education meant that there simply were not enough Africans with the requisite skills to meet 
the demand. 
The fervour of the debate is captured in the political discourse and policy documents from this 
time. In response to the Kenyan education minister’s 1965 budget proposal for instance, one 
Member of Parliament admonished that: ‘quite often when he has been questioned in this House 
about Africanization, we are told, that we cannot Africanize unless we have experienced 
people, and we would expect a definite government policy which would lead our nation to 
provide all the personnel it requires.’341 In Kenya’s first development plan President Kenyatta 
stressed in his introduction that ‘[o]ur plan places particular emphasis on the expansion of 
secondary education. This should have the greatest and earliest effect on the capacity of 
Kenya's citizens to contribute to the nation's development and to benefit from it.’342 Tanzanian 
government officials used similarly emotive language: ‘At her Independence in 1961 Tanzania 
(…) had very few citizens in high and middle level posts. Thus, it became the Country’s top 
priority to produce qualified manpower for almost 86% of the then existing high and middle 
level posts were held by foreigners. Everything else had to wait.’343 Uganda’s first president, 
Milton Obote, explicitly highlighted the relationship between manpower and full independence 
from the colonial powers in a speech from 1969: 
‘The replacement of expatriate staff by the citizens at all levels is a fundamental need 
for the consolidation of our independence, and the production of local qualified staff 
must therefore be given priority over all other educational requirements. If this is not 
done or achieved the independence of the country becomes lopsided and the most 
powerful instrument - the government - which must belong to the people becomes 
weak and unresponsive to the wishes of the people.’344 
All three government’s therefore tailored their investments in post-primary education to the 
expected manpower needs of the state.345 Fearing a loss of government-financed tertiary 
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graduates to the private sector, moreover, East Africa’s governments provided tied bursaries 
that required graduates from certain tertiary institutions to work for the government for 2-5 
years upon graduation. In exchange these graduates received an employment guarantee. There 
was a circularity to the employment system: expanding the educational system required the 
state to hire more skilled workers. As the system expanded more people graduated with the 
expectation (and in some cases explicit promise) of a public sector job.346 
The shortage of educational supply proved a short-lived phenomenon however, as the popular 
demand for education after independence proved insatiable. Aided by government spending, 
primary school enrolment exploded in the decades after independence, with the number of 
primary school students increasing five-fold in Kenya, eight-fold in Tanzania and three-fold in 
Uganda between c.1960-1980.347 Secondary enrolment also grew rapidly, but the higher unit 
cost and stronger central government controls over secondary schoolings meant planners 
initially tried to curb secondary access to what they considered a reasonable level of growth, 
albeit with varying success across the three countries. Governments in all three countries 
subsidized secondary and tertiary education heavily. University students received full 
bursaries, including accommodation, food and supplies; secondary schooling in public schools 
was also largely paid for by the state. Fiscal ceilings therefore put a relatively firm cap on the 
number of students that could be catered for in public secondary and tertiary institutions. In 
Kenya in 1968 the annual per student cost of university education was 27 times GDP per 
capita.348  In Ugandan parliamentary discussion the ministry puts the unit cost of secondary 
education at £1,000 per year, or 26 times GDP per capita, on account of Uganda’s expensive 
boarding school system.349 Tanzania’s secondary schools were also mostly boarding schools 
and therefore had high unit costs.350 
Some country differences in educational policy deserve note. In Kenya the government 
encouraged a separate track of so-called Harambee schools – community funded schools – to 
emerge alongside the government-financed secondary schools. This helped to shift some of the 
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popular pressure for secondary education from the government to local communities.351 With 
time, however, this put pressure on the government to extend support to Harambee schools. 
Starting the 1970s select Harambee schools were allocated teachers and other resources from 
the national budget, shifting them into a new category of ‘assisted’ schools.352 Some have 
argued that this increased the regressivity of educational spending as it opened a back door for 
richer communities, which were in a better position to start Harambee schools, to access public 
education funds.353 It also spread the secondary school budget more thinly and resulted in 
falling per student spending in the traditional government schools.354  
The Tanzanian central government maintained a firmer grip on secondary school expansion, 
limiting it in line with projected manpower needs and restricting private schooling on equity 
grounds.355 A government report from 1982 made the distinction between secondary education 
for national development versus education as a right, noting that ‘one of the principles guiding 
manpower policy in Tanzania is to provide secondary and higher education only to the extent 
justified by the manpower requirements of the economy (…) due to constraints in resources 
the Country cannot afford to educate everybody to the extent they would like.’356 In the mid-
1980s the government liberalized its policies on private education and the country has seen a 
big growth in private enrolment since.357  
Uganda had a longer tradition of secondary schooling than either Kenya or Tanzania, with 
education rooted in religious institutions during the colonial era. Private education thus had and 
retained a bigger place in the secondary education system after independence and already by 
1969 provided 40% of all secondary schools.358 However, as in Kenya, the Ugandan private 
schools on the whole provided inferior education to that of the government schools, and were 
thus less competitive.359 In the 1980s, motivated by budget constraints, the government 
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followed the Kenyan example of encouraging community-supported day secondary schools, 
where the capital costs were covered by communities and supplies and teaching staff financed 
by the government.360  
As illustrated in Table 4.1, secondary schooling expanded at different paces in the three 
countries. Using population data to roughly estimate the size of the secondary and tertiary-aged 
cohorts, the table below calculates rough gross enrolment rates for secondary school (Form I-
IV) and tertiary education (including teacher training). Kenya had the most rapid growth in 
secondary and tertiary education in the first decades of independence with secondary enrolment 
six times higher than in Tanzania by the 1980s. Uganda’s educational growth was respectable 
considering the perilous state of the economy, and converged with Kenya’s in the 1990s. All 
three countries saw strong attainment growth in the 2000s and Tanzania’s secondary and 
tertiary attainment levels began to converge with those of its neighbours. 
 
Table 4.1. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: Secondary and tertiary enrolment, 1961 - 2000 
 1961 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Secondary gross enrolment rate  
Kenya 3.2% 11.6% 26.0% 27.4% 23.8% 45.4% 
Tanzania 1.2% 3.1% 3.7% 5.8% 7.4% 37.5% 
Uganda  4.3% 5.7% 14% 20.4% 37.9% 
Tertiary gross enrolment rate  
Kenya 1.2% 2.5% 3.0% 4.3% 3.8% 7.8% 
Tanzania  1.2% 1.5% 1.5%  6.9%*  
Uganda  1.9% 2.2%   4.2%** 9.7%** 
* 2009. ** Total enrolment at all tertiary institutions, unclear if all are degree/certificate courses. 
Sources and definitions: Secondary enrolment in Form I-IV over population aged 13-16; tertiary 
enrolment (incl. teacher training) over population aged 20-22. Enrolment data, see Statistical Appendix 
1; population data from WB WDI. 
 
As the educational system expanded, however, the pressure on the state to continue employing 
graduates increased, even when this threatened the affordability and efficiency of the public 
service itself. In 1986 the Kenyan government finally abandoned its employment guarantee for 
graduates from state colleges on the grounds that it was no longer sustainable. In Tanzania, 
however, where educational expansion had proceeded more slowly, the government continued 
employing a large share of graduates for longer and never formally abandoned its employment 
guarantee. Qualitative evidence from Uganda suggests a similar dynamic, although the years 
of conflict also appear to have weakened the bargaining position of graduates.361 
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Figure 4.1 illustrates the relationship between public sector job creation and educational supply 
in Kenya and Tanzania (comparable series could not be constructed for Uganda). These charts 
compare the number of new government jobs created each year against the number of 
secondary school and college and university graduates entering the labour market. These are 
rough estimates, with ‘new hires’ calculated by assuming an attrition rate of 5% added to the 
annual growth in government employment.362 Form IV (secondary school) completers is 
calculated by taking the previous year’s Form IV enrolment and subtracting those entering 
Form V. All college and university graduates are assumed to join the labour market the year 
after they graduate. These estimates illustrate orders of magnitude rather than the exact rate of 
absorption; some share of new jobs most certainly went to employees with less than secondary 
schooling, while some graduates presumably never desired to enter the public service.  
Nonetheless it illustrates that already by the mid-1970s the number of secondary school 
graduates had exceeded the annual public sector employment intake in Kenya. By the 1980s 
moreover, the government labour force stopped expanding while the number of graduates 
continued to grow. By the early 1990s roughly the same number of Kenyan college and 
university graduates were entering the job market each year as the number of new public sector 
jobs created in total. In Tanzania the secondary school attainment grew much slower, and it 
was only towards the late 1980s that secondary school completers begin to outnumber 
government job growth. 
Figure 4.1. Demand and supply of employment: estimated number of new public sector jobs against 
secondary and tertiary graduates  
Kenya Tanzania 
 
Sources: Statistical Appendix 1. 
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How did this influence the public sector job prospects of secondary and tertiary graduates? 
Data from tracer surveys (designed to understand the career paths of a cohort of graduates) and 
manpower surveys suggests that the majority of people graduating from higher learning 
institutions embarked on public sector careers in the early independence period but that this 
ratio subsequently dropped (see Table 4.2 for a full list of all consulted surveys). Although 
these surveys rarely rely on randomized sampling techniques and cannot be assumed to be 
representative, taken together they suggest that somewhere in the order of 65-90% of all 
economically active university and college graduates were employed in the public sectors of 
their respective countries during the 1960s-1980s. Tanzanian and Ugandan tracer surveys from 
2003 suggest that the share of graduates entering the public sector fell in the 1990s. 
In the early postcolonial era the public sector’s absorption of secondary school completers was 
also high (as previously discussed in Chapter 3). A 1969 Kenyan survey of select secondary 
schools found that two-thirds of those secondary school graduates (Form IV) that did not 
proceed to upper secondary school joined the public sector or a public sector training 
programme (1965-68).363 In Uganda, among a sample of employed secondary school graduates, 
66-93% worked for the public sector in 1964-1971.364 Since the 1970s however the share of 
secondary school completers entering public employment in Kenya and Uganda has fallen. In 
Tanzania in contrast, where secondary school expansion was slower, the public sector 
continued to absorb 50% of all secondary school leavers into the 1990.365 
These findings alone suggest some need to temper or modify our understanding of patronage 
in East Africa. The employment guarantees in place and extremely high absorption of 
secondary and tertiary graduates suggests institutionalised educational and career paths over 
which politicians exercised comparatively little direct control. This point will be explored 
further in the coming section. Rather then, it appears that unequal access to education – be it 
along regional or ethnic lines – may be the bigger factor influencing public employment 
inequalities. At least for some public sector cadres, competition to get into the right secondary 
school, college or university may have been the more critical juncture, rather than competition 
on the job market itself. How then, were educational opportunities spread? 
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Table 4.2. Summary of tracer and manpower survey results, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda  
Country Source Type Year Sample / coverage Size, response rate Results 
Kenya Kinyanjui, ‘Education, Training 
and Employment of Secondary 
School leavers in Kenya’ 
Tracer survey 1968 Secondary 
students, Form IV 
leavers, 1 years 
after completion 
3,000 
Over four years – 1965-68 
Form IV completers went on to: 
Upper secondary: 27% 
Public sector training programmes or 
employment: 48% 
Kenya Hughes, ‘Revisiting the fortunate 
few’ 
Tracer survey 1987 University of 
Nairobi graduates 
294 Among uni graduates between 1970-
83: 64-79% entered public empl. 
Kenya KE MANPOWER 1986-88 
 
Manpower 
survey 
1986 Entire formal 
sector 
Formal sector 
establishments. Likely 
under-coverage of private 
sector 
Of total recorded formal sector 
employment, public sector employed: 
Uni grads: 75% 
Secondary: 60% 
Kenya KE MANPOWER 2010/11 
 
Manpower 
survey 
2010 Entire formal 
sector 
Likely under-coverage of 
private sector 
Of total recorded formal sector 
employment, public sector employed: 
Uni grads: 44% 
Tanzania TZ MANPOWER 1970-82 
 
Admin data on 
placements 
1970-
82 
Secondary, Form 
IV leavers 
Full coverage Of all Form IV completers between 
1970-82, 63% were placed through 
the govt mechanism (presumably in 
public employment) 
Tanzania Tanzania. Ministry of Labour and 
Manpower Development., 
“Tracer Study of Secondary 
School Leavers” (Dar es Salaam, 
1984). 
Tracer survey 1982 Secondary, Form 
IV leavers 
500 from 7 schools (public 
only) 
 
Tanzania Cited in: Brian Cooksey, Daniel 
Mkude, and Lisbeth A. Levey, 
Higher Education in Tanzania: A 
Case Study (Oxford: James 
Currey Publishers, 2003). 
Tracer survey 1989 University – 
faculty of 
engineering 
Unknown Graduates between 1977-80: 84% 
worked for the public sector 
Tracer survey 1995 University – 
faculty of 
engineering 
Unknown Graduates between 1992-94: 64% 
worked for the public sector 
Tanzania Faustin Mukyanuzi, Where Has 
All the Education Gone in 
Tanzania?(Brighton: Institute of 
Development Studies: University 
of Sussex, 2003). 
 
 
Tracer survey 2003 Secondary and 
university students 
from 10 secondary 
schools and 5 
university faculties 
Stratified sampling of 
schools / faculties. 
Stratified sampling of 
students. secondary: 1000, 
response rate 97% 
Uni: 500, response rate: 
90% 
Shares in public employment 
Form IV 1990 leavers: 50% 
Form IV 1995 leavers: 26% 
University 1980 leavers: 72% 
University 1999 leavers: 55%  
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Uganda Cited in: John B. Knight, “The 
Determination of Wages and 
Salaries in Uganda,” Bulletin of 
the Oxford University Institute of 
Economics & Statistics 29, no. 3 
(1967): 233–64. 
Manpower 
survey 
1963 Formal sector 
employment and 
earnings  
All formal sector 
employers 
Public sector and education share of 
graduates in formal employment: 
University graduates: 68% 
Secondary completers: 84% 
Uganda UG MANPOWER 1967 
 
Manpower 
survey 
1967 Formal sector 
employees 
All of government and all 
formal sector employers  
Public sector and education share of 
all graduates in formal employment 
University graduates: 70% 
Secondary completers: 69% 
Uganda Currie and Maas, ‘Uganda’s 
secondary school graduates’ 
Tracer survey 1971 Secondary school 
leavers 
209 respondents (response 
rate 37%) randomly 
sampled from 25 
government secondary 
schools 
Activity 1 year after completion of 
secondary school: 
Further studies: 59% 
Government employment:11% 
Private employment: 5% 
Unemployment/other: 25% 
Uganda International Labour 
Organisation, “Manpower 
Assessment and Planning 
Uganda: Project Findings and 
Recommendations” (Geneva, 
1979). 
Manpower 
survey 
1977 Formal sector 
employees, 
establishments with 
50+ workers 
All establishments with 
50+, thus in particular 
underestimates the stock of 
primary and secondary 
teachers 
Government and community services 
(primarily health and education) as % 
of total ‘high-level manpower’: 71% 
(Government: 60%; community 
services: 11%) 
Uganda Kirumira and Bateganya, ‘Where 
has all the education gone in 
Uganda?’ 
Tracer survey 2003 University 
graduates from 
Makerere 
University and 
secondary school 
leavers (Kampala 
and Iganga (rural)) 
321 uni graduates 
(graduating b/w 1980-
1999); 590 secondary 
school leavers (S4 and S6) 
leaving in 1990 or 1995, 
sampled from a 
‘representative’ group of 
schools.  
 
Original sample of 1,500; 
successfully traced 83% of 
uni sample, 77% of 
secondary sample. 
 
Of those alive and living in Uganda: 
University graduates: 66% in public 
employment; 68% for 1980 
graduates, 52% for 1999 graduates. 
Secondary (S4) completers: 35% in 
public employment (majority 
teachers) 
 
(Calculated based on Tables 3.1, 3.4, 
5.1 and 5.5.) 
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Ethnic and regional inequalities in educational attainment 
As discussed in Chapter 1, ethnic groups were unevenly incorporated into the modern economy 
during colonialism and access to schooling differed considerably across sub-national 
regions.366 However, while these inequalities have persisted in the postcolonial era, they appear 
to have narrowed rather than worsened. The figures below trace educational convergence by 
ethnicity or region of birth across birth cohorts (these measures of ethnicity are described 
further in Section 4.3 and Appendix VII). In the Kenyan case I pool data from the 1969, 1989, 
1999 and 2009 censuses, in Tanzanian case the 1988, 2002 and 2012 censuses, and Uganda the 
1992 and 2002 censuses, and measure average educational attainment for each group and age 
cohort, standardized in relation to the mean and smoothed using five-year moving averages. 
Thus, a score of 0.5 means the group has an average educational attainment 50% below the 
national average (for a given birth cohort), and +1.5 means a score 50% above the average. I 
then measure the coefficient of variation across ethnic or regional groups and cohorts. 
In all three countries average years of primary schooling has converged strongly across ethnic 
groups or regions, as illustrated by the falling coefficient of variation (Figure 4.2). Yet perhaps 
the more salient indicator in relation to formal labour markets is not the years of primary 
schooling but secondary or tertiary attainment. I therefore also measure convergence in the 
share of the population with secondary and university education across ethnic/regional groups. 
Figure 4.3 shows the coefficient of variation in educational attainment across groups for each 
level of education. This shows that secondary attainment has also converged over time. In 
Kenya and Uganda the rate of convergence slowed with time while Tanzania saw some 
divergence in attainment for cohorts born in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and then further 
convergence. University attainment also became more evenly spread for cohorts born up until 
the mid/late 1960s in Kenya and Tanzania and late 1950s in Uganda (in other words, 
convergence slowed amongst those cohorts who would have entered university in the 1980s or 
1990s). This divergence since the 1980s however, was driven largely by the higher university 
attainment of people born in the capital cities. Removing the people born in the capitals shows 
a continued decline among the remaining ethnic groups in Kenya and a flattening in Uganda. 
Although inequalities have persisted, it appears that educational attainment is more evenly 
spread today than at independence, even at the higher echelons of the education system.  How 
have these dynamics shaped access to public employment? The next section examines this 
more systematically by looking at the determinants of holding a public sector job. 
                                                   
366 Jutta Bolt and Dirk Bezemer, “Understanding Long-Run African Growth: Colonial Institutions or 
Colonial Education?,” Journal of Development Studies 45, no. 1 (January 2009): 24–54. 
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Figure 4.2. Average years of primary schooling by ethnic group and age cohort in proportion to the national mean 
Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
 
Note: 5-year moving averages. Sources: author’s calculations using: KE CENSUS, 1969, 89, 99 & 2009; TZ CENSUS 1988, 2002 & 2012; UG CENSUS 1992 & 2002. 
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Figure 4.3. Coefficient of variation in educational attainment across ethnic groups/regions by birth year  
Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
  
Sources: Author’s calculations using: KE CENSUS, 1969, 89, 99 and 2009; TZ CENSUS 1988, 2002 and 2012; UG CENSUS 1992 and 2002. 
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4.4. THE DETERMINANTS OF HOLDING A PUBLIC SECTOR JOB 
Method and data 
The remainder of this chapter examines the factors affecting the likelihood of holding a public 
sector job, using census and household survey data from Kenya (2009), Tanzania (2002) and 
Uganda (2002) from the Minnesota Population Center’s Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series (IPUMS). These datasets are used to construct a binary logistic model that specifies the 
(log) odds of holding a public sector job, conditional on the following variables: 
log(P(y = 1)/ P(y = 0)) = α + β1x1i + β2x2i … + βkxki  (1) 
y: Public employee (1 = yes, 0 = no) 
x1: Level of education (1 = none or some primary, 2 = primary, 3 = secondary, 4 = 
college, 5 = university) 
x2: Age (in years) 
x2 # x2: Quadratic age effect 
x3: Sex (1 = female, 0 = male) 
x1 # x2: Education # age interaction term 
x1 # x3: Education # gender interaction term 
x4: Ethnicity dummies 
x5: District of birth characteristics 
This model allows us to examine the conditional effect of age, gender, education and ethnicity 
on the probability of holding public employment. The sample is restricted to Kenyan/Ugandan-
born individuals and in the Tanzanian case citizens (born and living on the mainland only) 
between the ages 25 – 55 who are economically active (i.e., engaged in some form of economic 
activity, whether informal or formal). Respondents still attending school or university are also 
excluded.367 I use a relatively low age ceiling of 55 because this was the official public sector 
retirement age in East Africa up until recently. The census samples cover 10% of the population 
of each country. As a quality check I also present some results from the smaller Tanzanian 
2000 labour force survey and Ugandan 2006 national household survey. Further details about 
the samples and all variables are provided in Appendix VII. 
The dependent variable (Y) is set to 1 if the individual is a public sector employee and 0 if not. 
The Kenyan 2009 census recorded respondents by sector of employment, with the public sector 
grouped into four categories: central government, local government, teacher’s service and 
state-owned enterprises. The Tanzanian and Ugandan censuses lack a sectoral breakdown of 
employment but the respondent’s ‘industry of employment’ include the categories ‘public 
administration and education’ sector in the Tanzanian case and the separate industries ‘public 
service’, ‘education’ and ‘health’ for Uganda, which are used as proxies for public 
                                                   
367 This has only a minor effect on the Kenyan and Ugandan results, but a large share of Tanzanian 
university students classified themselves as employed in agriculture, which imposed a bias on the results. 
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employment. The Ugandan data can be disaggregated using and occupational classification, 
which allows further differentiation between public servants, teachers, health workers, soldiers 
and policemen. 
These proxies, however, exclude parastatal employees and some construction and agricultural 
workers in public sector, while including some private education and health providers. In 
Tanzania 8% of the 2002 teaching forces worked in private schools. In Uganda private schools 
employed 23% of secondary and primary school teachers in 2002, and private health facilities 
roughly 20% of health workers in 2005.368 While not a perfect measure therefore, alternative 
data sources suggest that of those respondents falling into these industrial classifications, 75-
80% do genuinely work in the public sector, with the remainder are in private schools and 
hospitals.369 Furthermore, I use the smaller Tanzanian and Ugandan labour force and household 
surveys, which contains precise public sector employment measures, to corroborate some of 
the main results. 
In this model age is also treated as a measure for likely year of entry into the public service. 
Respondents may of course have entered the public sector mid-career, but survey data suggests 
that this is the exception rather than rule, at least in Kenya and Tanzania. The Kenyan 1994 
household survey and 2014 Tanzanian labour force survey (both of which provide data on year 
in employment) shows a strong correlation between age and year in current employment among 
public sector employees (Kenya: R=0.76; Tanzania: R=0.86). 370 Studies of the public services 
of East Africa also highlight that dismissals or resignations from the public service are 
relatively uncommon, with people usually leaving the public service at retirement or death.371  
Ethnic identity is extrapolated from the census data. This analysis is limited to Kenya and 
Uganda as ethnic proxies could not be constructed for Tanzania.372 However, as Tanzania is 
considered to be one of the few countries in Africa where ethnicity has played a relatively 
minor role in politics any ethnic preference effects would likely be weaker than in Kenya and 
Uganda anyhow.373  
                                                   
368Tanzanian teachers: TZ SA 2002; Ugandan teachers: UG EDU 2000-2012; Ugandan health workers: 
Africa Health Workforce Observatory, “Human Resources for Health Country Profile: Uganda,” 2009, 
30–35. 
369 TZ LFS 2000 & 2006, UG HBS 2002. 
370 KE WMS 1994, TZ LFS 2014. 
371 Therkildsen and Tidemand, 'Staff Management '. 
372 Tanzania has not included ethnicity questions in its censuses since the 1960s and the relatively large 
regions of birth and high ethnic fragmentation would make proxies based on birth locations very blunt. 
373 See for instance: Yusuf Bangura, “Ethnicity , Inequality and the Public Sector : A Comparative 
Study,” 2006; Mamdani, Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity. 
 153 
 
Table 4.3. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: Summary statistics 
 Full sample Public sector employees 
Variable Obs Mean St. D. Min Max Obs Mean St. D. 
KENYA         
Age 909,186 36.4 8.5 25 55 56,247 38.8 8.4 
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female) 909,186 0.5 0.5 0 1 56,247 0.4 0.5 
Highest level of education 
(1 = none, 5 = university) 
909,186 
2.0 1.0 1 5 56,247 3.3 1.1 
UGANDA          
Age 431,560 36.0 8.2 25 55 32,830 35.3 7.7 
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female) 431,560 0.4 0.5 0 1 32,830 0.3 0.5 
Highest level of education  431,560 1.6 1.0 1 5 32,830 3.1 1.2 
TANZANIA         
Age 870,772 36.3 8.5 25 55 51,273 38.6 8.2 
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female) 870,772 0.5 0.5 0 1 51,273 0.4 0.5 
Highest level of education  870,772 1.7 0.6 1 5 51,273 2.6 0.8 
 
The Ugandan census data coded individuals by ethnic group. The analysis considers the 12 
largest Ugandan ethnic groups individually (which comprise roughly 75% of the population) 
and a composite group of all remaining small ethnic groups.  The Kenyan census sample does 
not include an ethnic variable so respondents’ counties of birth are used to construct an 
ethnicity proxy.374 A respondent is assigned to the ethnic group that dominates his or her county 
of birth.375 If no group constitutes more than 50% of the county population it is coded as 
‘mixed’ instead. The ethnic dummy variable thus covers 11 different ethnic categories, the 
mixed group, as well as a group of all residual smaller ethnicities. Note however that the mixed 
category is predominantly comprised of respondents born in the two main urban centres, 
Nairobi and Mombasa. As the Kikuyu ethnic group are overrepresented in the capital city, this 
may understate their employment shares somewhat. However, of those public servants living 
in the capital city, the vast majority (85%) were born in districts outside the capital, so this 
classification issue should have a relatively minor effect on the overall results. 
Following the literature on ethnic favouritism in Africa, we are particularly interested in 
whether coethnics of past or current Presidents are over-represented in the public service. Two 
of the Ugandan ethnic groups have had coethnic Presidents in the recent past: the Langi 
(President Obote), and the Banyankole (President Museveni). Kenya also has two ethnic groups 
who have had coethnic Presidents in the postcolonial era: the Kikuyu (Presidents Kenyatta and 
Kibaki) and the Kalenjin (President Moi).  
                                                   
374 Data on county ethnic composition taken from: U. U. Wiesmann, B. Kiteme, and Z. Mwangi, “Socio-
Economic Atlas of Kenya: Depicting the National Population Census by County and Sub-Location” 
(Nairobi, Nanyuki, Bern, 2014), 57. 
375 This approach is similar to that of: Burgess et al., 'The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road 
Building in Kenya.'; Lara Tobin, Essais Sur L'urbanisation En Afrique Subsaharienne (Unplublished 
PhD dissertation, Paris School of Economics, 2015). 
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To what extent do educational qualifications determine public sector job access? 
As already established in early chapters, the educational attainment of Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda’s public sector employees is considerably higher than that of the labour forces at large. 
Unsurprisingly therefore, the logistic model predicts that higher educational attainment sharply 
increases the likelihood of working in the public sector. Regression results examining the effect 
of education, age and gender on the probability of holding public employment are presented in 
Table 4.4 and fitted probabilities in Figure 4.4. The marginal effect of education is particularly 
strong among older public employees. In 2009, a 55-year old university-educated Kenyan had 
a 57% probability of holding a job in the public sector, while Tanzanian had a 59%, and a 
Ugandan had a 52% probability (2002). The probabilities are also high among workers with 
college certificates (many of whom are teachers), with estimated probabilities of 58% in Kenya, 
57% in Tanzania and 45% in Uganda for the same age cohorts. Among those with lower 
educational attainment the probability of working in the public sector drops sharply. Among 
the secondary educated the corresponding probabilities are 19% in Kenya and Uganda and 50% 
in Tanzania, and for those with only primary schooling the shares fall to 5% in Kenya, 16% in 
Tanzania and 4% in Uganda. Note that the higher employment levels for secondary educated 
Tanzanians is consistent with its comparatively slower growth in secondary attainment. 
In Kenya and Tanzania the likelihood of holding public employment decreases for younger 
cohorts. While roughly 60% of university educated Kenyans born in mid-1950s worked in the 
public sector, only around 30% of labour force participants born around 1980 did. In Tanzania 
the share of university graduates in public employment fell more modestly, from 59% among 
those born in early 1950s, to 49% for those born in the mid-1970s. The shares also fell for 
college and secondary school graduates, albeit modestly so for Tanzania’s college graduates. 
This most likely reflects the rationalisation of public sector employment in the 1990s coupled 
with continued expansion of the education system, which increased the number of qualified 
candidates in relation to the state’s absorption capabilities. 
In Uganda in contrast, the likelihood of working for the public sector differs less with age of 
the respondent. As a result, younger tertiary educated Ugandans have a higher probability of 
working for the state than in Kenya. This may reflect the more comprehensive reform of the 
Ugandan public service after President Museveni came to power in 1986 along with the 
expansion of the teaching service, which seems to have created more space for recent graduates 
to advance. 376 This is reflected in the lower average age of Ugandan government employees. 
                                                   
376 Sendyona, 'Public Service Restructuring.' 
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Table 4.4. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: the effect of education on public employment probabilities 
  (K.1) (T.1) (U.1) (T.2) (U.2) 
VARIABLES pubemp pubemp pubemp pubemp pubemp 
age 0.0795*** 0.0763*** 0.0433*** 0.431*** 0.129* 
 (0.00605) (0.0114) (0.00821) (0.0806) (0.0777) 
age#age -0.000709*** -0.000537*** -0.000910*** -0.00455*** -0.00111 
 (7.19e-05) (0.000129) (0.000107) (0.000861) (0.000951) 
sex (1 = female) -0.796*** -1.396*** -0.987*** -2.563*** -1.760*** 
  (0.0354) (0.0813) (0.0302) (0.569) (0.539) 
Education dummies (base 
= none or some primary) 
       
Primary -0.263*** -0.551*** -0.456*** -0.641 3.042*** 
 (0.0952) (0.181) (0.0950) (1.574) (0.993) 
Secondary 1.264*** 3.776*** 0.958*** 4.902*** 3.265*** 
 (0.0848) (0.186) (0.0896) (1.645) (1.150) 
College (other post-
secondary) 1.655*** 
5.787*** 
2.704*** 5.786*** 5.496*** 
 
(0.0892) (0.272) (0.0893) (1.659) (1.067) 
University 2.802*** 5.279*** 1.724*** 4.173* 3.994** 
  (0.105) (0.382) (0.137) (2.288) (1.576) 
age#education interaction 
(base = none or some pri) 
       
Primary 0.0252*** 0.0547*** 0.0303*** 0.0650* -0.0252 
 (0.00237) (0.00420) (0.00262) (0.0351) (0.0247) 
Secondary 0.0228*** 0.000227 0.0298*** -0.0208 -0.0141 
 (0.00210) (0.00438) (0.00250) (0.0373) (0.0292) 
College (other post-
secondary) 0.0448*** 
-0.0295*** 
0.0196*** -0.0137 -0.0205 
 
(0.00222) (0.00667) (0.00245) (0.0375) (0.0267) 
University 0.0223*** -0.0200** 0.0455*** 0.0243 0.0203 
  (0.00266) (0.00904) (0.00360) (0.0521) (0.0418) 
sex#education interaction 
(base = none or some pri) 
       
Primary 0.117*** 1.448*** 0.506*** 2.200*** 1.453** 
 (0.0437) (0.0845) (0.0466) (0.591) (0.573) 
Secondary 0.624*** 2.065*** 1.251*** 2.371*** 0.961 
 (0.0388) (0.0870) (0.0423) (0.619) (0.670) 
College (other post-
secondary) 0.948*** 
1.910*** 
1.429*** 3.678*** 1.555** 
 
(0.0403) (0.126) (0.0417) (0.645) (0.609) 
University 1.020*** 1.999*** 1.029*** 2.761*** 1.872** 
  (0.0473) (0.187) (0.0666) (0.878) (0.758) 
Constant -6.088*** -6.685*** -3.796*** -14.50*** -8.053*** 
  (0.133) (0.270) (0.156) (2.142) (1.627) 
Observations 909,186 870,772 431,560 16,124 8,946 
Pseudo R2 0.2316 0.2784 0.2822 0.3808 0.3167 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 4.4. Estimated probabilities of being employed in the public sector by educational attainment and age 
(95% confidence interval) 
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The model also provides some interesting results relating to gender and public employment. 
Overall women are less likely to be employed by the public sector than men (all else being 
equal), but this is driven by a disproportionate share of men among low-skilled workers. 
Women with college or university education, in contrast, have a higher probability of working 
for the state than men with the same educational qualifications. A Ugandan 2003 tracer survey 
found similar results; tertiary and secondary educated men were more likely to be self-
employed than women.377 This is consistent with the pattern in Europe and North America, 
which reflect the state’s high demand for traditionally female professions such as nursing, 
teaching and childcare. Yet a female bias usually signifies the comparatively low rather than 
high social status of a profession.378 
A potential problem with these results, however, is that they do not account for the effect of 
migration. It may be that those skilled graduates who failed to secure government employment 
instead chose to emigrate. Appendix VIII examines this potential bias by estimating the volume 
of migration to Europe and North America, presumably the preferred destinations for the highly 
educated. Using migration data in combination with the United Kingdom and US censuses give 
rough back-of-the-envelope estimates for the number of skilled migrants. It suggests that in the 
order of 5% of Kenyan and Ugandan university graduates and 3% of Tanzanian ones may have 
left the continent during the 1960s – 2000s (an upper bound estimate); not enough then, to 
significantly change the findings above. Ugandans also migrated to Kenya in large numbers, 
but Ugandan graduates in Kenya were only around 1% of the Ugandan university stock in 1999. 
As discussed above, the Tanzanian and Ugandan results rely on an imprecise measure of public 
employment that captures only employees in public administration, education and health. As a 
quality check I therefore replicate this analysis using data from other household surveys where 
the public sector variable is precisely defined (Figure 4.4). Although this raises the confidence 
intervals considerably as the samples are smaller, it gives estimates roughly consistent with the 
census results. In the Tanzanian case it suggests that the share of university and college 
graduates in public sector employment was even higher than that estimated by the census, 
peaking at over 70% for employees in their late 40s and 50s, while the secondary school 
graduate share is estimated to be somewhat lower. The alternative results for Uganda estimate 
similar levels for university graduates, but lower levels for college and secondary graduates, 
albeit with very high confidence intervals. 
                                                   
377 Kirumira and Bateganya, “Where Has All the Education Gone in Uganda? Employment Outcomes 
Among Secondary School and University Leavers.” 
378 Asaf Levanon, Paula England, and Paul Allison, 'Occupational Feminization and Pay: Assessing 
Causal Dynamics Using 1950-2000 U .S. Census Data,' Social Forces 88, no. 2 (2009), pp. 865-91. 
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For certain skill segments and age groups within the East African labour market then, the 
likelihood of working in the public sector is high. This supports the argument made in some of 
the policy literature that graduates from the right colleges and degree programmes had easy, if 
not guaranteed, access to public sector jobs, at least in the first decades of independence. 
Consistent with the results in Chapter 2 which showed a sharp contraction in the public sector 
labour market starting the late 1980s as governments rationalised their payroll during the 
structural adjustment phase, the probability of holding a public sector job fell for younger 
cohorts. Uganda provides an exception to this trend, but given the more extreme collapse and 
reorganisation of Uganda’s public service in the 1990s, age may be a worse indicator of likely 
year of public service entry. 
Geographic variation in public sector employment 
How geographically equitable is the distribution of public sector jobs? Given the strong 
relationship between education and public employment, we should expect a skew in access to 
public sector jobs driven by geographic inequalities in access to education. This is indeed the 
case; coming from a district or region with high educational attainment increases the likelihood 
of holding a public sector job. Entering the educational attainment in the respondent’s district 
of birth into the logistic regression (without other controls) shows strong and positive results 
in all three countries (Appendix Table VI.1).  
Conditional on the educational attainment of the respondent however, the coefficient changes 
sign in Kenya and Uganda and falls significantly in Tanzania. In Kenya and Uganda, if not in 
Tanzania, highly educated respondents born in regions with low educational attainment have a 
higher probability of working in the public sector than others. Figure 4.5 provides a visual 
illustration of this. The heat map shows the share of secondary educated workers employed in 
the public sector by district of birth. In Kenya and Uganda the levels are correlated with 
distance from the capital city. Secondary educated workers from the most peripheral parts of 
each country are more than twice as likely to work for the public sector as those born in the 
capitals. Dar es Salaam similarly has a very low share of secondary educated workers in public 
employment, although in Tanzania the correlation with distance from the capital is weaker.  
To examine this more systematically I introduce another independent variable measuring the 
level of economic development in each respondent’s district of birth. The level of economic 
development is measured from 0-100 using an index combining the distance to the capital city, 
population density, the share of the adult population in wage employment and the share of the 
population with electricity. I use factor analysis to determine the weight of each variable.  
 159 
 
The models in Table 4.5 introduce this development index into logistics model 1. This shows 
that in Kenya and Uganda the probability of holding a public sector job is higher for people 
from less developed parts of the country, once their educational attainment is controlled for 
(Models K.D.1 and U.D.1). The effects are considerable: all else being equal, lowering the 
developmental index in a respondent’s place of birth by one standard deviation raises the 
probability of holding a public sector job by 21% in Kenya and 15% in Uganda. 
Models K.D.2, K.D.3, U.D.2 and U.D.3 interact the development index with education, sex 
and age. The effect increases in strength with the level of education. Secondary and tertiary 
graduates from disadvantaged regions are strongly overrepresented, while those public sector 
employees with only a primary school degree or below are more likely to have been born in 
economically advantaged regions. A standard deviation reduction in the development index 
raises the probability of holding a public sector job among college graduates by 44% in Kenya 
and 16% in Uganda. The effect is also stronger for men than for women. In more economically 
advanced regions, educated women are still quite likely to hold public employment compared 
to women from less advantaged areas of the country, while highly educated men from 
advantaged regions are far more oriented towards the private sector than men with the same 
educational attainment from less developed regions.  
In Kenya, although not in Uganda, the effect is stronger for younger public servants, shown by 
the positive coefficient on the age#development index interaction term. This could suggest that 
the public service wage declines in the 1990s and improved private sector prospects in the 
2000s attracted graduates from more prosperous regions of their respective countries to the 
private sector. 
In Tanzania in contrast, public sector employees are on average from more economically 
developed regions, controlling for education, age and gender (Table 4.5). A standard deviation 
reduction in the development index lowers the public employment probability by 3.5%. The 
effect differs by level of education, however. Secondary and college graduates in public 
employment are more likely to come from less developed regions (consistent with Kenya and 
Uganda), while for primary school completers and university graduates, candidates from the 
more advantaged regions have a small advantage. This ambiguous impact of region on 
employment may partly be a data problem. Region of birth data for mainland Tanzania is less 
granular than for the other two countries (only 21 regional divisions) and thus the development 
variables have lower standard deviations. However, Tanzania liberalized its economy first in 
the 1990s, and these results may also reflect the fact that private sector opportunities remained 
scarce even for graduates from the most developed parts of the country, with the result that 
senior public service jobs continued to be attractive to those from the most prosperous regions. 
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Figure 4.5.  Percent of secondary educated population in public employment, by district/county of birth 
Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
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Table 4.5. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: level of development in place of birth and public employment probabilities 
  (K.D.1) (K.D.2) (K.D.3) (T.D.1) (T.D.2) (T.D.3) (U.D.1) (U.D.2) (U.D.3) 
VARIABLES pubemp pubemp pubemp pubemp pubemp pubemp pubemp pubemp pubemp 
Age controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Gender controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Education controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
District/region of birth development 
index 
-0.0140*** 0.0109*** -0.0226*** 0.00219*** 0.0183*** 0.0148*** -0.0186*** -0.00570** -0.0154*** 
(0.000351) (0.000959) (0.00154) (0.000399) (0.00188) (0.00190) (0.000652) (0.00246) (0.00307) 
Development index # education 
interaction (base = none or some pri) 
              
  
Primary  -0.0221***   -0.0129***  
 -0.0123***  
  (0.00137)   (0.00195)  
 (0.00307)  
Secondary  -0.0279***   -0.0245***  
 -0.0231***  
  (0.00110)   (0.00195)  
 (0.00272)  
College  -0.0414***   -0.0255***  
 -0.0292***  
  (0.00117)   (0.00250)  
 (0.00269)  
University  -0.0351***   -0.0163***  
 -0.0169***  
    (0.00132)     (0.00287)     (0.00280)   
Development index # gender interaction 
(base = male)                   
Female  0.00720***   0.00452***   0.0192***  
    (0.000735)     (0.000739)     (0.00133)   
Development index # age interaction 
    0.00023***     -0.00034***     -9.36e-05 
      (4.04e-05)     (4.79e-05)     (8.88e-05) 
Constant -5.656*** -6.451*** -5.378*** -6.736*** -7.156*** -7.004*** -3.585*** -3.670*** -3.613*** 
  (0.133) (0.138) (0.141) (0.269) (0.264) (0.267) (0.156) (0.158) (0.159) 
Observations 909,186 909,186 909,186 870,772 870,772 870,772 431,560 431,560 431,560 
Pseudo R2 0.2359 0.2395 0.236 0.2787 0.2822 0.2792 0.2819 0.2836 0.2819 
Robust standard errors in parentheses          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
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Drivers of the distribution of public sector jobs 
What explains this higher propensity for candidates from comparatively underdeveloped 
regions of Kenya and Uganda to enter the public service? Presumably the geographic 
placement of public sector jobs will shape employment prospects. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
public sector employment grew more geographically equitable over the course of the 
postcolonial era and has remained more equitably spread than formal private employment 
throughout the period. Table 4.6 calculates the range and coefficient of variation in public and 
private employment shares across districts in each country and shows lower coefficients of 
variation in the public sector than in the private sector. As shown in Figure 4.6, across Kenya’s 
eight former provinces, Uganda’s four regions and capital city, and Tanzania’s regions, the 
public employment to population ratio is reasonably even, with the exception of higher levels 
in the capital cities and a low level in Kenya’s North East. Much of the remaining variation is 
explained by differences in rates of urbanisation. Comparing regional public employment 
levels separately for urban and rural areas shows even less regional variance.379 As a result the 
public sector generates more jobs than the private sector in remote or underdeveloped regions 
where non-natives to the area are unlikely to settle. In areas where educational attainment is 
low and private sector employment opportunities are scarce, a higher share of secondary school 
graduates will presumably pursue public sector careers. In more economically developed 
regions in contrast, promising students are exposed to a broader range of career options while 
also facing greater job competition from other graduates. 
In Kenya and Uganda the coefficient of variation is lowest among teachers. Although overseen 
by a national teacher’s service commission, teachers are usually recruited at the district or 
county level. Moreover, as the first few years of primary schooling is commonly taught in local 
languages, local candidates are automatically privileged over candidates from other linguistic 
groups, which may account for a particularly equitable distribution of teaching jobs.380  
Lastly, even though the skilled labour force in each respective country is free to migrate to 
more prosperous regions, social and ethnic background and the networks these bring may in 
fact matter more in the private sector than public sector, privileging ethnic groups from more 
developed regions and pulling them away from the public sector. Studies from other regions of 
                                                   
379 Results not included. Public employment levels are higher in urban areas, and coefficient of variation 
falls when comparing regional urban and rural areas separately. 
380 Munene Mwaniki, “Mother Tongue Education in Primary Teacher Education in Kenya: A Language 
Management Critique of the Quota System,” Multilingual Education 4, no. 11 (2014): 1–17; Mathias 
Bwanika Mulumba and Fred Masagazi Masaazi, “Challenges to African Development: The Medium of 
Instruction in Uganda’s Education System,” Pedagogy, Culture and Society 20, no. 3 (2012): 435–50. 
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the world, in particular the United States, have found that ethnic, racial and gender 
discrimination in earnings tends to be lower within the public than private sector.381 
Table 4.6. Variance in public and private sector wage employment across counties/districts 
 % adult population (18-65) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Coefficient 
of variation 
KENYA 2009            
private  47 9.3 6.0 1.2 29.3 0.6 
public employment  47 3.7 1.2 1.1 6.5 0.3 
    Central govt 47 1.3 0.7 0.4 4.1 0.5 
    Local govt 47 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.2 0.5 
    Teaching service 47 1.3 0.4 0.4 2.1 0.3 
TANZANIA 2002         
private 20 4.4 2.3 1.9 12.1 0.5 
public employment 20 4.2 1.0 3.0 7.3 0.2 
UGANDA 2002         
private 56 3.5 4.1 0.6 26.4 1.2 
public employment 56 3.6 1.5 2.0 10.8 0.4 
    Public services 56 1.1 0.9 0.4 5.0 0.8 
    Education 56 1.9 0.8 0.6 3.9 0.4 
    Health 56 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.6 0.5 
Note: Private sector definition: Kenya: based on 'private' sectoral classification and NGOs and faith-
based employers; Uganda and Tanzania: based on those classified as paid employees, excl. public sector 
and agriculture. Note that the Tanzanian public sector variable cannot be disaggregated.  
Figure 4.6. Percentage of adult population (15-65) in public sector employment, by province/region 
Kenya Uganda 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
381 For a summary of this literature, see: Gregory and Borland, “Recent Developments in Public Sector 
Labor Markets.” 
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Tanzania 
 
The data allows us to test this last proposition by examining the internal migration propensity 
of public servants. This sheds light on the degree to which regional or district-level job markets 
are open to candidates from other parts of the country. The scatter plots in Figure 4.7 measure 
the share of all public sector employees in a given district that were born outside their district 
of work along the y-axis,382 and the level of economic development in said district along the x-
axis. In Kenya and Uganda the ratios are positively correlated, particularly strongly so in the 
Kenyan case. I.e., in richer districts, a higher proportion of public sector employees were born 
outside the district. As an alternative specification for Uganda, given that Uganda’s districts 
show little variation in district development, I include a second figure examining correlation 
with distance to the capital city, which shows a stronger relationship. In summary, in Kenya 
and Uganda, less developed or geographically remote districts recruit a higher proportion of 
local candidates, while the more developed districts attract candidates from further afar. This 
could be due to a stronger local hiring preference in more remote parts of the country, or a 
reluctance by non-natives to migrate to a less developed part of their respective country.383  
In Tanzania in contrast there is no clear relationship between these variables. In fact, with the 
exclusion of Dar es Salaam in upper right-hand corner, the relationship would be negative. The 
levels are also higher, particularly considering the larger size of the subnational unit under 
consideration in Tanzania. On average 45% of public servants are born outside the region in 
which they work compared to 35% in Kenya and Uganda.384 Tanzanian public servants appear 
                                                   
382 District of work assumed to be the district in which they are enumerated at the time of the census. 
383 Both factors are suggested by Therkildsen and Tidemand, 'Staff Management '. 
384 Note that the district divisions in Kenya and Uganda are smaller so these shares would be lower if 
using divisions of the same magnitude as in Tanzania. For instance, the share drops to 25% in Uganda 
if using the 1960 district divisions. 
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to be more geographically mobile than that of their neighbours. This may explain why there is 
less of a relationship between the level of economic development in the region of birth and 
propensity to work for the public sector; in Tanzania local candidates have less of a home-field 
advantage. 
Figure 4.7. Correlation between share of migrants in public employment and level of development, by 
district 
Kenya Tanzania 
 
Uganda (I) Uganda (II) 
 
Is the Kenyan and Ugandan home-field advantage due to employment discrimination at the 
local level? Does such discrimination also affect locally born ethnic minorities? The Ugandan 
data allows us to investigate this more closely as it is possible to differentiate between ethnicity 
and place of birth. I introduce three additional variables into the logistics model: (i) a dummy 
for whether a respondent is a migrant (working in a district different from the district of birth), 
(ii) a dummy for whether a respondent is an ethnic minority, and (iii) a migrant-minority 
interaction term. Ethnic minorities are defined as those respondents with a different ethnicity 
to the dominant ethnicity in their district of residence. Districts where no ethnic group 
constitutes at least 50% of the population are excluded from the sample. Controls for education, 
age and sex are retained. Results are given in Appendix Table VI.3, models U.E.5 & U.E.6.  
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This exercise shows that migrants are considerably more likely to work for the public sector 
than non-migrants, all else being equal, most likely because a disproportionate share of 
migrants are public servants who have been posted to a new district. Ethnic minorities face a 
small public sector penalty (~5%), while being a migrant and ethnic minority makes no addition 
difference to the probability of holding a public sector job. This ethnic minority penalty, 
however, is solely in the teaching service. Removing teachers from the sample shows ethnic 
minorities to have a slight advantage instead. This may be due to the practice of teaching 
primary school in local languages, which could be biasing against candidates from outside the 
locally dominant language group. In sum these findings show very little evidence of 
discrimination against either migrants or ethnic minorities at the district level. 
Ethnic inequalities in public sector employment 
Given these regional public sector employment dynamics, how ethnically unequal is the 
distribution of public sector jobs? Are ethnic inequalities solely the result of unequal schooling? 
Using descriptive statistics, Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 first measure the share of each ethnic 
group's adult population that works in the public sector (grey columns), and secondly the share 
of an ethnic group's secondary educated population that works in the public sector (clear 
columns). This second measure provides a rough measure of ethnic public employment 
inequalities in relationship to each ethnic group’s number of qualified candidates. In Appendix 
Table VI.2 and Appendix Table VI.3 I also include results from a logistic regression that 
includes ethnic group dummies. This shows that these ethnic group differences are (for the 
most part) statistically significant. Tanzania is excluded from this section as it is not possible 
to construct measures of Tanzanian ethnicity. 
Column 1.A in Table 4.7 gives the Kenyan share of public sector employees to total population 
by ethnic group, ordered from highest to lowest. With the exception of a few outliers, the 
variation in ethnic group public employment shares is not enormous, with an average of 6.2% 
and standard deviation of 1.8% (CoV = 0.31). The 'mixed' county group has the largest share 
(reflecting the high proportion of Nairobi-born public sector employees), followed by the 
Kalenjin. The Kikuyu share is only slightly above the national average. The laggards are the 
Turkana and Somali, two groups with large pastoral populations living in some of the least 
developed parts of Kenya, and in the Somali case the site of a secessionist war in the 1960s. 
Removing these two groups more than halves the standard deviation to 0.8%. 
When the sample is limited to secondary school educated respondents this rank order is 
reversed. The Turkana and Somali public employment shares are now the highest, with 33% 
of all secondary educated Turkana respondents and 31% of all secondary educated Somali 
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respondents employed in the public sector, compared to a national average of 17%. The 
Kikuyu, Kisii and 'mixed' counties, the three groups with the highest educational attainment, 
now have public employment shares well below the national average. The Kalenjin (former 
President Moi's ethnic group) are something of an outlier with a high share on both measures, 
a point to which we will return. It is not the case then, that Kenyans from larger and wealthier 
ethnic groups have disproportionate access to public sector jobs. In fact, conditional on skills, 
groups with low educational attainment are favoured. 
I also calculate these percentage shares separately for different segments of the Kenyan public 
sector (central government, local government, teaching force and state-owned enterprises), 
testing the suggestion by Francois, Trebbi and Rainer that ethnic patrons control different 
segments of the public service resulting in pockets of ethnic advantage in different parts of the 
service. This exercise does not significantly alter the rank orders, nor does it dramatically raise 
the coefficient of variation. An important exception however is the ‘mixed’ group, which has 
very high central and local government employment shares but low teacher shares. Given that 
these respondents are largely born in Nairobi and Mombasa, the seat of government and home 
to two large municipal governments, it is perhaps not surprising that their access to central and 
local government jobs is high. 
The differences in public employment share across Uganda’s 12 largest ethnic groups is smaller 
than in Kenya, with a mean of 7.6%, a standard deviation of 1.8% (CoV = 0.22) (Table 4.8, 
column 1.A.). Here the outliers are two ethnic groups with unusually large shares: the Iteso 
(12.8%) and Achoil (9.7%). Acholiland and Teso were sites of uprisings against the Museveni 
government in the 1990s, and their high public employment shares may be a result of an explicit 
effort to reduce civil strife by investing more state resources in these areas. Rather than 
punishing dissenters then (as some of the ethnic favouritism literature would predict), the 
government appears to be spending more on staffing in these war-affected regions. President 
Museveni’s coethnics in contrast, the Banyankole, lie below the mean. 
Restricting the sample to secondary educated respondents reduces the coefficient of variation 
slightly, suggesting that educational differences explain some of the variation. As in Kenya, 
the group with the lowest shares are now the Baganda, Uganda’s largest and most educationally 
advantaged group, who send a comparatively small share of their secondary school completers 
into the public service. Segmenting employees by sub-sector (general public service, teachers, 
health workers and security personnel) does not significantly alter the ethnic group rank order.
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Table 4.7. Kenya: Percentage of public sector employees in total employment, by ethnic group and public sector sub-sector 
 Total public sector Central government Local government 
Teacher's service 
commission 
State-owned 
enterprises Popu-
lation 
share 
Secondary 
educated 
share  
Ethnic 
group 
Total 
Secondary 
educated 
only 
Total 
Secondary 
educated 
only 
Total 
Secondary 
educated 
only 
Total 
Secondary 
educated 
only 
Total 
Secondary 
educated 
only 
 1.A. 1.B. 2.A. 2.B. 3.A. 3.B. 4.A. 4.B. 5.A. 5.B. 6. 7. 
Mixed 8.1% 16% 3.1% 6.2% 1.4% 2.0% 1.9% 4.0% 1.8% 3.5% 5% 40.6% 
Kalenjin 7.3% 23% 2.6% 8.3% 0.7% 1.4% 2.6% 9.1% 1.4% 3.9% 11% 26.3% 
Embu 6.9% 18% 2.4% 6.7% 0.8% 1.4% 2.6% 7.3% 1.1% 2.7% 2% 31.2% 
Luo 6.6% 20% 2.0% 6.7% 0.8% 1.8% 2.4% 8.2% 1.3% 3.6% 10% 25.7% 
Kamba 6.5% 17% 2.0% 5.6% 0.7% 1.4% 2.6% 7.5% 1.3% 3.0% 10% 29.6% 
Kikuyu 6.4% 14% 2.1% 4.9% 0.8% 1.4% 2.2% 5.1% 1.2% 2.4% 22% 38.3% 
Kisii 6.3% 15% 2.0% 4.9% 0.6% 1.2% 2.6% 6.5% 1.1% 2.3% 6% 36.2% 
Luhya 5.9% 18% 1.8% 5.9% 0.6% 1.4% 2.3% 7.8% 1.2% 2.9% 15% 25.6% 
Other 5.6% 22% 1.9% 7.9% 1.0% 2.6% 1.7% 7.9% 1.0% 3.9% 3% 18.5% 
Meru 5.4% 19% 1.9% 7.1% 0.5% 1.4% 2.2% 8.1% 0.8% 2.6% 6% 23.3% 
Mijikenda 5.3% 22% 1.4% 6.9% 0.9% 2.7% 1.8% 8.4% 1.2% 4.3% 4% 16.1% 
Somali 2.7% 31% 1.2% 15.6% 0.3% 2.4% 0.9% 9.8% 0.3% 3.5% 4% 4.8% 
Turkana 1.7% 33% 0.7% 16.2% 0.3% 1.8% 0.5% 11.2% 0.2% 3.7% 2% 2.8% 
Mean 
(weighted) 
6.2% 17% 2.0% 6% 0.7% 1.5% 2.2% 6.8% 1.2% 3.0%  28.5% 
Mean 
(unweighted) 
5.7% 21% 1.9% 8% 0.7% 1.8% 2.0% 8% 1.1% 3.3%  24.5% 
Std. dev 1.8% 5.8% 0.6% 3.7% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 1.9% 0.4% 0.6%  11.7% 
CoV 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.47 0.40 0.30 0.32 0.24 0.40 0.19  0.48 
Min 1.7% 14% 0.7% 4.9% 0.3% 1.2% 0.5% 4.0% 0.2% 2.3%  2.8% 
Max 8.1% 33% 3.1% 16.2% 1.4% 2.7% 2.6% 11.2% 1.8% 4.3%  40.6% 
# obs 909,186    259,344  909,186    259,344  909,186       259,344  909,186    259,344  909,186     259,344  909,186    909,186 
Note: sample limited to economically active respondents born in Kenya, aged 25-55 at time of enumeration. 
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Table 4.8. Uganda: Percentage of public sector employees in total employment, by ethnic group and public sector sub-sector 
  Total public sector Public service Education Health Defence 
Pop 
share 
Secondary 
educated 
share 
Ethnic 
group 
Total 
Sec 
educated 
only 
Total 
Sec 
educated 
only 
Total 
Sec 
educated 
only 
Total 
Sec 
educated 
only 
Total 
Sec 
educated 
only 
  1.A. 1.B. 2.A. 2.B. 3.A. 3.B. 4.A. 4.B. 5.A. 5.B. 7. 8. 
Iteso 12.8% 44.9% 2.8% 7.5% 6.7% 28.2% 1.0% 4.1% 3.0% 6.4% 5% 17% 
Acholi 9.7% 44.9% 2.4% 7.7% 4.8% 28.3% 1.0% 5.2% 1.4% 4.3% 4% 13% 
Lugbara 8.3% 47.2% 1.6% 6.1% 5.0% 32.5% 0.8% 5.6% 1.5% 4.9% 4% 13% 
Banyoro 8.1% 33.0% 2.0% 6.5% 4.3% 20.5% 0.8% 3.6% 1.4% 3.6% 3% 19% 
Bakhonzo 7.9% 44.8% 1.7% 7.1% 4.2% 27.7% 0.8% 6.1% 1.2% 4.7% 2% 11% 
Baganda 7.8% 23.4% 1.7% 4.1% 4.4% 14.7% 1.2% 3.8% 0.7% 1.2% 18% 25% 
Banyankole 7.5% 35.3% 1.7% 7.2% 4.2% 21.3% 0.7% 3.5% 1.0% 3.4% 10% 15% 
Langi 7.3% 43.7% 1.4% 5.5% 4.4% 30.3% 0.6% 3.6% 1.0% 4.3% 7% 12% 
Bagisu 7.2% 36.6% 1.3% 5.8% 4.3% 24.1% 0.7% 3.2% 1.1% 3.5% 5% 15% 
Basoga 7.0% 34.2% 1.1% 4.7% 4.0% 20.8% 1.1% 5.5% 0.9% 3.1% 9% 15% 
Other 6.9% 36.7% 1.6% 6.4% 3.4% 22.4% 0.7% 3.9% 1.6% 4.9% 22% 11% 
Batoro 6.5% 28.7% 2.0% 7.6% 2.9% 14.3% 0.9% 4.9% 1.1% 2.8% 3% 16% 
Bakiga 5.6% 40.8% 1.0% 6.4% 3.4% 26.8% 0.5% 3.3% 0.9% 3.9% 8% 10% 
Mean 
(weighted) 
7.6% 34.0% 1.6% 5.8% 4.1% 21.3% 0.8% 4.0% 1.2% 3.3% 7.7% 15% 
Mean 
(unweighted) 
7.9% 38.0% 1.7% 6.4% 4.3% 24.0% 0.8% 4.3% 1.3% 3.9% 7.7% 15% 
Std. dev 1.8% 7.2% 0.5% 1.1% 0.9% 5.7% 0.2% 1.0% 0.6% 1.3% 6.0% 4.1% 
CoV 0.22 0.19 0.29 0.17 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.44 0.32 0.78 0.28 
Min 5.6% 23.4% 1.0% 4.1% 2.9% 14.3% 0.5% 3.2% 0.7% 1.2% 2.5% 9.8% 
Max 12.8% 47.2% 2.8% 7.7% 6.7% 32.5% 1.2% 6.1% 3.0% 6.4% 22.3% 25.4% 
# obs 431,560  66,168  431,560  66,168  431,560 66,168  431,560 66,168  431,560 66,168  431,560  431,560  
Note: sample limited to economically active respondents born in Uganda, aged 25-55 at time of enumeration.  
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Table 4.9. Kenya and Uganda: Percentage of public sector employees in total employment by ethnic group and skills level 
Kenya Uganda 
"Skill level" 
"Low 
skilled" 
"Medium 
skilled"  
"High 
skilled"  
"High 
skilled" 
 "Skill level" 
"Low 
skilled" 
"Medium 
skilled"  
"High 
skilled"  
"High 
skilled" 
Level of 
education 
ALL 
Primary 
and below 
Secondary College University 
 
Level of 
education 
ALL 
Primary 
and below 
Secondary College University 
Mixed 8.5% 1.7% 3.2% 2.2% 1.4%  Iteso 12.1% 5.2% 2.7% 4.6% 0.9% 
Kalenjin 7.8% 1.3% 2.7% 2.8% 1.1%  Acholi 9.7% 3.7% 3.0% 3.1% 0.6% 
Embu 7.3% 1.2% 2.5% 2.5% 1.1%  Baganda 8.4% 1.8% 2.1% 2.8% 1.3% 
Luo 7.0% 1.3% 2.6% 2.0% 1.1%  Lugbara 8.4% 2.3% 2.2% 3.7% 0.6% 
Kamba 6.8% 1.3% 2.5% 2.1% 0.9%  Banyoro 8.4% 2.0% 2.2% 3.2% 0.9% 
Kikuyu 6.7% 1.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.1%  Bakhonzo 7.7% 3.1% 1.5% 3.1% 0.5% 
Kisii 6.6% 0.8% 2.4% 2.1% 1.2%  Banyankole 7.5% 2.2% 1.5% 3.0% 0.9% 
Luhya 6.2% 1.2% 2.2% 1.9% 0.9%  Basoga 7.3% 1.9% 2.0% 2.6% 0.8% 
Other 6.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.0% 0.6%  Langi 7.2% 1.9% 1.8% 3.3% 0.7% 
Meru 5.7% 0.9% 1.8% 2.1% 0.9%  Other 6.8% 2.8% 1.6% 2.2% 0.6% 
Mijikenda 5.6% 1.7% 2.2% 1.3% 0.3%  Batoro 6.7% 2.0% 1.4% 2.6% 0.7% 
Somali 2.9% 1.1% 0.9% 0.4% 0.3%  Bagisu 6.7% 1.7% 1.7% 3.3% 0.7% 
Turkana 1.9% 0.8% 0.5% 0.5% 0.1%  Bakiga 5.4% 1.6% 1.1% 2.6% 0.5% 
                    
Mean 
(weighted) 
6.5% 1.2% 2.3% 2.0% 1.0% 
 
Mean 
(weighted) 
7.6% 2.4% 1.9% 2.9% 0.8% 
Std. dev 1.8% 0.3% 0.7% 0.7% 0.4%  Std. dev 1.7% 1.0% 0.5% 0.6% 0.2% 
CoV 0.30 0.24 0.34 0.38 0.48  CoV 0.21 0.40 0.28 0.20 0.30 
Min 1.9% 0.8% 0.5% 0.4% 0.1%  Min 5.4% 1.6% 1.1% 2.2% 0.5% 
Max 8.5% 1.7% 3.2% 2.8% 1.4%  Max 12.1% 5.2% 3.0% 4.6% 1.3% 
# obs 945,110  945,110  945,110  945,110  945,110   # obs 437,503  437,503  437,503  437,503  437,503  
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While the educational requirements necessary for the higher level public service positions 
limits the pool of eligible applicants and thus opportunities for patronage, the lower skilled 
public sector jobs are theoretically open to a much larger pool of applicants, and therefore, 
presumably, more amenable to patronage influences. In Table 4.9 I therefore segment the 
public sector labour force by educational attainment level, treating educational attainment as a 
proxy for skill level, and measure inequalities in public sector employment separately for each 
‘skills level’. To give an example, the first column measures the percentage of primary-
educated public sector employees to total employment by ethnic group.  
This exercise shows that in Kenya lower-skilled public sector jobs are more equitably 
distributed on an ethnic group basis than those requiring higher levels of education. The Somali, 
Turkana and Mijikenda are not outliers when it comes to access to low skilled jobs, adding 
further support for the argument that skills rather than discrimination drives the ethnic 
inequalities observed above.  
In Uganda, however, the pattern is reversed. Jobs are more equitably distributed at higher levels 
of education/skill (although educational attainment is also more equitably spread in Uganda). 
This effect is driven by the Iteso and Acholi who have unusually high levels of unskilled 
employees in public employment. This is quite consistent with the conflict hypothesis above. 
More public spending in conflict-affected areas (on for instance reconstruction, staffing of IDP 
camps etc.) would likely raise the availability of low skilled public employment in particular. 
This hypothesis is tested further in model U.E.4 (Appendix Table VI.3) by introducing a 
dummy for conflict-affected districts in the 1990s. People born in districts with more than 100 
conflict-related deaths between 1989 and 2002 are coded as conflict-affected.385 This dummy 
is positive and significant after controlling for education, ethnicity and development indicators 
in the respondent’s district of birth. People born in districts that experienced significant conflict 
between 1989 and 2002 have a 19% higher probability of working in the public sector, all else 
being equal. This result should not be interpreted causally, as there could be underlying factors 
driving both public employment and conflict intensity, but the results are at least consistent 
with a conflict hypothesis. 
  
                                                   
385 1989 is the earliest available year of data, but the effect ought to have been the strongest in this period 
as the majority of the Ugandan 2002 public sector labour force would have been hired in the 1990s. Data 
from UCDP. 
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Ethnic favouritism for Presidential coethnics? 
Across the Kenyan tables, however, the Kalenjin group appears as something of an outlier with 
unusually high public employment shares in relation to the educational attainment and level of 
development in Kalenjin districts. Given that former Kenyan President Moi was of Kalenjin 
descent, this suggests a possible effect of Presidential ethnic favouritism. Keep in mind 
however, that for the other three groups across Kenya and Uganda with coethnic presidents the 
public employment shares are below or on par with the national average, both in aggregate 
terms and when controlling for education. 
A way to test this is to examine whether the coethnic advantage is concentrated among those 
cohorts who would have entered the labour market during the tenure of their coethnic president. 
To do this I construct another dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a respondent was of the 
same ethnicity as the President at the time when he or she was 25 (the average age of public 
service entry).386 The era dummies are admittedly imperfect, given that people do not enter or 
leave the public service at a precise age. Nonetheless they capture the cohorts that were most 
likely to have benefitted from presidential the ethnic favouritism. This dummy is added to the 
logistic model, in addition to educational, gender and ethnic controls, the district development 
index, and dummies for each presidential era (Appendix Table VI.4).  
The regression results shows that only the Kalenjin dummy is significant and of the right sign. 
The Kalenjin entering the labour market at the time of their coethnic's presidency had an 8% 
higher probability of working for the public sector than at other times, all else being equal. 
Treating this over-representation as the jobs attributed to patronage suggests that in the order 
of 1% of all public sector jobs in Kenya were unfairly held by Kalenjin candidates in 2009. 
While not insignificant, presidential favouritism appears to have has had a marginal rather than 
dominant effect on the composition of the Kenyan public sector labour force. 
Ethnic favouritism within the public service 
While some literature predicts an uneven distribution of public sector jobs on account of ethnic 
favouritism, others have suggested that ethnicity may be more salient within the public service, 
as favoured ethnic groups are promoted to higher positions or rewarded with benefits or access 
to informal rents. Using the asset wealth indices constructed in Chapter 3 as a proxy for income, 
I can examine ethnic group differences in asset wealth within the public services. Limiting the 
                                                   
386 This approach is similar to that used by Kramon and Posner, 'Ethnic Favouritism.', which uses years 
of schooling as the dependent variable. 
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sample to public sector employees, I examine the effect of ethnicity on the probability of being 
in the top asset wealth decile: 
log(P(y = 1)/ P(y = 0)) = α + β1x1i + β2x2i … + βkxki  (2) 
y: ‘Asset wealthy’ (1 = in top 10%, 0 = in bottom 90%) 
x1: Ethnicity dummies 
x2: Level of education (1 = none or some primary, 2 = primary, 3 = secondary, 4 = 
college, 5 = university) 
x3: Age (in years) 
x4: Sub-sector of the public service
387 
x5: Urban/rural dummy 
x6: District of residence dummy 
To reduce possible biases resulting with the inclusion of public sector employed women with 
wealthy husbands, the sample is restricted to male heads of household working in the public 
sector. I control for respondent age, education, district of residence, urban/rural status and sub-
sector of the public service. As a robustness check I also include an alternative specification 
where the sample is limited to respondents resident in the capital cities, thus holding geographic 
location constant. 
Note that this model may well suffer from omitted variable bias and the results should not be 
interpreted causally. Asset wealth can be a function of far more than the household head’s 
employment and unobserved ethnic group differences may well account for some of the 
observed inequalities. These results nonetheless provide a descriptive account of horizontal 
inequalities within the public service, even if we cannot distinguish ethnic favouritism from all 
other structural drivers of such inequality.  
The regression results are given in Appendix Table IV.5 and predicted probabilities in Figures 
4.8-4.9. These results show little sign of a wealth advantage for coethnics of present or past 
presidents. On average 26% of the Kenyan public servants in this sample are found in the top 
wealth decile,388 while the predicted probabilities by ethnic group range from 20% to 33% (all 
else being equal). The Kalenjin and Kikuyu are not outliers, with probabilities quite close to 
the average (both have probabilities of 27%). Limiting the sample to residents of Nairobi 
reduces the variance across ethnic groups further and increases the confidence intervals, while 
the rank order remains broadly the same. 
                                                   
387 Kenya: local govt, central govt, parastatals and teacher’s service; Uganda: public service, education, 
health, security. 
388 These shares are higher than those reported in Chapter 3 because the sample is restricted to 
economically-active, male household heads in the 25-55 age range. 
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In Uganda the ethnic group differences in are smaller still and for the most part statistically 
insignificant. On average 30% of all public servants in this sample are found in the top asset 
wealth decile. Across ethnic groups the probability of being asset wealthy ranges from 27% to 
35%. The Banyankole are found towards the middle of the distribution. The Langi do have a 
wealth advantage conditional on education and locality, but this seems linked to geographic 
factors as the wealth premium disappears when restricting the sample to residents of Kampala 
and Entebbe. 
While acknowledging that these remain crude measures of ethnic wealth inequalities, the 
exercise finds little evidence that coethnics of past or present presidents have higher 
probabilities of being wealthy compared to other public servants with the same educational 
level and working in the same locality. 
Figure 4.8. Kenya: conditional probability among public sector employees of being in top asset wealth 
decile by ethnic group 
 
Figure 4.9. Uganda: conditional probability among public sector employees of being in top asset wealth 
decile by ethnic group 
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4.5. SOCIAL REPRODUCTION IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT? 
Intergenerational educational mobility 
The ethnic and regional distribution of public sector jobs, which seems to privilege candidates 
from less advantaged communities (conditional on education), suggests that the public service 
is not the exclusive preserve of children of the elite. This is not an uncommon feature of the 
public service; studies of British civil servants have also found that they tend to be educational 
high achievers from comparatively poor households, relative to their own educational 
achievement.389 So far the analysis has looked at differences in probability at the group rather 
than individual level however. By linking characteristics of the parents of public sector 
employees it is possible to examine the effect of individual socioeconomic background on the 
probability of holding public sector employment. 
Some Ugandan household surveys from the 1990s and 2000s include questions about parental 
educational and occupational background.390 Assuming a strong correlation between 
educational attainment and socioeconomic status, these surveys provide insight into the 
socioeconomic background of public sector employees. I focus on the 1992 and 2005/06 
household surveys for consistency with Chapter 3. 
These datasets can be used to examine the effect of parental educational attainment on a 
respondent’s likelihood of working in the public sector, conditional on the respondent’s own 
educational attainment. I therefore introduce a further set of independent variables into logistic 
model 1 measuring parental education attainment, while retaining the age, gender and 
(respondent) educational controls. Respondents with missing parental characteristics are 
dropped from the sample. The predicted effect of the father’s educational attainment on the 
probability of holding a public sector job for a university educated respondent is given in Table 
4.10 and the full regression results in Appendix Table VI.6.  
The results for 1992 show that controlling for respondent education, having a highly educated 
father reduces the likelihood of working in the public sector, although none of the coefficients 
are significant.391 Having a mother with a university degree also reduces the likelihood of 
working in the public sector – and this result is significant - while a mother with a post-
                                                   
389 W. D. Rubinstein, “Education and the Social Origins of British Elites 1880-1970,” Past & Present 
112 (1986): 163–207.  
390 Some of these survey have previously been used in studies of social mobility, see: Bossuroy and 
Cogneau, “Social Mobility in Five African Countries.” 
391 The coefficients are also quite sensitive to the model specification; including the parastatal sector for 
instance, changes some of the signs. 
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secondary certificate or diploma increases it, likely reflects the higher probability of children 
of teachers entering public employment (significance at 5% level).  
These effects are stronger when using the 2005/06 sample. All else being equal, the likelihood 
of working in the public sector is halved if the respondent’s father has a university degree, as 
compared to no formal education, with results significant at the 10% level. In other words, 
relative to other labour market participants with the same educational attainment, public sector 
employees have comparatively uneducated parents, and thus pressumably come from humbler 
backgrounds than their educationally-equivalent private sector counterparts. 
Table 4.10. Uganda: Predicted average probability of public employment for a university educated 
respondent, by father’s educational attainment 
      
95% confidence 
interval 
Educational attainment of 
father 
probability Std. err. min max 
UGANDA 1992         
None or some primary 0.61 0.07 0.47 0.75 
primary 0.58 0.08 0.43 0.73 
secondary 0.54 0.09 0.37 0.71 
college 0.68 0.12 0.44 0.92 
university 0.44 0.15 0.14 0.73 
UGANDA 2005/06         
None or some primary 0.50 0.08 0.35 0.65 
primary 0.46 0.08 0.30 0.61 
secondary 0.39 0.07 0.25 0.54 
university 0.33 0.10 0.13 0.52 
Sources: calculated from: UG IHS 1992; UG NHS 2005/06. 
Although no dataset from Kenya or Tanzania has been found that asks respondents about the 
educational or occupational background of their parents, the censuses provides a sub-sample 
where parent-child variables are linked. From the censuses it is possible to observe parental 
characteristics when the respondent and parent reside in the same household, and for this sub-
sample it is therefore possible to examine the effect of parental education on the probability of 
holding a public sector job. This introduces a risk of sample biases, as the decision by a working 
adult to live with their aging parents is pressumably not radom, nor is the probability of having 
a parent who is still alive. To limit such biases this analysis is restricted to respondents 
classified as the head of their household (so that the parent is a dependent and not vice versa), 
and considers only respondent-mother pairs. It is considerably more common for adult heads 
of households to live with their mothers than with their fathers, and the characteristics of 
households with co-resident mothers are less atypical.  
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In Table 4.11 and Table 4.12 the characteristics of adult respondent heads of households living 
with their mothers are compared to the national average. The summary statistics do not differ 
markedly between the full census sample and mother-cohabitation sub-sample. In Kenya 
respondents living with their mothers are more likely to be male, are on average slightly older, 
from slightly less developed regions of the country and have lower educational attainment, but 
in all cases the differences are within half a standard deviation or less. In Tanzania the 
differences are even smaller, although respondents living with their mothers are more likely to 
be male, are on average slightly older and have roughly the same educational attainment and 
district of birth developmental level as in the full sample. 
Table 4.11. Kenya 2009: Sample mean, comparing the full sample with sample of household heads 
residing with their mothers 
Characteristic of 
respondent 
Full sample 
(St.dev.) 
’mother’ 
sample 
(St.dev.) 
Full public 
sector sample 
(St.dev.) 
’mother’ public 
sector sample 
(St.dev.) 
Percent male 73% 77% 77% 80% 
Age 38.2 
(8.2) 
40.2 
(8.0) 
40.0 
(8.0) 
42.4 
(7.2) 
Average years of 
schooling 
7.8 
(4.2) 
6.9 
(4.5) 
11.5 
(2.7) 
11.3 
(3.0) 
Development index 
in place of birth 
0.48 
(0.16) 
0.42 
(0.18) 
0.51 
(0.15) 
0.46 
(0.16) 
# observations 525,849 8,273 41,382 737 
 
Table 4.12. Tanzania 2002: Sample mean, comparing the full sample with sample of household heads 
residing with their mothers 
Characteristic of 
respondent 
Full sample 
(St.dev.) 
’mother’ 
sample 
(St.dev.) 
Full public 
sector sample 
(St.dev.) 
’mother’ public 
sector sample 
(St.dev.) 
Percent male 72% 76% 75% 72% 
Age 37.7 
(8.6) 
38.2 
(8.3) 
39.2 
(8.3) 
41.2 
(7.6) 
Average years of 
schooling 
5.4 
(3.5) 
5.4 
(3.4) 
9.2 
(3.0) 
8.9 
(2.9) 
Development index 
in place of birth 
0.23 
(0.22) 
0.23 
(0.23) 
0.30 
(0.27) 
0.32 
(0.30) 
# observations 480,401 17,668 41,037 1,317 
 
Using these two samples of households where the household head resides with his or her 
mother, I use the same the same approach as described for Uganda above and introduce a 
variable measuring the educational attainment of the respondent’s mother. Results are 
presented in Appendix Table VI.7, and predicted probabilities are given in Table 4.13 below 
for a university educated respondent. 
The Kenyan results mirror those for Uganda. On average, the higher the educational attainment 
of the mother, the lower the probability of working for the state, although the coefficients are 
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only significant at a 10% confidence interval. The only exception is a slightly higher probability 
of public employment for respondents with college educated mothers, as compared to 
secondary educated mothers, suggesting a possible positive effect of having a mother who was 
a teacher on a respondent’s public sector prospects. 
The Tanzanian results are largely insignificant; only primary school educated mothers have a 
statistically significant difference in probability of holding public employment compared to 
those with no education. However, the coefficient is positive rather than negative. In contrast 
to Kenya, the Tanzanian results therefore suggest that a more highly educated mother increases 
the prospect of working for the state, although the results are not significant.  
While the Tanzanian results are far from conclusive, they are at least consistent with the notion 
that the public service aids social reproduction by favouring children of a pre-existing elite. 
This result reinforces the findings on region of birth discussed above. Just as people born in a 
district of higher developmental level have a higher probability of working for the public sector 
(conditional on education), so too do people from families with high educational attainment. 
Table 4.13. Kenya and Tanzania: Predicted probability of public employment for a university educated 
respondent, by mother’s educational attainment 
      95% confidence interval 
Educational attainment of 
mother probability Std. err. min max 
KENYA 2009     
None or some primary 0.48 0.02 0.43 0.52 
primary 0.37 0.04 0.30 0.45 
secondary 0.27 0.05 0.16 0.37 
college 0.33 0.08 0.19 0.48 
university 0.20 0.12 -0.04 0.44 
TANZANIA 2002     
None or some primary 0.43 0.07 0.30 0.56 
primary 0.54 0.08 0.38 0.69 
secondary 0.47 0.29 -0.09 1.03 
university 0.60 0.16 0.30 0.91 
 
Public-private wealth premiums and elite concetration 
An alternative approach to examining social reproduction in the public sector is to consider 
public-private wealth premiums using an adapted mincer function. As the censuses contain no 
income data however, I examine the probability of being in the top 10% based on asset wealth 
instead, conditional on education, age and sector of employment (as in Section 4.3 above). 
Mincer models are usually used to study pay premiums, but here the aim is different. The goal 
is not to establish the returns to skills in the public sector compared to an individual’s next best 
option, but the economic standing of public sector-headed households relative to other 
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households with similar levels of educational attainment. The intuition is the following: 
independent family wealth, high earnings and educational quality are likely to be correlated.  If 
coming from a privileged socioeconomic background increases the likelihood of a public sector 
career, then public sector-headed households should have a clear wealth premium relative to 
candidates with the same educational attainment in private employment. Consequently, if we 
find a public sector wealth penalty, this would suggest that the public sector is not the main, or 
at least not the only, career route for graduates from the most privileged social backgrounds. 
Such a penalty should not, however, be interpreted as a sign that public sector employees are 
underpaid – unobserved differences could well explain this penalty. 
In the logistic model below, therefore, the dependent variable is a dummy variable set to 1 if 
the household is included in the top 10% of asset wealthy households and 0 if not (using the 
same asset wealth variable as in Chapter 3). As an alternative specification I also examine the 
probability of being in the top 1% of households.  
log(P(y = 1)/ P(y = 0)) = α + β1x1i + β2x2i … + βkxki   (3)   
y: asset wealth index (1 = top 10%, 0 = bottom 90%) 
x1: age of household head (in years) 
x1# x1: age squared  
x2: education of household head (0 = none, 1 = some primary, 2 = primary, 3 = 
secondary, 4 = post-secondary, 5 = university) 
x1# x2: age # education interaction term  
x3: sector of employment dummy (1 = public sector, 0 = all other) 
x2 # x3: public sector employee # educational attainment interaction term 
x4: rural / urban status (1 = urban, 0 = rural) 
x5: Province or region dummies 
As in the previous exercises, the Kenyan results uses the 2009 census which includes a precise 
definition of public sector employment, while the Tanzanian and Ugandan censuses from 2002 
only capture government employees in the public sector sample. For Uganda and Tanzania this 
has the disadvantage that it captures parastatal employees in the private rather than public sector 
variable. The sample is limited to male-headed households where the household head is 
economically active. The main variable of interest is the sector of employment dummy. The 
model controls for the age and education of the household head, as well as including a 
sector#education interaction term to see how the public sector premium varies with educational 
attainment. I control for province or district of residence and urban/rural status.  
The regression results are given in Appendix Table VI.8 and the predicted probabilities shown 
in Figures 4.10 – 4.13. In Kenya public sector employees have a considerable wealth premium 
(i.e. a higher probability of being in the top wealth decile) among primary and secondary school 
educated workers. At the college and university level the bias is reversed, and public sector 
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employees face a wealth penalty, albeit only statistically significant among the university 
educated. The results are similar when examining the probability of being in the top 1% as 
opposed to top 10% of households, where this public sector wealth penalty rises further for 
college and university graduates. 
In Uganda public sector employees have a significantly higher probability of being in the top 
10% among those with primary or secondary education only, a lower probability among those 
with college degrees, and a slightly higher, but statistically insignificant probability of asset 
wealth at university level. The probability of being in the top 1% however, is lower for 
university-educated public sector employees.  
Tanzanian public sector employees have a higher probability of being in the top 10% at all 
educational levels but the differences are statistically insignificant among college and 
university graduates. The probability of being in the top 1% is slightly lower for university 
educated public sector workers than those in private employment, although again this 
difference is statistically insignificant. 
These public-private categories are heterogeneous groupings however, and in an alternative 
specification I examine the Kenyan data using disaggregated sub-sectors of employment. For 
simplicity the sample is restricted to university-educated candidates only and examines the 
conditional probability of being in the top 1% of asset wealthy households. Predicted 
probabilities are given in Figure 4.11. This shows that the probability of being in the top 1% 
varies considerably across different sub-sectors of the labour market and divisions within the 
public sector (range of 8-32%). Teachers and local government employees are found towards 
the bottom of the rank order, with probabilities of being in the top wealth percentile of 8% and 
13% respectively. Central government employees are found in the middle (17%), and parastatal 
(/state-owned enterprise) employees towards the top (25%). The highest probability of being 
in the top 1%, however, are among employees in international NGOs, followed by business 
owners (‘self modern’), state-owned enterprises and private sector employees. With the 
exception of the parastatals/state-owned enterprises, this suggests that the wealthy are more 
strongly clustered in the formal private sector and NGOs than in the public sector. 
Overall then, there is little sign of a wealth premium among college and university-educated 
employees in the public sector relative to those in private or NGO employment, suggesting that 
the public sector is not disproportionately crowding in the wealthy. In Kenya there is a public 
sector penalty above secondary level while in Uganda and Tanzania the differences across 
sectors is statistically insignificant. Given its higher national income and larger private sector 
it is perhaps not surprising that Kenya’s private sector offers more alternative routes to wealth 
than in Tanzania and Uganda. 
 181 
 
The higher wealth probabilities among public sector employees at lower levels of educational 
attainment moreover, are quite consistent with results from other parts of the world. These tend 
to find that public sector institutions offer better terms for low-skilled workers relative to the 
private sector, and the same or worse terms for those at the top.392 
Summarizing the results from these different exercises (region of birth effects, 
intergenerational educational mobility and public wealth premiums), suggests that in Kenya 
and Uganda the public sector promotes social mobility more so than the private sector. The 
Tanzanian results are ambiguous but point to a possible elite concentration in public 
employment. This may seem a counterintuitive result given the policy emphasis on social 
equity in Tanzania, but could reflect fewer private sector alternatives for the sons and daughters 
of the elite, given the country’s historical statist orientation.  
Figure 4.10. Kenya 2009: Probability of being in top asset wealth decile by educational attainment and 
sector of employment (showing 95% confidence intervals) 
 
  
                                                   
392 For example: Fournier and Koske, “The Drivers of Labour Earnings Inequality: An Analysis Based 
on Conditional and Unconditional Quantile Regressions.” 
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Figure 4.11. Kenya 2009: Probability of being in top asset wealth percentile if university-educated, by 
sector of employment (showing 95% confidence intervals) (public sector in black)393 
 
Figure 4.12. Uganda 2002: Probability of being in top asset wealth decile by educational attainment and 
sector of employment (showing 95% confidence intervals) 
 
Figure 4.13. Tanzania 2002: Probability of being in top asset wealth decile by educational attainment 
and sector of employment (showing 95% confidence intervals) 
  
                                                   
393 Sectors with very few observations have been excluded from the chart (these include ‘other’, 
‘pastoralist’ and ‘private household’). 
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4.6. CONCLUSION 
Previous chapters examined some of the outcomes of East Africa’s postcolonial public 
employment policies including their effect on budgetary allocations and fiscal policy and 
contribution to the income and wealth stratification of East African society. This chapter looked 
at the people who make up the public service. By examining the characteristics of the public 
sector labour force in comparison to the Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan labour forces at large, 
this paper speaks to a large literature about inequality in access to public sector resources in 
Africa and the politics driving it.  
The first, and perhaps in hindsight obvious observation is that the educational attainment of 
Kenyan, Tanzanian and Ugandan public sector employees is well above that of the labour force 
at large, as the majority of public sector employees are teachers, nurses and other comparatively 
skilled professionals. I argue that once we control for the educational attainment required for 
such mid-level and senior posts, the government has had relatively few candidates to choose 
between. Among older cohorts there are less than two university or college graduates per public 
sector post. Among the candidates with certificates or degrees in disciplines strongly demanded 
by the state, such as teaching, medicine and nursing, this ratio is presumably even lower. Given 
the shortage of high level manpower at independence and policies explicitly linking 
educational qualifications with public sector employment opportunities, this result is consistent 
with stated policy. As a result, many candidates were selected into a public sector career at an 
early stage in their academic progression. Assuming that the examination system was broadly 
fair, their selection was at least in part a function of their educational performance. This is 
antithetical to the type of personalised, quid pro quo clientelism described by Hicken, Robinson 
and Verdier, as it curtails the ability of politicians to hire and fire freely. A large share of the 
East African public sector wage bill has not, at least up until recently at least, been amenable 
to the type of patronage described in this literature. It appears to have been distributed in 
accordance with institutionalized rules rather than informal negotiations on the ‘back 
veranda’.394 
A meritocratic system can of course be elitist. If the existing elite is better able to provide its 
children with the preconditions for strong academic performance then they stand a better 
chance of accessing public sector jobs.395 This dynamic is likely to intensify as educational 
attainment increases and competition for jobs within this growing group of graduates becomes 
                                                   
394 Common euphemism to describe informal power relations, see: Berman, “Ethnicity, Patronage and 
the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism,” 335. 
395 See for instance recent discussion about the United States in the Economist: “America’s Elite: An 
Hereditary Meritocracy,” The Economist, January 22, 2015. 
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fiercer. Although the evidence is scarcer, what data is available on intergenerational mobility 
however, suggests that the public sector (at least in Kenya and Uganda) is more amenable to 
social mobility than the private sector; it employs a disproportionate share of educational high 
achievers from comparatively underprivileged regions and educationally-underprivileged 
backgrounds. It also hires a disproportionate share of female educational high achievers. This 
is not to say that the distribution of public sector jobs is progressive. Educational attainment is 
itself correlated with socioeconomic background, and thus the average public sector employee 
comes from a comparatively privileged social background. Since independence however, 
educational attainment has grown more regionally and ethnically equitable – not less so. As a 
result, educational attainment and public sector employment access is more equitable today - 
on a regional, ethnic, gender and socioeconomic basis - than what the unfettered market would 
have delivered.  
Interestingly this is less the case in Tanzania, where there is no strong relationship between 
public employment probability and the level of development in a respondent’s place of birth, 
possibly because inequality was lower to begin with. It also appears that Tanzania’s public 
servants are more mobile than in the neighbouring countries and jobs outside the capital are 
therefore not disproportionately taken by people native to the locality. 
A different strand of literature about clientelism argues that public sector resources are used to 
reward favoured ethnic groups or regions, without necessarily targeting particular individuals 
within this favoured group. This is expected to lead to pronounced ethnic inequalities in public 
sector employment, and many academics have argued that it usually leads to an employment 
advantage for coethnics of present or past presidents. In both Kenya and Uganda however, 
ethnic inequalities in public employment (across the larger groups at least), are not particularly 
pronounced. In Kenya the differences are in large part explained by inequalities in educational 
attainment, while in Uganda the legacy of conflict seems to raise the availability of public 
employment, resulting in elevated public employment levels for some of the more 
disadvantaged ethnic groups. The public employment to population ratio of the ethnic groups 
of the current presidents, the Kikuyu and Banyankole, are roughly on par with the national 
averages. Only in the case of the Kalenjin, the ethnic group of former Kenyan President Moi, 
do we see signs of possible presidential favouritism. But my analysis suggests that this unfair 
Kalenjin advantage only accounts for around 1% of all public sector jobs and presumably a 
similar share of the wage bill (in 2009). It may have been higher prior to when President Moi 
left office in 2002, but is unlikely to have consumed more than a few percentage points of the 
overall share of jobs. Given that the Kalenjin had comparatively low educational access during 
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the colonial era, ethnic favouritism may in this case have been heightened by a particular sense 
of historical grievance or injustice.396 
Lastly a third strand in the literature (also invoking the concept of patronage), argues that 
ethnically polarized societies favour ethnically inclusive cabinets, where posts are allocated in 
rough proportion to the ethnic composition of the population. This is presumed to lead to a 
relatively equitable pattern of spending, albeit with different ministers using their spheres of 
influence to favour their coethnics. Yet segmenting the public service by broad sub-sections 
shows little evidence of pockets of favouritism in different sections of the service, and the large 
share of employees hired at local levels suggests that ministers have relatively limited control 
over employment anyhow. 
Problematically, this literature takes for granted that inclusive ruling coalitions will turn to 
patronage to reward their supporters, rather than using formal rules and institutions to safeguard 
the interest of their constituencies. I argue instead that the ethnic and regional pattern of public 
employment distribution are relatively consistent with the formal policies and rules in place, 
some of which may well have been instituted precisely to address specific ethnic group 
grievances and or to counter regional and ethnic inequalities. Across Kenya’s eight former 
provinces, Uganda’s four regions and Tanzania’s 21 regions, public sector employment is 
spread quite evenly, with the exception of the capital cities and other particular outliers. This 
is suggestive of central-level efforts to distribute public spending – and by extension jobs – in 
proportion to the population.  
These observations about the composition and structure of the East African public sector labour 
force are not dissimilar from those in the public labour market literature focusing on Europe 
and North America. Public sectors commonly employ a disproportionate share of the highly 
educated labour force, this skew tends to be stronger among women than men, and stronger 
among those from comparatively poorer regions or social backgrounds. Whether due to the 
inheritance of a European public service model under colonialism or an intrinsic public sector 
labour market ‘logic’, this suggests the need to bring developing country experiences into the 
mainstream literature on public sector labour markets rather than treating them as world apart. 
These results raise questions for the future. As shown in Table 4.1, secondary and tertiary 
enrolment have increased rapidly across the region in the past two decades. The government’s 
rate of absorption of graduates, which is already showing signs of a decline across the region, 
                                                   
396 For a discussion of the differences in redistributive strategy when a comparatively wealthier vs. poorer 
ethnic group is in power, see: Azam, “The Political Geography of Redistribution.” 
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will decline further. This dynamic is already in motion, as evidenced by popular concerns about 
high unemployment or underemployment among not only secondary school leavers, but also, 
increasingly, among university graduates.397 As a result, the government’s direct control over 
the skilled labour market is weakening. Besides the obvious economic benefits of increased 
human capital formation, this dynamic may have positive consequences for political 
accountability, if it is helping to drive a wedge between the state and educational elite. But it 
also seems likely that spatial and ethnic inequalities will deepen as the active, politically-
motivated distributional decisions of the government fall in importance relative to the narrow 
employment decisions of private firms. 
  
                                                   
397 John Aglionby, “Joblessness Is an ‘Existential Threat’ to Kenya’s Future,” Financial Times, April 
21, 2017, https://www.google.co.uk/amp/s/amp.ft.com/content/1751e888-04cf-11e7-aa5b-
6bb07f5c8e12; Ivan Mafigiri Kanyeheyo, “The Crippling Dilemma of Graduate Youth 
Unemployment,” New Vision, January 21, 2015, 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1319320/crippling-dilemma-graduate-youth-
unemployment. 
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Chapter 5. 
Conclusion 
The changing face of the public service 
Over the course of the past 50 years the people working for governments in Africa have been 
characterised in various ways, be it as a vanguard and driver of modernity, as a rent-seeking 
and exploitative elite, or as clients of political patronage. This thesis has sought to examine the 
composition and trace the changes to Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda’s public services over this 
same period to add more quantitative evidence to the debate about public employment and its 
political significance in postcolonial East Africa. 
This analysis has shown that over the course of this period, public employment policies 
changed markedly. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, across the three countries, public sector 
employment and pay have oscillated sharply. Public sector employment peaked as a share of 
the labour force in the 1980s at roughly 6-7%, then fell by a half by 2010. Average earnings in 
contrast fell by two-thirds or more over the course of the 1970s through 1990s and have been 
rising since. At the same time the skills and nature of the work of the average public servant 
has changed considerably. At independence the public service remained racially segmented, 
with a slim, foreign-dominated professional apex overseeing a large pool of largely unskilled, 
manual African workers. Today the public sectors of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are almost 
entirely staffed by citizens of their respective countries and the majority are mid-level 
professionals such as teachers, nurses, administrators and policemen. The vast majority of 
public servants have completed secondary school and a growing share have tertiary education. 
A third or more are women, compared to female public sector shares of around 10% in the mid-
1960s. 
Despite rising salary levels since the mid-1990s, controlling for skills or positions, their 
earnings are considerably lower today than in the late 1960s. The salary and basic allowances 
of a Kenyan government director in 2011 was roughly a third of its level in 1961. Among 
tertiary educated public servants there is little sign of a wealth premium relative to other tertiary 
educated labour market participants. Thanks to a rapidly expanding secondary and tertiary 
education system, moreover, these public service professionals are a smaller share of the 
educational elite than they were in the 1960s, and a smaller share of the relatively high-income 
earning classes. 
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Although public sector employees are concentrated towards the top of the income distribution, 
it is also valuable to keep absolute rather than relative wealth levels in mind. According to 
recent census data, the majority of public sector-headed households across the three countries 
live in homes without piped water or sewage in their dwellings, only around half have electrical 
lighting, and less than a fifth own a car or refrigerator.398 The majority work outside the capital 
cities and a third or more are based in rural communities.399 While on average better off than 
most of their compatriots, only a small share of public employees meet a European definition 
of a middle class income or lifestyle.  
A public sector jobs then, seem to offer a comparatively secure middle-tier career rather than 
an obvious route to riches. As shown in Chapter 4, in Kenya and Uganda, if less so in Tanzania, 
public sector jobs are disproportionately important for educational high achievers from poor 
regions of their respective countries, who continue to have a high probability of entering public 
service. Educated women, too, are over-represented in relation to men with the same 
educational attainment.  
In many regards the public sector labour markets in these three East African cases have come 
to look like public sector labour markets around the world. Governments often use public sector 
jobs as a part of their regional policy, with the aim of propping up lagging regions and 
promoting equity in service access, rather than maximizing growth. The public sector is often 
a more important employer of skilled workers in peripheral regions rather than in the capitals. 
Because of the scope of work, benefits structure and more transparent hiring criteria, 
governments commonly hire more women and minorities than private employers, and tend to 
institute more compressed pay scales, with premiums at the bottom of the pay scale but 
penalties at the very top.400 The Kenyan and Ugandan cases, if perhaps less so the Tanzanian 
case, conform to these stylized observations.  
The main difference, when comparing these case study countries to richer regions of the world, 
seems to lie not in the nature of public sector recruitment or remuneration, but in the low level 
of national income. Because of higher income and educational inequality, and because 
governments are smaller and employ a lower share of the labour force, public servants stand 
out as a relatively privileged group. Consequently the politics of public employment is more 
contentious and has greater inequality implications. 
                                                   
398 Calculated using the public sector definitions used in Chapter 4; KE CENSUS 2009; TZ CENSUS 
2002; UG CENSUS 2002. 
399 36% in Kenya, 33% in Tanzania and 67% in Uganda: Ibid.  
400 Gregory and Borland, “Recent Developments in Public Sector Labor Markets.” 
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Explaining public employment policies 
What drove these changes to the structure of public employment? The findings in Chapters 2-
4 point to three sets of factors that contributed to these changes to public sector employment 
and earnings: economic conditions, global development paradigms, and domestic political 
conditions.  
Broader economic conditions had a considerable impact on public employment conditions, 
particularly the shocks of the 1970s and 1980s. The declining terms of trade and exchange rate 
depreciations had a dramatic effect on the real value of public spending and by extension on 
public sector wages. Adjusted for inflation, I calculate in Chapter 2 that wages in the public 
sector fell by 70-95% on average between the late 1960s and early 1990s. This extreme fall in 
real earnings in turn prompted a decline in employment in the 1990s, as governments 
rationalised the public service and curbed new hiring to generate the fiscal space for wage 
increases. The wage declines probably had the unintended consequence of making such 
reforms easier as the attractiveness of state employment had declined. The most extensive 
rationalisation of public employment took place in Uganda where the wage declines had been 
most severe.  
Global ideas about the role of the state also influenced policymaking. As discussed in Chapters 
1 and 2, global development paradigms changed radically in the 1980s. While the state was 
regarded as the rightful driver of economic development in the 1950s to 1970s, by the 1980s 
an overextended state was thought to be stifling the private sector and preventing growth. These 
changing paradigms had a particularly pronounced effect on government involvement in 
industrial development. Governments nationalised industries and banks in the 1960s and 1970s, 
then reversed these policies in the 1990s by divesting from the parastatal sector. As a result, 
employment in parastatals shot up rapidly in the early independence era, bringing a larger share 
of the formal labour force under state direction, and then declined sharply in the 1990s and 
2000s. Another important global policy shift was the attention to basic service delivery, 
advocated strongly by development agencies in the 1990s and 2000s and embodied in the 
Millennium Development Goals. This has resulted in an even greater share of budget resources 
(and staff) directed towards primary education and healthcare since the late 1990s. 
These global ideas were in part imposed on African governments, through externally dictated 
loan conditions and grants that nudged spending in the direction of donor priorities. But studies 
suggest at least some degree of domestic buy-in for these policy shifts. In Uganda for instance, 
the government constrained spending and liberalised the exchange rate in the 1990s after a 
long-running internal government debate about the costs and consequences of different courses 
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of action.401 In a study of ideological shifts in Africa, Sirkku Hellsten has argued that Africa 
has developed its own brand of neoliberalism, which in contrast to the solidaristic and 
egalitarian ethos of African socialism of the 1960s, emphasises individualism, private 
accumulation and narrow, sub-national loyalties over national ones.402 Perception surveys also 
suggest that attitudes towards the state may be less favourable than in the past. While there are 
no earlier comparators against which to compare these results, Afrobarometer results from the 
early 2000s suggest popular support for reforms that reduced the role of the state in economic 
management.403 
Domestic political conditions and institutional legacies have also, invariably, shaped 
government course of action, although not necessarily in the ways predicted by academics. The 
nature of the postcolonial African political settlement and its consequences for public 
employment policies remains contested. A major question in African history is how political 
priorities changed with the transfer of power from colonial governments accountable to a 
colonial metropole, to independent, national governments. A further and more recent concern 
is how the erosion and recovery in democratic governance in Africa over the past half century 
has (re)shaped the policy space. In many academic texts, whether by historians, political 
scientists, economists or anthropologists, public sector jobs are viewed as a critical ingredient 
in postcolonial political settlements. Two arguments have been particularly influential. 
Dependency theorists and the public choice school saw public sector jobs as a way of creating 
a co-opted elite, who would use their relative power to oppress and extract from the majority 
of the population. Others viewed public sector jobs as instruments of patronage that could be 
given and taken away from individuals or ethnic groups collectively, depending on their ability 
to deliver political support. However, by tracing the change in employment and earnings and 
examining the structure of public services, this thesis throws doubt on both arguments. 
The idea of the public service as a site of social reproduction fits poorly with the available 
evidence. Already in the 1980s several scholars showed that wages in the formal sector had 
declined substantially across Anglophone Africa as union powers eroded, raising doubts about 
                                                   
401 Alan Whitworth and Tim Williamson, “Overview of Ugandan Economic Reform since 1986,” in 
Uganda’s Economic Reforms: Insider Accounts, ed. Florence Kuteesa et al. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010). 
402 Sirkku K. Hellsten, “Deconstructing the Myth of the African Middle Class,” in The Rise of Africa’s 
Middle Class: Myths, Realities and Critical Engagements, ed. Henning Melber (London: Zed Books, 
2016). 
403 58% of Kenyans, Ugandans and Tanzanians (pooled) were fairly or very satisfied with the 
government’s reduced role in the economy: Afrobarometer, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 2002/03, 
Round 2. 
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the disproportionate political leverage of the salariat.404 The long-run data presented in Chapter 
2 shows that these wage declines started in the late 1960s, which suggests that the independence 
leaders were quick to withdraw their support for the continuation of the high wage legacy of 
the colonial era. As the education system grew and more secondary and tertiary graduates 
joined the urban labour market, governments sought to include new aspirants rather than limit 
access to those from particular social backgrounds, at the expense of wages. Consequently, I 
find that the public sector share of households in the top income and wealth brackets have 
declined markedly in Kenya and Tanzania, and presumably in Uganda too, although there are 
no pre-crisis measures against which to compare Uganda’s current public sector elite shares.  
Furthermore, although the data points are few and samples small, the examination in Chapter 
4 of the educational attainment of the parents of today’s public servants shows that Kenya and 
Uganda’s public servants come from less educated homes than their educational equivalents in 
the private sector (the results from Tanzania are more ambiguous). Moreover, Kenyan college 
and university-educated private sector employees today have higher living standards, on 
average, than those in the public sector. This throws further doubt on the importance of the 
public service as a site of social reproduction.  
Clientelist theories in contrast, presume that jobs represent a reward to a client in exchange for 
his or her political support. If said support is not forthcoming, the politician has the power to 
revoke the privilege by withdrawing the job. This model also accords poorly with descriptions 
and data about how public sector recruitment actually worked in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 
where a large share of jobs were allocated to those graduating from universities, teaching or 
nursing colleges, and in the earlier periods, from the more prestigious secondary schools. As a 
result, a considerable share of candidates were selected into public employment on the basis of 
their educational performance. Exam results determined their educational opportunities and by 
extension employment opportunities. If politicians were seeking to maximise direct control 
over hiring and firing decisions across the public service, then such a long-term, 
institutionalised process of recruitment would be one of the least appropriate structures. 
Moreover, there is little evidence that politicians withdrew jobs other than during the formal 
retrenchment programmes of the 1990s. Clientelism, nepotism or other forms of favouritism 
may well have influenced decisions at the margins, but they do not appear to be the broader 
organising principle shaping access to public sector jobs. 
                                                   
404 Valentine, “Government Wage Policy, Wage and Employment Trends, and Economic Instability in 
Tanzania since Independence”; Jamal and Weeks, “The Vanishing Rural-Urban Gap In Sub-Saharan 
Africa.” 
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Nor are there obvious signs of ethnic favouritism among the public sector employees of the 
2000s. With the exception of the Presidency of Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya, Kenya and 
Uganda’s presidents have not shown strong signs of favouring their own ethnic group in new 
recruitment, at least not across the broader public service. Ethnic employment shares are 
correlated with educational attainment, and ethnic inequalities in job access are largely 
explained by ethnic educational inequalities. There have undoubtedly been instances where 
ethnic or regional politics influenced decisions about where to place a new college or factory, 
but on the whole such choices have a small effect on the aggregate distribution of public 
employment, which is strongly driven by the allocation formulas for the distribution of primary 
school teachers, policemen and local administrators.  
Ethnically-based allegiances may have mattered at the very top of the public service and 
presumably in politically appointed posts.405 But this is in keeping with the formal rules of the 
governance system. Appointed positions are designed to give presidents or parties the power 
to place individuals loyal to the party in strategic posts where they can help to drive a political 
agenda. In ethnically-polarized settings such choices are presumably more contentious, but this 
is feature of the institutional design rather than the opaque manipulation of the system by a 
political leader. It should not be taken for granted that ethnic inequalities at the top will be 
mirrored across the public service as a whole. 
Rather than a public service recruitment system structured around patronage relationships or 
elite reproduction, the findings presented in Chapters 2-4 suggest an alternative explanation 
that is consistent with some of literature that explains how multi-ethnic, young states manage 
and mitigate conflict, rather than the pathologies they suffer. Kpessa, Beland and Lecours, for 
instance, have argued that post-independence leaders in Africa used social policy, in particular 
education and healthcare, to further nation-building aims and counter the ethnic divisions 
inherited at independence.406 This is not a new argument. Gould, for instance, argued in 1974 
that all the governments of former British East Africa ‘[try] to promote national unity by 
reducing regional and group disaffection, promoting inter-group and inter-regional contact and 
adopting a national language policy.’407 Gould saw secondary schooling policy as key to this 
strategy, as by improving access to- and equity in secondary education, the government 
indirectly shaped the composition of its formal sector labour force. More recently Azam has 
                                                   
405 As argued by: Lindemann, “Exclusionary Elite Bargains and Civil War Onset: The Case of Uganda”; 
Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi, “How Is Power Shared in Africa?” 
406 Michael Kpessa, Daniel Béland, and André Lecours, “Nationalism, Development, and Social Policy: 
The Politics of Nation-Building in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 34, no. 12 (December 
2011): 2115–33. 
407 Gould, “Secondary School Admissions Policies in Eastern Africa: Some Regional Issues,” 375. 
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modelled this strategy formally, showing that where African leaders in multi-ethnic societies 
have the ability to credibly commit to redistribution, they can stave off ethnic conflict through 
redistribution rather than through force or military deterrence.408 
This raises the practical question of how leaders can structure a system of redistribution that 
all groups will accept. Which individuals should benefit and how? Azam argues that this 
redistribution often takes place through the education system and formal labour market 
(particularly the public sector labour market):  
Village communities send the most promising of their offspring to the urban sector 
equipped with the required education for hopefully obtaining good positions in the 
formal sector and preferably in government. They can thus have access to high and 
regular incomes so that they can in turn remit money to the village community which 
funded the initial investment in education or fund some investments in local 
infrastructure. The most talented ones will climb the social ladder and acquire 
powerful positions that will give them the opportunity to influence the regional 
allocation of public investment.409 
Azam regards this as a group dynamic, where communities or ethnic groups collectively invest 
in the education of their most promising group members and collectively benefit from the gifts 
and largess which their successful offspring in turn remit to the community. Others, however, 
have stressed the same mechanism without applying a collectivist logic to explain 
acquiescence. In a study of Kenya’s harambee (self-help) schooling sector, Kilemi Mwiria 
argued in 1990 that the Kenyan government successfully inculcated an ideology of meritocracy 
to legitimize inequality.410 He cited the 1974-78 Kenyan development plan, which justified 
inequality on meritocratic grounds:  
The present plan provides opportunities for everyone to participate in the economy 
and in so doing improve his standard of living. Such improvements are bound to be 
achieved more quickly by some than by others, however. Equal income for everyone 
is therefore not the object of this plan. Differences in skills, effort, and initiative need 
to be recognized and rewarded.411  
Mwiria argued that Kenyans were willing to accept a highly selective and unequal educational 
system on the grounds that it rewarded talent and hard work, without making the further 
assumption that educational high achievers would share their high urban salaries with their 
                                                   
408 Azam, “The Political Geography of Redistribution.” 
409 Ibid., 238. 
410 Mwiria, “Kenya’s Harambee Secondary School Movement: The Contradictions of Public Policy.” 
411 Cited in: Ibid., 364. 
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communities of origin.412 He refers to this as the ‘myth of meritocracy,’ given the obvious 
educational advantaged possessed by those from more economically privileged 
backgrounds.413 In interviews with 200 parents of students in poorer schools in Kenya in the 
1980s, he found that 75% approved of a selection system based on examination results. The 
parents regarded this educational progression system as a fair way of rewarding talent and hard 
work and believed that it justified higher earnings and standards of living for those who 
successfully completed their education.414 He argues that the system was accepted because it 
afforded poor students some hope of success. Some children from poorer communities did in 
fact progress up the education system and were rewarded with higher paying jobs. While 
Mwiria does not explicitly mention ethnicity, presumably the knowledge that people from 
one’s own ethnicity, religion or region did occasionally succeed in this education race, was 
important for the legitimacy of this system. 
Stephen Heyneman in contrast, writing about Uganda a decade earlier (1979), treated this 
promise of meritocratic selection as a reality rather than myth. He argued that the flatness of 
postcolonial Ugandan society offered a genuinely fair playing field:   
‘Ambitious children of both cabinet ministers and peasants know three things 
perfectly clearly: they know that occupational success depends first upon meeting 
the minimum educational entry requirements; secondly, they know that a grade I 
'pass' on the Primary Leaving Examination is the only prerequisite for achieving an 
opportunity for advancement beyond primary school and, thirdly, that only 10% of 
the applicants each year can achieve it.  
Thus the Ugandan grade seven children know that many elites, if not most, have 
humble origins; that educational advancement is required for most elite status; and 
that they will all have an opportunity for advancement on the same basis as everyone 
else, on the basis of their test performance. Although there are other arenas where 
particularistic ethnic and family influences may affect their mobility, to them, the 
secretly written, uniformly administered, multiple-choice, computer-graded Primary 
Leaving Examination represents a trustworthy and fair system of evaluation. The 
fact that their teachers, families and tribal affiliations will all be unknown and 
irrelevant to a machine which can only read their ID numbers is a boost in morale to 
those in the more compromising social milieux.’415 
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This appeal to meritocracy can be theorised in relation to what Albert Hirschman called the 
‘tunnel effect’ or ‘hope factor’. Hirschman observed in 1973 that in the early stages of a social 
transformation, inequalities between groups and individuals tend to rise, yet those left behind 
often greet this inequality positively as it signals that their turn will soon come.416 He used the 
analogy of being caught in a traffic jam in a two-lane tunnel. If the lane adjacent to one’s own 
begins to move this is initially gratifying, as it suggests one’s own lane will soon move. After 
a while however, if one’s own lane remains stationary, this hope turns to envy and anger.  In 
the short-run the tunnel effect can be politically useful, as it allows governments to tackle 
growth and inequality in turn rather than tackling both at once.  
From the perspective of policymakers then, selective educational and occupational 
advancement based on merit may have been a pragmatic approach to high popular expectations 
on an independence dividend, if it rested on the expectation that any person with the right 
talents and effort could succeed. In his autobiography, Duncan Ndegwa, a former head of 
Kenya’s civil service, reflected on the impossibly high expectations that Kenyans placed on 
their independence leaders. Had the leaders been honest about what their small budget could 
deliver, he noted, they ‘would have been accused of being prophets of doom and traitors.’417 
Julius Nyerere, in contrast, with his usual candour, acknowledged the limits to the state’s ability 
to offer the population modern, stable formal sector jobs, writing in 1967 that ‘it would be 
grossly unrealistic to imagine that in the near future more than a small proportion of our people 
will live in towns and work in modern industrial enterprises.’418 He described Tanzania’s 
education system as inherently elitist, and recognized that those who passed their exams and 
were admitted to secondary schools ‘have a feeling of having deserved a prize - and the prize 
they and their parents now expect is high wages, comfortable employment in towns, and 
personal status in the society.’419 While Nyerere sought to counter these tendencies through 
reform to the curriculum and a reduction in the private returns to education, the pressure to 
climb the educational ladder continued unabated in Tanzania. 
Given this context, I would like to suggest that public sector jobs can be understood as an 
independence dividend that selectively rewarded aspirants based on educational performance. 
People proved willing to accept this compromise as long as the competition itself was seen to 
                                                   
416 Albert O . Hirschman and Michael Rothschild, “The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in 
the Course of Economic Development,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, no. 4 (1973): 544–66. 
417 Duncan Nderitu Ndegwa, Walking in Kenyatta Struggles (Nairobi: Kenya Leadership Institute, 2011), 
336. 
418 Julius K. Nyerere, Education for Self-Reliance (Dar es Salaam: United Republic of Tanzania, 1967), 
7. 
419 Ibid., 10. 
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be open to aspirants from all walks of life. At least in the early independence era, if less so by 
the 1980s, the majority of secondary school entrants across the region came from relatively 
humble beginnings, proving that talent and hard work was rewarded.420 Maintaining the 
semblance of an open and meritocratic system, and ensuring that at least some aspirants from 
underprivileged communities also succeeded, was presumably important for the continued 
legitimacy of such a system. In all three countries, therefore, the elitism of this system was 
counterbalanced by efforts to level the playing field. The regional placement of schools, 
regional quota systems and other forms of affirmative action guarded against capture by any 
single ethnic or regional group, and presumably also buffered against social reproduction.  
As educational attainment grew, however, pressure on the state to continue incorporating these 
new, comparatively educated, middle class aspirants into the formal job market escalated. 
There was a circularity to this system moreover, as a large share of the new formal sector 
employees (particularly in Kenya and Uganda) were teachers, who in turn educated more 
middle class aspirants. This helps to explain the decision to continue expanding public 
employment even as wages began to fall in the 1970s. Rather than limiting entry, governments 
chose to allow real incomes to fall with inflation and ploughed at least some of these wage 
savings into new employment creation and educational expansion. Partly by design, and partly 
due to unfortunate economic conditions, salaries fell to extremely low levels.  
This practice came to an end in the 1990s under the strain of a declining budget. Governments 
accepted the need to rationalise the level of employment and put a damper on the rate of 
employment of new graduates in order to raise wages. Perhaps the falling attractiveness of 
public sector jobs relative to other employment opportunities also helped to relieve the pressure 
on the state, making the reforms easier to push through. Moreover, by placing more public 
sector jobs outside of the main cities, the employment declines were most marked in the capital 
cities where private sector employment growth was the highest. As a result, in Kenya and 
Uganda at least, the probability of obtaining a public sector job has continued to be quite high 
for educational high performers from outside the main urban areas, and particularly from the 
most economically underdeveloped districts or regions. 
Unlike the dependency, public choice or neopatrimonial explanations, this theory stresses the 
importance of broad-based popular expectations rather than narrow interest groups, and the use 
of formal, transparent rules of the game for managing such expectations. This does not 
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Graduates in the Kenyan Labor Market.” 
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necessarily mean that ethnicity or class are irrelevant to African politics or policymaking. I 
simply want to suggest that such social fissures it need not always result in ethnic patronage 
politics or elite capture. 
Country differences 
Much of this dissertation has focused on general trends across all three of the case study 
countries. An important finding is in fact that the public sector employment and wage 
trajectories in all three countries share much in common, suggesting that the constraints 
imposed by being young, poor and primary commodity-dependent nations may have 
outweighed differences in leadership or political structure. Some of the finer differences 
between the three, however, deserve note. 
The country differences in the severity of wage and employment declines are correlated with 
the severity of the economic crisis and rate of inflation. The income declines were largest in 
Uganda, followed by Tanzania and then Kenya, reflecting differences in the degree of 
economic and political turmoil. Financial constraints also meant that Uganda’s public service 
never grew as large as in the neighbouring countries. Poor economic performance acted as a 
restraint on wage bill growth, suggesting that the causality ran from economic performance to 
employment policy rather than vice versa. Furthermore, the retrenchments and wage reforms 
of the 1990s were further reaching in Uganda and Tanzania than in Kenya, possibly reflecting 
the greater reform space afforded by the crisis in Uganda, and to a lesser degree Tanzania. 
Conflict exacerbated the wage crisis but speed up the post-crisis reforms and recovery. 
Consequently, public sector salaries are relatively similar across the countries today, although 
average earnings in Uganda still lag those in Kenya and Tanzania. 
These similarities also challenge the hypothesis that Kenya and Uganda’s greater ethnic 
polarization have led to a greater use of ethnic patronage to manage the political settlement 
than in the more politically cohesive Tanzania.421 Public employment is often assumed to be 
an important patronage resource, yet Tanzania’s greater national unity and weaker ethnic 
polarization does not seem to have resulted in markedly different public employment policies. 
Like its neighbours, Tanzania’s leaders expanded employment during the initial period of 
growth and allowing earnings to fall to exceptionally low levels in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Despite its socialist orientation, Tanzania’s public service remained smaller than in Kenya, 
reflecting the binding constraint of finances on the state’s reach. Since independence 
                                                   
421 See argument and evidence by: Edward Miguel, “Tribe or Nation ? Nation-Building and Public Goods 
in Kenya versus Tanzania,” World Politics 56, no. 3 (2004): 327–62. 
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Tanzania’s educational and employment opportunities have grown more regionally equitable, 
much as it did in Kenya and Uganda. It does not appear that public sector employment by 
region of birth was any more equitable in Tanzania in 2002 than in Uganda.422 
In contrast to Kenya and Uganda however, the Tanzanian public service offers less of an 
employment advantage for educated candidates from less developed regions. This may simply 
be because inequalities were lower to begin with and the absorption of secondary and tertiary 
graduates into public employment has remained higher. However, it could also be that less 
ethnic polarization put the government under less pressure to distribute state resources in equal 
share across ethnic groups or regions. Tanzania’s secondary and tertiary education policies 
differed in some respects from those of its neighbours. In order to foster national solidarity the 
government explicitly sought to mix students from different regions in secondary schools by 
relocating secondary school entrants to boarding schools away from their place of birth.423 In 
similar fashion, public servants could be relocated to regions other than their place of birth or 
preferred residence (see Figure 4.7). This may inadvertently have reduced the home-field 
advantage for candidates from more peripheral regions and increased the relative elite privilege 
in access to public employment. Furthermore, by placing greater restrictions on private sector 
accumulation (up until the 1990s), elite competition for public sector jobs may in fact have 
remained fiercer in Tanzania. 
These country comparisons and generalizations should not be stretched too far, however. For 
practical more so than analytical reasons, this thesis focused on three case studies from a 
particular sub-region of the African continent. These cases provided some diversity in terms of 
ethnic structure and political paths, but to explore the relevance of these findings it would be 
necessary expand the number and diversity of country cases examined. For instance, by 
selecting countries without significant mineral or oil exports this study lacks variation in the 
terms of trade cycles, capturing only countries that were hurt by the oil price shocks of the 
1970s. The timing and volatility of public sector expansions and contractions may well be 
different in resource rich countries. Also important to note is the limited variation in colonial 
legacy. Francophone African countries, for instance, experienced a somewhat different public 
finance trajectory to that of Anglophone Africa because they retained the colonial monetary 
unions after independence. This limited monetary expansion and inflation, and thus the extent 
to which public spending could be adjusted by inflationary means. As a result it appears that 
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public sector salaries never fell as severely as in Anglophone Africa.424 Exploiting the 
consequences of this difference in monetary policy could shed light on the causes and costs of 
the Anglophone African wage declines. 
Implications of the postcolonial public employment shifts 
One of the reasons to be concerned about the politics of public employment is that it affects 
state capacity, in particular the quality and efficiency of public service delivery. This thesis 
stays relatively quiet on the topic of bureaucratic efficiency, approaching public sector 
employment from the perspective of job and income creation rather than an input into the 
production of services. By challenging assumptions about social reproduction, patronage and 
ethnic favouritism, however, I do not seek to discount the very real public service delivery 
challenges in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Poor public service outcomes however, need not 
necessarily reflect the politicization of public employment. In fact, the erosion in earnings 
alone, set against a period of economic and political turmoil, seems quite likely to have eroded 
morale, discipline and the performance culture. While earnings have in part recovered, this 
damage to the public service institutions may not be automatically reversed once earnings 
rebound.  
Furthermore, a comparatively inclusive, meritocratic public service entry system, as described 
in Chapter 4, is by no means incompatible with corruption, nor does it ensure strong 
performance incentives, or even the right allocation of human capital. Many of its features can 
lead to perverse outcomes. The practice of queuing for public sector jobs, for instance, where 
selection into employment depends on the length of time the candidate has been waiting for a 
job, is unlikely to attract the brightest and best candidates as those still waiting for employment 
are presumably those less able to forge a successful career elsewhere.425 Nor is it obvious that 
the national examinations that influence opportunities to progress through the education system 
are ideal tools for gauging aptitude. Already in the 1970s studies examining Kenya and 
Tanzania’s exam system argued that they were not optimally designed to spot raw talent and 
inadvertently privileged students from schools where the teachers could help them study to the 
test.426  
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Patronage relations may also arise internally within the public service, not necessarily by grand 
political design but as a grass-roots response to resource scarcity and competition for rents or 
informal remuneration such as per diems and travel allowances. Poor management, which 
could be a consequence of many factors, can alone generate dysfunction. A recent study of new 
teachers in Kenya found new public school teaching recruits to be the most public service 
oriented and enthusiastic about their jobs, but a few years into their employment they had 
undergone the greatest decline in public spirit.427 This suggests that the employment experience 
rather than the characteristics of the candidates had the bigger influence on motivation. Many 
things have to come right in order for public service delivery to work efficiently, but the 
findings in this study suggest that they need not be rooted in patronage or ethnic tensions. 
How then should we evaluate the changes to the public service structures of East Africa over 
past five decades? Should these changes be regarded as good or bad for growth and 
development? What do they bode for the future? There are no simple answers to such questions. 
The changes to the wage and employment structure has helped to correct some of the 
imbalances inherited at independence. It reduced the duality of a racially-segmented salary 
scale, reduced the urban income bias of the 1960s, and has helped to expand both broad-based 
demand for- and supply of education. 
However, while some decline in the wage levels was probably necessary, it is hard to see how 
the extreme erosion of real earnings experienced in the 1980s and early 1990s could have been 
good for development. It is likely to have taken a considerable toll on worker motivation and 
shifted efforts away from public service provision. As discussed in Chapter 3, a large share of 
public sector employees are engaged in secondary economic activities, be it a family business, 
farm or second job. Qualitative accounts suggest a rise in petty corruption linked to falling 
earnings.428 Furthermore, due to the large rationalisation of employment since the 1990s, the 
governments of East Africa may well be under- rather than overstaffed today compared to other 
regions of the world. Teacher to pupil ratios, health worker to population ratios, police to 
population ratios are all low compared to global standards and UN recommendations.429  
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While earnings have partially recovered since the mid-1990s, this does not guarantee that the 
boom and bust pattern of public employment growth and wage decline will not repeat itself. In 
Kenya public employment levels have steadily been inching upwards again in the past five 
years, particularly since devolution in 2012/13 which shifted more budget responsibility to 
county governments and led to an increase in hiring.430 At the same time, wage increases 
contributed to an increase in the wage bill. If growth slowed in the region, this could rapidly 
reverse the wage increases of the past years. 
The results from Chapter 3 which showed a falling share of public sector earners in the top 
consumption decile and percentile, particularly in the capital cities, is probably a more welcome 
development. It suggests that high earning private sector employees and business owners have 
become a more permanent fixture in the East African social structure. Some of these private 
sector actors may of course depend on the state in other ways, be it through contracts or 
favourable regulation, but an increase in separation between economic elite and government 
employment is probably helping to shift political incentive structures in new directions and 
creating more public debate about public policy. A greater share of skilled workers in private 
employment also allows price signals to make their mark on labour markets more rapidly. 
Private sector actors compete with each other for labour, which should prevent the type of 
erosion in earnings and effort experienced by the East African public sectors. Because 
governments have unified salary scales that usually have to be adjusted across the board rather 
than piecemeal, and by virtue of its size and influence on the formal labour market, adjustments 
take longer.431 More private sector benchmarks and more competition for labour may in fact 
help the public sector to improve its wage setting.432  
However, an interesting implication of the ‘decline of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ is the 
weakening control of the government over educational opportunities and the career paths of 
graduates. Results in Chapter 4 showed that the government’s absorption of graduates has been 
declining (at least in Kenya and Tanzania). Recent reports from these countries raise concern 
about growing graduate unemployment.433 Less state control over education and employment 
also means less central ability to manage horizontal inequalities. To the extent that public sector 
jobs have been used to further nation-building aims and have helped to improve regional and 
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ethnic balance within the income elite, recent trends may be a cause for concern. As described 
in chapter 4, ethnic and regional differences in educational attainment converged in the first 
decades of independence, but at tertiary level there appears to be some divergence since the 
late 1980s, at least in Kenya and Uganda. If the education system is growing more regressive 
and less regionally representative, and if the government influence over labour markets is 
weakening, how will this influence the composition of the formal labour market participants 
going forward? Will it aggravate existing ethnic and regional inequalities or give rise to new 
social fissures? More research will be needed on the implications of the recent changes to the 
higher education system and labour markets, both from an economic standpoint and from a 
perspective of social inclusion. 
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Appendix I. Data appendix 
[See separate excel file, can be requested from author.] 
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Appendix II. Constructing data series on government 
finances, employment and earnings               
(supplement to Chapter 2) 
This appendix discusses how the main data series which underpin the analysis in Chapter 2 
have been constructed and justifies choices of measures and method. These core series cover: 
(i) government revenue and expenditure, (ii) expenditure by economic classification, (iii) 
public employment (disaggregated by categories), and (iv), total public sector wage bill and 
average earnings, from the late colonial period until the present. Most series start around 1950, 
although several could only be reconstructed starting in the 1960s. The full dataset is provided 
in data appendix 1. Further notes are given in the excel sheet, which highlights any imputed 
variables or other adjustments, as well as detailing all sources. 
Below I discuss the control variables and other general matters that cut across all three 
countries, before moving on to a country-specific discussion of the data. 
II.I. Common sources and issues 
Population. For the pre-1960 era I rely on Frankema and Jerven’s population estimates for 
Africa. These correspond quite well with the World Development Indicator (WDI) population 
series (originally from the UN World Population Prospects), which start in 1960. Using the 
census shares, I revise the Tanzanian population estimates downwards to exclude Zanzibar 
(~3% of total population), as this study is concerned only with the Tanzanian mainland. 
For comparative purposes I also include the published national census results, in addition to 
the WDI population series (which the World Bank sources from the UN Population Division). 
Note that both the Tanzanian and Ugandan census results are judged to be under-enumerated 
by the UN and the WDI estimates are higher than official census estimates. For Tanzania the 
discrepancy only arises in the 2000s, while the Ugandan estimates diverge already in the early 
1990s.  
The labour force is assumed to be 85% of all 15-64 year olds. WDI provides data on the share 
of the population aged 15-64. Estimates of labour force participation rates are available from 
the WDI from the late 1980s or 1990s. For simplicity I use a rounded average for the three 
countries. 
GDP. Nominal GDP estimates are taken primarily from the WDI. For Kenya and Uganda, the 
WDI GDP series starts in 1960. For the late 1950s I use the contemporary estimates of GDP at 
factor prices, scaled up to converge with the 1960s estimates of GDP at market prices. For 
Tanzania however, the WDI only records nominal GDP starting in 1988. For the period before 
1988 I use the contemporary estimates scaled up to converge with the 1988 series, see 
discussion below on Tanzanian sources. 
Currency. The British introduced the East African Shilling in Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda 
in 1921, equal in value to the British Shilling. The East African Shilling was managed by the 
East Africa Currency Board until 1966, after which each country established their own central 
banks and began minting individual, national currencies. Colonial government budgets and 
financial reports tend to record transactions and expatriate wages in pounds (£1 = Sh.20), 
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although local market prices and African wages were typically recorded in shillings. All three 
countries have over time shifted to recording government transactions exclusively in shillings. 
For the purposes of this study all values have been converted into Sh., denoted by the country 
first letter to distinguish the different Shillings (KSh., TSh. and USh.). Uganda issued a New 
Ugandan Shilling in 1987 that removed two zeros from the value of the old shilling.  
Time units (fiscal versus calendar year). All three countries moved from calendar year fiscal 
year to a July 1 – June 30th fiscal year in 1954. While basic economic data is typically recorded 
on a calendar year basis (GDP, inflation etc.), all budgetary accounts are recorded on a fiscal 
year basis. Where calendar/fiscal year series are combined or compared, I have simply recorded 
data on a fiscal year basis to be aligned with the later of the two calendar years to which it 
corresponds (e.g., 1973 aligned with FY1972/73). This primarily affects the comparison of 
budget estimates with employment and wage data from the EES. As the EES was typically 
conducted in June of each year and salary adjustments usually come into effect in July at the 
beginning of the new fiscal year, this seems the most appropriate way of aligning the series. 
For long-term trends this simplification should be inconsequential. 
East Africa Common Services Organisation / Community. Up until the breakup of the East 
African Community in 1976 some public sector activities were conducted jointly for all three 
countries by the East African Common Services Organisation (initially named the East Africa 
High Commission, it became the East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO) in 
1961 and the East African Community (EAC) in 1967). Most of its central functions were 
administered from Kenya. However, when constructing fiscal accounts for the three countries 
I have chosen not to incorporate the EACSO in total expenditure and revenue as it had little 
own revenue (beyond that off the parastatals). It was financed primarily through transfers from 
the three governments and therefore most of its revenue and expenditure was already captured 
in the country accounts as transfers to other branches of government. 
With the disbandment of the EAC in FY1977/78 Kenya transferred the former EAC 
administrative staff onto the central government budget;434 the Kenyan employment series have 
been adjusted to take this into account. Note that the number of EAC administrative staff, as 
opposed to those employed directly by the parastatals, was small. 
Military personnel. None of the main data sources used to estimate public sector employment 
include the military. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) military balance, 
an annual yearbook of global military statistics, provides rough estimates of the size of the 
armed forces by country (excl. militias). These estimates have been used in certain figures to 
give a sense of the order of magnitude of the armed forces relative to civilian employment. 
This data is available from 1971. 
II.II. Kenya: main data series 
General government revenue comprises central government revenue and local government 
own-revenue, i.e., revenue net of transfers from the centre. Data on local government revenue 
has been collected from 1964 (when it constituted roughly 10% of total revenue). For the period 
prior to 1964 I assume that own-revenue remained a constant share of central government 
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revenue.  In 1970 the central government subsumed responsibility for many services previously 
managed by local authorities (education and health and roads maintenance etc.) which reduced 
the scope of local government activity sharply. 
In the revenue accounts from the 1960s some forms of borrowing were included as a source of 
revenue rather than a source of financing. All borrowing has been subtracted from the revenue 
totals. I provide separate series for revenue before and after grants. For the accounts from the 
late 1940s the Colonial Development and Welfare grants are given as a bulk sum for several 
years. In this particular case the grants are assumed to have been spent evenly across years. 
General government expenditure is taken to be the sum of central government expenditure 
and local government own-revenue. In effect, I make the simplifying assumption that local 
governments run balanced budgets. Judging from the local government accounts, this 
simplification has a negligible impact on the totals. 
General government expenditure by economic classification. I also construct a simple 
economic classification of government expenditure, by collecting data on spending on 
personnel, capital, defence and interest payments. The residual, once these items have been 
subtracted from total general government expenditure, is assumed to be non-wage recurrent 
spending. Note that defence is a functional rather than economic category of expenditure, but 
because it plays an important role in the changing composition of spending over this period, it 
is treated as its own category (including its wage component). 
Note however, that in the Kenyan case, personnel spending is taken from the EES rather than 
the budgetary accounts. In Kenya the budgeting conventions changed a number of times and 
the wage budget is therefore not a consistent measure over time. For example, in 1969/70 local 
government staff began to be captured on the central accounts resulting in a jump in personnel 
expenditure. In the 1980s all teaching staff were moved from the central government wage bill 
into a separate transfer to the semi-autonomous teacher’s service commission. The EES in 
contrast, provides greater consistency over time. While the EES does not include military 
personnel, their wages are captured in the separate ‘defence’ category anyhow. 
Public sector employment. The main source of Kenyan employment and earnings data is the 
Enumeration of Employees Survey (EES). It is conducted at the end of June each year through 
a questionnaire distributed to all formal sector establishments, including all public sector 
institutions with the exception of all non-civilian employees of the armed forces.  
With a few smaller exception, this survey has classified public employees relatively 
consistently over time. The key exceptions however, are the teachers, which only receive their 
own heading in 1981 (teachers were classified under local government personnel until 1970 
and under the parastatal header between 1971-80). Using the separate industrial classification 
of public employment, I estimate the share of teachers for the pre-1981 period. I also reclassify 
administrative EACSO/EAC personnel into the central government category prior to 1977 (as 
in 1977 they begin being recorded under this header). Note that most of the EAC staff worked 
for parastatals and their classification therefore doesn’t alter after 1977. Kenya also makes a 
distinction between parastatals (which includes some autonomous agencies) and majority state-
owned enterprises. For the purposes of this study these two categories are merged into a single 
parastatal category. 
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As discussed, I use the IISS military balance estimate of the total size of the force to give a 
sense of the order of magnitude of the missing military. The military wage bill is not included 
in any of the wage bill or earning series. 
In addition to the EES which surveys establishments, Kenya has undertaken a number of labour 
force and household surveys in recent years that allow us to estimate the number of public 
sector employees on the basis of respondent self-reporting. Figure 1 compares the EES series 
against the estimates from household surveys and the 2009 census. Note that the household 
surveys (although not the census) are based on samples (using the national sampling frame), 
and the point estimates thus have a non-negligible margin of error. While the EES and survey 
estimates do not differ by orders of magnitude (which is reassuring), the household surveys 
give consistently higher estimates (the same is true of Tanzania and Uganda). This is probably 
due to several factors. Firstly, the EES measures may well be incomplete (particularly at local 
government level where locally hired staff may not be reported in full to the central 
government). Secondly, it seems likely that the state’s definition of employee will differ from 
that of an individual respondent. Governments do not typically classify consultants, contractors 
or casual employees hired at the service delivery unit level as public sector employees. Such 
workers, however, may very well consider the government to be their employer. A further 
disaggregation of the household survey results suggest that they overestimate the number of 
employees in lower skilled positions and outside of the main cities, which is consistent with 
the idea of incomplete measurement of contract or casual staff, particularly at local government 
level. Note that the absence of military personnel from the EES may constitute a part of this 
discrepancy, although as households typically exclude group or institutional housing (such as 
military barracks), military personnel should be understated in these surveys too. 
Appendix Figure II.1. Kenya: total number of public sector employees, different sources compared 
 
Note: 1992 survey excluded three districts and estimate is therefore not national; 1978 labour force 
survey estimate has been scaled based on the 1979 census and should be treated as a rough estimate. 
Public sector earnings. The EES also provides an estimate of the public sector wage bill. The 
survey contains questions about the monthly wage bill (in June) and annual estimates in the 
reports are simply the June figures multiplied by 12. The earnings data covers “all cash 
payments, including basic salary, cost of living allowances, profit bonus, together with the 
value of rations and free board, and an estimate of the employer's contribution towards 
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housing,” but exclude employer contributions to the National Social Security Fund (NSSF).435 
NSSF contributions were a fairly small share of the overall wage bill, judging by the NSSF 
reports in the Statistical Abstracts. 
As already discussed, the EES estimates of total public sector earnings diverge from the 
budgetary accounts due to differences in coverage. Some of the Kenyan economic surveys, 
however, provide consolidated general government accounts combining the central, local 
government and East African services for the late 1960s. In such cases the EES corresponds 
quite closely to the budgetary amounts.436  
Price indices. The wage series are deflated using the consumer price index. From 1960 and on 
the World Development Indicators provides a continuous price series for consumer prices, 
which corresponds closely to the Nairobi middle income index. Given the focus on public 
sector employees, which are majority urban based and mostly found within the middle income 
bracket (as defined by the statistical abstracts), this is an appropriate choice of measure. For 
the period before 1960 I use the Nairobi Cost of Living Index (excl. rent). While designed for 
‘a standard of living prevailing among European government servants’,437 inflation during this 
period was fairly low so the choice of index has only a minor impact on the final results. 
II.III. Tanzania: main data series 
GDP. The WDI GDP series for Tanzania only starts in 1988 following a rebasement of GDP 
in that year. The previous series with base years in 1966 and 1976 were deemed to be 
undervalued.438 I therefore project GDP back in time from 1988, assuming that the nominal 
GDP growth estimated from the earlier series were accurate (which effectively raises the earlier 
nominal series by 38%).  
As an alternative, I also derive nominal GDP from the PENN World Tables (version 9.0). My 
spliced series corresponds reasonably well with the PENN series up until 1980 and after 2007 
(deviations of maximum 10-15%), but diverge sharply for the late 1980s and 1990s, when the 
PENN estimates are roughly twice the WDI estimates. Comparing the different GDP series to 
revenue suggests and unrealistically large fall using the PENN series, from a high of 15% in 
the late 1970s to less than 5% in the 1990s. I therefore choose to use the spliced series instead, 
but with the caveat that these are rough estimates at best. To the best of my knowledge, 
Tanzania’s official GDP estimates cover only the mainland (excluding Zanzibar).439 
  
                                                   
435 KE SA 1977, p.264.  
436 KE ES 1971, Table 10.3. 
437 KE SA 1960 
438 TZ IMF RED 1999 
439 See: TZ NA 2014 
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Appendix Figure II.2. Tanzania: Revenue to GDP ratio, different GDP estimates 
 
Government revenue and expenditure. As in the Kenyan case, general government revenue 
and expenditure is constructed by summing central government revenue or expenditure and 
urban and district council own-revenue. In 1972 Tanzania abolished local authorities and their 
revenue contribution was virtually eliminated; they continued to collect some fees and market 
dues but these funds were negligible compared to central government revenue.440 Although 
local governments were re-established in 1984,441 their own revenue remained a very small 
share of total revenue after that. I only have ad hoc measures of local government own-revenue 
from the period after their re-establishment and estimate a value for the missing years by 
assuming that local government revenue remains a fixed share of total revenue.  
Tanganyika’s revenue accounts proved hard to reconcile prior to 1964, as these earlier revenue 
figures do not include appropriations-in-aid (fees, charges etc. levied by ministries and 
departments). I make an upward adjustment to both the revenue and expenditure estimates to 
account for this omission. 
General government expenditure by economic classification. This classification uses the 
same assumptions and methods as for Kenya. In the Tanzanian case however, I rely on the 
budgetary estimates of personnel spending (rather than the EES figure). The Tanzanian 
personnel budget seems to have remained more consistent over time and there is no sign of big 
shifts in coverage. It corresponds relatively well to the EES up until 1974. Despite the 
governmental reorganizations of the 1970s and 1980s, it continues to capture most local 
government wage spending up until the present. 
Public sector employment. The public employment and wage series for Tanzania are a lot 
less reliable than for Kenya and the figures presented in Chapter 2 rest of data from several 
different data sources. There are three main sources of data on public employment in Tanzania: 
(i) the Employee and Earnings Survey (EES), which was conducted from the 1950s until 1984, 
and then restarted in 2000; (ii) payroll/personnel data, reported in a variety of World Bank 
studies, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s as the civil service reform programme was 
initiated; and (iii) estimates from household survey and labour force surveys, which are based 
on sample estimates, weighted on the basis of the national sample frame. Neither the EES nor 
                                                   
440 TZ WB 1975, Annex II, Fiscal aspects of decentralization 
441 Urban and municipal councils were re-established earlier, in 1978. 
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the payroll data include the armed forces, and as the household surveys tend to exclude people 
in group quarters (such as military barracks), these surveys capture only a small share of the 
military and where possible to identify, I have omitted those reporting defence as their 
occupation or industry. 
The EES surveys from the 1960s and 1970s are the most comprehensive and robust of the 
sources, but lacks the crucial mid-1980s through 1990s period when Tanzania’s public sector 
was reformed. Unfortunately the revived EES data from 2001 until the present appears to be 
flawed. This series shows shows implausible fluctuations in employment levels and a very 
rapid employment growth since 2010. A more careful comparison of the EES microdata against 
the sampling method suggests problems with the weighting scheme. In the discussion of the 
survey methodology, the EES survey reports state that all public sector establishments were 
included in the survey (no sampling), while for the private sector they used a two-tiered 
sampling technique.442 Yet the 2013 and 2014 EES microdata443 shows that the public sector 
results have been scaled up significantly; by as much as 60% in 2014. Even assuming some 
adjustments on account of non-responses (public sector establishments had an 88% response 
rate on average), these weights seem implausible. A central government establishment in 
Morogoro for example, categorised as public order and employing 1642 people (thus 
presumably the regional police headquarters), has been given a weight of 8.2. This implies that 
statistically there were likely to be more than 7 other establishments of similar size that went 
uncounted in that region. Using the raw rather than weighted data gives results that are closer 
to the administrative records: 389,000 general government employees in 2014, rather than 
641,000 when applying weights. Furthermore, it seems likely that non-responding 
establishments are the relatively smaller ones, rather than big public sector institutions that 
enumerators will have an easy time locating. An earlier survey (TZ EES 2007) also noted that 
missing responses were sometimes due to aggregation at a higher level of government, so that 
the missing establishment numbers were included in the parent institution aggregates instead. 
While the EES results from the 2000s are retained in data appendix 1 for informational 
purposes, the chapter analyses do not make use of them. 
The second public employment data sources is that generated from the payroll, which captures 
the vast majority of general government employees, but excludes casual employees (many of 
whom are paid out of a non-wage budget line, particularly at the local level), local councillors 
(politicians), trainee teachers, parastatal employees and those in public institutions/executive 
agencies (which receive un-earmarked budget allocations).444 The 2004 payroll analysis put the 
missing employees in public institutions and teacher trainees at 7% of the total, and in the EES 
recorded casual employment was usually around 10% of the total. This gives a sense of the 
upward adjustment needed to compare the payroll and EES estimates. For the 1980s the 
ministry of labour and manpower also published a separate public employment series that gives 
somewhat different figures to those from the other payroll estimates. I have chosen to set aside 
this last source and work primarily with the data from the payroll office. 
                                                   
442 TZ EES 2002, p.5. 
443 Microdata only released for the 2013 and 2014 surveys. 
444 Tanzania. President’s Office Public Service Management., “Public Service Employment and Pay: 
The Current State and Trends over the Last Four Years: Part I (Main Report)” (Dar es Salaam, 2004). 
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The third set of sources are the household surveys. These are in theory comprehensive, but 
some rely on relatively small samples (particularly for urban areas where many public servants 
tend to reside), which increases the confidence interval. As in Kenya moreover, the household 
surveys tend to over-estimate low-skilled staff (particularly at the local government level), most 
likely reflecting the inclusion of contractors and casual employees that are not formally public 
sector employees. 
The figures below compare these three sets of sources for the parastatal and general government 
employees separately. Appendix Figure II.3 compares the estimated number of general 
government employees as reported in the EES, the payroll reports and in household or labour 
force surveys. The payroll estimates correspond relatively well with the EES up until 1984 and 
the spike in 1993 followed by a swift decline in employment is supported in the secondary 
literature.445 The estimates for the 2000s, however, vary considerably. The EES data is likely 
the main culprit due to weighting errors just discussed.446 Some of the household surveys (the 
2014 labour force survey and 2011/12 household budget survey) also give relatively high 
estimates, but as noted, household survey estimates are generally higher than the administrative 
sources.  
To construct a plausible public employment trajectory therefore, I use the EES estimates up 
until 1980. After that I rely on the payroll data, but adjust the number upward by 20% to account 
for omission of casual employees and employees of public institutions from the central 
government payroll. This is therefore a rough estimate, but errs on the side of caution by 
selecting reasonably high estimates for the post-1980 period. This gives us a reasonable order 
of magnitude if not a precise number, and perhaps more importantly, a plausible direction of 
travel. It appears to capture the relevant peaks and troughs described in the secondary literature 
accurately. In 1975 the government laid off the former TAZARA railway construction workers, 
which explains the dip in the series. In 1985 the government had tried to reduce public 
employment, but failed to follow through on its employment freezes.447  Following the 1993 
spike in employment the government initiated a civil service reform programme (with donor 
support) to reduce the absolute number of staff (both through retrenchment and the removal of 
‘ghost workers’ from payroll). 
  
                                                   
445 WB PER 1996; TZ POPSM 2004. 
446 Using the underlying raw EES microdata for 2013 and 2014, with some revision upward for missing 
respondents, give results that are quite close to the payroll data, at around 330,000 in 2013.   
447WB PER 1989, Volume II, p.63. 
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Appendix Figure II.3. Tanzania: Total general government employment, estimates using different 
sources 
 
The parastatal employment estimates in contrast, are more consistent across sources. Appendix 
Figure II.4 shows how the estimates of parastatal employment from the EES compare to that 
of the household or labour force surveys. These two sources give reasonably consistent 
estimates, although the EES estimates appear high for the very recent years. As the EES is 
likely overestimating the parastatal employment, I choose to use the household survey 
estimates to trace the trend after 1984, see thin black line, the ‘plausible path’. 
Appendix Figure II.4. Tanzania: Total parastatal employment, estimates using different sources 
 
Public sector earnings. Estimating average public sector earnings in Tanzania also has its 
challenges. Up until 1984 the EES gives data on average earnings and the total wage bill 
(disaggregated by sector and industrial category). As in Kenya, these measures of earnings 
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include benefits and allowances but exclude pension contributions. From the 1980s and on 
however, I am forced to rely on the budget estimates of total personnel spending divided by the 
estimated size of the public service. As the personnel expenditure estimate and payroll data on 
employment appear to come from the same source, I divide personnel expenditure by the 
unadjusted number of public sector employees recorded from the payroll sources (the dark 
black dotted line in Figure II.5). Comparing average earnings across the various available 
sources during the 1970s and 1980s shows agreement on the trend, albeit not perfect alignment. 
These series have somewhat different coverage however, which presumably explains the level 
differences. 
Appendix Figure II.5. Tanzania: Average government earnings 1971-88, different sources compared 
 
Another important data quality concern however, is the extent to which personnel expenditure 
(as classified in the budget) is an accurate guide to actual take-home pay. Several World Bank 
reports, particularly from the 1990s as the civil service reform programme took pace, raised 
concerns about a number of staff benefits and allowances classified under non-wage budget 
headings.448 The donor-funded development budget was a particular culprit, as projects topped 
up salaries in various ways in order to motivate staff whose base pay had been falling since the 
1960s. A 1994 report estimated that roughly 15% of the budget line “other charges” was in fact 
salary supplements of different kinds.449 A later study from 2009 provided a detailed analysis 
of for the years 2004/05 through 2009/10, and found that allowances and other effective wage 
supplements were roughly 20-25% of total pay, although most of these expenses were correctly 
coded under compensation of employees.450 While allowances formed an important part of the 
public service remuneration package in colonial times too, it seems plausible that the wage 
declines lead to various creative ways to channel non-wage budgets into staff compensation. 
In Figure 5 I run some sensitivity tests, adjusting the total wage bill upward by assuming (i) 
that 20% of non-wage recurrent expenditure leaked into the wage bill, (ii) a 50% leakage, and 
(iii) that personnel costs stayed constant at 60% of total recurrent expenditure (excl. interest 
                                                   
448 TZ WB PER 1994, Vol 1, p.22. 
449 TZ WB PER 1994, Vol 1, Table 3.8 
450 TZ WB PER 2009, Table 16. 
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and defence). This shows that even under an implausibly high leakage assumptions, the fall in 
real earnings during the 1980s was substantial. In recent years however, as government 
expenditure rebounded, real earnings estimates are more sensitive to these assumptions.  
Appendix Figure II.6. Tanzania: Average government earnings using alternative estimates of total wage 
bill size 
 
II.IV. Uganda: main data series 
Government revenue and expenditure. The fiscal and macroeconomic data for Uganda is 
considerably weaker than for the other two countries and should be treated as indicative. The 
statistics published by the government and reported in IMF briefs from this era are perhaps a 
better reflection of how statisticians and IMF staff believed the economy and budget to have 
fared than an independent measure. Nonetheless, the trends, if not the levels, help to tell the 
story of Uganda’s state erosion and recovery. 
Uganda’s state practically collapsed after Idi Amin’s coup in 1971 and regular reporting ceased. 
What data we do have on fiscal operations from the 1970s is limited to the central government, 
and even then is of weak quality. Fiscal operations were in part run through a number of extra-
budgetary accounts used to circumvent the official budget, and makes it hard to assess the 
actual purpose of spending.451 In addition, high inflation, coupled with exchange rate and price 
controls and very large spreads between the official and parallel markets, make it difficult to 
accurately correct for inflation. Some of the statistical volatility is undoubtedly a result of these 
pricing policies. The situation reached its nadir in the late 1970s and early 1980s around the 
time of the Ugandan-Tanzanian war. In 1980/81 the deficit reached roughly 75% of total 
expenditure, financed primarily through domestic borrowing and accumulation of arrears 
(particularly for defence). The economy briefly improved in the early 1980s when Milton 
Obote regained power, with a big increase in the revenue take in 1981/82. However, the 
                                                   
451 To make matters worse, the IMF reported that the central government computer broke down in 1978 
and there was no manual backup system, see: UG IMF RED 1983. 
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political situation deteriorated and fighting resumed in the early 1980s (during the Bush Wars), 
which rapidly unravelled what progress had been made towards stabilising the economy. 
Despite the public finance chaos, the government produced basic accounts, which were 
reviewed and reported by the IMF and form the basis of the analysis for the 1970s and 1980s, 
although the data quality from the end of the Idi Amin period is particularly poor. Data from 
the 1960s are taken from government sources and loans have been subtracted from the revenue 
accounts.  
As for Kenya and Tanzania, the estimates of general government revenue combine central 
government revenue with local government own-revenue. Up until 1975 it is possible to extract 
local government own-revenue from the statistical bulletins (with some imputations for missing 
years). After 1975 I assume that local government revenue represented a fixed percentage of 
total revenue, based on a few observable benchmark years. In the 1960s local government 
revenue was substantial, peaking at around a quarter of total government revenue. As in its 
neighbouring countries however, the central government sought to weaken these competing 
power bases after independence, and in the 1960s President Obote centralized many services 
and reduced the local government revenue base. What data we have suggests that the revenue 
share fell to roughly 10% of total revenue in the mid-1970s. While data is not available for the 
late 1970s, Uganda’s 26 urban and 33 district administrations presumably continued to raise 
some taxes locally throughout the tumultuous 1970s, but reporting to the central government 
stopped while their reliance on central government transfers is thought to have increased.452 By 
the 1990s locally raised revenues accounted for only a small share of their resources.453  
In 1993 the government embarked on a decentralization process to reform and revive local 
governments. Local governments were re-established in the 1995 Constitution and subsequent 
Local Government Act of 1997. Although fiscal decentralisation began in 1994, the central 
government retained considerable financial control over the districts for some time and the 
reforms had relatively little impact on local government revenue generation. Local government 
revenue is estimated at roughly 2% of total revenue today. 
Economic classification of government expenditure. For the pre-1976 period, personnel 
costs are taken from the EES rather than the budget, excluding earnings in the transport sector 
which are likely to be staffed primarily employed on the railways (a parastatal). Economic 
classification of expenditure for the 1970s and 1980s period are rough estimates and for some 
years the estimates are based on a commitment rather than cash-basis. Of all categories of 
spending, however, the IMF thought the wage bill to be the most reliable, as it was based on 
the disbursed payroll.454 Nonetheless, even disregarding the tumultuous 1970s and 1980s 
period, it helps to tell a story about the effect of rising defence spending and falling wages, and 
thus this rough picture of change is included despite its flaws. 
Government employment. Uganda only undertook the EES until 1977. Unlike the other two 
countries, their measure of public employment included the general government and the East 
Africa Common Services Organisations (primarily railways), but no other parastatals. From 
1993 and on the government resumed its annual statistical report on general government 
                                                   
452 Ibid. 
453 UG IMF SA 1998 
454 UG IMF RED 1983 
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employment (based on the payroll rather than a survey of each institution), although it provided 
only sporadic wage data. We have a few sporadic data points with which to fill in the gap in 
reporting between 1977 and 1993. In 1979 the Commonwealth produced a report that provided 
summary statistics on public employment, and in 1987 the government undertook a civil 
service census.  
For Uganda therefore, we lack any consistent data on the parastatal sector. State-owned 
enterprises bulged in number in the 1970s when Uganda’s Asian population was expelled and 
many of their businesses appropriated by the state.455 In 1983 there were estimated to be 140 
such nonfinancial public enterprises, many of which were heavily reliant on credit or direct 
subsidies from the central government. A report by the Commonwealth Secretariat from 1979 
estimated their total employment to be 80,000, while an estimate from 1988 put total parastatal 
employment at 54,000.456 The data series for Uganda discussed in Chapter 2 simply excludes 
the parastatal sector, for lack of any reliable measures. 
The general government employment estimates from the various available sources are plotted 
in Appendix Figure II.7. These show that there is considerable uncertainty about the trend 
between 1977 and the early 1990s. The point estimate of general government employment from 
1990 proves particularly problematic to interpret. In several sources, a 1990 estimate of 
government employment (at 320,000) is referenced. The World Bank traced this number to an 
unpublished ILO report.457 They were unable to ascertain whether it included parastatal 
employees or not, but presumed that it probably did. As a measure of the general government 
alone, this 1990 measure seems high compared the other available measures for this period and 
does not match estimates of the number of posts rationalised. Clearly the jump in number 
between the 1987 civil service census and estimate for 1990 is implausibly large, and there are 
no narrative accounts in the IMF or World Bank reports of a major hiring spree immediately 
after President Museveni came to power in 1986. I therefore choose to revise the 1990 measure 
downward by 50,000 to adjust for the inclusion of the parastatal sector, see Appendix Figure 
II.8 (‘plausible path’).  
Appendix Figure II.7. Uganda: Total general government employment estimates by source 
 
                                                   
455 Ibid. 
456 UG WB PER 1993, p.105 
457 Ibid., p.103 
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Appendix Figure II.8. Uganda: Total general government employment, plausible and higher-bound 
scenarios 
 
Government earnings. The total earnings reported in the EES match the wage bill figures for 
the central government relatively well for the period 1962 – 1977. The budgetary estimates are 
lower in the early 1960, most likely due to the absence of local government personnel costs in 
the central government accounts as well as staff of the East African parastatals (primarily 
railways). Over time however, the two series converge as services were centralized and local 
government personnel costs reported in the central government accounts.  
In order to calculate average earnings I therefore divide the reported wage bill for the period 
1977 until the present by the level of employment calculated in Figure 7 above. Various ad hoc 
estimates of salary levels from this time allow me to benchmark these results with independent 
measures. These give reasonably consistent measures. As in Tanzania however, it seems likely 
that some non-wage expenditure were in fact used to remunerate staff, as reliance on benefits 
and informal remuneration increased when wages declined. As in the Tanzanian case however, 
this is unlikely to have altered the general trend.  
Consumer price index. A price index has been constructed up until 1986 (before the currency 
was revised), by splicing together the Kampala cost of living index and the latter Kampala 
middle income cost of living index. Extremely high inflation in the late 1980s makes it difficult 
to account for price changes after 1987 and the available consumer price indices give 
implausible wage fluctuation results. I therefore normalise earnings in relation to GDP per 
capita instead, as the WDI nominal GDP per capita series provides a more plausible trend. 
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Appendix III. Regional distribution of employment and 
earnings (supplement to Chapter 2) 
Figures 2.14 – 2.15 (in Chapter 2) were constructed by using regionally disaggregated data on 
the population and the total number of public/formal sector employees and public sector wage 
bill. The table below provides detail on the data sources used for the analysis. Note that in the 
Tanzanian and Ugandan measures only includes general government employees (i.e., it 
excludes the parastatal sector).  
Appendix Table III.1. Sources underpinning regional analysis of public sector employment and pay 
Kenya Formal sector employment and earnings 
1972 – 2005: KE EES, various years 
Public sector employment and earnings 
1972 – 1985: KE EES, various years 
1994: KE WMS 1994 
2009: KE CENSUS 2009 
Total population 
Censuses from 1969, 1979, 1989, 1999, 2009 (population assumed to grow linearly 
between census years), 1994 data point using estimated district pop from WMS 
1994. 
Tanzania Government and formal sector employment and earnings 
1965 – 1980: TZ EES (various years); TZ HRDS 1993; TZ HBS 2000/01; TZ HBS 
2011/12. 
Total population 
Censuses from 1967, 1978, 1988. For data points using household surveys, regional 
population estimates taken from the surveys. 
Uganda Government and formal sector employment 
1965 – 1970: UG EES; 1987: UG BTB 1989/90, Table 32; 1992: UG IHS 1992 
Total population 
Census from 1969 (1965 and 1970 normalized by same year); 1992 and 1987 use 
estimated district population from IHS. 
 
The subnational boundaries in all three countries have changed over time. The data has been 
constructed on the basis of the 1970s boarders in Kenya and Tanzania, and 1960 borders in 
Uganda. 
Kenya 
To keep the sample constant over time, the original 41 Kenyan district divisions of the 1970s 
are used for this analysis. Kenya’s administrative divisions have undergone considerable 
change since independence. Under President Moi and President Kibaki the number of districts 
in Kenya increased, and as a result the censuses contain an increasing number of districts (69 
in 1999, 158 in 2009). However, a High Court ruling in 2009 deemed 210 of the then existing 
256 districts illegal, and reverted the administrative structure back to the 46 districts and 
Nairobi as set out in the Districts and Provinces Act of 1992. When the 2010 Constitution came 
into effect in 2013, these districts were converted into 47 counties, which form the basis for the 
devolution envisaged under the new constitution. New Kenyan districts were carved out of 
single old districts, making it a relatively straightforward task to merge new districts into old 
ones. The mapping below shows how any new district divisions have been merged into the 
original 1972 list. 
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Appendix Table III.2. Kenya: mapping of subnational divisions 
 Code  Master list (1972) New districts mapped onto old 
110 Nairobi   
205 Kirinyaga   
208 Kiambu Thinka 
220 Nyandaura   
221 Nyeri   
222 Muranga Maragua 
301 Mombasa   
303 Kwale   
306 Kilifi Malindi 
309 Tana River   
311 Lamu   
320 Taita Taveta   
401 Marsabit Moyale 
405 Isiolo   
415 Embu Mbeere 
421 Machakos Makueni 
430 Kitui Mwingi 
431 Meru Meru South, North, Central, Tharaka 
501 Garissa   
520 Wajir   
521 Mandera   
601 Siaya Bondo 
630 Kisumu Nyando 
632 Kisii Kisii Central, Kisii South, North Kisii 
634 South Nyanza Homa Bay, Migori, Suba, Rachuonyo, Kuria 
704 West Pokot   
713 Baringo Koibatek 
730 Nakuru   
739 Kericho Bomet, Buret 
750 Turkana   
751 Samburu   
752 Trans Nzoia   
753 Nandi   
754 Laikipia   
755 Narok Trans Mara 
756 Kajiado   
757 Elgeyo Markwet Marakwet, Keiyo 
758 Uasin Gishu   
816 Busia Teso 
830 Kakamega Vihiga, Lugari, Butere 
832 Bungoma Mt. Elgon 
NB. Other categories excluded (overall share of pop minimal) 
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Tanzania 
Tanzania’s regions have undergone less change than Kenya’s districts but some of the regions 
created in 1978 and 2012 have been carved out of more than one original region. As the 
employment data is not available at district level, I have made the simplifying assumption that 
a new region was drawn in equal proportion between old regions. This assumption makes a 
negligible difference to the results. In addition, there were some boundary changes between 
1967 and 1978. The 1967 regional populations were calculated using the 1978 boundaries in 
the 1978 preliminary census report. 
Appendix Table III.3. Tanzania: mapping of subnational divisions 
Regions 1967 2002 2012 
Arusha   
Manyara added to 
Arusha 
Manyara added to 
Arusha 
Pwani (Coast) 
Mzizima District 
removed      
Dar es Salaam  
Mzizima District 
added      
Dodoma       
Iringa   
  
Njombe included in 
Iringa 
Kigoma       
Kilimanjaro       
Mara       
Mbeya       
Morogoro       
Mtwara       
Mwanza   
  
Half of Simiyu pop 
and third Geita pop 
Ruvuma       
Shinyanga   
  
Half of Simiyu pop 
and third Geita pop 
Singida       
Tabora       
Tanga       
Kagera/West Lake     Third Geita pop 
Lindi 
Emp estimated as 
share of Mtwara     
Rukwa 
Emp estimates as share 
of Mbeya and Tabora   
Katavi included in 
Rukwa 
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Uganda 
Uganda’s districts have multiplied in number over the postcolonial period. This analysis used 
the 1960 district boarders, with the latter breakout districts mapped onto the old boarder 
divisions, see mapping below. 
Appendix Table III.4. Uganda: mapping of subnational divisions 
1960 Districts 
<1992 districts mapped onto 
old divisions 
2002 districts mapped onto 
old divisions 
Kampala (not a district, 
separated out) 
Kampala Kampala 
Mengo 
Kiboga, Luwero, Mpigi, 
Mukono, Rakai 
Kiboga, Luwero, Mpigi, 
Mukono, Rakai, Kalangala, 
Nakasongola, Kayunga, 
Wakiso 
Masaka Masaka Masaka, Rakai, Sembabule 
Mubende Mubende Mubende, Kiboga 
Busoga 
Iganda, Jinja, Kamuli Iganda, Jinja, Kamuli, Bugiri, 
Mayunge 
Bugisu Kapchorwa, Mbale, Sebei Kapchorwa, Mbale, Sironko 
Bukedi Kumi, Pallisa, Tororo Busia, Pallisa, Tororo 
Teso 
Soroti Soroti, Katakwi, Kumi, 
Kaberamaido 
Karamoja Kotido, Moroto Kotido, Moroto, Nakapiripirit 
Acholi (incl. Madi*) 
Gulu, Kitgum, Moyo Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, 
Adjumani, Moyo 
Lango Apac, Lira Apac, Lira 
West Nile Nebbi, Arua Nebbi, Arua, Yumbe 
Bunyoro Hoima, Masindi Hoima, Kibaale, Masindi 
Toro 
Bundibugyo, Kabarole, Kasese  Bundibugyo, Kabarole, Kasese, 
Kamwenge, Kyenjojo 
Ankole Mbarara, Bushenyi Mbarara, Bushenyi, Ntungamo 
Kigezi 
Kabale, Kisoro, Rukungiri Kabale, Kisoro, Rukungiri, 
Kanungu 
*Madi was an independent district in 1960 but not in the latter periods and is therefore grouped with 
Acholi. 
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Appendix IV. Calculating average public sector 
educational attainment                                   
(supplement to Chapter 2, 3, 4) 
Tables 3.3 – 3.6 provides estimates of the share of the public sector labour force with secondary 
and tertiary education as well as the share of such graduates working in the public sector. The 
estimates for the 1990s and 2000s are calculated from census and household survey microdata, 
while the estimates from the 1960s or 1970s build on manpower surveys. These manpower 
estimates rest on a number of assumptions. Firstly, the various manpower reports give estimates 
of the total ‘mid- and high-level manpower’ rather than educational attainment directly. These 
classifications of manpower level, however, rest on educational or skills requirements, and 
therefore serve as a proxy for educational attainment. However, workers without the requisite 
educational attainment may at times have been employed in such posts, or alternatively, there 
may be overqualified candidates in ‘low-level manpower’ posts. Secondly, I assume that all 
working secondary and tertiary graduates in the 1960s/70s were employed in the formal (rather 
than informal) sector. Note that this may overstate the public sector share if there are additional 
high educational achievers working in private establishments not captured by these surveys. A 
further point to keep in mind is that these estimates include expatriates, who made up a 
considerable share of the mid and high-level manpower in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
For each country and year I describe how the estimates have been calculated below. 
Kenya 
1972: Estimates based on 1972 high and middle level manpower survey, reported in KE SA 
1974, Table 273. This survey estimated 99,821 people in high and middle level positions in 
Kenya. Of these 41,000 were in the public sector and 59,000 in the private sector. This puts the 
high and mid manpower ratio at 15% in the public sector and 15% in the formal sector overall, 
and 41% of the total high and mid-level manpower in the public sector. ‘High and mid-level 
manpower’ is in the Kenyan case synonymous with jobs requiring at least a secondary school 
degree (Form IV). 
1994: Author’s calculation based on KE WMS 1994. 
2009: Author’s calculation based on KE CENSUS 2009. 
Uganda 
1967: Based on high level manpower survey 1967, Table II-VI (UG MANPOWER 1967). I 
use employees categorized in education level 3 – 9 as the definition of the secondary school 
educated population, as these groupings require at a minimum a Cambridge School Certificate 
(CSC) (achieved after 4 years of secondary school). 
In total there were 27,900 employees in posts requiring at least a CSC. Of these, 14,390 were 
in the public sector, 4,640 in the education sector and 8,470 in the private sector, set against a 
total number of employees in the public and education sector of 117,000, and in the private 
sector of 140,000. This means that 16% of total public and education sector employees were in 
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posts requiring a CSC, and 11% of all employees in total. The public and education sector 
employed 69% of all employees with at least a CSC. 
The table also allows us to calculate the share with a tertiary degree. I classify tertiary educated 
as those with a university degree or with a higher secondary degree or secondary degree and at 
least two years of further training (a generous classification, slightly broader than that for the 
latter periods). This suggests that 7% of all public and education sector employees had a 
tertiary-level job, and 2% of those in the formal private sector.  
Appendix Table IV.1. Uganda: formal sector labour force by educational attainment, 1967 
  
 Education level Public  Private Education Total 
Public and 
education 
Pub and 
edu % 
Uni, HCS or 
CSC plus 2 
years further 
training 
9 140 40 810 990 950 96% 
8 1390 1340 940 3670 2330 63% 
7 110 450 560 1120 670 60% 
6 2060 50   2110 2060 98% 
5 1750 870 470 3090 2220 72% 
At least CSC 
4 2740 1600 1660 6000 4400 73% 
3 6200 4120 200 10520 6400 61% 
Primary + 
further 
training 
2 4670 5650 9590 19910 14260 72% 
1 2000 1410 90 3500 2090 60% 
               
  
Total 
employment 84000 140000 33000 257000 117000 46% 
               
  Level 5-9 5450 2750 2780 10980 8230 75% 
  Level 3-9 14390 8470 4640 27500 19030 69% 
  Level 5-9 % 6% 2% 8% 4% 7%  
  Level 3-9% 17% 6% 14% 11% 16%  
Source: UG MANPOWER 1967, Table II-VI 
1992: Author’s calculations based on UG IHS 1992. 
2005/06: Author’s calculations based on UG NHS 2005/06. 
Tanzania 
1964: Based on results reported in the Annual Manpower Report to the President 1982 (TZ 
MANPOWER 1982), which summarised results from all previous manpower surveys. These 
surveys classify high and mid-level manpower as those positions requiring four years of 
secondary schooling or equivalent experience.  
For 1964, this report records total high and mid-level manpower in the formal sector as 12,639 
(categories A-C), of which 5,389 work in the civil service (TZ MANPOWER 1982, Table 64 
& 65). This means that roughly 6% of all civil service employees and 4% of all formal sector 
employees overall, had at least four years of secondary schooling. 
For the year 1980 the report also provides a breakdown of the total high and mid-level 
manpower by sector of the formal labour force. It suggests an extremely high share of the 
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educated in public employment, with 90% in either the civil service or parastatals, 9% in the 
private sector and 1% within the party. 
Appendix Table IV.2. Tanzania: Distribution of high and mid-level manpower, 1980 
 Citizens Non-citizens Total Percentage 
Civil service (i.e. general 
govt) 
26,707 429 
27,136 57% 
Parastatals 15,488 353 15,841 33% 
Private firms 4,058 455 4,513 9% 
CCM or affiliates 329 12 341 1% 
Source: TZ MANPOWER 1982, Table 67 
1993: Author’s calculations based on TZ HRDS 1993. 
2011/12: Author’s calculations based on TZ HBS 2011/12. 
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Appendix V. Reconstructing income and consumption 
distributions (supplement to Chapter 3) 
V.I. Kenyan data sources 
Constructing the 1975 income distribution 
Kenya did not undertake any comprehensive household budget surveys in the 1960s or 1970s 
and reconstructions of the income distribution from this period therefore rely on data from 
several sources. Several authors have used data from the Integrated Rural Surveys (1974-79), 
in combination with other sources, to establish a rough income distribution.458 Because these 
studies were foremost about poverty, and thus the bottom of the distribution, they tend to have 
relatively large, undifferentiated brackets at the top. I therefore use the most detailed of the 
rural income distribution tables available, constructed by Smith (1978) based on the 1974/75 
Integrated Rural Survey.459 As this survey only covered small-holder households (roughly 75% 
of the population), other sources are used to add the missing households to this distribution. 
Large farming households are added to this distribution based on the large farm survey, along 
with the data on formal sector wages (from the EES), self-employed (income tax statistics 
report), and urban informal sector (informal sector survey), and rough estimates of the pastoral 
population from Collier and Lal (1980).  This is therefore a rough calculation, and relies on a 
number of simplifying assumptions in order to reconcile the data from different surveys. 
Appendix Table V.1 shows the full distribution and indicates the source of data for each sector.  
Appendix Table V.1. Constructed income distribution for Kenya, thousands of households, 1975 
 (1) (2) (3) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
 Income 
groups, 
KSh/month 
Small 
holders 
Large 
farms 
Public 
sector 
(male) 
Private 
sector 
(male) 
Self-
employed 
(formal) 
Informal 
sector 
(urban) Pastoral 
Other 
rural TOTAL 
IRS 
1974/75 
Large 
farm 
survey EES EES 
Income 
tax 
report 
Informal 
sector 
survey
460
 
Collier 
and Lal 
Resi-
dual   
0-89 192   2 13     40 38 285 
90-189 368   7 137     40 38 590 
190-389 415   57 90   44 40 38 684 
390-579 137   75 39   7 40 38 335 
580-990 94   75 34 2 8     213 
990+ 26 3 48 37 14 2     129 
TOTAL 1233 3 264 349 17 62 160 150 2237 
                                                   
458 E. Crawford and E. Thorbecke, “Employment, Income Distribution, Poverty Alleviation and Basic 
Needs in Kenya” (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1978); L.D. Smith, “Kenya: Low Income 
Smallholder Marketing and Consumption Patterns: Analysis and Improvement Policies and 
Programmes” (Rome, 1978); Paul Collier and Deepak Lal, “Poverty and Growth in Kenya,” World Bank 
Staff Working Papers (Washington D.C., 1980); I. Livingstone, “Rural Development Employment and 
Incomes in Kenya” (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1981). 
459 Smith, “Kenya: Low Income Smallholder Marketing and Consumption Patterns: Analysis and 
Improvement Policies and Programmes.” 
460 Results reported in: Crawford and Thorbecke, “Employment, Income Distribution, Poverty 
Alleviation and Basic Needs in Kenya.” 
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Appendix Table V.2. Constructed income distribution for Kenya, percentage of each income bracket, 
1975 
Income groups, 
KSh/month Public sector Private sector 
Self-
employed 
and informal 
Agricultural 
and pastoral 
Income 
bracket share 
of total hhs 
0-89 1% 5% 0% 95% 13% 
90-189 1% 23% 0% 76% 26% 
190-389 8% 13% 6% 72% 31% 
390-579 22% 12% 2% 64% 15% 
580-990 35% 16% 5% 44% 10% 
990+ 37% 29% 12% 22% 6% 
TOP 10% 36% 23% 9% 32% 10% 
 
(1) Small holders comprised 55% of total households. The income distribution in the small 
holder sector is drawn from the Integrated Rural Survey from 1974/75.461 Smith (1978) 
calculated an income distribution based on this survey which presents number of ‘adult 
equivalents’ by income group (in KSh per annum). Adult equivalents were calculated by giving 
all adults aged 15 and above a weight of 1, and all children below 15 a weight of  0.5. For the 
purposes of this paper the distribution was recalculated into monthly KSh. per household, 
assuming an average household size of 6.7 (based on IRS 1974/75), and presuming that 50% 
of household members were below the age of 15 (based on 1969 census). Furthermore, as 
remittances were included as a form of income, the income cut-offs were lowered on the basis 
of the average remittance share of income. Lastly, the IRS also included a significant share of 
households in the top brackets that were headed by formal sector employees; of households in 
the top income bracket for instance, 27% of that income was earned from regular or casual 
employment. I therefore adjust the number of households downwards to account for those 
whose main form of income was from paid employment, thus avoiding double counting as 
these households will also be captured by the enumeration of employees. 
Note that in contrast to the assumptions made by Crawford and Thorbecke (1978), the so-called 
intermediate or gap farms with holdings of between 20-50 acres (8-20 hectare) are assumed to 
be captured by the small holder survey, as the total estimated holdings of 8 hectare and above 
roughly match the number reported in the 1979 intermediate farm survey.  
(2) Kenyan authorities defined farms of over 50 acres as large farms. These were land holdings 
in the former scheduled areas, and there were roughly 3,000 such farms in 1975.462 I assume 
that all 3,000 large farm households had incomes that placed them in the top income decile.  
(3) Formal sector employee households are calculated from the 1975 Enumeration of 
Employees Survey.463 This survey reports the number of employees by wage group. The female 
share of each wage group is subtracted from the total to give the number of male employees by 
wage bracket, to avoid double counting. I then assume that each male employee is the head of 
one household and his earnings are the household’s sole source of income. This is a problematic 
                                                   
461 Kenya. Central Bureau of Statistics., “Integrated Rural Survey 1974/75: Basic Report” (Nairobi, 
1977). 
462 KE SA 1980, Table 84. 
463 KE SA 1976, Table 255 & 257. 
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assumption, as many households headed by employees in formal employment had other 
sources of income that would have raised their overall household income. Thus the formal 
sector shares in the top income brackets are likely to be under-estimated. As the wage brackets 
do not overlap perfectly with the income group brackets given by the IRS, I assume a linear 
distribution of employees within each bracket. Experimenting with alternative in-bracket 
distributions suggests that this simplification makes little difference to the overall results.  
 (4) Data on self-employed, high income households is taken from the income tax department 
annual report for 1974.464 It assumes that each tax unit is a household, and the reported taxable 
income their total household earnings for that year. 
(5) Informal sector workers in the urban areas are estimated based on the 1975 informal sector 
survey (republished in Crawford and Thorbecke, Appendix B). This survey gives average 
earnings by industrial sub-group. These workers are assigned to income brackets on the basis 
of the average earnings in their respective industrial sub-group. I assume the same male share 
of workers as in the formal sector (85%) and thus subtract 15% from each bracket. 
(6) The number of pastoral households is taken from Collier and Lal, 1980. They are assumed 
to be distributed evenly in the bottom four brackets. This is an arbitrary decision, but as they 
are unlikely to be found in the top decile or percentile, this is unlikely to affect the reported 
results. 
(7) The missing rural households (presumed to be squatters or landless households) are 
calculated as a residual (based on the total population size) and distributed evenly in the bottom 
four brackets. This is an arbitrary decision, but as they are unlikely to be found in the top decile 
or percentile, this is unlikely to affect main the reported results.  
The top 10% is calculated from the top two brackets, weighting the top bracket by 0.6 and the 
second by 0.4, thus capturing the top 10% of the distribution. 
The top 1% estimate for 1975 is calculated solely from the income tax department annual report 
and enumeration of employees, assuming that all those with incomes that put them in the top 
1% would pay taxes and making adjustments for women. 
Appendix Table V.3. Composition of top 1% of households 
 Public  Private  Self-employed TOTAL 
Source EES EES Income tax statistics report  
# hhs earning 
>KSh.3000 / 
month 7 11 7 25 
Share of total 29% 46% 25% 100% 
 
  
                                                   
464 KE TAX 1974 
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The 1994 and 2005/06 household surveys 
Appendix Table V.4. Details of Kenyan surveys used in analysis 
 Welfare Monitoring Survey 2, 
1994* 
Kenya Integrated Household 
Budget Survey 2005-2006 
Coverage National National 
Sample size (households) 11,279 13,430 
Sampling frame National Sample Surveys and 
Evaluation Programme (NASSEP 
III) sample frame, based on the 
1989 Population and Housing 
Census 
NASSEP IV sampling frame, 
based on the 1999 Population 
and Housing Census 
Sampling Three-stage sampling technique, 
sampling by enumeration area, 
cluster and household, for a total 
of 1,377 clusters and 11,279 
households. Sampling was 
stratified by district and 
urban/rural status.   
It covered 1,343 clusters, 
selected randomly on a district 
basis, and 13,430 households 
(10 selected randomly per 
cluster), stratified by district and 
urban/rural status. 
Data collection time 
period 
Started June 1994 May 2005 - May 2006 
Data collection  Face to face interviews Face to face interviews. 
Households kept diaries to 
record goods and services 
purchased and consumed by the 
household 
Produced by Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics, with technical and 
financial support from the World 
Bank 
Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics Funded by: 
Government of Kenya, DFID, 
USAID and General Data 
Dissemination System (GDDS) 
 
*Note: the 1994 WMS was part of a series of three Welfare Monitoring Surveys (1992, 1994 
and 1997). The 1994 survey was chosen for use in this paper because the quality of the survey 
was superior to that of 1992,465 and because it contained more detailed employment and 
earnings data than the 1997 survey. 
Construction of main variables 
Public sector-headed households: designated household head reports working in the public 
sector. 
▪ 1994 WMS: Based on variables mainoccu & empsecto, excluding 
observations where respondents report zero income from public sector 
employment and removing those who worked less than 9 months of the 
preceding year (unless they were recent hires). 
▪ 2005/06 KIHBS: Based on sector of employment, variable e17, excluding 
those not reporting any wage income. 
A point to note is that the in contrast to the EES the household surveys do not explicitly exclude 
the military, although they tend to be limited to private households and thus exclude army 
                                                   
465 World Bank, “Kenya Poverty Assessment” (Washington D.C., 1995)., Annex 1. 
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barracks. However, the military was only 8% of total public sector employment and their 
inclusion thus make only minor difference to the final results. 
Main economic activity of household head:  
▪ 1994 WMS: Based on variable empsecto 
▪ 2005/06 KIHBS: Based on economic activity, variable e03. Paid employees 
were subsequently divided into public, private and informal sector on the 
basis of sector of employment (e17). In order to reduce the other category 
(where household head reports being retired, looking for job or gave no 
information), all households in this category which reported agricultural 
income or business incomes of 50% or more of household expenditure were 
re-categorized to the agricultural or business/informal sectors. 
Total household consumption:  
▪ 1994 WMS: Based on variable hh_expen (total household expenditure). 
Includes auto-consumption, but does not impute rent. 
▪ 2005/06 KIHBS: Based on variable hhtexp.  
It should be noted that I do not control for differences in cost of living in different localities. 
While price differences will significantly influence measures of poverty it should have less on 
an impact at the top of the distribution where a larger proportion of consumption is on goods 
and services marketed nationally. 
Asset wealth (index constructed based on following variables) 
• 1994 WMS: Electricity in home, piped water, flush toilet, cooking fuel (gas or 
electricity); flooring (whether tiles, wood or cement), modern walls and roof to 
home. 
• 2005/06 IHBS: Electricity in home, piped water, flush toilet, cooking fuel (gas or 
electricity); flooring (whether tiles, wood or cement), car, TV, refrigerator, computer. 
• 2009 CENSUS: Electricity in home, piped water, flush toilet, cooking fuel (gas or 
electricity); flooring (whether tiles, wood or cement), car, TV, refrigerator, computer. 
Data Quality Discussion 
▪ Do the Kenyan household surveys underestimate the wealthy? 
Household surveys tend to underestimate the number of high income earners, both because 
they are few in number and because wealthier households often decline to partake in surveys. 
466 This may bias the results if we are missing a large share of the top of the distribution and if 
this top has different economic characteristics to those just below them in the distribution (for 
instance, if no household in the top 3% of the distribution agreed to be interviewed, and public 
servants comprised the majority of these respondents, then their exclusion would bias our 
public sector share decile results downwards). By comparing the household survey population 
estimates, stratified by characteristics associated with wealth, with census results, we can 
estimate the likely order of magnitude of this under-reporting. As all households are by law 
                                                   
466 Atkinson, Inequality: What Can Be Done? 
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required to partake in censuses, and as the census questions do not contain questions on income, 
they should provide a reasonably accurate coverage of the entire population, including the elite. 
One such wealth proxy is educational attainment. Appendix Table V.5 compares the Kenyan 
population disaggregated by broad educational attainment level for each of the household 
surveys along with the 1989, 1999 and 2009 census results. It suggests a plausible growth in 
the level of educational attainment over time, with the secondary and tertiary stock growing 
considerably, the primary educated population growing until 2005/06 and then remaining 
constant, and the number of people without any education remaining roughly constant, (growth 
shown in Appendix Figure V.1, where all trends are indexed to 100 in 1989). The 1994 WMS 
measure of people with university degrees looks too high for the overall trend, and is likely 
explained by the inclusion of people in the university category who have some university 
education rather than a completed university degree. Presuming a strong correlation between 
income and education, it does not appear that under-enumeration has made a significant dent 
on the top 10% of the distribution. Given that university graduates are only around 1% of the 
population, and likely concentrated in the top income brackets, the fact that their number is not 
significantly underestimated suggests that the under-enumerated top of the distribution is likely 
to be quite small.  
Appendix Table V.5. Kenya: number of people by educational attainment, household surveys and 
censuses compared 
 Level of education 
completed (respondents 
>=10 years old) 1989 1994 1999 2005/06 2009 
 
CENSUS 
1989 
WMS 
1994 
CENSUS 
1999 
IHBS 
2005/06 
CENSUS 
2009 
None / pre-primary 4,065,300 3,727,437 3,818,800 3,530,151 4,321,240 
Standard 1-8 7,594,460 9,844,807 11,900,920 15,069,541 14,831,710 
Form 1-6 2,282,720 3,421,677 4,026,200 5,858,245 6,882,970 
Trade tests / polytechnics 0 94,923 0   109,660 
University completed 55,520 139,684 142,980 207,066 326,210 
Other / not stated 67,720 236,637 0 102,357 443,190 
Total 
   
14,065,720  
  
17,465,165  19,888,900  24,767,360  26,914,980  
 
Appendix Figure V.1. Kenya: Growth in stock of people by level of education, household surveys and 
censuses compared (indexed, 1989=100%) 
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Another way to examine whether the top of the income distribution is under-represented is to 
compare assets or household characteristics associated with wealth. The results below show 
the percentage of households reporting household characteristics associated with income: 
whether the household has a flush toilet, access to electricity, and whether it uses gas as cooking 
fuel (as opposed to paraffin, wood etc.). The electricity series suggests a relatively even and 
plausible growth trajectory. The flush toilet measure shows both the 1994 and 2005/6 surveys 
to have shares below the census trends, and the measure of cooking gas similarly shows a very 
low level for 1994. These results suggest that there may be some under-representation of the 
elite but the missing share is likely quite small. 
Appendix Table V.6. Percentage of population with elite characteristics, household survey and censuses 
compared 
Household characteristics (% 
of households) 
1989 
CENSUS 
1994 
WMS 
1999 
CENSUS 
2005/06 
IHBS 
2009 
CENSUS 
Toilet (flush/WC) (in dwelling) 9.7% 8.9% 10.0% 8.4%   
Electricity 8.9% 10.2% 13.8% 18.3% 22.2% 
Gas as main cooking fuel 2.7% 1.5% 2.4% 3.6% 4.9% 
 
▪ The public sector sample: reliability of reported level of employment and income 
I also examine how well these surveys capture public sector workers compared to the Kenyan 
administrative and census data, as a possible under-enumeration of public sector employees 
could bias the results.  As discussed in Appendix II, household surveys and censuses tend to 
over-estimate public sector employees compared to the administrative data. The 2005/06 
survey is very close to the administrative data (it also has the most detailed questions about 
sector of employment), while the 1994 WMS and 2009 census significantly overestimate the 
size of the public service, even after excluding inconsistent entries.  
A few percentage of this overestimation may be due to the inclusion of the military in the 
household surveys (even if barracks were not enumerated). Another possible explanation for 
this inconsistency is a looser definition of public sector employee in the household surveys, 
and possibly also a failure of the central government to properly account for all staff in its 
administrative records. Keep in mind that the EES captures data from employers while the 
household surveys interview employees.  The question in the household survey is generally 
phrased “who does [RESPONDENT] work for?” One likely difference is that when posed the 
question, people who are not formally on the government payroll (contractors, consultants, 
short-term casual labourers), will also identify with a public sector employer, while the 
government’s administrative data uses a more stringent definition based on contract type.  
Appendix Table V.7. Number of public sector employees, comparing household survey estimates with 
administrative data 
# of public sector 
employees ‘000 
1994 
 
2005/06 
 
2009 
 
EES  688 650 612 
Household survey/census 880 647 726 
Difference 28% 0% 19% 
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Average earnings are reported as lower in the 1994 WMS, at Shs.4,111/month467 compared to 
Shs.4,607/month according to the EES (11% lower), which supports the hypothesis that the 
WMS is capturing more low-skilled and poorly remunerated casual workers, few of whom 
would be in the top consumption decile or percentile anyhow. Moreover, an overestimation of 
the public sector share works against the argument in this paper that the public sector share of 
the elite fell over time. 
For 2005/06 we have the opposite and potentially more serious bias, as a possible under-
enumeration of public sector employees could be accounting for some of the observed decline 
in public employment share between 1994 and 2005/06. The table below compares the 2005/06 
IHBS survey results disaggregated by broad public sector division with the EES for 2005, and 
finds the estimates to be relatively consistent on both an aggregate and disaggregated basis. 
Appendix Table V.8. Kenya: Estimates of public sector employees by branch of government, EES 2005 
vs. KHBS 2005/6 
 
Number of employees Average earnings 
Standard 
deviation 
 
EES  
2005 
IHBS 
2005/06 
EES  
2005 
IHBS 
2005/06 
IHBS 
2005/06 
Central government 189,500 223,526      17,432       17,764  15,460  
Local government 87,600 85,948  15,608      16,178  27,538  
Teachers service commission 232,800 208,465      20,407       19,636  10,931  
Majority-owned public companies 46,900 45,254      48,897       29,861  37,558  
Parastatals/SOEs 97,500 83,399      37,015       21,343  36,868  
Total 654,300 646,592    
 
Appendix Figure V.2 compares the wage distribution in the two datasets. It shows a reasonably 
consistent, if not perfect fit. If anything, it appears that the EES data rather than the household 
survey data, underestimates the right-hand tail.  
Appendix Figure V.2. Kenya: public sector wage distribution, EES 2005 vs. KHBS 2005/06 
 
                                                   
467 Because the earnings data is collected so as to facilitate annual earnings, this estimate is based only 
on monthly earners and those daily and weekly earners who report working for the entire year. 
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Lastly, in Appendix Table V.9 I compare the public sector sample by educational attainment 
to the 2009 population and housing census - the only one of Kenya’s recent censuses to provide 
data on sector of employment. Note that the EES does not provide a disaggregation of 
employment by educational attainment and therefore our only anchor is the 2009 census. The 
1997 WMS is also added to give one further year of observation.  
As already suggested, the 1994 survey appears to be over-estimating the number of unskilled 
and primary educated public sector employees, as shown by the rapid fall in these categories 
between the 1994 and 1997 WMS. In the higher educational categories (secondary and 
tertiary), the 1994 estimations look more plausible. 
Of greater worry is the underestimation of university graduates in the 2005/06 sample 
compared to 1997 and 2009. While the number of university graduates was rising rapidly over 
this time, the discrepancy within the public sector sample is larger than that for the labour force 
as a whole, which suggests that a disproportionate share of the most highly educated and thus 
highly paid civil servants were excluded from the sample. The biggest discrepancy are in 
Nairobi and the Central province, which are also the areas which are comparatively under-
sampled (weights are considerably higher for these two provinces). This may bias our estimates 
of the public sector share of the top decile downwards.  
By estimating the number of missing entries of university educated public sector employees 
we can provide some rough parameters for the possible size of the bias that this may be 
imposing on the results reported in Table 3.10. Between 1999 and 2009 the stock of university 
graduates grew by roughly 6% per year; assuming a similar rate of growth in the number of 
public servants with university education puts the corrected 2005/06 number at 75,000 instead 
of 45,000, i.e. 30,000 more. Assuming that all of these graduates are household heads and that 
all have incomes that place them in the top decile (a generous assumption), raises the public 
sector-headed household share of the top decile from 17% to 20%.  While not insignificant, 
this does not change the broader trend; even with such a correction the 2005/06 public sector 
middle class share still represents a considerable decline compared to 1994 (30%).  
Appendix Table V.9. Kenya: Number of public sector employees by educational attainment, different 
surveys 
Age above 25 
1994 
WMS 
1997 
WMS 
2005/06 
IHBS 
2009 
CENSUS 
None / pre-primary 45,064 20,595 23,661 14,020 
Standard 1-8 231,753 134,152 100,251 78,430 
Form 1-6 and college 541,812 466,076 472,926 446,680 
University 45,593 52,302 45,561 94,740 
Other 53,668 41,242 24,842 8,010 
TOTAL 917,890 714,367 667,241 641,880 
Percentage terms     
None / pre-primary 5% 3% 4% 2% 
Standard 1-8 25% 19% 15% 12% 
Form 1-6 and college 59% 68% 71% 70% 
University 5% 7% 7% 15% 
Other 6% 6% 4% 1% 
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V.II. Tanzanian data sources 
The 1969 distribution 
The 1969 estimate was derived by comparing the 1969 national income distribution (on a cash 
basis) with the salaries of public and formal private sector employees (TZ EES 1969, Table 
26). As in the Kenyan analysis, this comparison rests on the assumption that gross public sector 
cash earnings are a good approximation of the total income of public sector-headed households. 
This will underestimate earnings somewhat, as the 1969 survey results showed that employees 
in the services industry (primarily government) earned on average 82% of household cash 
earnings from wages and salaries and the other 18% from a variety of sources (crops, trade and 
business).  
Possibly biasing the public sector share upward instead however, is that the income data in the 
national distribution table excluded production for own-consumption and therefore 
underestimates the incomes of rural households. This should have less of an impact on incomes 
among the top 10% and top 1%, as own-production of food is presumably a fairly small share 
of total consumption at these income levels. 
Appendix Table V.10. Employment by wage group, reproduced from TZ EES 1969  
TSh./annum TSh./month 
All employees 
(adult male) 
Government 
(adult male) 
Parastatal 
(adult male) 
Public (total) 
(adult male) 
Private sector 
(adult male) 
<1200 <100 11,987  1,457  387               1,844        10,143  
1200 - 1499 100-124 24,091  11,947  1,063             13,010        11,081  
1500 - 1800 125-149 28,041  10,000  3,614             13,614        14,427  
1800 - 2400 150 - 199 68,767  33,450  8,359             41,809        26,958  
2400 - 3600 200-299 50,402  21,990  10,212             32,202        18,200  
3600 - 4800 300-399 26,411  13,212  5,633             18,845           7,566  
4800 - 6000 400-499 10,583  5,033  1,488               6,521           4,062  
6000 - 9000 500-749 17,900  9,048  2,261             11,309           6,591  
9000 - 12000 750-999 5,642  2,570  1,278               3,848           1,794  
>12000 >1000 9,607  4,082  2,070               6,152           3,455  
 Total 253,431  112,789  36,365           149,154      104,277  
Note: shaded cells denotes income thresholds common to both the EES and the household survey 
Appendix Table V.11. Tanzania 1969: Estimated public sector share by household income bracket, EES 
(grey), total households from 1969 household income survey 
TSh. /year 
% 
of 
hhs 
Total 
hhs 
General 
govt 
Para-
statal 
sector 
Public 
sector 
(total) 
Private 
sector  
Govt 
empl. 
% of 
income 
group 
Parastatal 
emp. % of 
income 
group 
Public 
sector 
% of 
income 
group 
Private 
sector 
% of 
income 
group 
0-1499 78% 2,184,000  13,404  1,450  14,854  21,224  1% 0% 1% 1% 
1500-3599 16% 448,000  65,440  22,185  87,625  59,585  15% 5% 20% 13% 
3600-5999 4% 112,000  18,245  7,121  25,366  11,628  16% 6% 23% 10% 
6000-11999 1% 41,720  11,618  3,539  15,157  8,385  28% 8% 36% 20% 
>12000 1% 14,560  4,082  2,070   6,152  3,455  28% 14% 42% 24% 
Total   2,800,280  112,789  36,365  149,154  104,277          
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Tanzania household surveys, 1993, 2000/01 and 20111/2 
Appendix Table V.12. Details of Tanzanian surveys used in analysis 
 1993 Human Resource 
Development Survey 
2000/01 National 
Household Budget 
Survey 
2011/12 National 
Household Budget 
Survey 
Coverage National, including 
Zanzibar (excl. for this 
analysis) 
Mainland Tanzania Mainland Tanzania 
Sample size 
(households) 
4,953 22,178 10,186 
Sampling frame National Master Sample 
frame 
National Master 
Sample frame, based 
on 1988 census 
National Master 
Sample frame, based 
on 2002 census 
Sampling Drew from all of the 
222 clusters of the 
National Master Sample 
frame, although two had 
to be excluded due to 
inaccessibility. 
two-stage sampling 
on the basis of the 
National Master 
Sample; 1,161 
primary sampling 
units were selected 
(621 urban and 540 
rural), and within 
these, 24 households 
from each PSU 
Households drawn 
from 400 clusters (120 
from Dar es Salaam, 
120 from other urban 
areas, and 160 from 
rural areas). 
Response rate  Not known. The replacement rate 
(where the originally 
selected households 
could not be located 
or contacted) was 
relatively high, at 
12%. 
The response rate (for 
originally selected 
households) was 94% 
(out of a planned 
sample of 10,400), 
and a further 398 
replacement 
households were 
added to increase the 
sample size to 
10,186468 
Data collection time 
period 
Sept-Oct 1993 May 2000 – June 
2001 
October 2011 and 
October 2012 
Data collection  Not known. Each household was 
visited regularly 
throughout a month, 
to assemble monthly 
data on household 
expenditures (two 
households a month in 
each PSU). 
Expenditure and 
consumption was 
tracked over a 28 day 
period, with each 
household member 
above the age of 5 
given a diary to record 
purchases and 
consumption. 
Produced by University of Dar es 
Salaam with support 
from British Overseas 
Development 
Administration, the 
Government of Japan 
and the World Bank 
National Bureau of 
Statistics 
National Bureau of 
Statistics 
 
                                                   
468 Tanzania, “Household Budget Survey Main Report, 2011/12” (Dar es Salaam, 2014). 
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Construction of variables 
Public sector-headed households: designated household head reports working in the public 
sector. 
▪ 1993 HRDS: Based on economic activity, variable i24, but excluding 
households that do not report public sector income as a most important or 
second most important household income. This additional exclusion criteria 
was added because the HRDS appears to be capturing a lot of part-time and 
casual public sector employees compared to other contemporary sources. 
However, this added exclusion criteria only accounts for 2-3% of households 
in the top 10%. 
▪ 2000/01 HBS: Based on main activity, variable s2q08a. Those who reported 
zero employment income were excluded. 
▪ 2011/12 HBS: Based on main economic activity, variable S12Q20. 
Inconsistent entries were removed (roughly 5% of entries); those that 
reported a public sector employer but not paid employment as an activity, nor 
any income from this employer. 
A point to note is that the in contrast to the EES the household surveys do not explicitly exclude 
the military, although they tend to be limited to private households and thus exclude army 
barracks.  
Main economic activity of household head:  
▪ 1993 HRDS: Based on economic activity, variable i24. Those who reported 
public sector employment but did not report income from this source have 
been recoded on the basis of their main reported source of income. 
▪ 2000/01 HBS: Based on main activity, variable s2q08a. 
▪ 2011/12 HBS: Calculated based on S12Q9, S12Q10A and S12Q20. 
Total household consumption/expenditure:  
▪ 1993 HRDS: Variable constructed based on data on reported weekly, 
monthly and annual data on expenditure. Dataset contained no aggregate 
variables so these were constructed (multiplying weekly exp with 52 and 
monthly with 12). Includes in-kind (barter) trade but excludes consumption 
of own-production. 
▪ 2000/01 HBS: Based on exp_adeq. 
▪ 2011/12 HBS: Based on totc. Includes consumption of own-production. 
Unlike other surveys it also includes imputed rent.  
As in the Kenyan case, I do not control for differences in cost of living in different localities. 
While price differences will significantly influence measures of poverty it should have less on 
an impact at the top of the distribution where a larger proportion of consumption is on goods 
and services marketed nationally. 
Asset wealth (index constructed based on following variables) 
▪ 1993 HRDS: Electricity in home, piped water, flush toilet, cooking fuel (gas 
or electricity); flooring (whether tiles, wood or cement), TV, refrigerator, 
bank account. 
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▪ 2000/01 HBS: Electricity in home, flush toilet, cooking fuel (gas or 
electricity); flooring (whether tiles, wood or cement), car, TV, refrigerator, 
bank account. 
▪ 2011/12 HBS: Electricity in home, flush toilet, cooking fuel (gas or 
electricity); flooring (whether tiles, wood or cement), car, TV, refrigerator, 
air conditioning. 
Data quality discussion 
▪ Do the Tanzanian household surveys underestimate the wealthy? 
As discussed in the case of Kenya, household surveys tend to underestimate the number of high 
income earners, which could downward bias the public sector measures of the top 10% and 
1%, if public sector employees make up a disproportionate share of the under-sampled strata.  
In Appendix Table V.13 the population (above age 10) is disaggregated by educational 
attainment across our household survey samples and the national censuses (which act as 
anchors). While some of the inconsistencies across years are due to differences in classification 
(as the surveys provide inconsistent classifications for qualifications such as diplomas, post-
secondary certificates etc.), there are some signs of under-reporting, particularly amongst 
university graduates. The 1993 HRDS did not capture a single respondent with a university 
degree (although with only 0.3% of household heads holding such a degree and a sample size 
of 5,000 households, this is not entirely implausible). The 2000/01 and 2011/12 household 
surveys also estimate a lower share of university graduates than the corresponding censuses, 
which provides further indication of under-reporting. In all cases, however, the household 
surveys over-estimate the post-secondary category compared to the census, which may also 
suggest some classification inconsistencies. Either way, the extremely low share of university 
graduates and diploma/certificate holders suggests that this bias will be fairly small. Treating 
the full discrepancy in university graduates between the 2002 census and 2000/01 household 
survey as missing entries would only add 0.3% to the total number of respondents, while 
assuming that the university graduate discrepancy between the 2011/12 household survey and 
2012 census are the missing elite would add around 0.75%. The effect on our measures of the 
top 10% would thus be marginal, although this suggests the need to treat the top 1% estimates 
with caution. 
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Appendix Table V.13. Tanzania: population estimates by highest level of education achieved (aged 10 
and above), household surveys and censuses compared 
Educational attainment 
1988 
CENSUS 
1993 
HRDS 
2000/01 
HBS 
2002 
CENSUS 
2011/2 
HBS* 
2012 
CENSUS* 
None or some primary 10,187,140 9,098,559 12,004,522 12,453,990 3,057,718 682,855 
Primary (St.7 and above) 4,811,062 6,612,419 8,930,758 8,924,994 8,930,758 11,230,000 
Secondary (Form IV and 
above) 261,682 507,327 699,634 850,823 1,713,794 1,745,016 
Post-secondary (incl. 
diploma courses) 68,379 87,359 96,192 72,878 249,155 114,922 
University 21,634  32,759 117,588 146,197 324,000 
Other / unknown 25,567 514,236  2 12,088,245  
Total 15,375,464 16,819,900 21,763,865 22,420,275 26,185,867 14,096,793 
In percentage terms 
None or some primary 66% 54% 55% 56% 12%  
Primary (St.7 and above) 31% 39% 41% 40% 34%  
Secondary (Form IV and 
above) 2% 3% 3% 4% 7%  
Post-secondary (incl. 
diploma courses) 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 1.0%  
University 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.6%  
Other / unknown 0.2% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 46%  
*Note: only provides data on respondents who have completed their studies; for post-secondary 
graduates this should not provide any major bias, but means the ‘none’ and ‘primary’ categories are 
significantly smaller than in other years. 
ercentile may be less accurate. 
Appendix Table V.14 repeats this exercise using household characteristics indicative of wealth. 
It compares the share of households reporting high status household characteristics across the 
household surveys and censuses. While there are some inconsistencies that are likely due to 
data quality problems (it is unlikely that electricity access fell between 1993 and 2002 for 
instance), on the whole the trends are reasonably accurate. The household surveys 
underestimate the share of households with flush toilets marginally, while overestimating 
access to electricity. On the whole the margin of error is in the order of 1-2%. While not 
conclusive, this does suggest that we are capturing a broadly representative share of the top 
decile, although our measures of the top percentile may be less accurate. 
Appendix Table V.14. Tanzania: indicators of household wealth, household surveys and censuses 
compared 
Assets/characteristics, % 
households 
1988 
census 
1993 
HRDS 
2000/01 
HBS 
2002 
census 
2011/12 
HBS 
2012 
census 
Flush toilet 4% 2% 2% 3% 8% 13% 
Electricity 6% 11% 10% 9% 18% 21% 
‘Modern' cooking fuel 
(electricity, gas or kerosene)   3% 6% 5% 4% 5% 
 
▪ The public sector sample: reliability of estimated level of public employment 
Unlike for Kenya, we lack a consistent and reliable source of administrative data against which 
to compare the household survey public sector estimates. Comparing the general government 
estimates from the three surveys against the payroll estimates (see Appendix II) shows a 
reasonably consistent overestimation of ~30%. Given that the payroll is an incomplete measure 
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(excludes casual workers, autonomous agencies and some other categories of staff), the 
household surveys results seem reasonably accurate.   
Appendix Table V.15. Number of public sector employees estimated in surveys compared to payroll 
# of public sector employees, 
‘000 
1993 2000/01 2011/12 
Household surveys – public 
employment 
597 433 507 
Household surveys – 
government employment 
479 325 442 
Payroll  355 257 ~340* 
Difference 35% 26% 30% 
*Estimate 
None of the Tanzanian censuses include a sectoral disaggregation of employment, which 
prevents the kind of comparison of educational attainment across the public sector samples 
carried out for Kenya. However, some of the census industrial classifications are public sector-
oriented, and thus provide a partial way of comparing the datasets. In Appendix Table V.16 I 
compare the educational attainment of all employees in the educational sector (of which 
roughly 80% work in the public sector), between the 2011/12 household survey and 2012 
census. While the overall employment estimates are relatively similar across datasets, the 
census estimates a higher share of university graduates and a lower share of diploma or 
certificate-course completers. This is likely a classification problem, with some diploma 
holders classified as university-educated in the census; in sum these two educational categories 
give reasonably consistent estimates across datasets. However, even if we attribute the 
university deficit in the 2011/12 survey to poor enumeration of the wealthy, this omission is a 
relatively small number compared to the number of households in the top 10%. 
Appendix Table V.16. Educational attainment of employees in the educational sector, 2011/12 
Educational attainment 2011/12 HBS 2012 CENSUS 
None or some primary 2,008 14,569 
Primary (St.7 and above) 44,876 47,347 
Secondary (Form IV and above) 147,018 116,665 
Post-secondary (incl. diploma courses) 64,111 30,536 
University 25,784 53,032 
Other / unknown 
  
Total 283,797 262,149 
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V.III. Ugandan data sources 
Ugandan household surveys, 1992 and 2006  
Appendix Table V.17. Details of Ugandan surveys used in analysis 
 1992-93 Integrated Household 
Survey 
2005-06 National Household 
Survey 
Coverage National (all districts) National 
Sample size 
(households) 
9,924 7,426 
Sampling frame Enumeration Area frame Uganda Population and Housing 
Census Frame for 2002 
Sampling Stratified two-stage sampling 
design except in some districts 
where the sample was selected in 
three stages due to lack of an 
Enumeration Area (EA) frame. 
EA frame based on 1991 census. 
Two-stage sampling design; (1) 
Enumeration Areas (EAs) drawn 
with Probability Proportional to 
Size; (2) households drawn using 
Simple Random Sampling. 
Data collection time 
period 
March 1992 – March 1993 2005-06 
Data collection  Two stage collection (to avoid 
seasonality patterns in 
consumption/income data) 
No known. 
Produced by Statistics Department of the 
Ministry of Planning and 
Economic Development, with 
support from United Nations 
Development Programme and the 
World Bank. 
Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
(UBOS), Economic Policy 
Research Centre (Makerere 
University), Population Secretariat 
(Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development), World 
Bank 
 
Construction of variables 
Public sector-headed households: designated household head reports working in the public 
sector (government or parastatal). 
▪ 1992 IHS: Based on main economic activity in last 30 days, variable s6bq2a. 
▪ 2006 NHS: Main employment status in last 7 days, variable h7bq2. 
Note that these surveys also include a separate variable giving economic activity in the past 12 
months. Using this variable instead would raise the public sector employment estimates by 
roughly 10%. 
Main economic activity of household head:  
▪ 1992 IHS: Based on main economic activity in last 30 days, variable s6bq2a 
in combination with industry variable s6bq2b, used to separate out 
agricultural from non-agricultural self-employed. 
▪ 2006 NHS: Based on employment status, variables hh7q2-4 and h7bq2 (for 
detailed disaggregation of wage employees). Additional variables hh7q5-9 
used to disaggregate those not in employment.  
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Total household consumption/expenditure:  
▪ 1992 IHS: Based on total monthly expenditure, measure constructed by 
producers of the dataset (xtot) divided by adults (15 and above) in household. 
▪  2006 NHS: Based on variable ‘welfare’, measure constructed by producers 
of the dataset (consumption per adult equivalent in real terms). Converted 
from a per adult equivalent measure to an adult-only basis.  
Asset wealth (index constructed based on following variables) 
• 1992 HIS: Electricity in home, piped water in home, flush toilet, cooking fuel (gas or 
electricity); flooring (whether tiles, wood or cement), phone, radio, car, TV, camera, 
electric iron. 
• 2006 NHS: Electricity in home, piped water in home, flush toilet, cooking fuel (gas 
or electricity); flooring (whether tiles, wood or cement), mobile phone, car, 
household appliances, other electronic equipment. 
Data quality discussion 
▪ Do the Ugandan household surveys underestimate the wealthy? 
Following the method used in the Kenyan and Tanzanian cases above, Appendix Table V.18 
compares educational attainment of respondents in the household budget surveys against the 
census results. The primary and secondary estimates are reasonably consistent across the 1992 
IHS and 1991 census, but the university educated respondents are 25% lower in the latter of 
the samples (~10,000), suggesting a slight under-sampling of the elite. However, these 
‘missing’ university-educated respondents would account for less than 0.3% of households. 
They thus make very little impact on the top decile measures, but may skew the top percentile 
measure somewhat.   
Appendix Table V.18. Uganda: population estimates by highest level of education achieved (aged 10 
and above), household surveys and censuses compared 
 1991 census 1992 IHS 2002 census 2005/06 HBS 
None or some primary 8,587,745 9,025,808 11,686,730 11,522,577 
primary 1,732,616 1,814,201 3,269,150 4,823,500 
secondary 561,900 589,089 977,710 1,219,530 
postsecondary    358,830 358,103 
university 31,860 23,792 132,610 213,081 
Unknown 45,136     1,988,651 
 Total 10,959,257 11,452,890 16,425,030 20,125,442 
 
▪ The public sector sample: reliability of estimated level of public employment 
Appendix Table V.19 compares the 1992 and 2005/06 survey estimates of the total size of the 
public service against the administrative data on Uganda’s civil service. For 2005/06 it is not 
possible to disaggregate general government employment from the full public sector. With 
these results suggest that the 2005/06 survey estimates are reasonably consistent with the 
administrative data while the 1992 estimates are high. 
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Unfortunately there is no census data or administrative data against which to benchmark the 
educational attainment of public sector employees in the two household survey samples. 
Appendix Table V.20 compares the two datasets and shows a sharp rise in the share of tertiary 
educated public sector employees between 1992 and 2005/06 and a big absolute drop in 
employees with primary education or less. This is consistent with the descriptions of Uganda’s 
civil sector reform programme over this period, which rationalised the casual ‘group 
employees’ in particular. This also helps to explain why there is no decline in the public sector 
share of the top 10% over this period; not only were salaries rebounding but the educational 
attainment of the public service was increasing rapidly. 
Appendix Table V.19. Number of public sector employees, comparing household survey estimates with 
administrative data 
# of government employees 
‘000 
1992 2005/06 
Household survey/census 306 299 (incl. parastatals) 
Administrative data (civil 
service) 
213 (1993) 239 
Difference 43% 25% 
 
Appendix Table V.20. Public sector employees by educational attainment, 1992 and 2005/06 
  1992 HIS % 2005/06 HBS % 
None or some primary 72,586 21% 27,133 9% 
primary 119,240 35% 105,822 35% 
secondary 69,045 20% 35,499 12% 
postsecondary 66,432 20% 93,553 31% 
university 13,174 4% 44,217 14% 
  340,477   306,224  
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Appendix VI. Additional regression tables for    
Chapter 4 
 
Appendix Table VI.1. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: Regression results with educational attainment 
in district/region of birth 
  (K.3) (K.4) (T.3) (T.4) (U.3) (U.4) 
VARIABLES pubemp pubemp pubemp pubemp pubemp pubemp 
Age controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Gender controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Education controls NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Average years of 
schooling in 
district/region of birth 
0.127*** -0.111*** 0.541*** 0.0812*** 0.0585*** -0.200*** 
(0.00241) (0.00289) (0.0100) (0.0118) (0.00474) (0.00533) 
Constant -7.287*** -5.544*** -10.05*** -7.064*** -3.904*** -2.773*** 
  (0.0999) (0.134) (0.176) (0.271) (0.131) (0.159) 
Observations 909,186 909,186 870,772 870,772 431,560 431,560 
Pseudo R2 0.0263 0.2351 0.0363 0.2788 0.0127 0.2842 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table VI.2. Kenya: regression tables including ethnic group dummies 
  (K.E.1) (K.E.2) (K.E.3) 
VARIABLES pubemp pubemp pubemp 
Age & age#age NO YES YES 
Sex NO YES YES 
Education NO YES YES 
Development index (district of birth)     -0.0128*** 
      (0.000454) 
Ethnicity (base = Kikuyu)    
Luhya -0.0909*** 0.301*** 0.131*** 
 
(0.0147) (0.0160) (0.0436) 
Kalenjin 0.146*** 0.586*** 0.644*** 
 
(0.0151) (0.0167) (0.0387) 
Luo 0.0313* 0.434*** 0.967*** 
 
(0.0162) (0.0179) (0.0402) 
Kamba 0.0223 0.280*** 1.058*** 
 
(0.0164) (0.0179) (0.0475) 
Somali -0.891*** 0.680*** 0.137*** 
 
(0.0352) (0.0393) (0.0170) 
Kisii -0.0194 0.179*** 0.389*** 
 
(0.0195) (0.0211) (0.0181) 
Mijikenda -0.189*** 0.647*** 0.256*** 
 
(0.0255) (0.0282) (0.0190) 
Meru -0.175*** 0.231*** 0.176*** 
 
(0.0212) (0.0233) (0.0183) 
Turkana -1.357*** 0.417*** 0.00562 
 
(0.0584) (0.0623) (0.0459) 
Embu 0.0879*** 0.274*** 0.0822*** 
 
(0.0310) (0.0340) (0.0214) 
Mixed 0.261*** 0.160*** 0.336*** 
 
(0.0191) (0.0211) (0.0302) 
Other -0.130*** 0.549*** 0.0472* 
 
(0.0279) (0.0311) (0.0242) 
Constant -2.687*** -6.510*** -5.841*** 
  (0.00921) (0.133) (0.135) 
Observations 909,186 909,186 909,186 
Pseudo R2 0.0060 0.2359 0.2378 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix Table VI.3. Uganda: regression tables including ethnic group dummies 
  (U.E.1) (U.E.2) (U.E.3) (U.E.4) (U.E.5) (U.E.6) 
VARIABLES pubemp pubemp pubemp pubemp pubemp 
pubemp, 
excl. 
teachers 
Age & age#age NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Sex NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Education NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Development index     -0.0102*** -0.0095*** -0.0066*** 0.004*** 
      (0.000668) (0.000671) (0.000713) (0.00090) 
Conflict affected (1 = >100 conflict 
deaths; 0 <100 conflict deaths)  
    0.263*** 0.0188   
    (0.0231) (0.0335)   
Migrant (1 = district 
migrant, 0 = non-
migrant) 
        0.323*** 0.912*** 
    
    (0.0203) (0.0235) 
Ethnic minority (1 = 
minority, 0 = 
majority) 
  
  -0.0578* 0.116** 
  
  (0.0347) (0.0477) 
Migrant#minority 
interaction 
        -0.115 -0.276*** 
        (0.0789) (0.0549) 
Ethnicity (base = Baganda)      
Banyankole -0.0411* 0.410*** 0.250*** 0.260*** 0.284*** 0.524*** 
 
(0.0225) (0.0260) (0.0279) (0.0279) (0.0296) (0.0397) 
Basoga -0.117*** 0.430*** 0.284*** 0.295*** 0.335*** 0.450*** 
 
(0.0244) (0.0278) (0.0292) (0.0293) (0.0307) (0.0417) 
Bakiga -0.351*** 0.417*** 0.246*** 0.253*** 0.217*** 0.301*** 
 
(0.0273) (0.0315) (0.0333) (0.0334) (0.0375) (0.0518) 
Langi -0.0692*** 0.591*** 0.397*** 0.156*** 0.474*** 0.793*** 
 
(0.0265) (0.0307) (0.0330) (0.0393) (0.0466) (0.0478) 
Iteso 0.556*** 1.139*** 0.965*** 0.849*** 1.140*** 1.508*** 
 
(0.0239) (0.0287) (0.0307) (0.0325) (0.0408) (0.0440) 
Bagisu -0.0879*** 0.380*** 0.227*** 0.237*** 0.276*** 0.490*** 
 
(0.0298) (0.0341) (0.0355) (0.0355) (0.0369) (0.0512) 
Acholi 0.238*** 0.913*** 0.744*** 0.516*** 0.756*** 1.162*** 
 
(0.0280) (0.0329) (0.0346) (0.0401) (0.0478) (0.0474) 
Lugbara 0.0756** 0.763*** 0.570*** 0.364*** 0.625*** 0.889*** 
 
(0.0307) (0.0360) (0.0380) (0.0423) (0.0486) (0.0547) 
Banyoro 0.0480 0.359*** 0.202*** 0.151*** 0.229*** 0.579*** 
 
(0.0356) (0.0408) (0.0420) (0.0424) (0.0487) (0.0647) 
Batoro -0.188*** 0.186*** 0.0449 -0.0939* 0.0702 0.539*** 
 
(0.0403) (0.0462) (0.0471) (0.0488) (0.0523) (0.0609) 
Bakhonzo 0.0130 0.853*** 0.695*** 0.457*** 0.837*** 1.281*** 
 
(0.0384) (0.0450) (0.0462) (0.0507) (0.0594) (0.0649) 
Other -0.136*** 0.644*** 0.475*** 0.434*** 0.376*** 0.586*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0216) (0.0241) (0.0244) (0.0474) (0.0579) 
Constant -2.471*** -4.267*** -4.032*** -4.054*** -4.081*** -6.140*** 
  (0.0135) (0.158) (0.158) (0.158) (0.183) (0.246) 
Observations 431,560 431,560 431,560 431,560 328,721 318,070 
Pseudo R2 0.0053 0.2868 0.2927 0.2884 0.2976 0.2128 
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Appendix Table VI.4. Kenya and Uganda: regression results measuring presidential favouritism 
  (K.E.7) (U.E.7) 
VARIABLES pubemp pubemp 
Sex YES YES 
Education YES YES 
Development index YES YES 
Ethnicity YES YES 
Dummies for age cohorts 
corresponding to each past president YES YES 
Kalenjin#Moi era match dummy 0.102***   
 (0.0312)  
Kikuyu#Kibaki era match dummy -0.215***  
  (0.0260)   
Langi#Obote era match dummy   0.0829 
 
 (0.0766) 
Banyankole#Museveni match dummy  0.0504 
    (0.0521) 
Constant -3.485*** -3.997*** 
  (0.0343) (0.0325) 
Observations 864,437 437,503 
Pseudo R2 0.2348 0.2917 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Appendix Table VI.5. Uganda and Kenya: Probability of being in the top wealth decile, conditional on 
ethnicity 
  (K.E.8) (K.E.9)    (U.E.8) (U.E.9) 
VARIABLES top 10% top 10%  VARIABLES top 10% top 10% 
Age controls YES YES  Age controls YES YES 
Education controls YES YES  Education controls YES YES 
Urban/rural YES YES  Urban/rural YES YES 
District of 
residence controls YES YES 
 District of 
residence controls YES YES 
Ethnicity (base = Kikuyu, Kenyatta & Kibaki)  Ethnicity (base = Baganda) 
Luhya 
-0.174*** -0.429*** 
 Banyankole 
(Museveni) -0.0572 0.290* 
 (0.0659) (0.115)   (0.0996) (0.173) 
Kalenjin (Moi) -0.0278 0.0292  Basoga -0.0847 0.254 
 (0.0693) (0.144)   (0.110) (0.194) 
Luo -0.116* -0.188  Bakiga -0.150 0.568** 
 (0.0701) (0.119)   (0.127) (0.268) 
Kamba -0.347*** -0.350***  Langi (Obote) 0.465*** 0.589** 
 (0.0711) (0.115)   (0.149) (0.280) 
Somali 0.334** 0.526*  Iteso 0.0588 0.316 
 (0.158) (0.286)   (0.109) (0.208) 
Kisii -0.175** -0.385***  Bagisu -0.232* 0.449 
 (0.0826) (0.138)   (0.136) (0.280) 
Mijikenda -0.559*** -0.214  Acholi 0.264* 0.592** 
 (0.116) (0.311)   (0.137) (0.287) 
Meru 0.150 0.334  Lugbara 0.253 0.376 
 (0.102) (0.214)   (0.176) (0.315) 
Turkana -0.153 -0.0832  Banyoro -0.0320 1.173*** 
 (0.322) (0.804)   (0.155) (0.420) 
Embu -0.215 -0.365  Batoro 0.179 0.128 
 (0.133) (0.258)   (0.193) (0.305) 
Mixed 0.425*** 0.536***  Bakhonzo -0.219 -0.333 
 (0.0714) (0.129)   (0.181) (0.393) 
Other -0.122 -0.646**  Other -0.0302 0.302** 
  (0.122) (0.264)    (0.0817) (0.144) 
Constant -4.284*** -2.727***  Constant -4.108*** -0.612** 
  (0.151) (0.291)    (0.613) (0.281) 
Observations 31,148 4,651  Observations 19,618 3,096 
Pseudo R2 0.3059 0.1884  Pseudo R
2 0.4194 0.1177 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Appendix Table VI.6. Uganda: Parental educational attainment and the probability of being publically 
employed 
  U.S.1 U.S.2 U.S.3 U.S.4 
  1992 1992 2005/06 2005/06 
VARIABLES 
Prob of govt 
employment 
Prob of govt 
employment 
Prob of govt 
employment 
Prob of govt 
employment 
     
Age YES YES YES YES 
Sex  YES YES YES YES 
Respondent's education YES YES YES YES 
Father's education (base = none or some primary)     
Primary -0.128  -0.180  
 (0.156) 
 (0.211)  
Secondary -0.279  -0.434*  
 (0.238) 
 (0.235)  
Post-secondary 0.314  N/A  
 (0.515) 
  
 
University -0.715  -0.732* 
 
  (0.584)   (0.410)   
Mother's education (base = none or some primary)     
Primary  -0.116  -0.275 
  (0.226)  (0.227) 
Secondary  -0.554  -0.622** 
  (0.407)  (0.305) 
Post-secondary  2.553**  N/A 
  (1.056)   
University  -2.522**  0.100 
    (1.151)   (1.112) 
Constant -5.853*** -5.837*** -7.301*** -7.007*** 
 (0.395) (0.388) (1.083) (0.826) 
Observations 11,742 11,857 6,842 7,500 
Pseudo R2 0.3374 0.3357 0.4574 0.4466 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
 
  
 249 
 
Appendix Table VI.7. Kenya and Tanzania: Parental educational attainment and the probability of being 
publically employed 
 K.S.1 T.S.1 
  
Probability of 
public 
employment 
Probability 
of public 
employment 
VARIABLES Kenya Tanzania 
      
Age 0.226*** 0.174** 
 (0.0655) (0.0748) 
age#age -0.00228*** -0.00134 
 (0.000788) (0.000907) 
Sex (base = male) 0.0248 0.543*** 
  (0.110) (0.118) 
Respondent's education (base = none or some primary)   
Primary 0.818*** 2.342*** 
 (0.170) (0.212) 
Secondary 2.420*** 4.384*** 
 (0.152) (0.227) 
College 3.991*** 4.196*** 
 (0.160) (0.359) 
University 3.801*** 4.832*** 
  (0.196) (0.352) 
Mother's education (base = none or some primary)   
Primary -0.429*** 0.495** 
 (0.165) (0.224) 
Secondary -0.928*** 0.192 
 (0.279) (1.278) 
College -0.611* OMITTED 
 (0.353)  
University -1.332* 0.763 
  (0.788) (0.669) 
Constant -9.344*** -9.875*** 
 (1.334) (1.548) 
   
Observations 8,180 17,665 
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Appendix Table VI.8. Regression results: Probability of being in the top 10%/1% of asset wealthy 
households 
  Kenya 2009 Tanzania 2002 Uganda 2002 
VARIABLES Top 10% Top 1% Top 10% Top 1% Top 10% Top 1% 
Public sector-headed 
household (base = other)             
Public sector headed 1.497*** 1.864*** 1.217*** 2.089*** 1.349*** 1.246*** 
  (0.101) (0.460) (0.131) (0.414) (0.0605) (0.268) 
Public sector-education 
interaction (base = none)       
pubemp#primary -0.545*** -0.995* -0.304** -1.123** -0.476*** -0.719** 
 (0.115) (0.557) (0.138) (0.463) (0.0786) (0.325) 
pubemp#secondary -0.755*** -1.711*** -0.732*** -1.936*** -0.934*** -0.777*** 
 (0.104) (0.468) (0.140) (0.460) (0.0723) (0.282) 
pubemp#college -1.498*** -2.260*** -0.841*** -0.277 -1.568*** -1.522*** 
 (0.106) (0.468) (0.190) (0.765) (0.0731) (0.283) 
pubemp#university -1.692*** -2.311*** -1.084*** -2.483*** -1.268*** -1.381*** 
 (0.112) (0.464) (0.230) (0.690) (0.0982) (0.277) 
Education and age controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
urban/rural control YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Regional controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -6.733*** -14.77*** -6.901*** -10.02*** -3.815*** -11.48*** 
 (0.228) (1.142) (0.310) (1.647) (0.0823) (0.377) 
Observations 373,206 373,206 446,860 446,860 303,278 303,278 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3817 0.4312 0.3924 0.1733 0.4023 0.4608 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix VII. Construction of variables used in 
Chapter 4 
Public employment 
The public employment variable is constructed from the IPUMS sector of employment variable 
for Kenya, and industry and occupational variables for Uganda, as per the table below. 
Appendix Table VII.1. Construction of public employment variable 
 Kenya Uganda Tanzania 
IPUMS 
VARIABLE 
KE2009A_EMPSECT UG2002A_IND & 
UG2002A_OCC 
TZ02A_IND 
Pubemp (Y = 1) Central government 
Local authorities 
Teachers service 
commission 
State-owned enterprises 
Public service 
Education 
Health 
Defence and related 
Public administration 
and education 
Not in pubemp (Y 
= 0) 
All other sectors of 
employment 
All other industries of 
employment 
 
Other 
inclusion/exclusion 
criteria 
Kenyan born, 25-55 Ugandan born, 25-55 Tanzanian citizen, 
only from and 
working in mainland, 
25-55 
 
Excluded respondents 
not classified as 
employees and 
wage/salary worker 
 
The table below shows which categories from the industrial and occupational classifications 
have been included in the Ugandan public sector variable. In sum these four sub-categories 
make up the public sector employment variable. 
Appendix Table VII.2. Uganda: detailed definition of public employment variable 
 Industrial classification Occupational classification 
 UG2002A_IND UG2002A_OCC 
Public service Public service  
(excluding any observations already 
covered in edu, health or security 
below) 
If not included in public service, 
these occupations added: 
Legislators 
Senior government officials 
Traditional chiefs  
Teachers  teachers college, uni 
teachers secondary 
teachers training institutes 
teachers woodworking 
teaching professional 
primary teachers only 
post-primary teaching 
pre-primary teaching 
special ed. Teaching 
teaching associates 
teaching experienced 
personal care workers 
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Health workers  nursing and midwifery 
other health professional 
medical doctors 
veterinary doctors 
nurses and midwives 
medical assistants 
dental assistants 
life science experienced 
Security and defence Defence and related activities Policemen 
Soldiers 
‘Private’ Residual, all other industries or 
occupations of employment 
 
 
Education 
Educational attainment is classified somewhat differently in the different datasets. The 
following categories were created, drawing from the national classifications as described in the 
table below.  
Appendix Table VII.3. Construction of educational attainment variable 
 Kenya  
(2009 census) 
Tanzania  
(2002 census) 
Uganda  
(2002 census) 
VARIABLE NAME educke edattand educug 
None or some primary None 
Standard 1-6 
No schooling 
Standard 1-6 
 
None 
Standard 1-6 
Primary Standard 7-8 and Form 
1-3 
Primary 7, courses 
after primary, 
Secondary grade 1-3 
Primary 7, technical 
grade 1-3, Secondary 
grade 1-3 
Secondary Form 4-6 Secondary grade 4-6 Secondary grade 4-6, 
vocational incomplete 
College College 
 
Courses after 
secondary 
 
Vocational certificate 
Vocational diploma 
University University, undergrad 
University, Masters or 
PhD 
University complete University, no degree 
Incomplete university 
Completed university 
 
 Tanzania (2000 LFS) Uganda (2006 NHS) 
VARIABLE NAME Educa + typtrain h4q2 + h4q4 
None or some primary No schooling 
Primary up to std. 6 
No schooling (h4q2) 
p.1 – p.6 
Primary Primary std.7  - 8 
Secondary Form 1-3 
 
p.7 – s.3 
post-primary 
specialized training 
Secondary Secondary Form 4-6 
(excl. those with 
diplomas or 
certificates) 
s.4 – s.6 
College Secondary Form 4-6 + 
certificate (2yrs +) or 
diploma (2yrs +) 
Post-secondary 
specialized training 
University University degree 1 or 
degree 2 
Completed degree 
and above 
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District development index 
This index is constructed from the following variables, calculated on a district or regional basis. 
Factor analysis is then used to determine the weight for each variable. The predicted level for 
each district or region is then normalized to produce an index from 0 to 1. 
Appendix Table VII.4. Construction of district development index 
Indicator Notes 
Distance to capital city (county basis) (km) 
Distance from capital to main town/city in 
district/region. In Kenya calculated on a county 
basis. (from 
http://distancecalculator.globefeed.com) 
Population density (people per km2) (log) 
District/region size taken from national statistical 
sources. 
% of households with electricity  Calculated from censuses 
% labour force in private wage employment  
Calculated from censuses  
In Kenya the private employment (incl. NGOs and 
faith-based organsiations) variable is used (from 
KE09A_EMPSECT). 
In Uganda, this is calculated by subtracting ‘public 
sector employees’ and agricultural sector from total 
wage employees. 
 
Asset wealth index 
This index is constructed from the following categorical variables, calculated on a household 
basis. Factor analysis is used to determine the weight for each variable. I then impute predicted 
asset wealth score for each household based on these weights. This score is then normalized to 
produce an index from 0 to 100. 
Household ‘wealth’ measures included in index: 
• Motor vehicle (Kenya and Uganda only) 
• Television (Kenya and Uganda only) 
• Refrigerator (Kenya only) 
• Computer (Kenya only) 
• Landline telephone (Uganda and Tanzania only) 
• Electricity in the home 
• Piped water in the home 
• Flush toilet in the home 
• Cooking fuel (whether gas or electricity) 
• Flooring (whether tiles, wood or cement) 
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Administrative Divisions of Uganda 
The Ugandan district level variables use the 2002 district divisions, as given by unharmonized 
district division in the 2002 census (56 districts, including Kampala). This is the greatest level 
of geographic granularity that the 2002 microdata set will allow. Uganda’s government has 
continued to subdivide the country into smaller districts. In 1960 the country had 16 districts; 
by 1992 this had risen to 38, and by 2002 to 56. As of 2016 the country had 111 districts and 
one city (Kampala). 
Administrative Divisions of Tanzania 
The Tanzanian regional variables use the 2002 regional divisions, as given by the census. Only 
the mainland is considered, thus all the Zanzibari regions are removed from all the calculations 
leaving 21 regions. Since 2002 the number of regions in the mainland has increased to 25. 
Administrative Divisions of Kenya 
As discussed in Appendix III, prior to the 2013 constitution, Kenya was divided into 8 
provinces, which were further subdivided into districts. Under President Moi and President 
Kibaki the number of districts in Kenya proliferated, and as a result the censuses contain an 
increasing number of districts (69 in 1999, 158 in 2009). However, a High Court ruling in 2009 
deemed 210 of the then existing 256 districts illegal, and reverted the administrative structure 
back to the 46 districts and Nairobi as set out in the Districts and Provinces Act of 1992. When 
the 2010 Constitution came into effect in 2013, these districts were converted into 47 counties, 
which form the basis for the devolution envisaged under the new constitution. The 2009 
districts (as listed in the census) map cleanly onto the present-day counties, and thus where 
necessary, the census divisions have been recoded to match the current county divisions. 
Some data is thus calculated on a county basis (see ‘district development index’ above). Where 
I use indicators constructed from within the dataset itself (e.g., years of schooling or access to 
electricity), the 2009 district divisions are used in order to maximize the number of units of 
analysis. 
Kenyan ethnic dummies 
Ethnicity and place of birth are strongly correlated, as the original district divisions were shaped 
by the location of ethnic areas. Tobin using 1989 census data, estimates that the mean share of 
the main ethnic group at district level is 73%, rising to 80% at division level and 89% at sub-
location level. 469  
                                                   
469 Lara Tobin, “Essais Sur L’urbanisation En Afrique Subsaharienne” (Paris School of Economics, 
2015), 95. 
 255 
 
The 2009 census collected data on ethnic identity, with respondents self-reporting their ethnic 
identity. While ethnic data was not released as part of the microdata sample, the socio-
economic atlas of Kenya reports ethnic shares by county drawing from the 2009 census.470  
Respondents are coded as belonging to the dominant ethnic group in their county of birth, 
where the ethnic group share in that county exceeds 50%. All respondents in counties where 
no ethnic group exceeds 50% of the population are coded as ‘mixed’, or excluded from the 
analysis. These respondents are primarily born in Nairobi or Mombasa and are therefore a 
somewhat anomalous group. Only the ten largest ethnicities are included and all smaller groups 
are classified as ‘Other’. 
Appendix Table VII.5. Kenya: Ethnic group share by county of birth (based on Wiesmann, Kiteme and 
Mwangi, 2014) 
County 
Largest ethnic 
group 
Share of largest 
ethnic group in 
county population 
People born in county, 
ethnic classification for 
regression analysis 
Nairobi Kikuyu 29% Mixed 
Mombasa Mijikenda 30% Mixed 
Kwale Mijikenda 83% Mijikenda 
Kilifi Mijikenda 86% Mijikenda 
Tana River Pokomo 28% Mixed 
Lamu Swahili 30% Mixed 
Taita Taveta Taita 63% Taita 
Garissa Somali 80% Somali 
Wajir Somali 99% Somali 
Mandera Somali 100% Somali 
Marsabit Gabra 28% Mixed 
Isiolo Borana 37% Mixed 
Meru Meru 92% Meru 
Tharaka Nithi Meru 66% Meru 
Embu Embu 50% Embu 
Kitui Kamba 97% Kamba 
Machakos Kamba 91% Kamba 
Makueni Kamba 98% Kamba 
Nyandarua Kikuyu 96% Kikuyu 
Nyeri Kikuyu 94% Kikuyu 
Kirinyaga Kikuyu 95% Kikuyu 
Murang'a Kikuyu 91% Kikuyu 
Kiambu Kikuyu 81% Kikuyu 
Turkana Turkana 94% Turkana 
West Pokot Kalenjin 95% Kalenjin 
Samburu Samburu 79% Other 
                                                   
470 U. Wiesmann, Kiteme, and Mwangi, “Socio-Economic Atlas of Kenya: Depicting the National 
Population Census by County and Sub-Location.” Data is also republished by Dominic Burbidge, 
“Democracy versus Diversity: Ethnic Representation in a Devolved Kenya” (unpublished, 2015). 
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Tranz Nzoia Luhya 52% Luhya 
Uasin Gishu Kalenjin 58% Kalenjin 
Elgeyo Marakwet Kalenjin 93% Kalenjin 
Nandi Kalenjin 77% Kalenjin 
Baringo Kalenjin 92% Kalenjin 
Laikipia Kikuyu 63% Kikuyu 
Nakuru Kikuyu 52% Kikuyu 
Narok Maasai 51% Other 
Kajiado Kalenjin 41% Mixed 
Kericho Kalenjin 88% Kalenjin 
Bomet Kalenjin 96% Kalenjin 
Kakamega Luhya 94% Luhya 
Vihiga Luhya 92% Luhya 
Bungoma Luhya 83% Luhya 
Busia Luhya 57% Luhya 
Siaya Luo 95% Luo 
Kisumu Luo 89% Luo 
Homa Bay Luo 88% Luo 
Migori Luo 60% Luo 
Kisii Kisii 97% Kisii 
Nyamira Kisii 97% Kisii 
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Appendix VIII. Migration                         
(supplement to Chapter 4)  
One point to consider is whether the public sector share of employment is artificially inflated 
by migration – i.e., if those with skills but lacking the political connections to obtain jobs 
domestically chose to migrate abroad instead (thereby biasing the ethnic or region of birth 
composition of the domestic sample). Brain drain did likely matter for particular types of 
professionals and particular ethnic groups (particularly those of Asian or European descent), 
but for Africans it does not appear to have made a major dent on the overall stock of graduates 
in country. The data below lists the number of migrants by main destination outside of Africa 
from Kenya and Uganda. In total roughly 320,000 Kenyan-born, 92,000 Tanzanian-born and 
109,000 Ugandan-born people today reside in North America, Europe and Australia. Migration 
to other non-African countries appears to have been small. 
Appendix Table VIII.1. Emigrants from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in main non-African 
destination countries (2013) (thousands) 
Origin UK* US Canada Australia Rest of 
Europe 
Total 
Kenya 136 113 27 16 27 319 
Tanzania 35 19 23 4 11 92 
Uganda 64 19 13 3 10 109 
Sources:  
Excl. UK: Migration Policy Institute, 'Maps of Immigrants and Emigrants Around the World,' Data 
Hub, 2013, http://migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub. 
UK (2011): Office of National Statistics, ‘Table 1.3: Overseas-born population in the United Kingdom, 
excluding some residents in communal establishments,  by sex, by country, Jan-Dec 2011’, 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigrati
on/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationality 
For the US and UK migrants, detailed data from the UK and US censuses, made available by 
the Minnesota Population Center and the UK allows a closer look at the composition of these 
migrant populations.471 Available samples are small and subject to considerable sampling error, 
but may nonetheless give a rough indication of patterns. For East African migrants in the US 
in 2010, 61% of Tanzanian, 63% of Ugandan and 79% of Kenyan migrants were of African 
background (‘black’); of these only about half arrived in adulthood (and thus likely to have 
been educated in East Africa);472 and fewer still were secondary or tertiary educated. Our 
population of interest, ethnically African, university educated and migrating in adulthood,473 
there are roughly 9,000 from Kenya, 3,200 from Tanzania and 2,600 from Uganda.  A similar 
exercise for the UK suggests that there are roughly 5,600 Kenyan-born, 2000 Tanzanian-born 
and 2,700 Ugandan-born university graduates of African descent in the UK in 2011.474 
                                                   
471 USA CENSUS 2010; UK CENSUS 2011. 
472 As the UK only gives year of arrival in decade-long intervals, this exercise can only be done roughly, 
and errs on the side of caution. 
473 I also exclude those currently in education, and limit the sample to those arriving before 2009 in 
Kenya and 2002 in Uganda, in line with the university stock measures from the corresponding EA 
censuses. 
474 Census microdata complemented with data from: UK Office of National Statistics, “LC2804EW - 
Country of Birth by Year of Arrival in the UK (Computer File),” Nomis, 2015, 
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A back of the envelope calculation, assuming a similar migrant composition in Canada, 
Australia and the rest of Europe, suggests that in the order of 19,000 Kenyans, 9,000 
Tanzanians and 7,000 Ugandans fitting the criteria above left the continent between the 1960s 
and early-mid 2000s. This is around 5.4% of the Kenyan, 3.2% of Tanzanian and 5% of 
Ugandan university educated populations (in 2009, 2012 and 2002 respectively). Note that 
these are probably over-estimates as it is not possible to say with precision whether the 
respondent was educated in East Africa or in their new country of residence. 
In the Ugandan case there was also considerable migration to Kenya, which represented by far 
the biggest recipient of Ugandan emigrants.475 Using the Kenyan 1999 census, the closest in 
time to the 2002 Ugandan census, I follow the same process of exclusion to estimate the number 
of Ugandan graduates in Kenya.476 This exercise suggests a stock of roughly 1,600 Ugandans 
with university education (not currently studying) living in Kenya in 1999, or roughly 1% of 
the Ugandan university stock. It was not possible however, to identify which of these arrived 
in adulthood; some of these migrants are likely to have arrived in childhood and received their 
education in Kenya.  
A 2003 Ugandan tracer survey of 500 graduates from Makerere (graduating between 1980 and 
1999), found a somewhat higher rate of migration, with 10% of their sample residing abroad at 
the time the tracer survey was conducted, although it only captured students from the most 
prestigious of Uganda’s tertiary institutions. Among a similar sized sample of secondary school 
graduates, 1% had migrated.477  
  
                                                   
https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/; UK Office of National Statistics, “CT0071 - Highest Level of 
Qualification by Year of Arrival in the UK by Country of Birth by Age (National) (Computer File),” 
Nomis, 2015, https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/. 
475 International Organisation for Migration, ‘Migration in Uganda: Rapid country profile 2013’ (IOM, 
Kampala, 2015) 
476 Minnesota Population Center, ‘Kenya 1999 Population and Housing Census, Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series, International: Version 6.3 [Machine-Readable Database]’ (Minneapolis, University 
of Minnesota, 2015). 
477 Kirumira and Bateganya, “Where Has All the Education Gone in Uganda? Employment Outcomes 
Among Secondary School and University Leavers.” 
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Data Sources 
[Organised by country and creator] 
General  
AFROBAROMETER 
[COUNTRY / YEAR / 
ROUND] 
Afrobarometer Data [Available at http://www.afrobarometer.org] 
Frankema and Jerven, 
2014 
African population estimates:  
Ewout Frankema and Morten Jerven, ‘Writing history backwards or 
sideways: Towards a consensus on African population, 1850-present’ 
Economic History Review. 67.4 (2014): 907–931. 
IMF PFMH 2013 Public finance in modern history dataset: 
Binder, Ariel J., Asad Zaman, Paolo Mauro, and Rafael Romeu, A 
Modern History of Fiscal Prudence and Profligacy, IMF Working Paper 
(Washington D.C., 2013) [Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40222.0>] 
ISS MB [YEAR] International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa,’ The 
Military Balance (London). Vol. 71 – 117, 1971 - 2017 
MADDISON 2013 The Maddison-Project, 2013 version [Available at: 
http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm] 
POVCALNET 2017 World Bank, PovcalNet [Available at: 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/home.aspx] 
PENN WT 9.0 Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar and Marcel P. Timmer, ‘The Next 
Generation of the Penn World Table’ American Economic Review, 
105(10), 3150-3182 (2015) [Available at: atwww.ggdc.net/pwt] 
WDI World Bank, World Development Indicators [Dataset] (Washington D.C.: 
World Bank, 2016) [Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators] 
UCPD UCDP georeferenced event dataset (GED) global version 17.1 (2016):  
Ralph Sundberg and Erik Melander, 'Introducing the Ucdp Georeferenced 
Event Dataset,' Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 4 (2013). [Available 
at: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/] 
East Africa (general) 
EA ESB [YEAR] East Africa High Commission. East African Statistical Department. 
Quarterly Economic and Statistical Bulletin (Nairobi : East African 
Statistical Department, 1952 -1977) 
EA TAX [YEAR] East African Common Services Organization, East African Income Tax 
Department Annual Report (Nairobi, 1960/61 - 1965/66). 
France 
FRA CENSUS 1999 Minnesota Population Center, “France General Population Census 1999, 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.3 
[Machine-Readable Database].” (University of Minnesota, 2016). 
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Kenya 
KE BIGSTEN 1987 Arne Bigsten, Income distribution and growth in a dual economy: Kenya, 
1914-1976, vols., Memorandum. (Gothenburg University, Department of 
Economics, 1987). 
KE CENSUS 1969 Minnesota Population Center, ‘Kenya 1969 Population and Housing 
Census’, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 
6.3 [Dataset] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015). 
http://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V6.4. 
KE CENSUS 1979 Minnesota Population Center, ‘Kenya 1979 Population and Housing 
Census’, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 
6.3 [Dataset] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015). 
http://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V6.4 
KE CENSUS 1989 Minnesota Population Center, ‘Kenya 1989 Population and Housing 
Census’, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 
6.3 [Dataset] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015). 
http://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V6.4 
KE CENSUS 1999 Minnesota Population Center, ‘Kenya 1999 Population and Housing 
Census’, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 
6.3 [Dataset] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015). 
http://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V6.4 
KE CENSUS 2009 Minnesota Population Center, ‘Kenya 2009 Population and Housing 
Census’, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 
6.3 [Dataset] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015). 
http://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V6.4 
KE EES [YEAR] Kenya. Statistics Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. 
Employment and earnings (Nairobi, 1955-1967)  
KE EES [YEAR] Kenya. Central Bureau of Statistics. Employment and earnings in the 
modern sector (Nairobi, 1968 – 1985) 
KE ES [YEAR] Kenya. Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey (Nairobi: Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 1960 - 2013) [Available at: https://www.knbs.or.ke/] 
KE ESTIMATES 
[YEAR] 
Kenya. Estimates of recurrent expenditure of the Government of Kenya 
for the year ending [...] / Estimates of expenditure of the Colony and 
Protectorate of Kenya for the year ending [...] (Nairobi: Government 
Printer, 1960 – 2012) 
KE IHBS 2005/06 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.  Integrated Household Budget Survey 
2005/06, [Dataset] [ID#  KEN_1997_WMS-III_v01_M]. Nairobi. 
[Available at: http://statistics.knbs.or.ke/nada/index.php/catalog] 
KE LFS 1998/99 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Integrated labour force survey 
1998/99, Second Round [Dataset]  [ID#  KEN-KNBS-LFS-1999-v02.] 
Nairobi. [Available at: http://statistics.knbs.or.ke/nada/index.php/catalog] 
KE IRS 1974 Kenya. Central Bureau of Statistics, Integrated Rural Survey 1974/75: 
Basic Report (Nairobi, 1977). 
KE MANPOWER 
1967 
Kenya. Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, High-level 
manpower requirements and resources in Kenya, 1964-1970 (Nairobi, 
1965). 
KE MANPOWER 
1986-88 
Kenya. Ministry of Manpower Development and Employment, An 
overview report of national manpower survey 1986-88, (Nairobi, 1989). 
KE MANPOWER 
2010/11 
Kenya. Ministry of Labour and the Kenya National Bureau of 
Statistics, National Manpower Survey Basic Report 2010/11 (Nairobi, 
2011). 
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KE SA [YEAR] Kenya. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract (Nairobi: Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 1955 - 2013) [Available at: https://www.knbs.or.ke/] 
KE WMS 1992 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.  Welfare Monitoring Survey 1992, 
First Round, [Dataset] [ID#  KEN_1992_WMS-I_v01_M]. (Nairobi) 
[Available at: http://statistics.knbs.or.ke/nada/index.php/catalog] 
KE WMS 1994 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.  Welfare Monitoring Survey 1994, 
Second Round, [Dataset] [ID#  KEN_1994_WMS-II_v01_M]. Nairobi. 
[Available at: http://statistics.knbs.or.ke/nada/index.php/catalog] 
KE WMS 1997 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.  Welfare Monitoring Survey 1997, 
Third Round, [Dataset] [Available at: 
http://statistics.knbs.or.ke/nada/index.php/catalog] 
KE IMF ARTICLE IV 
2006 
International Monetary Fund, Kenya: 2006 Article IV Consultation and 
Second Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility, IMF Country Report No. 09/137 
(Washington D.C.:IMF, 2009) [Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/country/KEN/] 
KE IMF ARTICLE IV 
2009 
International Monetary Fund, Kenya: Staff Report for the 2009 Article IV 
Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 10/26 (Washington D.C.:IMF, 
2010) [Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/country/KEN/] 
KE IMF ARTICLE IV 
2011 
International Monetary Fund, Kenya: 2011 Article IV Consultation, 
Second Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Extended 
Credit Facility, IMF Country Report No. 12/14 (Washington D.C.:IMF, 
2012) [Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/country/KEN/] 
KE IMF ARTICLE IV 
2014 
International Monetary Fund, Kenya: 2014 Article IV Consultation, IMF 
Country Report No. 14/302 (Washington D.C.:IMF, 2014) [Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/country/KEN/] 
KE IMF RED [YEAR] International Monetary Fund, Kenya: Recent Economic 
Developments (Washington D.C.: IMF, 1971 - 1999). [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
KE IMF SA [YEAR] International Monetary Fund, Kenya: Statistical appendix (Washington 
D.C.: IMF, 1992 - 1995). [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
KE IMF SA [YEAR] International Monetary Fund, Kenya: Selected issues and statistical 
appendix (Washington D.C.: IMF, 1998 - 2009). [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
KE WB PER 1992 World Bank, Kenya: Re-Investing in Stabilization and Growth through 
Public Sector Adjustment (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1992). 
[Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
Tanzania 
TZ BEST [YEAR] Tanzania. Basic Education Statistics Tanzania: National data (Dar es 
Salaam: 2002 – 2004) 
TZ BEST 2014 Tanzania. Prime Minister’s Office, Regional administration and local 
government. Pre-primary, primary and secondary education statistics 
2013: National data, Dodoma 2014 [Available at: 
http://www.pmoralg.go.tz/noticeboard/tangazo-1023-20141229-Basic-
Education-Statistics-BEST/FINAL-NATIONAL-27-MAY-2014.pdf] 
TZ CENSUS 1988 Minnesota Population Center, ‘Tanzania 1988 Population and Housing 
Census’, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 
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6.3 [Dataset] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015). 
http://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V6.4. 
TZ CENSUS 2002 Minnesota Population Center, ‘Tanzania 2002 Population and Housing 
Census’, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 
6.3 [Dataset] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015). 
http://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V6.4 
TZ CENSUS 2012 Minnesota Population Center, ‘Tanzania 2012 Population and Housing 
Census’, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 
6.3 [Dataset] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015). 
http://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V6.4 
TZ DoL [YEAR] Tanganyika. Annual report of the labour department (Dar es Salaam: 
Government Printers; 1946-1960) 
TZ EES [YEAR] Tanganyika/Tanzania. National Bureau of Statistics, Employment and 
Earnings / Survey of Employment and Earnings (Dar es Salaam, 1961 – 
1978; 2001 - 2014)   
TZ ES [YEAR] Tanzania. Ministry of Finance, Annual Economic Survey/Economic Survey 
(Dar es Salaam, 1969 - 2012)   
TZ HBS 1969 Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics. 1969 Household Budget Survey, 
Volume 1 (Dar es Salaam, 1972) 
TZ HBS 1976 Tanzania. National Bureau of Statistics. 1976 Household Budget Survey, 
Volume 1 (Dar es Salaam, 1976) 
Additional tables available in: Alexander Sarris and Roger van den 
Brink, Economic Policy and Household Welfare During Crisis and 
Adjustment in Tanzania (NYU Press, 1993). 
TZ HBS 2001 Tanzania. National Bureau of Statistics, Household Budget Survey 
2000/01 [Dataset] [ID#  TZA-NBS-HBS-2000-v01] (Dar es Salaam). 
[Available on: http://nbs.go.tz/catalog/index.php/catalog] 
TZ HBS 2007 Tanzania. National Bureau of Statistics, Household Budget Survey 2007 
[Dataset] [ID#  TZA-NBS-HBS-2007v01] (Dar es Salaam). [Available on: 
http://nbs.go.tz/catalog/index.php/catalog] 
TZ HBS 2012 Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics, Household Budget Survey 
2011/12, Sixth Round [Dataset] [ID#  TZA-NBS-HBS-2011-V01] (Dar es 
Salaam). [Available on: http://nbs.go.tz/catalog/index.php/catalog] 
TZ HRDS 1993 University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Human Resource Development 
Survey 1993 [Dataset] [ID# TZA_1993_HRDS_v01_M] (Dar es Salaam) 
[Available on: http://nbs.go.tz/catalog/index.php/catalog] 
TZ JACKSON 1979 Dudley Jackson, “The Disappearance of Strikes in Tanzania: Incomes 
Policy and Industrial Democracy,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 
17, no. 2 (1979): 219–51. 
TZ LFS 1990/91 Tanzania. Bureau of Statistics & Labour Department. Tanzania 
(Mainland): The labour force survey 1990/91 (Dar es Salaam, 1993) 
TZ LFS 2000 Tanzania. National Bureau of Statistics. Integrated Labour Force Survey 
2000-01 [Dataset] [ID# TZA-NBS-ILFS-2000-2001V01] (Dar es Salaam). 
[Available on: http://nbs.go.tz/catalog/index.php/catalog] 
TZ LFS 2006 Tanzania. National Bureau of Statistics. Integrated Labour Force Survey 
2006 [Dataset] [ID# TZA-NBS-ILFS-2006-v01.0] (Dar es Salaam). 
[Available on: http://nbs.go.tz/catalog/index.php/catalog] 
TZ LFS 2014 Tanzania. National Bureau of Statistics. Integrated Labour Force Survey 
2014 [Dataset] [ID# TZA-NBS-ILFS-2014-v01.0] (Dar es Salaam). 
[Available on: http://nbs.go.tz/catalog/index.php/catalog] 
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TZ LUKUMAI 2006 Emmanuel C. Lukumai, “The Implementation of Civil Service Reforms in 
Tanzania, 1991-2000” (Master’s Thesis, University of Bergen, 2006). 
TZ MANPOWER 
[YEAR] 
Tanzania. Ministry of Labour and Manpower Development., Annual 
Manpower Report to the President (Dar es Salaam, 1971 - 1982) 
TZ NA 2014 Tanzania. National Bureau of Statistics. Revised National Accounts 
Estimates for Tanzania Mainland, Base Year 2007 (Dar es Salaam, 2014) 
TZ POPSM 2004 Tanzania. President’s Office Public Service Management, Monitoring and 
Evaluation Unit, ‘Public service employment and pay: the current state 
and trends over the last four years, Part I (main report)’ (Dar es Salaam: 
2004) 
TZ SA [YEAR] Tanganyika/Tanzania. Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract (Dar es 
Salaam, 1938 - 2016)   
TZ SSS 1993 Tanzania, Bureau of Statistics, Selected statistical series 1951-1990, Dar 
es Salaam: Bureau of Statistics, 1993 
TZ IMF ARTICLE IV 
1965 
International Monetary Fund, Tanzania: Article XIV Consultations, 
SM/65/64 (Washington D.C.:IMF) [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
TZ IMF ARTICLE IV 
1968 
International Monetary Fund, Tanzania: Article XIV Consultations, 
SM/68/156 (Washington D.C.:IMF) [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
TZ IMF ARTICLE IV 
1968 
International Monetary Fund, Tanzania: Article XIV Consultations, 
SM/68/156 (Washington D.C.:IMF) [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
TZ IMF ARTICLE IV 
2004 
International Monetary Fund, Tanzania: Staff Report for the 2004 Article 
IV Consultation and Second Review Under the Three-Year Arrangement 
Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, EBS/04/108 
(Washington D.C.:IMF, 2004) [Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/country/TZA/index.htm] 
TZ IMF ARTICLE IV 
2005 
International Monetary Fund, United Republic of Tanzania: Third Review 
Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility, IMF Country Report No. 05/181 (Washington D.C.:IMF, 
2005) [Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/country/TZA/index.htm] 
TZ IMF ARTICLE IV 
2006 
International Monetary Fund, United Republic of Tanzania: Fifth Review 
Under the Three-Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility, IMF Country Report No. 06/138 (Washington D.C.:IMF, 
2006) [Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/country/TZA/index.htm] 
TZ IMF ARTICLE IV 
2007 
International Monetary Fund, United Republic of Tanzania: Staff Report 
for the 2007 Article IV Consultation and First Review Under the Policy 
Support Instrument, EBS/07/63 (Washington D.C.:IMF, 2007) [Available 
at: https://www.imf.org/external/country/TZA/index.htm] 
TZ IMF ARTICLE IV 
2009 
International Monetary Fund, United Republic of Tanzania: Sixth Review 
Under the Policy Support Instrument, First Review Under the Exogenous 
Shocks Facility, IMF Country Report No. 09/336 (Washington D.C.:IMF, 
2009) [Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/country/TZA/index.htm] 
TZ IMF ARTICLE IV 
2011 
International Monetary Fund, United Republic of Tanzania: 2011 Article 
IV Consultation and Second Review Under the Policy Support Instrument, 
IMF Country Report No. 11/105 (Washington D.C.:IMF, 2011) [Available 
at: https://www.imf.org/external/country/TZA/index.htm] 
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TZ IMF RED [YEAR] International Monetary Fund, Tanzania: Recent Economic 
Developments (Washington D.C.: IMF, 1972 - 1994). [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
TZ IMF SA [YEAR] International Monetary Fund, Tanzania: Selected issues and statistical 
appendix (Washington D.C.: IMF, 1990 – 2004) [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
TZ IMF SA 1995 International Monetary Fund, Tanzania: Statistical Appendix, SM/95/295 
(Washington D.C.:IMF, 1995) [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
TZ IMF SA 2000 International Monetary Fund, Tanzania: Statistical Annex, SM/00/175 
(Washington D.C.:IMF, 2000) [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
TZ IMF SA 2002 International Monetary Fund, Tanzania-Selected Issues and Statistical 
Appendix, SM/02/342 (Washington D.C.:IMF, 2002) [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
TZ IMF SA 2004 International Monetary Fund, Tanzania—Selected Issues and Statistical 
Appendix, SM/04/266 (Washington D.C.:IMF, 2004) [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
TZ UNESCO 2011 UNESCO. “Tanzania: Education Sector Analysis: Beyond Primary 
Education, the Quest for Balanced and Efficient Policy Choices for 
Human Development and Economic Growth” (Dakar: UNESCO, 2011) 
[Available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002152/215247e.pdf] 
TZ WB ECON 1962 International Bank for reconstruction and Development, International 
Development Association, The Economy of Tanganyika, Report No. AF-
3a, Dec 1962 [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
TZ WB EM 1977 World Bank, Tanzania: Economic Memorandum, Report No. 1567-TA 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1977) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
TZ WB EM 1984 World Bank, Tanzania: Economic Memorandum (Washington D.C.: 
World Bank, 1984) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
TZ WB PER 1989 
[VOL] 
World Bank, Tanzania: Public Expenditure Review, Volumes I-III 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1989) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
TZ WB PER 1991 World Bank, Tanzania: Economic report: Towards sustainable 
development in the 1990s, Vol I: Main report, Vol II: Background papers, 
Report No. 9352-TA (Washington D.C.: 1991) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
TZ WB PER 1994 World Bank, Tanzania Role of Government: Public Expenditure Review, 
Volume 1 (Washington D.C., 1994) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
TZ WB PER 1996 World Bank, Tanzania: The Challenge of Reforms: Growth Incomes and 
Welfare, Volumes 1 - II  (Washington D.C., 1996) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
TZ WB PER 2000 World Bank, Tanzania: Public Expenditure Review FY00, Volume 
1 (Washington D.C., 2001) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
TZ WB PER 2002 World Bank, Tanzania: Public Expenditure Review FY02, Volume 
1 (Washington D.C., 2002) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
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TZ WB PER 2009 World Bank, Tanzania: Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability 
Review 2009 (Washington D.C., 2010) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
Uganda 
UG BtB [YEAR] Uganda. Ministry of Finance. Background to the budget (Entebbe, 1960 – 
2016) 
UG CENSUS 1948 Uganda. Report on the census of the non-native population of Uganda 
Protectorate, taken on the night of the 25th February, 1948 (Nairobi, 
1953) 
UG CENSUS 1992 Minnesota Population Center, ‘Uganda 1992 Population and Housing 
Census’, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 
6.3 [Dataset] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015). 
http://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V6.4. 
UG CENSUS 2002 Minnesota Population Center, ‘Uganda 2002 Population and Housing 
Census’, Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International: Version 
6.3 [Dataset] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015). 
http://doi.org/10.18128/D020.V6.4 
UG EAL 1949 East Africa High Commission. Uganda Protectorate: Report on 
the enumeration of African labour, March, 1949. (Nairobi, 1949) 
UG EDU [YEAR] Uganda. Ministry of Education and Sports. Education and sports sector 
fact sheet (2000 – 2016) [Available at: 
http://www.education.go.ug/data/dcat/2/Data-and-Statistics.html] 
UG EES [YEAR] Uganda. Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. Statistics 
Division. Enumeration of Employees (Entebbe, 1957 – 1971) 
UG IHS 1992 Uganda. Statistics Department of the Ministry of Planning and Economic 
Development. Integrated Household Survey 1992/93 [Dataset] [ID# 
UGA_1992_IHS_v01_M]  
UG MANPOWER 
1967 
Uganda. Ministry of Planning and Economic Development., High Level 
Manpower Survey 1967 and Analyses and Requirements, 1967-1981 
(Entebbe: Government Printer, 1967) 
UG NHS 1996 Uganda Bureau of Statistics. National Household Survey 1995/96 
[Dataset] [ID# UGA_1995_UNHS_v01_M] 
UG NHS 1999 Uganda Bureau of Statistics. National Household Survey 1999/2000 
[Dataset] [ID# UGA-UBOS-UNHS-1999-v1.0] 
UG NHS 2002 Uganda Bureau of Statistics. National Household Survey 2002/03 
[Dataset] [ID# UGA-UBOS-UNHS-2002-v1.0] 
UG NHS 2005/06 Uganda Bureau of Statistics. National Household Survey 2005/06 
[Dataset] [ID# UGA_2005_UNHS_v01_M] 
UG NHS 2009/10 Uganda Bureau of Statistics. National Household Survey 2009/10 
[Dataset] [ID# UGA_2009_UNHS_v01_M] 
UG SA [YEAR] Uganda. Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. Statistics 
Division. Statistical Abstract (Entebbe, 1957 – 1978) 
UG SA [YEAR] Uganda Bureau of Statistics. Statistical Abstract  (Entebbe, 2002 – 2016) 
[Available at: http://www.ubos.org/publications/statistical-abstract/] 
UG COMMON-
WEALTH 1979 
Dudley Seers, The Rehabilitation of the Economy of Uganda (London: 
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1979). 
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UG ILO 
MANPOWER 1979 
International Labour Organisation. Manpower assessment and planning 
Uganda: Project findings and recommendations  (Geneva: ILO, 1979) 
UG IMF ARTICLE IV 
2007 
International Monetary Fund. Uganda: First Review Under the Policy 
Support Instrument and Modifications to Assessment Criteria—Staff 
Report; Press Release on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement 
by the Executive Director for Uganda, IMF Country Report No. 07/212 
(Washington D.C.: IMF, June 2007) [Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/country/UGA/] 
UG IMF ARTICLE IV 
2009 
International Monetary Fund. Uganda: Fifth Review Under the Policy 
Support Instrument and Request for Modification of Assessment Criteria—
Staff Report; and Press Release, IMF Country Report No. 09/202, 
(Washington D.C.: IMF, July 2009) [Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/country/UGA/] 
UG IMF RED 
[YEAR] 
International Monetary Fund, Tanzania: Recent Economic 
Developments (Washington D.C.: IMF, 1970 - 1988). [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
UG IMF SA [YEAR] International Monetary Fund, Tanzania: Selected issues and statistical 
appendix (Washington D.C.: IMF, 1993 – 2005) [Available at: 
http://archivescatalog.imf.org/default.aspx] 
UG UNESCO 1983 UNESCO. Uganda: Education: recovery and reconstruction (Paris, 1983) 
UG WB EM 1982 World Bank. Uganda Country Economic Memorandum, Report No. 3773-
UG, (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1981) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
UG WB EM 1961 World Bank. The Economy of Uganda (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 
1961) [Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
UG WEB PER 1985 World Bank. Uganda: progress towards recovery and prospects for 
development (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1985) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
UG WB PER 1988 World Bank, Uganda: Towards Stabilization and Economic 
Recovery (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1988) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
UG WB PER 1991 World Bank, Public Choices for Private Initiatives: Prioritizing Public 
Expenditures for Sustainable and Equitable Growth in 
Uganda (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1991) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
UG WB PER 1993 World Bank, Uganda: Growing out of poverty, Report No. 11 380-UG 
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1993) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
UG WB PER 1995 World Bank, Uganda: The Challenge of Growth and Poverty 
Reduction (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1995) [Available at: 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
UG WB PER 2007 World Bank, Uganda: Fiscal Policy for Growth: Public Expenditure 
Review 2007, Vol. 2: Main Report (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2007) 
[Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
UG WB SSS PER 
1993 
Uganda: Social sector strategy, Vol I: The main report & Vol II annexes, 
Report No. 10765-UG (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1993) [Available 
at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/home] 
UG ODAET 1990 Cooper F. Odaet, “Implementing education policies in Uganda”, World 
Bank Discussion Paper (Washington D.C.:World Bank, 1990) 
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United Kingdom 
UK CENSUS 
2011 
Office for National Statistics. (2014). “2011 Census Microdata Individual 
Safeguarded Sample (Regional): England and Wales”. [data collection]. UK 
Data Service. SN: 7605, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-7605-1.  
UK FRS 2014/15 National Centre for Social Research and Office for National Statistics. Social 
and Vital Statistics Division Department for Work and Pensions, “Family 
Resources Survey, 2014-2015 [Computer File]” (Colchester, Essex: UK Data 
Archive, 2016), [http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-8013-1 ] 
UK LFS 1995 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. Central Survey Unit. Office 
for National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division, “Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey, April - June, 1995. [Data Collection]” (UK Data Service., 1995), 
doi:SN: 5876. [http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5876-1 ] 
UK LFS 2005 Office for National Statistics. Social and Vital Statistics Division and Northern 
Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. Central Survey Unit, ‘Quarterly Labour 
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Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], 2014) [http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-
SN-5427-2] 
UK BoE 2015 Bank of England, “Three Centuries of Macroeconomic Data, Version 2.3,” 
(2015) [Available at: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/threecenturies.aspx] 
 
United States of America 
USA CENSUS 
2010 
Minnesota Population Center. “United States 2010 Census” Integrated Public 
Use Microdata Series, International: Version 6.4 [dataset]. Minneapolis, MN: 
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